

V-Dem

VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY

Codebook

v16 - March 2026

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1 Explanatory Notes

1.1 New in Version 16 compared to Version 15

- **New indicators and Indices**
  - Other Indices Using V-Dem Data
    - Electoral Integrity Index (v2x_electoral_integrity)
    - Deliberative Democracy Stock (v2x_delibdem_stock)
    - Egalitarian Democracy Stock (v2x_egaldem_stock)
    - Electoral Democracy Stock (v2x_polyarchy_stock)
    - Liberal Democracy Stock (v2x_lidem_stock)
    - Participatory Democracy Stock (v2x_partipdem_stock)
  - External Variables
    - Cumulative Fatalities (Best Estimates) in Organized Violence (e_ovctd)
    - Existence of Organized Violence (e_ovexist)
- **Other new or modified information**
  - Changes to the Measurement Model
    - We have changed the prior distribution for universal thresholds γ_μ^k in the V-Dem measurement model from a uniform distribution (*U(-6,6)*) to a normal distribution (*N(0,6)*). We found that the uniform priors were too restrictive and often too uninformative within their bounds to identify unique stationary distributions. After extensive analyses, we found that relatively wide normal distibutions provide roughly identical point and uncertainty estimates for latent country-year values as models that use uniform distributions, and tend to converge at a higher rate. Nevertheless, data sparsity still creates diffculties for the identification of a unique stationary distribution for some variables. See Pemstein et al. (2026) for further information about the V-Dem Measurement Model.
  - Regimes Survey
    - The Regimes survey was not updated in v15, but has been updated in v16. Regime variables now have data up to 2025.
  - Coder-level Datasets
    - The coder-level datasets have been re-uploaded, and coder_ids have been changed. Coder_ids remain comparable across coder-level dataset versions.

For more details on changes to previous versions of the dataset, please see Appendix E or the specific version of the codebook. All previous codebook versions are available at `https://www.v-dem.net/data/dataset-archive/`.

1.2 Cautionary Notes

V-Dem is firmly committed to full transparency and release of our data. Therefore, we do ask users to take the following cautions into consideration when using our data.

- The *V-Dem measurement model*, which we use to aggregate expert-coded data, assumes that each country-year-variable has five or more coders. For a few country-year-variables – and especially in the context of countries with a small population – it has been impossible to achieve this target. Country-year-variable combinations with fewer than five expert coders are more likely to show substantial changes in their point estimates than countries with five or more coders, since individual expert changes have more weight in these contexts. Unfortunately, these changes may be more extreme than the actual changes in the latent concept the variable is intended to measure. We therefore strongly advise against using point estimates for country-year-variable combinations with three or fewer coders. To allow users to filter these observations out of the dataset we provide a variable with the suffix "_nr" (number of raters/coders), which provides the count of experts for each country-year-variable combination.

  - We have already removed observations for *Exclusion* and *Legitimation* indicators (section 3.14 and section 3.15) with less than three coders per country-date (*_nr < 3). Furthermore, we have removed observations in *Exclusion indices* (section 5.6) where less than three component country-year-variables had three or more coders.
  - We have removed observations for *Civic and Academic Space* indicators (section 3.16) with less than 3 coders per country-date (*_nr < 3).

- Point estimates can jump around slightly across iterations of the dataset due to the simulation-based nature of the estimation process and expert turnover. Consumers of the data should therefore always be attentive to the uncertainty about the estimates. Indeed, this uncertainty provides vital information about the degree to which one can be certain that a change in a score reflects an actual change in the level of the concept being measured.

- We advise caution when using variables that had convergence issues. Please see individual codebook entries for additional information. For details on interpreting convergence information, please refer to *Variable Entry Clarifications* (section 1.4.5), the Methodology Document, and Pemstein et al. (2026).

  - The following variables had issues with convergence in v16:
    v2caautmob, v2caconmob, v2caviol, v2cltrnslw, v2csgender, v2dlencmps, v2eldonate, v2elpaidig, v2elpdcamp, v2elpubfin, v2elrgstry, v2exdjcbhg, v2exdjdshg, v2peedueq, v2pepwrses, v2pscohesv, v2psprlnks, v2regoppgroupssize, v2smforads, v2smonper, v2x_cspart, v2xeg_eqaccess, v2xeg_eqdr.

- We do not account for variation in expert reliability or scale perception when estimating values for percentage variables. As a result, expert error such as miscoding can result in substantial changes to the estimates of these variables irrespective of actual changes in the constructs they represent. We therefore recommend that users exercise caution when interpreting the three percentage variables:

  - Female journalists (v2mefemjrn)
  - State authority over territory (v2svstterr)
  - Weaker civil liberties population (v2clsnlpct)

- We constantly improve the coding of factual data (A) to make it as accurate as possible. This may result in changes at the index-level.

- *Historical V-Dem:* We advise users to exercise caution before running analysis on the time series extending across both the historical and contemporary coding periods. Specifically, we note an issue with Historical V-Dem A-type variables. In the historical part of the time series, one or more coders conducted the historical part of the time series independently of the existing coding in the V-Dem dataset. This practice extended to the overlap period with the contemporary V-Dem time series (typically 1900-1920).

  For many of these historical variables, we have checked the consistency of the coding, further scrutinized the sources, and determined which coding represents the most appropriate score after deliberation. We have subsequently made the appropriate adjustments to the data. For other historical A variables we have yet to finalize this process. For these variables, the scores reported for the overlap period in the dataset are the contemporary V-Dem scores by default. This coding decision means that in the case of countries where there is disagreement between the historical and contemporary coding in the starting year for the contemporary time series (typically 1900) [1], there may be artificial changes between that year and the year before that do not necessarily reflect a real-world change in the political system in the country.

  Please also note that for the variables where there is not full correspondence between the historical (1789-1920) and contemporary (1900-2025) coding, we also provide the historical coding of the variables in their original form as separate variables, carrying a "v3" rather than a "v2" prefix on the variable tag. These "v3" variables can be found in a separate section of the codebook.

[1] For more information on the coding years coverage for each country, see the V-Dem *Country Coding Unit* document.

1.3 Suggested Citation

Nota bene: If a variable drawn from the V-Dem dataset plays an important role in your project (published or unpublished), please use the applicable citations below:

- **V-Dem Dataset:**
  Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Linnea Fox, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Marcus Tannenberg, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2026. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v16" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. `https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds26`.

  and:

  Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2026. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 11th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

- **V-Dem Codebook:**
  Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Linnea Fox, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Anja Neundorf, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Marcus Tannenberg, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2026. "V-Dem Codebook v16" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Methodology:**
  Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Juraj Medzihorsky, Daniel Pemstein, Linnea Fox, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Steven Wilson. 2026. "V-Dem Methodology v16" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Country Coding Units:**
  Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Ana Good God, and Steven Wilson. 2026. "V-Dem Country Coding Units v16" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Organization and Management:**
  Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Susanna Burmeister, Saga Cambon, Linnea Fox, Moosa Ghaeb, Ana Good God, Sara Haug Andersson, Maria Verkhovtseva, and Steven Wilson. 2026. "V-Dem Organization and Management v16" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

1.4 Variable Information

1.4.1 Variable Types

The V-Dem Codebook divides variables into the following variable types:

- **Type A*: Variables coded by Project Managers and Research Assistants**
  This data is based on existing sources and is factual in nature. Country Experts indicate their confidence for this pre-coded data.
- **Type A: Variables coded by Project Managers and Research Assistants**
  This data is based on existing sources and is factual in nature.
- **Type B: Converted into type A or type C variables**
  Type B variables were coded by Country Coordinators or Research Assistants. The coder was typically a graduate student or recent graduate from the country in question.
- **Type C: Variables coded by Country Experts**
  A Country Expert is typically a scholar or professional with deep knowledge of a country and of a particular political institution. Furthermore, the expert is usually a citizen or resident of the country. Multiple experts (usually 5 or more) code each variable. More information about the Country Experts can be found in the *V-Dem Methodology* document.
- **Type A,C: Variables coded by Country Experts and crosschecked by Research Assistants**
  These variables are based on expert-generated data which, due to their factual nature, are in a second stage processed by a research assistant for quality control.
- **Type D: Indices**
  Variables composed of type A, or C variables. This data may be accomplished by adding a denominator (*e.g.*, per capita), by creating a cumulative scale, or by aggregating larger concepts (*e.g.*, components or indices of democracy).
- **Type E: Non-V-Dem variables**
  If we import a variable from another source without doing any original coding, except for perhaps imputing missing data, it is not considered a V-Dem product. These variables are found in the sections of the Codebook labeled *Background Factors* and *Other Democracy Indices and Indicators*. If, however, we gather data from a number of sources and combine them in a more than purely mechanical fashion (requiring some judgment on our part), we regard this as a V-Dem product and classify it as type A, or C.

1.4.2 Number of Variables

Variable Type	A*/A	C	D	E	PSQ	Total
V-Dem Democracy Indices and Indicators						
High-level Democracy Indices			5			5
Mid-level Democracy Indices			21			21
Indices created using V-Dem data	3		64			67
Elections	54	25	4			83
Political Parties		13				13
Direct Democracy	38					38
The Executive	21	26	4			51
Regime	4	12	2			18
The Legislature	16	14	2			32
Deliberation		7				7
The Judiciary	5	11				16
Civil Liberty		24				24
Sovereignty/State	1	8				9
Civil Society		10				10
The Media		10				10
Political Equality	3	6				9
Exclusion		24				24
Civic and Academic Space	4	17				21
Historical V-Dem	84	29				113
Coder Comments		18				18
Post Survey Questionnaire					50	50
Total	233	254	102		50	639
Other Democracy Indices and Indicators						
Party Systems			12			12
Digital Society Survey		37				37
V-Indoctrination		28	13			41
Ordinal version of the V-Dem indices			42			42
Political Regimes				4		4
Freedom House				4		4
World Bank Governance Indicators				6		6
Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy				1		1
Unified Democracy Score				1		1
Political Institutions and Events				2		2
Polity 5				5		5
Others				4		4
Total		65	67	27		159
Background Factors						
Education				2		2
Geography				5		5
Economics				6		6
Natural resource wealth				3		3
Infrastructure				1		1
Demography				9		9
Conflict				7		7
Total				33		33
Total	233	319	169	60	50	831

1.4.3 Variable Versions and Suffixes

The V-Dem Dataset contains several versions of the variables coded by country experts (type C variables).

- **Model Estimates**
  "Model Estimates" — Measurement Model Output:
  This version has no special suffix (*e.g.* v2elmulpar). This version of the variables provides country-year (country-date in the alternative dataset) point estimates from the V-Dem measurement model (see Pemstein et al. (2026)). The measurement model aggregates the ratings provided by multiple country experts and, taking disagreement and measurement error into account, produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale (see the *V-Dem Methodology* document). The point estimates are the median values of these distributions for each country-year. The scale of a measurement model variable is similar to a normal ("Z") score (*e.g.* typically between -5 and 5, with 0 approximately representing the mean for all country-years in the sample) though it does not necessarily follow a normal distribution. To aid interpretation, the codebook entries for "C" variables report the approximate ranges of the continuous scores that correspond to each of the survey scale scores. For most purposes, these are the preferred versions of the variables for time series regression and other estimation strategies.

  "Model Estimates Measure of Uncertainty" — Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density (HPD) Intervals:
  This version has the suffixes: "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_codelow and v2elmulpar_codehigh). These two kinds of variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, v2elmulpar_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals. For further explanation, see the "Comparison of Model Estimates, Original Scale, and Ordinal Scale" section below.

- **Original Scale (*_osp)**
  "Original Scale" — Linearized Original Scale Posterior Prediction:
  This version has the suffix "_osp," (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_osp). In this version of the variables, we have linearly translated the measurement model point estimates back to the original ordinal scale of each variable (*e.g.* 0-4 for v2elmulpar_osp) as an interval measure. The decimals in the _osp version roughly indicate the distance between the point estimate from the linearized measurement model posterior prediction and the threshold for reaching the next level on the original ordinal scale. Thus, a _osp value of 1.25 indicates that the median measurement model posterior predicted value was closer to the ordinal value of 1 than 2 on the original scale. Technically, it calculates the sum of the posterior probabilities that the estimate is in a particular category: If a particular country-year-variable has a probability of 90% to be in category "4", a 10% probability of being in category "3", and 0% probability of being in categories "2", "1", and "0", the result is a value of 3.9 ($4 * 0.9 + 3 * 0.1 = 3.6 + 0.3$). Since there is no conventional theoretical justification for linearly mapping ordinal posterior predictions onto an interval scale, these scores should primarily be used for heuristic purposes. Using the "Ordinal Scale" estimates—or incorporating the properties of ordinal probit models into the estimation procedure—is thus preferable to using the _osp estimates in statistical analyses. However, since the _osp version maps onto the coding criteria found in the V-Dem Codebook, and is strongly correlated with the Measurement Model output (typically at .98 or higher), some users may find the _osp version useful in estimating quantities such as marginal effects with a clear substantive interpretation. If a user uses _osp data in statistical analyses it is imperative that they confirm that the results are compatible with estimations using Measurement Model output.

  "Original Scale Measure of Uncertainty" — Linearized Original Scale HPD Intervals:
  This version has the suffixes "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_osp_codelow and

v2elmulpar_osp_codehigh). We estimate these quantities in a similar manner as the Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density Intervals. These two variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 70 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, v2elmulpar_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals. For further explanation, see the "Comparison of Model Estimates, Original Scale, and Ordinal Scale" section below.

- **Ordinal Scale (*_ord)**
  "Ordinal Scale" — Measurement Model Estimates of Original Scale Value:
  This version has the suffix "_ord" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_ord). This method translates the measurement model estimates back to the original ordinal scale of a variable (as represented in the Codebook) after taking coder disagreement and measurement error into account. More precisely, it represents the most likely ordinal value on the original codebook scale into which a country-year would fall, given the average coder's usage of that scale. More specifically, we assign each country-year a value that corresponds to its integerized median ordinal highest posterior probability category over Measurement Model output.

  "Ordinal Scale Measure of Uncertainty" — Original Scale Value HPD Intervals:
  This version has the suffixes - "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_ord_codelow and v2elmulpar_ord_codehigh). We estimate these values in a similar manner as the Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density Intervals. These two variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 70 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals. For further explanation, see the "Comparison of Model Estimates, Original Scale, and Ordinal Scale" section below.

- **Comparison of Model Estimates, Original Scale, and Ordinal Scale**
  Each of these versions of the data emphasizes a different aspect of the same underlying estimates. The measurement model direct output "Model Estimates" prioritize measuring concepts on an equal-interval scale so that, for example, an increase from -2.7 to -1.7 is a change in magnitude that is equivalent to an increase from 0.7 to 1.7: both are an increase of one point. The same goes for the Bayesian confidence intervals that accompany each variable. Interval-level measurement makes this version the only one that is, strictly speaking, appropriate for analyses such as ordinary regression that are designed for continuous variables. The downside is that the scale of the measurement model is different from the scale used in the codebook and translating from the "Model Estimates" to codebook values must be done on an indicator-by-indicator basis. It is can be difficult to substantively interpret "Model Estimates," or marginal effects based on these estimates, in terms of the codebook scale. Therefore, we include ranges which show how on average measurement model point estimates map onto the ordinal scale for each variable codebook entry.

  The "Original Scale" (_osp) versions rescale the "Model Estimates" to cover the range of the discrete original scale scores in the codebook (commonly 0 to 3, 4, or 5) in order to make it easier for users to see where the continuous scores are located on the category definitions in the codebook; be able to make descriptive analyses that are interpretable in substantive terms; and supplement repression-type analyses with substantive interpretations and estimates. However, a consequence is that these estimates distort the intervals to some extent (varying between variables). Despite the very high correlation between the measurement model version and the original scale version, a unit change at one range of the scale is not strictly equivalent to a unit change at a different range. For most variables, the original scale version is a non-linear S-curve transformation of the measurement model estimates because the *_osp transformation tends to expand the intervals close to the median and shrink the

intervals at the extremes. The confidence intervals are similarly distorted. There also tend to be a very small number of cases that deviate minutely from this pattern. The shape of the S-curve varies somewhat across variables. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship using the "Party ban" variable.

Figure 1: Comparison of original scale and equal-interval measurement model estimates for Party ban (all countries, 1900-2025)



Note: Diagonal line shows what the linear relationship would be.

The "Ordinal Scale" version of the variables favors a one-to-one correspondence between the codebook definitions and ordinal-level scores, by converting continuous score into the most likely (highest posterior density) ordinal codebook value. This conversion offers a categorical interpretation for each data point. However, it does so by omitting the degrees of variation found in the model estimates and the original scale version. Figure 2 clarifies the relationship between the ordinal version and model estimates using the example of Barriers to political parties (v2psbars). Clearly each ordinal category corresponds to a range of continuous values, and some continuous values fall entirely outside of the categories. Observations that are at the low end of category 2 may be more similar to those at the high end of category 1 than they are to those at the high end of category 2. The thresholds come from estimates in the measurement model but are somewhat poorly identified (i.e. there is a relatively high degree of uncertainty around them), and there is therefore not always a perfect correspondence between the continuous ranges and ordinal categories. For instance, some observations that are assigned to category 1 have continuous scores in the same range as most of the scores in category 2, and so on. The confidence bounds for the ordinal scores are similarly discrete, typically one point above or below the score, although sometimes they are the same as the score.

Figure 2: Comparison of ordinal scale and equal-interval measurement model estimates for Barriers to political parties (all countries, 1900-2025)



Note: Vertical bars added to suggest thresholds between categories.

The relationships are similar between the original scale and ordinal scale versions, as shown in Figure 3, although they suggest that the most natural thresholds between ordinal scores are not necessarily midway between them.

Figure 3: Comparison of original scale and equal-interval measurement model estimates for Barriers to political parties (all countries, 1900-2025)



Note: Vertical bars added to suggest thresholds between categories.

No single version of our C variables captures all the relevant information – an equal-interval continuous score and the corresponding ordinal score that is easily interpreted. However, this information is displayed in the variable-specific line graphs on the *V-Dem website*. As shown in the example in Figure 4, this visualization plots the equal-interval measurement model estimates (with their corresponding 68 percent Bayesian confidence intervals) for Egypt by

year, on horizontal gridlines that divide the ranges that correspond to the ordinal scores, which are the y-axis labels. Note that the intervals between thresholds vary in size; this reflects the fact that the distance between a 3 and a 4 is greater than the distance between a 1 and 2, while unit changes are comparable along all values on the scale. The gridlines are approximations that sometimes do not have a one-to-one relationship with the measurement model estimates, but they are the same thresholds (specifically, the average global thresholds used in the measurement model) that are used to calculate the ordinal and original scale versions of the data.

Figure 4: Estimates for Party Ban (v2psparban_osp) in Egypt (1900-2025)



- **Number of Coders per Country, Variable and Year/Date (*_nr)**
  The number of V-Dem Country Experts (regular coders, bridge- and lateral coders) who provided data on country, variable and year. V-Dem's methodology is based on the assumption that we have a minimum of five Country Experts for every single country-variable-year. Sometimes, however, we end up with fewer than five Country Experts. From v7 of the Country-Year, and the Country-Date type datasets, we provide all data we have for full transparency. By providing the number of Country Experts for each country-variable-year/date, we suggest that users primarily base analyses on observations based on five or more coders. We strongly advise against using observations based on three or fewer coders. This concerns all C type variables.

- **Arithmetic Mean of Coder Answers per Country-Year (*_mean)**
  It is commonplace to aggregate respondents' data to the level of country or country-year using arithmetic mean in order to merge it with other country-level data. V-Dem Institute provides such variables for every expert-coded variable aggregated by the Measurement Model in Country-Date/Year dataset.

1.4.4 Variable Tags

Every variable has a name and a tag. The tag consists of three or four parts and has the following structure:

Prefix + Index (if V-Dem index) + Section + Abbreviated title

While the prefix specifies the variable type, the letters that follow indicate which section the variable belongs to.

Prefixes

- v2: V-Dem variables (A, B, C)
- v3: Historical V-Dem only variables (A, B, C)
- v2x_: Main indices and component-indices
- v2x[two-letter designation]_: Indices specific for certain areas (see below). For example, v2xel_ would be an index in the election-specific area. Sometimes used in aggregations of higher-level indices (*i.e.* v2x_ type indices D)
- e_: Non-V-Dem variables (E) and ordinal versions of V-Dem indices.

Sections

- ca: Civic and academic space
- cl: Civil liberty
- dd: Direct democracy
- de: Demography
- dl: Deliberation
- el: Elections
- ex: Executive
- exl: Legitimation
- ju: Judiciary
- lg: Legislature
- me: Media
- pe: Political equality
- ps: Political parties
- reg: Regime
- sv/st: Sovereignty/State
- x: Index (calculated from variables that are also included in the dataset)
- zz: Post survey questionnaire

1.4.5 Variable Entry Clarifications

The following information is available per variable (if applicable):

Project Manager: The team member(s) primarily responsible for designing the indicator/index, and in some cases responsible for the data collection.

Additional versions: Indicates if the variable is also available in the following versions; *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean and/or *_nr. Detailed information about the different versions can be found in section 1.4.3 (*Variable Versions and Suffixes*).

Available versions: Lists the available variable types (Only applicable for ordinalized versions of indices).

Question: The question that the variable attempts to measure.

Clarification: Definition of key terms, clarification of scope-conditions, contexts, and any other features needed to understand the question (if any). All key terms appear in the Glossary (*Appendix B*), unless they are specific to a single section (in which case they only appear in the introduction to that section or in the clarifications for particular questions). Key terms are sometimes cross-referenced with hypertext.

Responses: Numeric, Percentage, Text, Date, Countries, or specific response categories (listed below under "Answer-types" and "Scales").

Answer-Types:
Multiple-choice: Where a coder can select only one answer. This is the usual protocol and is therefore not noted.
Multiple-selection: Where a coder can select more than one answer. For most multiple-selection variables, the dataset contains both the original variable as well as a set of dummies for each of the responses.

Ordering (only applicable to a selection of C variables): This relates to the ordering of questions when the coding of one indicator depends upon the coding of other indicators (*i.e.*, whenever there is some alteration of the serial ordering of questions as listed in this document).

Aggregation (only applicable to indices): Explanation of how an index is constructed.

Scale: Dichotomous, Nominal, Ordinal, or Interval/Ratio (Extra response options such as N/A or Other, are not counted as part of this classification).

Cross-Coder Aggregation (only applicable to C variables): IRT, Bayesian ordinal item response theory measurement model (see the *V-Dem Methodology* document). Available in mode and mean.

Data releases: Indicates dataset version (1-15). Versions respond to changes to the dataset for V-Dem variables (A, B, C, D), including new variables, new indices, corrections to existing variables, and new iterations of the measurement model. Changes are synchronized with Codebook and Methodology documents so that they all share the same version number. The second number (after the decimal point), refers to sub-versions of the data.

Releases to date:
Version 1-4 were only internal releases, thus not publicly available.
v1: March 31, 2014
v2: September 11, 2014
v3: December 17, 2014
v4: March 31, 2015

Version 5-15 are publicly available free of charge.
v5: January 4, 2016 (first public release of data for download)
v6: March 31, 2016
v6.2: June 2016
v7: May 2017
v7.1: July 2017
v8: April 2018
v9: April 2019
v10: March 2020
v11: March 2021
v11.1: March 2021
v12: March 2022
v13: March 2023
v14: March 2024
v15: March 2025
v16: March 2026

Sources: Citations for type-A* and A variables are listed, wherever possible, with complete references in the *Bibliography*. Note that this coding sometimes rests on numerous country-specific sources, in which case it has not been possible to include all citations. Composite indices (type-D) build on other variables in the V-Dem database, which are therefore listed as the source for that index.

Date specific: Specifies if observations are coded on specific dates only e.g. election dates.

Cleaning: Specifies if observations are set to missing based on values from other variables.

Citation: Suggested citation when using the specific variable.

Convergence: V-Dem assesses convergence among expert-coded variables using the Gelman-Rubin Diagnostic. Specifically, we consider a variable to have converged if no more than 5% of parameters in each of the relevant parameter sets (universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds, expert thresholds, expert reliability, and country-date latent trait estimates) has $\widehat{R} \geq 1.01$. We assess BFA convergence in a similar manner across relevant model parameter sets (intercept, slope, measurement standard error, and country-date latent trait estimates), but using $\widehat{R} \geq 1.1$. We provide convergence information for a given variable only if a set of model parameters did not converge, reporting these set(s). Note that if country-date latent trait estimates converged (i.e. we do not mention them in the convergence details) it means that the convergence issues likely reflect a problem with model parameter identification, and the latent trait estimates are relatively safe.

Years: Available coverage for the respective variable. For more information on country-specific year coverage, see *the country table*.

Note: Additional information about the variable.

1.5 Notes on Methodology

1.5.1 Index Aggregation

The V-Dem conceptual scheme recognizes several levels of aggregation. The table below shows the structure of aggregation for one of our high-level indices: The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index. This index consists of five sub-components (each of these sub-components being indices themselves built from a number of indicators) that together capture Dahl's seven institutions of polyarchy: freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, and freedom of expression and alternative sources of information.
Appendix A includes a table with a complete hierarchy of our democracy indices, democracy component indices, democracy sub- component indices, and indicators, as well as the hierarchy of related concept indices.

Note: High-level indices which have components that are calculated using the measurement model and/or Bayesian factor analysis use the posterior samples of these components for calculating index scores and confidence intervals (68% highest posterior density intervals).

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Index Name	Lower-Level Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Electoral democracy index				v2x_polyarchy	
	Additive polyarchy index			v2x_api	
	Multiplicative polyarchy index			v2x_mpi	
		Elected officials index**		v2x_elecoff	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber	v2exapup	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval	v2exapupap	
			HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
			HOG appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdjcbhg	
			HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
			HOG directly elected	v2ex_elechog	
			HOG dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdshg	
			HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
			HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
			HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
			HOS appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdfcbhs	
			HOS directly elected	v2ex_elechos	
			HOS dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdmhs	
			HOS selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphos	
			Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
			Legislature directly elected	v2xex_elecleg	
			Lower chamber elected	v2lgello	
			Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber	v2lginello	
			Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber	v2lginelup	
			Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
			Upper chamber elected	v2lgelecup	
		Clean elections index		v2xel_frefair	
			EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	0.484
			EMB capacity	v2elembcap	0.529
			Election free and fair	v2elfrfair	0.304
			Election government intimidation	v2elintim	0.348
			Election other electoral violence	v2elpeace	0.640
			Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg	0.325
			Election voter registry	v2elrgstry	0.433
			Election vote buying	v2elvotbuy	0.554
			Electoral Regime Index	v2x_elecreg	
		Freedom of expression and alternative sources of information index		v2x_freexp_altinf	
			Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	0.355
			Freedom of discussion	v2xcl_disc	0.290
			Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm	0.334
			Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	0.351
			Media bias	v2mebias	0.313
			Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	0.331
			Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	0.291
			Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	0.311
		Freedom of association index (thick)		v2x_frassoc_thick	
			Barriers to parties	v2psbars	0.285
			CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.385
			CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.452
			Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar	0.043
			Electoral Regime Index	v2x_elecreg	
			Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	0.023
			Party ban	v2psparban	0.422
		Share of population with suffrage		v2x_suffr	
			Percent of population with suffrage	v2elsuffrage	

*Unmodeled Variance. Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.

1.5.2 Country–Year Aggregation

C-variables, ratio/percentage variables, and High-Level/Mid-Level Democracy indices are aggregated from the country-date level to the country-year level by the day-weighted mean. Ordinal versions of C-variables are aggregated to the country-year level by taking the last observation in the year. Ordinal A-variables and A*-variables are aggregated by taking the last observation in the year with one exception: event-specific dichotomies or event-specific ordinal variables, which mostly concerns elections or election related data, are aggregated by max (meaning the highest observed value for a given year is retained) to reflect that an "event" of the coded type occurred within the year.

1.5.3 Open source code

Since version 11 of the V-Dem dataset we have released the code that is used for creating the V-Dem datasets to the public at `https://github.com/vdeminstitute/dataset_construction`.

1.6 Country Units

The following table contains all country units (and their year coverage) that are included in the V-Dem Dataset. Some countries are coded prior to independence, and some have gaps in their coding periods. For a more detailed description of the country units and their year coverage please consult the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

Name	ID	Coverage	Name	ID	Coverage
Afghanistan	36	1789–2025	Egypt	13	1789–2025
Albania	12	1912–2025	El Salvador	22	1838–2025
Algeria	103	1900–2025	Equatorial Guinea	160	1900–2025
Angola	104	1900–2025	Eritrea	115	1900–2025
Argentina	37	1789–2025	Estonia	161	1918–2025
Armenia	105	1990–2025	Eswatini	132	1900–2025
Australia	67	1789–2025	Ethiopia	38	1789–2025
Austria	144	1789–2025	Fiji	162	1900–2025
Azerbaijan	106	1990–2025	Finland	163	1809–2025
Baden	349	1789–1871	France	76	1789–2025
Bahrain	146	1900–2025	Gabon	116	1910–2025
Bangladesh	24	1971–2025	Georgia	118	1990–2025
Barbados	147	1900–2025	German Democratic Republic	137	1949–1990
Bavaria	350	1789–1871	Germany	77	1789–2025
Belarus	107	1990–2025	Ghana	7	1902–2025
Belgium	148	1789–2025	Greece	164	1822–2025
Benin	52	1900–2025	Guatemala	78	1789–2025
Bhutan	53	1900–2025	Guinea	63	1900–2025
Bolivia	25	1825–2025	Guinea-Bissau	119	1900–2025
Bosnia and Herzegovina	150	1992–2025	Guyana	166	1900–2025
Botswana	68	1900–2025	Haiti	26	1789–2025
Brazil	19	1789–2025	Hamburg	362	1789–1867
Brunswick	363	1789–1867	Hanover	357	1789–1866
Bulgaria	152	1878–2025	Hesse-Darmstadt	359	1789–1866
Burkina Faso	54	1919–2025	Hesse-Kassel	358	1789–1866
Burma/Myanmar	10	1789–2025	Honduras	27	1838–2025
Burundi	69	1916–2025	Hong Kong	167	1900–2025
Cambodia	55	1900–2025	Hungary	210	1789–2025
Cameroon	108	1961–2025	Iceland	168	1900–2025
Canada	66	1841–2025	India	39	1789–2025
Cape Verde	70	1900–2025	Indonesia	56	1800–2025
Central African Republic	71	1920–2025	Iran	79	1789–2025
Chad	109	1920–2025	Iraq	80	1920–2025
Chile	72	1789–2025	Ireland	81	1919–2025
China	110	1789–2025	Israel	169	1948–2025
Colombia	15	1789–2025	Italy	82	1861–2025
Comoros	153	1900–2025	Ivory Coast	64	1900–2025
Costa Rica	73	1838–2025	Jamaica	120	1900–2025
Croatia	154	1941–2025	Japan	9	1789–2025
Cuba	155	1789–2025	Jordan	83	1922–2025
Cyprus	156	1900–2025	Kazakhstan	121	1990–2025
Czechia	157	1918–2025	Kenya	40	1900–2025
Democratic Republic of the Congo	111	1900–2025	Kosovo	43	1999–2025
Denmark	158	1789–2025	Kuwait	171	1789–2025
Djibouti	113	1900–2025	Kyrgyzstan	122	1990–2025
Dominican Republic	114	1789–2025	Laos	123	1900–2025
Ecuador	75	1830–2025	Latvia	84	1920–2025

Name	ID	Coverage
Lebanon	44	1918–2025
Lesotho	85	1900–2025
Liberia	86	1821–2025
Libya	124	1789–2025
Lithuania	173	1918–2025
Luxembourg	174	1815–2025
Madagascar	125	1817–2025
Malawi	87	1900–2025
Malaysia	177	1900–2025
Maldives	88	1900–2025
Mali	28	1900–2025
Malta	178	1900–2025
Mauritania	65	1904–2025
Mauritius	180	1900–2025
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	360	1789–1867
Mexico	3	1789–2025
Modena	351	1789–1859
Moldova	126	1990–2025
Mongolia	89	1911–2025
Montenegro	183	1789–2025
Morocco	90	1789–2025
Mozambique	57	1900–2025
Namibia	127	1900–2025
Nassau	366	1806–1866
Nepal	58	1789–2025
Netherlands	91	1789–2025
New Zealand	185	1841–2025
Nicaragua	59	1838–2025
Niger	60	1922–2025
Nigeria	45	1914–2025
North Korea	41	1945–2025
North Macedonia	176	1991–2025
Norway	186	1789–2025
Oldenburg	364	1789–1867
Oman	187	1789–2025
Pakistan	29	1947–2025
Palestine/British Mandate	209	1918–1948
Palestine/Gaza	138	1948–2025
Palestine/West Bank	128	1948–2025
Panama	92	1903–2025
Papal States	361	1789–1870
Papua New Guinea	93	1900–2025
Paraguay	189	1811–2025
Parma	352	1789–1859
Peru	30	1789–2025
Philippines	46	1900–2025
Piedmont-Sardinia	373	1789–1861
Poland	17	1789–2025
Portugal	21	1789–2025
Qatar	94	1900–2025
Republic of the Congo	112	1903–2025
Republic of Vietnam	35	1802–1975
Romania	190	1789–2025
Russia	11	1789–2025
Rwanda	129	1916–2025
Sao Tome and Principe	196	1900–2025
Saudi Arabia	197	1789–2025
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach	365	1809–1867
Saxony	353	1789–1867
Senegal	31	1904–2025
Serbia	198	1804–2025
Seychelles	199	1903–2025
Sierra Leone	95	1900–2025
Singapore	200	1867–2025
Slovakia	201	1939–2025
Slovenia	202	1989–2025
Solomon Islands	203	1900–2025
Somalia	130	1900–2025
Somaliland	139	1900–2025
South Africa	8	1900–2025
South Korea	42	1789–2025
South Sudan	32	2011–2025
South Yemen	23	1900–1990
Spain	96	1789–2025
Sri Lanka	131	1900–2025
Sudan	33	1900–2025
Suriname	4	1900–2025
Sweden	5	1789–2025
Switzerland	6	1789–2025
Syria	97	1918–2025
Taiwan	48	1900–2025
Tajikistan	133	1990–2025
Tanzania	47	1914–2025
Thailand	49	1789–2025
The Gambia	117	1900–2025
Timor-Leste	74	1900–2025
Togo	134	1916–2025
Trinidad and Tobago	135	1900–2025
Tunisia	98	1789–2025
Türkiye	99	1789–2025
Turkmenistan	136	1990–2025
Tuscany	354	1789–1861
Two Sicilies	356	1789–1860
Uganda	50	1900–2025
Ukraine	100	1990–2025
United Arab Emirates	207	1971–2025
United Kingdom	101	1789–2025
United States of America	20	1789–2025
Uruguay	102	1825–2025
Uzbekistan	140	1789–2025
Vanuatu	206	1906–2025
Venezuela	51	1789–2025
Vietnam	34	1945–2025
Würtemberg	355	1789–1871
Yemen	14	1789–2025
Zambia	61	1911–2025
Zanzibar	236	1856–2025
Zimbabwe	62	1900–2025
.	.	.
Total number of countries	**202**	

1.7 Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets

1.7.1 Country Name (country_name)

Name of coded country. A V-Dem country is a political unit enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For more details on country units consult the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

Response: Text.

1.7.2 Time-Specific Country Name (histname)

Time-specific name of coded country. Many countries go by different names in different time-periods, for example due to name changes, changes in territory, colonization, occupation, or independence. This variable contains a brief description of the identity of each polity that comprises a country's history. This variable is based on the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

Response: Text.

1.7.3 V-Dem Country ID (country_id)

Unique country ID designated for each country. A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset can be found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

Response: Numeric.

1.7.4 Country Name Abbreviation (country_text_id)

Abbreviated country names.

Response: Text.

1.7.5 Year (year)

V-Dem year coded annually from 1789-2025. This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Year as well as Country Date datasets.

Response: Date.

1.7.6 Historical Date (historical_date)

This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Date dataset and the coder-level dataset. As of v13, December 31st as in 2022-12-31, is no longer the default date. When experts provide ratings in the online interface, the default date is still December 31st. However, in our data processing pipeline we add January 1st to all variables except election-date specific ones. This has the effect that December 31st is no longer representative of the full year. This variable also exists in the country-year dataset, but has no direct meaning in that context and should not be preferred over the year column.

Response: Date.

1.7.7 Start of Coding Period (codingstart)

V-Dem country coding starts in 1789, or from when a country first enjoyed at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For detailed information, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

Response: Date.

1.7.8 Contemporary Start of Coding Period (codingstart_contemp)

This variable indicates the coding start for the countries coded by Contemporary V-Dem.

Response: Date.

1.7.9 Historical Start of Coding Period (codingstart_hist)

This variable indicates the coding start for the countries coded by Historical V-Dem.
Response: Date.

1.7.10 Gap in Coding Period Starts (gapstart)

Time periods when a country does not fulfill V-Dem's coding period criteria are not coded. The date that indicates the gap start is the last date coded before the gap. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.
Response: Date.

1.7.11 Gap in Coding Period Ends (gapend)

The periods of when a country does not fulfill V-Dem's coding period criteria are not coded. The date that indicates the gap end is the first date coded after the gap. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.
Response: Date.

1.7.12 Gap index (gap_index)

An index for each country and continuous non-gap, i.e. it is reasonable for interpolation to interpolate only within the same gap index. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.
Response: Numeric.

1.7.13 End of Coding Period (codingend)

V-Dem country coding ends in 2025, or from when a country formally stopped enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For detailed information, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.
Response: Date.

1.7.14 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend_contemp)

This variable indicates when the coding ends for countries coded by the Contemporary V-Dem project.
Response: Date.

1.7.15 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend_hist)

This variable indicates when the coding ends for countries coded by the Historical V-Dem Project.
Response: Date.

1.7.16 V-Dem Project (project)

This variable indicates which V-Dem project coded that country-year: Contemporary V-Dem (0), Historical V-Dem (1), or both (2).

1.7.17 Historical V-Dem coding (historical)

This variable indicates if the Historical V-Dem project coded a country at any time: No (0), Yes (1).

1.7.18 COW Code (COWcode)

Correlates of War (COW) project country codes.
Response: Numeric.
Citation: Correlates of War Project (2017).

2 V-Dem Democracy Indices

2.1 V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level. Please see Appendix A for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

2.1.1 Electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_freexp_altinf v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

Data release: 1-16. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$
\begin{aligned}
v2x_polyarchy &= .5 * MPI + .5 * API \\
&= .5 * (v2x_elecoff * v2xel_frefair * v2x_frassoc_thick * \\
&\quad v2x_suffr * v2x_freexp_altinf) \\
&\quad + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair \\
&\quad + (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/8) * v2x_suffr \\
&\quad + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf)
\end{aligned}
$$

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Teorell et al. (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.1.2 Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_liberal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 1-16. Release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:
$v2x_libdem =$
$.25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x_liberal + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x_liberal$

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2015); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.1.3 Participatory democracy index (D) (v2x_partipdem)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_polyarchy v2x_partip

Data release: 1-16. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:
$v2x_partipdem =$
$.25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x_partip + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x_partip$

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2015); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.1.4 Deliberative democracy index (D) (v2x_delibdem)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the

common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 1-16. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:
$v2x_delibdem =$
$.25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2xdl_delib + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2xdl_delib$

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2015); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

2.1.5 Egalitarian democracy index (D) (v2x_egaldem)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 1-16. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:
$v2x_egaldem =$
$.25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x_egal + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x_egal$

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2015); Sigman & Lindberg (2015); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

2.2 V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices presented in section 2.1. Please see Appendix A for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

2.2.1 Additive polyarchy index (D) (v2x_api)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections.

This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_freexp_altinf

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr). The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively.
The index is aggregated using this formula:
$v2x_api = (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf + (1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/8) * v2x_suffr$

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Teorell et al. (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.2 Multiplicative polyarchy index (D) (v2x_mpi)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_freexp_altinf

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link. Specifically, the index is formed by multiplying indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr), or
v2x_mpi = v2x_frassoc_thick * v2xel_frefair * v2x_freexp_altinf * v2x_elecoff * v2x_suffr

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Teorell et al. (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.3 Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index (D) (v2x_freexp_altinf)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Clarification: This index includes all variables in the two indices v2x_freexp and v2xme_altinf.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl_disc v2clacfree v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

Data release: 4-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media bias (v2mebias), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.4 Freedom of association thick index (D) (v2x_frassoc_thick)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2x_elecreg

Data release: 1-16. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x_frassoc.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.5 Share of population with suffrage (D) (v2x_suffr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal *de jure* restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice *de facto*. The adult population as defined by statute is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence', estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc., secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the

conditions in similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elsuffrage

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: v2elsuffrage/100

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.6 Clean elections index (D) (v2xel_frefair)

Project Manager(s): Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are elections free and fair?

Clarification: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair v2x_elecreg

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), non-state electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg. If a country is recorded as an electoral regime (v2x_elecreg) at the beginning of the time series until the first election that we record, then the scores for this election are backfilled towards the beginning of the time series.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to 0 when v2x_elecreg is 0.

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.7 Elected officials index (D) (v2x_elecoff)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?

Clarification: This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected. Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, "appointment" by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): v2ex_elechos v2ex_elechog v2exdfcbhs_rec v2ex_hosw v2xex_elecleg v2lgbicam v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog v2exapupap v2exapup

Data release: 1-16. 1-3 preliminary aggregation formula, 4-6 as v2x_accex, 7 renamed to v2x_elecoff and modified aggregation, 8.

Aggregation: The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected ($a = 1$) or not ($a = 0$) (from v2ex_elechos). Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b). If the legislature is unicameral, b is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state ($c1 = 1$, otherwise 0). Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government ($c2 = 1$, otherwise 0). Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state ($d = 1$) or not ($d = 0$). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected ($e = 1$) or not ($e = 0$) (from v2ex_elechog).

In the second step, the extent to which the legislature is elected (b) is also independently taken into account in order to penalize presidential systems with unelected legislatures, or legislatures with a large share of presidential appointees, for example.

Define hosw as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government (*v2exhoshog = 1*, $hosw = 1$). If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then $hosw = 1$; if the reverse is true, $hosw = 0$. If they share equal power, $hosw = .5$. Define the weight for the head of government as $hogw = 1 - hosw$. The formula then is:

$$v2x_elecoff = hosw \times \max(a, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2),$$

unless the head of state is directly elected (*v2ex_elechos* = 1) and the chief executive (*v2ex_hosw* = 1), in case of which:

$$v2x_elecoff = [hosw \times \max(a, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2) + b]/2)$$

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.8 Liberal component index (D) (v2x_liberal)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xcl_rol v2x_jucon v2xlg_legcon v2lgbicam

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon). Prior to the calculation v2xlg_legcon gets set to 0 whenever v2lgbicam is 0.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.9 Equality before the law and individual liberty index (D) (v2xcl_rol)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2xcl_acjst v2xcl_prpty v2cltort v2clkill v2xcl_slave v2clrelig v2clfmove v2xcl_dmove

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.10 Judicial constraints on the executive index (D) (v2x_jucon)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.11 Legislative constraints on the executive index (D) (v2xlg_legcon)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are the legislature and government agencies *e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.12 Participatory component index (D) (v2x_partip)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_cspart v2xdd_dd v2xel_locelec v2xel_regelec

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x_cspart), elected local government power (v2xel_locelec) or elected regional government power (v2xel_regelec) — whichever has higher score — and direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2015); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.13 Civil society participation index (D) (v2x_cspart)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

Clarification: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.
The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csprtcpt v2csgender

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection — national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women participation (v2csgender).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

2.2.14 Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_dd)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

Clarification: Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy at the national level. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmci v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmrf v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyrpl v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror v2ddthreor v2ddthrerf v2ddthrepl v2ddthreci

Data release: 1-16. New aggregation formula in version 7.

Aggregation: This index results from the addition of the weighted scores of each type of popular votes studied (popular initiatives ×1.5, referendums ×1.5, plebiscites, and obligatory referendums). Each type of popular vote receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of two terms (easiness of initiation and easiness of approval), where each term obtains a maximum value of one. As we are studying four types of popular votes, the minimum value is 0, and the maximum is 8. In the v2xdd_dd all scores are normalized to range between 0 and 1. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see: Altman, David. 2017.
The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_dd = (v2xdd_i_ci) \times 1.5 + (v2xdd_i_rf) \times 1.5$$

$$+ (v2xdd_i_pl) + (v2xdd_i_or)$$

Regarding each type of citizen initiated popular vote (i.e., popular initiative), the ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlexci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigpci), and (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddsigdci). Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by (a) participation quorum (v2ddsigdci), (b) approval quorum (v2ddpartci), and (c) supermajority (v2ddspmci). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority (v2ddadmci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by

citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexci), and (b) the frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (v2ddthreci). The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$
\begin{aligned}
v2xdd_dd = [&(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - (v2ddsigpci)) \times (IF\ v2ddsigdci \\
&= 0, 1, .5 + (2 \times v2ddsigdci/365))+ \\
&(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmci)] \\
&\times (0.5 + ((100 - v2ddadmci)/100))/2] \\
&\times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 2, 1, IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, v2ddlexci = 0, 0) \\
&\times (IF\ \textit{years since last successful event} < 6, \\
&v2ddthreci = 1, \textit{afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year} \\
&\textit{until 0.1; if the event was not successful} \\
&\textit{during the first years v2ddapprci} \\
&= 0.9, \textit{afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1})
\end{aligned}
$$

In case the vote originates from above (i.e., authorities), there is no need to account for v2ddsigpci and v2ddsigdci. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, $(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmci)$, see Altman, David. 2017.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

2.2.15 Local government index (D) (v2xel_locelec)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr v2ellocgov

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.

This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel_locelec is set to 0 whenever v2ellocgov is 0 (there is no local government).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.16 Regional government index (D) (v2xel_regelec)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr v2elreggov

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.
This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel_regelec is set to 0 whenever v2elreggov is 0 (there is no regional government).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.17 Deliberative component index (D) (v2xdl_delib)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.
To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation

(v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2015); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

2.2.18 Egalitarian component index (D) (v2x_egal)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when (1) rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; (2) resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and (3) access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class and social group.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xeg_eqprotec v2xeg_eqaccess v2xeg_eqdr

Data release: 1-16. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula, 5-8 modified aggregation formula including v2xeg_eqaccess.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equal protection index (v2xeg_eqprotec), equal access index (v2xeg_eqaccess) and equal distribution of resources (v2xeg_eqdr).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2015); Sigman & Lindberg (2015); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

2.2.19 Equal protection index (D) (v2xeg_eqprotec)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

Clarification: Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of another group or individual.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clsnlpct

Data release: 5-16. Release 7 modified excluding v2xcl_acjst.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp) and percent of population with weaker civil liberties (v2clsnlpct); reversed scale.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2015); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

2.2.20 Equal access index (D) (v2xeg_eqaccess)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How equal is access to power?

Clarification: The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal *de facto* capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2pepwrgen v2pepwrsoc v2pepwrses

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses), power distributed by social group (v2pepwrsoc), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

2.2.21 Equal distribution of resources index (D) (v2xeg_eqdr)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How equal is the distribution of resources?

Clarification: This component measures the extent to which resources — both tangible and intangible — are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services *i.e.* means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping "spheres", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth

Data release: 5, 7-16. Release 7 modified: v2pepwrses, v2pepwrsoc and v2pepwrgen now form a separate subcomponent index.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for particularistic or public goods v2dlencmps, means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies v2dlunivl, educational equality v2peedueq and health equality v2pehealth.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2015); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

3 V-Dem Indicators

This section lists all V-Dem variables by theme.

3.1 Elections

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Elections: Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

Non-election specific coding: The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

Election specific questions: The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

Election specific questions – Historical clarification: The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

Subnational elections and offices: This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

Lower chamber election: The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously *_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously *_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel_elecparl is 1.

3.1.1 General

3.1.1.1 Election type (A*) (v2eltype)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What type of election was held on this date?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

Responses:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_0]
1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_1]
2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_2] (Not yet coded)
3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_3] (Not yet coded)
4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_4]
5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_5]
6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_6]
7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_7]
8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_8] (Not yet coded)
9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_9] (Not yet coded)

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple selection.

Source(s): Hyde & Marinov (2012); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); Marshall & Gurr (2020); Keesing's Worldwide (n.d.); CIA (n.d.); International IDEA (2026c),

Notes: All direct elections and elections by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing an executive or members of parliament are coded. Note that single-party elections, elections held under limited suffrage and for only parts of a parliament, as well as elections of which the results are subsequently cancelled are included. Elections for constituent assemblies that come to perform functions beyond drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are also included and coded under category 0 and 1 (Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers; first or second round). Direct elections for prime minister (*e.g.* Israel in 1996-2001) are coded under category 6. Excluded are elections that are not decisive, i.e. when the HOS alone is selecting the candidate(s). The variable includes elections where results were declared invalid after the fact, *e.g.* by a constitutional court, since they also provide information on the quality of democracy.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.2 Suffrage

3.1.2.1 Suffrage (A) (v2asuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised adults older than the minimal voting age?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent.
This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x_elecreg), v2asuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.
The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent

countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Bilinski (2015); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Constitute Project (2026); v2x_elecreg.

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.2.2 Minimum voting age (A) (v2elage)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote in national elections?

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); Constitute Project (2026); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Flora (1983) Furtak (1990); Mackie & Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (2019); Paxton, Bollen, Lee & Kim (2003); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); International IDEA (2026c) and various country specific sources.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.2.3 Compulsory voting (A) (v2elcomvot)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.
2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.
3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); International IDEA (2026b); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.2.4 Female suffrage restricted (A) (v2elfemrst)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Are women eligible to vote in national elections?

Clarification: If there are no (direct) national elections, observations are not coded (missing).

Responses:

0: No female suffrage. No women are allowed to vote, but some or all males vote.
1: Restricted female suffrage. Some women are allowed to vote, and face more or different restrictions than men
2: Universal female suffrage. All women are allowed to vote.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Paxton, Green & Hughes (2003); Paxton et al. (2025)

Data release: 1-6, 10-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.2.5 Suffrage level (A) (v2elgvsuflvl)

Project Manager(s): Megan Reif

Question: What is the level of suffrage practiced?

Clarification: Note that this question applies to citizens only. Note also that we are interested in legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). In cases where married people are allowed to vote at a younger age than single people, the higher (older) age minimum for single voters is given (see v2elage).

Responses:

0: Indirect suffrage and/or offices filled by appointment only
1: Propertied ethnic males
2: Ethnic males
3: Propertied/educated males
4: Ethnic males and females
5: Propertied/educated males and females
6: All males
7: Spatially variant
8: Universal
9: Occupational categories/Party membership
10: Only citizens of colonial metropole
11: Propertied/tax-paying colons and non-colons
12: Propertied males and military females
13: Propertied/landowning households
14: All households
15: All males and married females
16: Age differential: Married people vote at younger age than single

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Furtak (1990); Mackie & Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (2019); Constitute Project (2026); International IDEA (2026c) and various country specific sources.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.2.6 Percentage of population with suffrage (A) (v2elsuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.
Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage is only coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence'), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the conditions in similar countries or colonies.
The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International IDEA (2026c), country-specific sources.

Notes: In Version 3 of the dataset this variable was re-coded from scratch based on the modified criteria reflected in the clarification section (above).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.2.7 Fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?

Clarification: "Western monitors" refers to monitors from Western countries (as defined by OECD membership) or Western international organizations. Fraud allegations are not required to include the word "fraud". Other forms of electoral malpractice like vote-buying are considered forms of fraud for the purposes of this question, as are any allegations of significant manipulation that undermine the credibility of the electoral process. If there were no Western monitors, this variable is coded as missing.

Responses:
0: No/Unclear
1: Yes

Source(s): Hyde & Marinov (2012), reports by international election monitors.

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2025

3.1.2.8 Female suffrage (A) (v2fsuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised female adults older than the minimal voting age?

Clarification: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x_elecreg), v2fsuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Bilinski (2015); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Constitute Project (2026); v2x_elecreg.

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.2.9 Male suffrage (A) (v2msuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age?

Clarification: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x_elecreg), v2msuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Bilinski (2015); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Constitute Project (2026).

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.3 Election Qualities

3.1.3.1 Disclosure of campaign donations (C) (v2eldonate)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.69 to -0.76	0	No. There are no disclosure requirements.
-0.76 to 0.11	1	Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.
0.11 to 1.39	2	Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.
1.39 to 2.74	3	Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.
2.74 to 3.69	4	Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.1.3.2 Public campaign finance (C) (v2elpubfin)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.81 to -0.88	0	No. Public financing is not available.
-0.88 to -0.01	1	Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.
-0.01 to 0.88	2	Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.
0.88 to 1.99	3	Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.
1.99 to 3.62	4	Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.1.3.3 EMB autonomy (C) (v2elembaut)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.99 to -0.91	0	No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body.
-0.91 to -0.11	1	Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body.
-0.11 to 0.77	2	Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.
0.77 to 2.08	3	Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.
2.08 to 3.78	4	Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.4 EMB capacity (C) (v2elembcap)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?

Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.21 to -1.4	0	No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory.
-1.4 to -0.59	1	Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.
-0.59 to 0.18	2	Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB.
0.18 to 1.5	3	Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.
1.5 to 3.3	4	Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.5 Elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Was this national election multiparty?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.73 to -2.62	0	No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party).
-2.62 to -1.8	1	Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.
-1.8 to -0.93	2	Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally.
-0.93 to -0.25	3	Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.
-0.25 to 1.89	4	Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.6 Election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.08 to -2.82	0	No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.
-2.82 to -1.41	1	No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20 percent or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).
-1.41 to -0.31	2	Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.
-0.31 to 0.83	3	Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10 percent of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.
0.83 to 2.63	4	Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1 percent of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.1.3.7 Election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

Clarification: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e. "porkbarrel" legislation.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.12 to -2.01	0	Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.
-2.01 to -0.5	1	Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.
-0.5 to 0.27	2	Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.
0.27 to 1.42	3	Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.
1.42 to 3.27	4	None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.8 Election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

Clarification: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.23 to -1.62	0	Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.
-1.62 to -0.5	1	Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.
-0.5 to 0.31	2	Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.
0.31 to 1.4	3	Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.
1.4 to 2.89	4	None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.9 Election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.18 to -2.86	0	Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.
-2.86 to -1.55	1	Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.
-1.55 to -0.6	2	Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.
-0.6 to 0.45	3	Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.
0.45 to 2.63	4	None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.10 Election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.6 to -2.76	0	No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.
-2.76 to -1.58	1	Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.
-1.58 to -0.66	2	Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.
-0.66 to 0.41	3	Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.
0.41 to 2.45	4	Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.11 Election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

Clarification: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.68 to -3.77	0	Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.
-3.77 to -2.26	1	Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.
-2.26 to -1.38	2	Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.
-1.38 to -0.5	3	Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.
-0.5 to 1.8	4	Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.12 Election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.29 to -0.29	0	Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.
-0.29 to 0.93	1	Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.
0.93 to 2.93	2	All parties receive free access.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.3.13 Election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.9 to -1.15	0	Not at all.
-1.15 to 0.31	1	It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.
0.31 to 1.32	2	It is permitted without limit.
1.32 to 3.07	3	It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

3.1.3.14 Election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.49 to -0.46	0	Not at all.
-0.46 to 0.68	1	It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.
0.68 to 1.76	2	It is permitted without limit.
1.76 to 3.13	3	It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.1.3.15 Election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

Clarification: The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.46 to -2.21	0	No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).
-2.21 to -1.08	1	Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).
-1.08 to -0.26	2	Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).
-0.26 to 0.87	3	Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).
0.87 to 2.86	4	Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.3.16 Election domestic election monitors (A) (v2eldommon)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.3.17 Election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were international election monitors present?

Responses:
0: No/Unclear
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Hyde & Marinov (2012), reports by international election monitors.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.3.18 Election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were some international election monitors denied opportunity to be present by the government holding the election?

Responses:

0: No/Unclear
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Hyde & Marinov (2012), reports by international election monitors

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1915-2025

3.1.3.19 Monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it would not be free and fair?

Responses:

0: No/Unclear
1: Yes

Source(s): Hyde & Marinov (2012), websites of election monitors.

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1915-2025

3.1.3.20 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrstrct)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for national legislative office (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

Clarification: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

Responses:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.
1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Constitute Project (2026); ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.4 Election Outcomes

3.1.4.1 Election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.9 to -2.68	0	None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.
-2.68 to -1.53	1	A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.
-1.53 to -0.87	2	Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.
-0.87 to 0.14	3	Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.
0.14 to 2.1	4	All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.4.2 Election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-6.93 to -3.69	0	No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by unconstitutional means.
-3.69 to -2.43	1	Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.
-2.43 to 0.77	2	Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of "within 12 months of the election". In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.4.3 Election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

Responses:
Percent.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Hyde & Marinov (2012); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); International IDEA (2026b); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Notes: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different turnout for each election, the turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

Data release: 6-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.4.4 Election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of the adult voting-age population cast a vote according to official results?

Clarification: The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, it can occur that VAP values surpass 100 which is not an error but reflects such conditions.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): International IDEA (2026b) (VAP figures are estimates and should be treated as such).

Notes: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different VAP turnout for each election, the VAP turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The VAP turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1830-2025

3.1.4.5 Name of largest party (A) (v2lpname)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Based on seat share. If two parties have an equal amount of seats, vote share decides which of the two is larger. Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); Bederke et al. (2023), websites of National Election Commissions.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.4.6 Name of second largest party (A) (v2slpname)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the second largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Based on seat share. If two parties have an equal amount of seats, vote share decides which of the two is larger. Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); Bederke et al. (2023), websites of National Election Commissions.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.4.7 Name of third largest party (A) (v2tlpname)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the third largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Based on seat share. If two parties have an equal amount of seats, vote share decides which of the two is larger. Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); Bederke et al. (2023), websites of National Election Commissions.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1791-2025

3.1.5 Executive Elections Specifics

3.1.5.1 Presidential elections consecutive (D) (v2elprescons)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of presidential elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency.

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Presidential election dates (v2eltype_6, v2eltype_7)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.5.2 Presidential elections cumulative (D) (v2elprescumul)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of presidential elections, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency. However, if there is a presidency, and no elections have ever occurred, this should be recorded as 0.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Presidential election dates (v2eltype_6, v2eltype_7)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.5.3 HOG restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthog)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of government (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

Clarification: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

Responses:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (2026); International IDEA (2026c), national constitutions.

Data release: 4-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.5.4 HOS restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthos)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of state (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

Clarification: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

Responses:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.
1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Constitute Project (2026); International IDEA (2026c); ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (2026).

Data release: 4-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.5.5 Election HOG turnover ordinal (A) (v2elturnhog)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. If the HOS and HOG are the same person, the coding is the same for the two variables. The second round of election is coded as the first.

Responses:

0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG.
1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership.
2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999); International IDEA (2026b); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026), V-Dem country coordinators

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.5.6 Election HOS turnover ordinal (A) (v2elturnhos)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was there turnover in the office of the head of state (HOS) as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party.

Responses:

0: No. The head of state retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOS.

1: Half. The head of state is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected.

2: Yes. The head of state lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. This code also applies if this is the first head of state elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); International IDEA (2026b), V-Dem country coordinators.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.5.7 Election executive turnover ordinal (A) (v2eltvrexo)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. This question considers whether turnover occurs both in the office of head of state and head of government, even if one of the positions is not contested in the particular elections.

Responses:

0: No. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders — the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new

president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999); International IDEA (2026b); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.5.8 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotlrg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In the first (or only round) of this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the candidate eventually winning office?

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Presidential election dates (v2eltype_6, v2eltype_7)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1792-2025

3.1.5.9 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotsml)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In the first (or only round) of this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the candidate eventually finishing in second place?

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Notes: In uncontested elections this question is coded 0.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Presidential election dates (v2eltype_6, v2eltype_7)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1792-2025

3.1.6 Lower Chamber Specifics

3.1.6.1 Lower chamber 'base' tier electoral districts (A) (v2ellobadis)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many electoral districts were there in the 'base' (or 'nominal') tier?

Clarification: In electoral systems with one tier, the 'base' tier includes all elected seats. In proportional systems with more than one tier, the 'base' tier is the tier with most seats. In mixed systems, the 'base' tier is the SMD (singe-member district) part of the system. In hybrid systems where electoral rules differ geographically, the 'base' tier includes all elected seats. Does not include appointed (nonelected) and reserved seats. Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); International IDEA (2026c); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010).

Data release: 14-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

3.1.6.2 Lower chamber 'base' or 'nominal' tier seats (A) (v2ellobaseat)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the 'base' (or 'nominal') tier?

Clarification: In electoral systems with one tier, the 'base' tier includes all elected seats. In proportional systems with more than one tier, the 'base' tier is the tier with most seats. In mixed systems, the 'base' tier is the SMD (singe-member district) part of the system. In hybrid systems where electoral rules differ geographically, the 'base' tier includes all elected seats. Does not include appointed (nonelected) and reserved seats. Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 14-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

3.1.6.3 Lower chamber election consecutive (D) (v2ellocons)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no legislature.

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.6.4 Lower chamber election cumulative (D) (v2ellocumul)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.6.5 Lower chamber election district effective magnitude (A) (v2ellodiseff)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: For this election, what was the district effective magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: We have used different calculations to find the lower chamber election district effective magnitude value, depending on the electoral system. In electoral systems with reserved seats, reserved seats are treated as a second tier in a hybrid system. Effective magnitude is calculated separately for reserved seats. Effective magnitude in such systems is the weighted average where the weight is the proportion of seats allocated in each tier.

- Systems with only one tier:

$$\text{v2ellodiseff} = \frac{S}{Eb}$$

- Non-parallel systems (v2elloelsy $\neq 5$) with more than one tier:

$$\text{v2ellodiseff} = \frac{2.5^{(6\times t)} \times B^2}{Eb \times S}$$

- Parallel systems (v2elloelsy $= 5$) with more than one tier:

$$\text{v2ellodiseff} = \frac{\sqrt{\left(2.5^{(6\times t)} \times \frac{B^2}{Eb}\right) \times (Eb + t \times S)}}{S}$$

- Hybrid systems (electoral rules differ geographically):

$$\text{v2ellodiseff} = \frac{S}{Eb}$$

Formula key:

- S = number of seats in the lower chamber (v2elloseat)
- B = number of seats allocated in the 'base' tier (v2ellobaseat)
- Eu = number of electoral districts in the 'upper' tier(s) (v2elloupdis)
- Eb = total number of districts (v2ellobadis + v2elloupdis)
- t = $\frac{S-B}{S}$ = the share of seats allocated in the 'upper' tier(s)

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); International IDEA (2026c).

Data release: 14-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

3.1.6.6 Lower chamber election district magnitude (A) (v2elloeldm)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

Question: For this election, what was the average district magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Responses:
Numeric.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Colomer & Grofman (2016); International IDEA (2026c).

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.6.7 Lower chamber electoral system — 13 categories (A) (v2elloelsy)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as a two-round system. Regarding multi-member districts we coded list PR with large multi-member districts when the mean district size = 7. Constituent Assembly elections are excluded from the coding, since they often use specifically designed electoral systems. Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) — downloadable, free of charge, at www.idea.int/publications/esd/.

Responses:
0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.
1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50% + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.
2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of

first preferences, s/he is elected.
If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50% +1 of the votes.
3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.
4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.
5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.
6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary.
This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).
7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.
8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size > 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.
9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.
10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)
11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.
Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)
12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Colomer & Grofman (2016); International IDEA (2026c).

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.6.8 Lower chamber hybrid system reserved seats (A) (v2elloreseat)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many reserved seats were there, either in the 'base' or in the 'upper' tier?

Clarification: This variable refers to hybrid (or split) electoral systems where electoral rules differ geographically. In such systems, we treat the reserved seats as a second tier, compute an eff_M for them separately and take the weighted average (where the weight is the proportion of S allocated in each tier). Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. We only consider seats that are filled by popular elections and are reserved for minorities with regards to ethnicity, religion, or social group. We do not consider seats filled by appointment, or quotas (e.g. gender quotas). We do not consider non-elected or non-voting seats.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 14-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

3.1.6.9 Lower chamber election seats (A) (v2elloseat)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. For (the relatively few) cases with staggered terms, at present only Argentina, this question only regards seats contested in this election.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.6.10 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v2ellostlg)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats.

Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.6.11 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (A) (v2ellostsl)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.6.12 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostsm)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.6.13 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostss)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.6.14 Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party (A) (v2ellosttm)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Numeric.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1791-2025

3.1.6.15 Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party (A) (v2ellostts)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats.

Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Numeric.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999), Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1791-2025

3.1.6.16 Lower chamber 'upper' tier electoral districts (A) (v2elloupdis)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many electoral districts were there in the 'upper' tier?

Clarification: In an electoral system with one tier, v2elloupdis=0. In proportional systems with more than one tier, the 'upper' tier is the tier with fewer seats. In mixed systems, the 'upper' tier is the PR (proportional representation) part of the system. In hybrid systems where electoral rules differ geographically, v2ellouptield=0. Does not include appointed (nonelected) and reserved seats. Leave this question blank if the election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed. If there are more than two tiers, include these extra upper tiers into this category.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 14-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

3.1.6.17 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtlg)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.* , no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.6.18 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtsm)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.* , no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.6.19 Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovttm)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the third largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Candidates elected as independents are treated as one group, with the name of independent (see party name variables). Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.* , no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1795-2025

3.1.6.20 Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v2elparlel)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Responses:

0: Majoritarian.
1: Proportional.
2: Mixed.
3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

Source(s): Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen et al. (1999); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Colomer & Grofman (2016); International IDEA (2026c).

Notes: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as majoritarian systems. Category 3: Other was introduced for data release 7.

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.6.21 Lower chamber election statutory threshold (A) (v2elthresh)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: For this election, what was the statutory threshold (% share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: In cases where thresholds are applied at a regional level, and in cases of mixed electoral systems where a threshold is applied in more than one tier, the threshold that applies to the most seats should be considered. If there are separate thresholds for individual parties and coalitions, code the threshold pertaining to parties. If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1816-2025

3.1.6.22 Lower chamber election turnover (A) (v2eltvrig)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

Responses:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 % of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 % of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators; Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026).

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype_0, v2eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

3.1.7 Subnational

3.1.7.1 Regional government exists (A,C) (v2elreggov)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Is there a regional government?

Clarification: Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.
Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.
Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as "0" for the appropriate time period.
If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please send an email inquiry to your V-Dem contact.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A*.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.2 Regional government name (A,C) (v2elregnam)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use multiple terms such as "provinces and federal city." If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany regional units are called "Länder."

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A*.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.3 Regional government elected (A,C) (v2elsrgel)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

Clarification: "Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, *not* a judiciary and *not* minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.
"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by higher or lower levels of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.
In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:
0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.
1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.
2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.
3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.
4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.
5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A*.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.4 Regional offices relative power (C) (v2elrgpwr)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, *not* the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.
Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)
An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.9 to -0.99	0	All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
-0.99 to -0.28	1	Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
-0.28 to 0.39	2	Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.
0.39 to 1.31	3	Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.
1.31 to 3.06	4	All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.5 Local government exists (A,C) (v2ellocgov)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Is there a local government?

Clarification: Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.
Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on local government.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A*.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.6 Local government name (A,C) (v2ellocnam)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units.
If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Mexico local units are called "Municipios."

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A*.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.7 Local government elected (A,C) (v2ellocelc)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice?

Clarification: "Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, *not* a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials.
"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by a higher level of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.
In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:
0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.
1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.
2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.
3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.
4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.
5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions on local offices relative power.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A*.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.8 Local offices relative power (C) (v2ellocpwr)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to *each other*, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.
Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)
An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.08 to -0.85	0	All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.
-0.85 to -0.09	1	Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.
-0.09 to 0.65	2	Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.
0.65 to 1.62	3	Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.
1.62 to 2.94	4	All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.9 Subnational elections free and fair (C) (v2elffelr)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

Clarification: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.
"Free and fair" refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.57 to -1.8	0	No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).
-1.8 to -0.76	1	Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).
-0.76 to 0.25	2	Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).
0.25 to 1.32	3	Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).
1.32 to 3.36	4	Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, the former category "5" is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin).

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2elffelrbin_ord.

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.10 Subnational elections held (C) (v2elffelrbin)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are subnational elections held?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.75 to 1.52	0	No.
1.52 to 1.56	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, the former category "5" from variable v2elffelr is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin). If a coder chose the 5th category in the original question, it receives 0 in the new "v2elffelrbin" variable (corresponding to the answer, no, there were no subnational elections); otherwise it receives 1 (yes, there are subnational elections held). The resulting series of 0-1 country-coder time-series is run in the measurement model, which calculates the final value of v2elffelrbin while taking into account background coder characteristics.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this

document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.11 Subnational election unevenness (C) (v2elsnlsff)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

Clarification: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.24 to -1.53	0	Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.
-1.53 to -0.03	1	Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.
-0.03 to 2.39	2	No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: If answer is "2", skip remaining questions in this section.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.1.7.12 Subnational election area less free and fair name (C) (v2elsnless)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *less* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, "the North").

Responses:
Text.

Data release: 3-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.7.13 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnlfc)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:
0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_1]
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_2]
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_3]
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_4]
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_5]
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_6]
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_7]
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_8]
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_9]
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_10]
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_11]
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_12]
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_13]
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_14]
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_15]
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_16]
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_21]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple selection.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.1.7.14 Subnational election area more free and fair name (C) (v2elsnmore)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *more* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, "the North").

Responses:
Text.

Data release: 3-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.7.15 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnmrfc)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:
0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_2]
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_3]
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_4]
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_5]
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_6]
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_7]
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_8]
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_9]
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_10]
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_11]
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_12]
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_13]
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_14]
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_15]
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_16]
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_21]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.2 Political Parties

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Political parties: A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization. Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden. Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure*/*de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

3.2.1 General

3.2.1.1 Barriers to parties (C) (v2psbars)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

Clarification: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.83 to -2.04	0	Parties are not allowed.
-2.04 to -0.97	1	It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).
-0.97 to -0.05	2	There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).
-0.05 to 0.98	3	There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).
0.98 to 2.95	4	There are no substantial barriers.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.2 Party ban (C) (v2psparban)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are any parties banned?

Clarification: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.65 to -1.88	0	Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.
-1.88 to -1.33	1	Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.
-1.33 to -0.7	2	Yes. Many parties are banned.
-0.7 to 0.43	3	Yes. But only a few parties are banned.
0.43 to 2.65	4	No. No parties are officially banned.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: If your answer is 4, skip the next question [v2psbantar].

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.3 Party ban target (C) (v2psbantar)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Ethnic party. [v2psbantar_0]
1: Religious party. [v2psbantar_1]
2: Regional/local party. [v2psbantar_2]
3: Leftist extremist party. [v2psbantar_3]
4: Rightist extremist party. [v2psbantar_4]
5: Other. [v2psbantar_5]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Notes: The answer categories for contemporary and historical differ in the inclusion of the word "extremist". In contemporary it is included while excluded in the historical answer categories.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.4 Opposition parties autonomy (C) (v2psoppaut)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

Clarification: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.7 to -2.03	0	Opposition parties are not allowed.
-2.03 to -1.01	1	There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.
-1.01 to 0.18	2	At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
0.18 to 1.47	3	Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
1.47 to 3.29	4	All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.5 Party organizations (C) (v2psorgs)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

Clarification: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.32 to -1.5	0	No parties.
-1.5 to 0.07	1	Fewer than half of the parties.
0.07 to 0.63	2	About half of the parties.
0.63 to 1.93	3	More than half of the parties.
1.93 to 3.61	4	All parties.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.6 Party branches (C) (v2psprbrch)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.4 to -1.45	0	None.
-1.45 to 0.33	1	Fewer than half.
0.33 to 0.95	2	About half.
0.95 to 2.45	3	More than half.
2.45 to 3.69	4	All.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.7 Party linkages (C) (v2psprlnks)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

Clarification: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.32 to -1.47	0	Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.
-1.47 to -0.03	1	Mixed clientelistic and local collective.
-0.03 to 0.39	2	Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.
0.39 to 1.79	3	Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.
1.79 to 3.67	4	Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.2.1.8 Distinct party platforms (C) (v2psplats)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

Clarification: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.
This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.21 to -1.04	0	None, or nearly none.
-1.04 to 0.19	1	Fewer than half.
0.19 to 0.74	2	About half.
0.74 to 1.58	3	More than half.
1.58 to 3.52	4	All, or nearly all.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.9 Candidate selection-national/local (C) (v2pscnslnl)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

Clarification: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.69 to -1.07	0	National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.
-1.07 to 0.46	1	National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.
0.46 to 1.32	2	National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.
1.32 to 2.13	3	National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.
2.13 to 2.78	4	National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.
2.78 to 4.72	5	National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.10 Legislative party cohesion (C) (v2pscohesv)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.72 to -1.77	0	Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.
-1.77 to -0.67	1	More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.
-0.67 to 0.9	2	Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.
0.9 to 2.85	3	Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

3.2.1.11 Party competition across regions (C) (v2pscomprg)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 % of the vote)?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.6 to -1.11	0	Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, i.e., their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.
-1.11 to 0.61	1	Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.
0.61 to 2.66	2	Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.2.1.12 National party control (C) (v2psnatpar)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How unified is party control of the national government?

Clarification: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.04 to -0.57	0	Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.).
-0.57 to 0.49	1	Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.
0.49 to 3.11	2	Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.2.1.13 Subnational party control (C) (v2pssunpar)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.85 to -0.61	0	In almost all subnational units (at least 90 percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.
-0.61 to 0.73	1	In most subnational units (66 percent-90 percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.
0.73 to 3.03	2	In few subnational units (less than 66 percent), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.3 Direct Democracy

Direct democracy: This set of questions focuses on direct popular votes. Four mechanisms are distinguished:

a. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature for which the constitution or basic laws require a vote. These are referred to as *constitutional referendums* (*i.e. obligatory referendums*).

b. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature that for which the constitution or basic laws does not require a vote. These are referred to as *plebiscites*.

c. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible adoption of a new law or constitutional amendment. These are referred to as *popular initiatives*.

d. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. These are referred to as *referendums*.

Note that we do not consider recall elections or citizen petitions to the legislature even they may also involve a gathering of signatures or a popular vote. Note also that in coding these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice. In order to clarify the *de jure*/*de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..."

3.3.1 Initiatives

3.3.1.1 Initiatives permitted (A) (v2ddlexci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for initiatives?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment.

Responses:
0: Not allowed.
1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
2: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Referendums permitted" [v2ddlexrf].

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.2 Initiatives signatures (A) (v2ddsignci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.3 Initiatives signatures % (A) (v2ddsigpci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters — are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.4 Initiatives signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigdci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is the period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for an initiative?

Responses:

Numeric.

Ordering: Answer only if answered 1 for previous question.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1919-2025

3.3.1.5 Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (A) (v2ddsiglci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing an initiative on the ballot?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.6 Initiatives participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.7 Initiatives approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.8 Initiatives administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an initiative to be approved?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.9 Initiatives super majority (A) (v2ddspmci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an initiative?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.1.10 Popular initiative credible threat (A) (v2ddthreci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of a popular initiative?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthreci =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthreci =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2 Referendums

3.3.2.1 Referendums permitted (A) (v2ddlexrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for referendums?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall elections.)

Responses:
0: Not allowed.
1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
2: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Occurrence of plebiscite this year" [v2ddyrpl].

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.2 Referendums signatures (A) (v2ddsignrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

Clarification: If the law treats this as a percentage (%) of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the next question instead.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.3 Referendums signatures % (A) (v2ddsigprf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters — are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

Clarification: If the law treats this as a raw number of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the previous question instead.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.4 Referendums signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigdrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for a referendum?

Responses:
Numeric.

Ordering: Answer if previous question is coded 1.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.5 Referendums signature-gathering limit (A) (v2ddsiglrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing a referendum on the ballot?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.6 Referendums participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.7 Referendums approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.8 Referendums administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for a referendum to be approved?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.9 Referendums super majority (A) (v2ddspmrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a referendum?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.2.10 Popular referendum credible threat (A) (v2ddthrerf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of a popular referendum?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthrerf =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthrerf =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.3 Obligatory referendums

3.3.3.1 Enforcement of Constitutional changes through popular vote (A) (v2ddlexor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is a popular and direct vote required in order for a constitutional change to be legally binding?

Clarification: Unless otherwise stated, every question refers to direct democracy at the national level, *i.e.* it does not incorporate popular votes at the provincial or local level.

Responses:
0: No, it is not required.
1: Depends on the content of constitutional change (for some it is required, for others however it is not).
2: Yes, any constitutional must be approved directly by the citizenry.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.3.2 Obligatory referendum participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.3.3 Obligatory referendum approval threshold (A) (v2ddappor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of approval — among registered voters — be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.3.4 Obligatory referendum administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an obligatory referendum to be approved?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.3.5 Obligatory referendum super majority (A) (v2ddspmor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an obligatory referendum?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.3.6 Obligatory referendum credible threat (A) (v2ddthreor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of an obligatory referendum?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthreor =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthreci =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.4 Plebiscites

3.3.4.1 Plebiscites permitted (A) (v2ddlexpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: Is there legal provision for plebiscites?
Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot by the legislature and/or the executive.
Responses:
0: Not allowed.
1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
2: Allowed and binding.
Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Initiatives permitted" [v2ddlexci].
Scale: Ordinal.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.
Data release: 1-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.4.2 Plebiscites participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?
Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.
Responses:
Percent.
Scale: Interval.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.
Data release: 1-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.4.3 Plebiscites approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?
Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.
Responses:
Percent.
Scale: Interval.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.
Data release: 1-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.4.4 Plebiscites administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Must a majority across subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) be attained in order for a plebiscite to be approved?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes — at least half of subnational districts.
2: Yes — more than half of subnational districts.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.4.5 Plebiscites super majority (A) (v2ddspmpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.4.6 Plebiscites credible threat (A) (v2ddthrepl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of a plebiscite?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthrepl =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthrepl =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.5 Occurrences

3.3.5.1 Occurrence of citizen-initiatives this year (A) (v2ddyrci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many *citizen-initiative* occurred this year?

Responses:
Numeric.
Scale: Interval.
Data release: 7-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.5.2 Occurrence of referendum this year (A) (v2ddyrrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: How many *referendums* occurred this year?
Responses:
Numeric.
Scale: Interval.
Data release: 7-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.5.3 Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (A) (v2ddyror)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: How many *obligatory referendums* occurred this year?
Responses:
Numeric.
Scale: Interval.
Data release: 7-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.5.4 Occurrence of plebiscite this year (A) (v2ddyrpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: How many *plebiscites* occurred this year?
Responses:
Numeric.
Scale: Interval.
Data release: 7-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

3.3.5.5 Number of popular votes this year (A) (v2ddyrall)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: How many direct democracy elections (initiatives, referendums and/or plebiscites) occurred this year?
Responses:
Numeric.
Scale: Interval.

Data release: 3, 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.3.5.6 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (A) (v2ddcredal)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: If any direct democracy election occurred this year, was the official result of the vote, or votes (their success or failure) credible?

Clarification: By credible, we mean whether the official results of the vote(s) reflect the actual vote (leaving aside issues of voter exclusion, intimidation, or vote-buying).

Responses:

0: Not credible.
1: Credible.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.4 The Executive

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Executive: In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed. The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country. Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general—not the King/Queen of England—would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony—not the prime minister in London—would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

Executive – Historical clarification: In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The head of state is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes, this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.*, a monarch who reigns but does not rule or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed.

The head of government is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically

presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then servers as both head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government. These definitions are grounded in the functions that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country.

Likewise, it may be that the effective head of state/head of government is someone other than the official head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government. This would apply for example to regency councils for underage monarchs. Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have only included executives who held office for at least 100 days.

Head of Government (HOG): This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG).

Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that "effective" head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOG name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of government." Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

Head of Government (HOG) – Historical clarification: This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG). Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is

no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that "effective" head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, only include executives who held office for at least 100 days.

Executive as a whole: This final section of the survey pertains to the executive, considered as a whole. Some questions refer to "members of the executive", *i.e.*, the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers. If you feel that the answer to a question varies across these offices, your answer should reflect the average (arithmetic mean) across these offices. Other questions refer to lower-level members of the executive branch. This will be clarified as we proceed.

Regime – Part 1: Thank you for answering the survey on executive! We have been prompted by scholars and policy practitioners that data for the following questions related to the regimes would be really important for the research and policy advise. Please consider coding the three new questions that follow right after an important clarifying note and two pre-coded questions with information on what we consider are the country's regimes (at different points in time) and how they ended – this is completely voluntary.

Regime – Part 2: This final part of this section of the survey pertains to the political regime, and asks questions about the key supporting groups the regime relies on to stay in power.

A political regime can be defined as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. If it is evident that formal and informal rules correspond (i.e. the formal rules are followed), then the formal rules define the regime. In these cases, we observe the formal rules (e.g. the constitution) to observe the regime. If, on the other hand, the formal rules do not correspond with the informal rules, such as in most dictatorships, then the regime is defined by the informal coalition of actors that select and sustain leaders, along with the informal rules they administer. In these cases, we must look to the de facto ruling elites and their established practice to observe the regime (e.g., the military junta in a military regime). Thus a regime is typically characterized by it determining who selects policies, and often also how these policies are typically selected. A regime change presupposes a substantial change in the formal and/or informal rules by which a country is governed.

Examples of regimes might include the Second French Republic, the Communist regime in post-WWII Poland, the current Saudi monarchic regime in Saudi Arabia and the post-WWII democratic regime in Austria. Sometimes, regime changes are related to government or leadership changes (such as the change in Zaire/DR Congo from the regime under Mobutu to the current regime under Kabila), but government or leadership changes do not necessarily bring regime changes (such as in post-election government changes in democracies or with the institutionalized changes to prime ministers and presidents in current China). Sometimes, regime changes can also take place without leadership changes (for instance when military juntas and leaders institutionalize one-party rule, or when there is substantial political liberalization e.g. by opening up for multi-party elections but where the former autocrat continues in power for some time).

Clarification: Please note that the default date for the pre-coded regime data is January 1st. Please also note that, in order to avoid overlapping data points, each regime unit is registered in the dataset as having started one day after it actually began (the true start date is reported in the next question on Regime information).

3.4.1 General

3.4.1.1 Executive respects constitution (C) (v2exrescon)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.48 to -1.53	0	Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.
-1.53 to -0.6	1	Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.
-0.6 to 0.68	2	Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.
0.68 to 2.39	3	Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.
2.39 to 3.35	4	Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.1.2 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (C) (v2exbribe)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.18 to -1.7	0	It is routine and expected.
-1.7 to -0.68	1	It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.
-0.68 to 0.39	2	It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.
0.39 to 2.04	3	It happens occasionally but is not expected.
2.04 to 3.74	4	It never, or hardly ever, happens.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.1.3 Executive embezzlement and theft (C) (v2exembez)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.53 to -1.83	0	Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
-1.83 to -0.79	1	Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
-0.79 to -0.07	2	About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
-0.07 to 1.54	3	Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
1.54 to 3.46	4	Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.1.4 Public sector corrupt exchanges (C) (v2excrptps)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.22 to -1.97	0	Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.
-1.97 to -0.51	1	Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.
-0.51 to 0.49	2	Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.
0.49 to 2.62	3	Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.
2.62 to 4.13	4	No. Never, or hardly ever.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.1.5 Public sector theft (C) (v2exthftps)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.76 to -2.23	0	Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
-2.23 to -0.85	1	Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
-0.85 to -0.04	2	About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
-0.04 to 1.93	3	Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
1.93 to 3.64	4	Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.1.6 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (A) (v2exapup)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the approval of the upper chamber (together with the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

Clarification: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex_hosw, v2ex_hogw). Answer v2exapup only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1), there is a bicameral legislature (v2lgbicam is 2), and the upper and lower chamber are directly or indirectly elected to any extent (v2lgello, v2lgelecup, v2lginello, and v2lginelup are not 0).

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): National constitutions; websites of national governments.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.1.7 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (A) (v2exapupap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the tacit or implicit approval of the upper chamber (alongside the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

Clarification: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex_hosw, v2ex_hogw). Answer v2exapupap only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1), there is a bicameral legislature (v2lgbicam is 2), and the upper and lower chamber are directly or indirectly elected to any extent (v2lgello, v2lgelecup, v2lginello, and v2lginelup are not 0).

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): National constitutions; websites of national governments.

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2 Head of State (HOS)

3.4.2.1 HOS name (A*) (v2exnamhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the name of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression

"collective body." Do not include nicknames. If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. The current head of state, and previous heads of state that were in office for at least 100 days, should be included. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999).

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.2 HOS title (A*) (v2extithos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, this and the following questions refer to both. Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of state temporarily fills the role, this will be excluded from the answer; they should be called e.g. "President" and not "Acting President". The current head of state, and previous heads of state that were in office for at least 100 days, should be included. If the head of state is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple Heads of State with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026) Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999), governments' websites.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.3 HOS removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhsp)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of

unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.6 to -0.19	0	No, under no circumstances.
-0.19 to 0.91	1	No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.
0.91 to 2.05	2	Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.
2.05 to 4.26	3	Yes, most likely.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.4 HOS removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhsol)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_0]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_4]
5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_5]
6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_6]
7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_7]

Ordering: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhsnl]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exctlhs].

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.5 HOS other body remove HOS in practice (C) (v2exrmhsnl)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the head of state from office?

Responses:
Text.

Data release: 3-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.2.6 HOS control over (C) (v2exctlhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

Responses:
0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_0]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_4]
5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_5]
6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_6]
7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_7]

Ordering: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhos]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exdfdshs].

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.7 HOS other body controls (C) (v2exctlhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the head of state need approval for its actions?

Responses:
Text.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered "other" (7) to the previous question [v2exctlhs].

Notes: The question text is different for the historical coding: "From which kind of body or bodies does the head of state need approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?"

Data release: 3-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.2.8 HOS dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdfdshs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been

exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election for the legislature.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.36 to -1.14	0	No.
-1.14 to 0.22	1	Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).
0.22 to 0.95	2	Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as ”once a year”, by time point within term, such as ”not within the last sixth months of the head of state’s term”, and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).
0.95 to 3.27	3	Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.9 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.63 to -1.72	0	No.
-1.72 to -0.87	1	Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.
-0.87 to 0.15	2	Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.
0.15 to 0.66	3	Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.
0.66 to 2.83	4	Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.10 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs_rec)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.75 to -1.57	0	No.
-1.57 to 0.18	1	Yes, combines answer categories 1 and 2 from v2exdfcbhs.
0.18 to 2.61	2	Yes, combines answer categories 3 and 4 from v2exdfcbhs.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: v2edfcbhs_rec is a version of v2exdfcbhs, for v2edfcbhs_rec the answer categories 1 and 2, 3 and 4 has been merged.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2018

3.4.2.11 HOS veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvths)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: By ”veto”, we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.6 to -1.61	0	No.
-1.61 to -0.9	1	Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).
-0.9 to -0.27	2	Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).
-0.27 to 0.66	3	Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).
0.66 to 2.65	4	Yes, with no possibility of override.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.12 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdmhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.55 to -1.65	0	No.
-1.65 to -0.43	1	Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).
-0.43 to 0.26	2	Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval,
0.26 to 2.4	emphi.e., so called "constructive dismissal").	

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.13 HOS proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

Clarification: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.82 to -0.66	0	Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).
-0.66 to 1.1	1	Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.
1.1 to 3.49	2	No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.14 HOS = HOG (A*) (v2exhoshog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

Clarification: Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to all of them by checking or unchecking the specific dates. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:

0: No
1: Yes

Ordering: If HOS=HOG (answer is yes: 1) for all years: skip to "Executive as whole introduction" [v2exintro3].

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Henisz (2002); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates, HOG appointment dates, and December 31.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.15 HOS age (A) (v2exagehos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell
Question: In what year was the head of state born?
Responses:
[date-year only]
99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOS is a collective body.
Source(s): Cahoon, Ben (2026).
Data release: 7-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum
Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.16 HOS selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell
Question: Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?
Clarification: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are *not* concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico).
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you selected 1-5 on question v2expathhs.
Scale: Dichotomous.
Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.
Data release: 1-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum
Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).
Cleaning: Set to missing where v2expathhs is 6 or 7
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.17 HOS directly elected (D) (v2ex_elechos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell
Question: Is the head of state HOS directly elected?
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
Scale: Dichotomous.
Source(s): v2expathhs
Data release: 5-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.18 HOS female (A) (v2exfemhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

Question: What is the gender of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

Responses:
0: Male
1: Female

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cahoon, Ben (2026); Melander (2005); Hughes & Paxton (2007).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.19 HOS term length by law (A) (v2exfxtmhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years?

Responses:
Numeric, number of years.
0: Term length not specified in constitution.
99: Not Applicable.
100: Term length for life or there is no term length.

Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Constitute Project (2026).

Notes: *De jure* term lengths for Head of State and Head of Government, coded for each head of state and head of government as coded in v2exnamhos and v2exnamhog. In the case of a single office representing both Head of State and Head of Government, HOS is coded to the appropriate term length while HOG is coded as 99. For colonies, if there was no official local constitution, HOS/HOG is coded by their constitutional status according to the colonial power. Finally, for sovereign states lacking a constitution or having suspended their constitution, HOS/HOG is coded to 99 as not applicable for those relevant years.
Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.4.2.20 HOS appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How did the head of state reach office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. We count as direct elections (category 7) also those indirect elections carried

out by an electoral college, whose only purpose is to elect the president. In cases where an elected president dies, resigns, or is legally removed from office, and a line of succession is defined by the constitution, we code a vice president ascending to the presidency according to how they assumed the vice presidency. *E.g.*, coded under category 7 when elected on the same ticket as the outgoing president, or 6 if they were appointed by the legislature.

Responses:
0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.
1: Appointed by a foreign power.
2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
3: Appointed by a royal council.
4: Through hereditary succession.
5: Appointed by the military.
6: Appointed by the legislature.
7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
8: Other.

Ordering: If you select 1-5, skip to question "HOS selection by legislature in practice [v2exaphos]". If you selected 6-7, skip to question [v2excomhs].

Scale: Nominal (v2expathhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from B to A coding. v2expathhs is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of State. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOS was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.21 HOS year of death (A) (v2exdeathos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In what year did the head of state die?

Responses:
Date — year only

Scale: Interval

Source(s): Cahoon, Ben (2026).

Data release: 10-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.2.22 HOS party affiliation (A) (v2exparhos)

Project Manager(s): Nils Düpont

Question: What is the name of the political party to which the head of state belongs?

Clarification: "Technical" refers to non-party leaders, such as members of the royal family, military leaders, foreign leaders, governors, or collective bodies. "Independent" refers to leaders without party affiliation in systems where the leader would normally be affiliated to a party. This does not include leaders in systems where a candidate who is running on a party platform is required to leave the party for the duration of their term. Appointed leaders are considered to be affiliated with the party or body that appointed them.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Döring & Regel (2019); Düpont et al. (2021); Cahoon, Ben (2026).

Data release: 11-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.4.3 Head of Government (HOG)

3.4.3.1 HOG name (A*) (v2exnamhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the head of government?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." Do not include nicknames. If multiple heads of government were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. The current head of government, and previous heads of government that were in office for at least 100 days, should be included. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999).

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.2 HOG title (A*) (v2extithog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

Clarification: Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of government temporarily fills the role, this will be excluded from the answer; they should be called e.g. "Prime Minister" and not "Acting Prime Minister". The current head of government, and previous heads of government that were in office for at least 100 days, should be included. If the head of government is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the name of the entire body. If multiple heads of government with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to all of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating;

we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026), governments' websites.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.3 HOG removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.88 to -0.73	0	No, under no circumstances.
-0.73 to 0.29	1	No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.
0.29 to 1.43	2	Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.
1.43 to 2.99	3	Yes, most likely.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.4 HOG removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhgnp)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

Responses:
0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_4]
5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_5]
6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_6]
7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_7]
8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_8]

Ordering: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG control [v2exctlhg].

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple selection

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.5 HOG other body remove HOG in practice (C) (v2exrmhgop)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the head of government from office?

Responses:
Text.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered "other" (8) to the previous question [v2exrmhgnp].

Data release: 3-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.3.6 HOG control over (C) (v2exctlhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. In case the HOG does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

Responses:
0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_0]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_4]
5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_5]
6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_6]
7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_7]
8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_8]

Ordering: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhog]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG dissolution in practice [v2exdjdshg].

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.7 HOG other body controls (C) (v2exctlhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the head of government need approval for its actions?

Responses:
Text.

Notes: The question text is different for the historical coding: "From which kind of body or bodies does the head of government need approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?"

Data release: 3-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.3.8 HOG dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdjdshg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.11 to -0.2	0	No.
-0.2 to 0.82	1	Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).
0.82 to 1.5	2	Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as ”once a year”, by time point within term, such as ”not within the last sixth months of the head of government’s term”, and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).
1.5 to 3.38	3	Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.4.3.9 HOG appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdjcbhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.97 to -1.29	0	No.
-1.29 to 0.44	1	Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.
0.44 to 2.59	2	Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.4.3.10 HOG dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdshg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.41 to -1.08	0	No.
-1.08 to -0.05	1	Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).
-0.05 to 0.74	2	Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval , i.e., so called "constructive dismissal").
0.74 to 2.81	3	Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.11 HOG veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvthg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.47 to -0.64	0	No.
-0.64 to -0.07	1	Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).
-0.07 to 0.42	2	Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).
0.42 to 0.99	3	Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).
0.99 to 3.42	4	Yes, with no possibility of override.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.12 HOG proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

Clarification: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.8 to -0.66	0	Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).
-0.66 to 1.86	1	Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.
1.86 to 3.55	2	No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.13 HOG age (A) (v2exagehog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In what year was the head of government born?

Responses:

[date-year only]
99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOG is a collective body.

Source(s): Cahoon, Ben (2026).

Data release: 7-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.14 HOG selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphogp)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?

Clarification: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority

support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Ordering: Answer this question only if you selected 1-6 on question v2expathhg.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1; Set to missing when v2expathhg is 7 or 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.15 HOG directly elected (D) (v2ex_elechog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of government HOG directly elected?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhg

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.16 HOG female (A) (v2exfemhog)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell

Question: What is the gender of the head of government?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

Responses:
0: Male
1: Female

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cahoon, Ben (2026); Hughes & Paxton (2007); Melander (2005).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.17 HOG term length by law (A) (v2exfxtmhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the maximum term length of the head of government?

Responses:
Numeric
0: Term length not specified
99: Not Applicable
100: Term length is explicitly unlimited or the life of the office holder.

Ordering: CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM=3 or HOSHOG=2; Constitutions.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025).

Notes: Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.4.3.18 Relative power of the HOG (D) (v2ex_hogw)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Does the head of government HOG have more relative power than the head of state HOS over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The relative power of the HOG is simply 1- v2ex_hosw.

Responses:
0: No.
0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.
0.75: See notes.
1: Yes.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg

Notes: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex_hogw is 1.
From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.75.

Data release: 5-16.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.19 HOG appointed by HOS (D) (v2ex_hosconhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the head of state HOS?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhg

Data release: 5-16.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.20 HOG appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How did the head of government gain access to office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

Responses:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.
1: Appointed by a foreign power.
2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
3: Appointed by a royal council.
4: Through hereditary succession.
5: Appointed by the military.
6: Appointed by the head of state.
7: Appointed by the legislature.
8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
9: Other.

Ordering: If you selected 1-6, skip to question "HOG selection by legislature in practice" [v2exaphogp]. If you selected 7-8, skip to question [v2excomex].

Scale: Nominal (v2expathhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.21 HOG year of death (A) (v2exdeathog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In what year did the head of government die?

Responses:

Date — year only

Scale: Interval

Source(s): Cahoon, Ben (2026).

Data release: 10-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.4.3.22 HOG party affiliation (A) (v2expothog)

Project Manager(s): Nils Düpont

Question: What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

Clarification: "Technical" refers to non-party leaders, such as members of the royal family, military leaders, foreign leaders, governors, or collective bodies. "Independent" refers to leaders without party affiliation in systems where the leader would normally be affiliated to a party. This does not include leaders in systems where a candidate who is running on a party platform is required to leave the party for the duration of their term. Appointed leaders are considered to be affiliated with the party or body that appointed them.

Responses:
Text.

Source(s): Döring & Regel (2019); Düpont et al. (2021); Bederke et al. (2023); Cahoon, Ben (2026).

Data release: 11-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.5 Regime

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

This survey pertains to the political regime, and asks questions about the support groups the regime relies on to stay in power and key opposition groups. "A support group is a group of individuals who are supportive of the existing regime, and, if it were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. A key opposition group is defined as a group of individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime." A political regime can be defined as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power.

If it is evident that formal and informal rules correspond (i.e. the formal rules are followed), then the formal rules define the regime. In these cases, we observe the formal rules (e.g. the constitution) to observe the regime. If, on the other hand, the formal rules do not correspond with the informal rules, such as in most dictatorships, then the regime is defined by the informal coalition of actors that select and sustain leaders, along with the informal rules they administer. In these cases, we must look to the de facto ruling elites and their established practice to observe the regime (e.g., the military junta in a military regime).

Thus a regime is typically characterized by it determining who selects policies, and often also how these policies are typically selected. A regime change presupposes a substantial change in the formal and/or informal rules by which a country is governed.

Examples of regimes might include the Second French Republic, the Communist regime in post-WWII Poland, the current Saudi monarchic regime in Saudi Arabia and the post-WWII democratic regime in Austria. Sometimes, regime changes are related to government or leadership changes (such as the change in Zaire/DR Congo from the regime under Mobutu to the current regime under Kabila), but government or leadership changes do not necessarily bring regime changes (such as in post-election government changes in democracies or with the institutionalized changes to prime ministers and presidents in current China). Sometimes, regime changes can also take place without leadership changes (for instance when military juntas and leaders institutionalize one-party rule, or when there is substantial political liberalization e.g. by opening up for multi-party elections but where the former autocrat continues in power for some time).

3.5.1 General

3.5.1.1 Regime information (A*) (v2reginfo)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

Question: What is the regime name as well as start and end dates of this regime?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the identity of the regime, which is given a suggestive name, and its start and end dates have already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

Source(s): Djuve et al. (2020).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.2 Regime end type (A*) (v2regendtype)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

Question: Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important in leading to the end of the regime?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that what is considered the most important process that eventually ended the relevant regime has already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information This means that the information has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

Responses:

0: A military coup d'etat.
1: A coup d'etat conducted by other groups than the military.
2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'etat)
4: Natural death of the sitting leader
5: Loss in civil war.
6: Loss in inter-state war.
7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
8: Popular uprising.
9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders
10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization)
11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1–10
12: Other process than those specified by categories 1–11.
13: The regime still exists

Source(s): Djuve et al. (2020).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.3 Regime end type, multiple selection version (A) (v2regendtypems)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

Question: Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end of the regime?

Responses:

0: A military coup d'etat. [v2regendtypems_0]
1: A coup d'etat conducted by other groups than the military. [v2regendtypems_1]
2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems_2]
3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'etat). [v2regendtypems_3]
4: Natural death of the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems_4]
5: Loss in civil war. [v2regendtypems_5]
6: Loss in inter-state war. [v2regendtypems_6]
7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war). [v2regendtypems_7]
8: Popular uprising. [v2regendtypems_8]
9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders. [v2regendtypems_9]
10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization). [v2regendtypems_10]
11. Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1-10. [v2regendtypems_11]
12: Other process than those specified by categories 1-11. [v2regendtypems_12]
13: The regime still exists. [v2regendtypems_13]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple selection

Source(s): Djuve et al. (2020); Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.); various region- and country-specific sources.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.4 Regime interregnum (A) (v2regint)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

Question: Is there an identifiable political regime?

Clarification: This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that partial control over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.

Please note that the expert coded (C) questions on support and opposition groups in the regime survey are only coded when v2regint=1.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Djuve et al. (2020); Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.); various region- and country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.5 Regime ID (D) (v2regidnr)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the unique identifier number given to the current regime?

Clarification: This numeric regime identifier consists, first, of the country's V-Dem country code and, second, of a regime numeric counter that has at least two digits (hence the first regime identified for a country would be assigned 01).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): v2reginfo

Data release: 12-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Djuve et al. (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.6 Regime duration (D) (v2regdur)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: How many days have passed since the current regime started?

Clarification: The variable pertains to the regime coded under v2reginfo, and is measured in number of calendar days.

Scale: Interval

Source(s): v2reginfo

Data release: 12-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Djuve et al. (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.7 Regime support groups (C) (v2regsupgroups)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

Responses:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regsupgroups_0]
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regsupgroups_1]
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regsupgroups_2]
3: Business elites. [v2regsupgroups_3]
4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regsupgroups_4]
5: The military. [v2regsupgroups_5]
6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regsupgroups_6]
7: A religious group(s). [v2regsupgroups_7]
8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regsupgroups_8]
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regsupgroups_9]

10: Urban middle classes. [v2regsupgroups_10]
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regsupgroups_11
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regsupgroups_12]
13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regsupgroups_13]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.8 Regime most important support group (C) (v2regimpgroup)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which (one) group does the current political regime rely on most strongly in order to maintain power?

Clarification: Choose the group that, if it were to retract its support to the regime, would most endanger the regime (most strongly increase the chance that it loses power).

Responses:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
3: Business elites.
4: Civil servants.
5: The military.
6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
7: A religious group(s).
8: Local elites, including chiefs.
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
10: Urban middle classes
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers).
13: A foreign government or colonial power.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode.
"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.9 Regime support groups size (C) (v2regsupgroupssize)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In total, how large is the percentage share of the domestic adult (18+) population that belongs to the political regime's supporting groups?

Clarification: You should consider the sum of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regsupgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size of the/those groups that are supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract

support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. Regarding the issue of overlapping identities, and one individual potentially belonging to more than one groups: Individuals should only be "counted" once; thus if the two relevant supporting groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5%, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the supporting groups is still 5% (presuming that no other members of that ethnic group are essential for the regime staying in power).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.73 to -2.03	0	Extremely small (About 1 percent of the population or less; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — a handful of higher-rank military officers, or by only a royal council and a few hundred landowners)
-2.03 to -0.94	1	Very small (Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — higher ranking civil servants and the military, or by moderately sized business and agrarian elites)
-0.94 to -0.15	2	Small (Between 5 percent and 15 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — relatively small ethnic groups, or by urban elites and the urban middle classes in predominantly rural societies)
-0.15 to 0.76	3	Moderate (Between 15 percent and 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — moderately sized ethnic groups, by rural middle classes in rural societies, or by urban middle classes in urban societies)
0.76 to 2.99	4	Large (More than 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — large ethnic groups (and then not only the elites/leaders of such groups), or by rural working classes in rural societies.)

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.10 Regime support location (C) (v2regsuploc)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: In which geographic area do the support groups for the current political regime mainly reside?

Responses:

0: Abroad.
1: In the capital.
2: In urban areas outside the capital.
3: In rural areas.
4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

Scale: Nominal

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode.
"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.11 Regime opposition groups (C) (v2regoppgroups)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which groups include noteworthy opposition actors – that is, individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who both oppose the regime and pose a non-negligible threat to the regime (either mobilized or dormant). In other words, these individuals must both want to see the regime removed and, at least under hypothetical "favorable conditions", be capable of removing the regime. Groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; opposition groups also include individuals who oppose the regime without taking particular actions, at the moment. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

Responses:
0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroups_0]
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroups_1]
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroups_2]
3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroups_3]
4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroups_4]
5: The military. [v2regoppgroups_5]
6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroups_6]
7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroups_7]
8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroups_8]
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroups_9]
10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroups_10]
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroups_11]
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroups_12]
13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroups_13]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.12 Explicit and active regime opposition groups (C) (v2regoppgroupsact)

Project Manager(s): Sirianne Dahlum, Tore Wig

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which (if any) groups include a significant share of individuals who explicitly and actively mobilize against the regime in a particular year? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who engage in active and explicit opposition to the regime to promote its removal. These actors make explicit statements of dissent from the regime, publicly voice their preference for regime change, and may possibly engage in other actions intended to further the removal of the regime such as anti-regime demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, the formation of anti-system parties, acts of sabotage, or armed rebellion.

Please note that only years when anti-regime speech or activity occurs should be coded. In years when groups probably oppose the regime, but are not engaged in any explicit acts of opposition, the group should not be selected. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

Responses:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroupsact_0]
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroupsact_1]
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroupsact_2]
3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroupsact_3]
4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroupsact_4]
5: The military. [v2regoppgroupsact_5]
6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact_6]
7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact_7]
8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroupsact_8]
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroupsact_9]
10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroupsact_10]
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroupsact_11]
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroupsact_12]
13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroupsact_13]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.13 Regime most important opposition group (C) (v2regimpoppgroup)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which (one) group constitutes the greatest threat to the current regime?

Clarification: Choose the one group (among those you registered as opposition groups under the v2regoppgroups question) that is the most dangerous threat to the regime in a given year. That is, the group that could most strongly increase the chance that the regime loses power. The importance/danger associated with an opposition group will be affected both by its level of hostility towards the regime and its power resources/how capable it is of removing the regime should it try to do so. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they

do not take particular actions in a given year.

Responses:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
3: Business elites.
4: Civil servants.
5: The military.
6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
7: A religious group(s).
8: Local elites, including chiefs.
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
10: Urban middle classes
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
13: A foreign government or colonial power.

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode.
"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.14 Regime opposition groups size (C) (v2regoppgroupssize)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In total, how large is the share of the domestic adult (18+) population that are noteworthy opposition actors to the current political regime?

Clarification: Consider the sum total of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regoppgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size/number of the actors that oppose the regime and pose a threat to the regime maintaining power.
We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.
Regarding the issue of individuals potentially belonging to more than one “opposition group”: Individuals should only be "counted" once for the purpose of this question. For example, if the two relevant opposition groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5% of the population, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the opposition groups is still 5% (presuming that there are no other members of that ethnic group who oppose the regime).
We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.86 to -1.75	0	Extremely small (About 1 percent of the population or less)
-1.75 to -0.73	1	Very small (Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population)
-0.73 to 0.09	2	Small (Between 5 percent and 15 percent)
0.09 to 1.06	3	Moderate (Between 15 percent and 30 percent)
1.06 to 3.47	4	Large (More than 30 percent)

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

3.5.1.15 Regime opposition location (C) (v2regoppploc)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: In which geographic area do groups opposing the current political regime mainly reside?

Clarification: You should consider the groups entered in v2regoppgroups, hence groups that both want to see the regime removed and (at least under "favorable conditions") are capable of removing the regime. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

Responses:

0: Abroad.
1: In the capital.
2: In urban areas outside the capital.
3: In rural areas.
4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

Scale: Nominal

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode.
"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.16 Strongest pro-regime preferences (C) (v2regproreg)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which (one) group has the strongest pro-regime preferences, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

Clarification: Consider only the pro-regime preferences of individuals in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival. Hence, the group with the strongest pro-regime preferences need not be the most important support group.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences means is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime, with 10 indicating the strongest support." Select the group with the highest average score in this hypothetical survey.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

Responses:

0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
3: Business elites.
4: Civil servants.
5: The military.
6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
7: A religious group(s).
8: Local elites, including chiefs.
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
10: Urban middle classes
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
13: A foreign government or colonial power.

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.17 Strongest anti-regime preferences (C) (v2regantireg)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which (one) group has the strongest anti-regime preferences/antipathy against the current regime, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

Clarification: Consider only the anti-regime preferences of the actors in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival and change. Hence, the group with the strongest anti-regime preferences need not be the most important opposition group. Both capable and incapable political actors may have strong anti-regime preferences and want to see the regime removed from power. We also remind that the group needs not be currently mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; individuals may strongly resent a regime, without taking particular actions, in a given

year.
One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences mean, independently of ability to affect regime survival is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime".
We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

Responses:
0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
3: Business elites.
4: Civil servants.
5: The military.
6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
7: A religious group(s).
8: Local elites, including chiefs.
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
10: Urban middle classes
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
13: A foreign government or colonial power.

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode.
"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.5.1.18 Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (C) (v2regpower)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Irrespective of its stance toward the regime (pro-, anti-, or neutral), which one group is the most important for affecting the current regime's chances of staying in power?

Clarification: Here we ask you to disregard group preferences, and only consider a group's resources and capabilities vis-a-vis affecting regime survival. In other words, do not consider whether this group is pro-regime, anti-regime, or neutral to the regime. Take only into consideration the capabilities of this group to affect regime survival, if key members of the group were to hypothetically mobilize the group in an effort to remove the regime. Politically neutral, as well as pro- and anti-regime groups, may have ample resources and be capable of organizing coordinated action. As a result, all three types of groups may have great influence over regime survival and change.

Responses:
0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
3: Business elites.
4: Civil servants.
5: The military.
6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

7: A religious group(s).
8: Local elites, including chiefs.
9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
10: Urban middle classes
11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
13: A foreign government or colonial power.

Data release: 11-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode.
"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

Cleaning: Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Default date: Default date for this variable is January 1.

3.6 The Legislature

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

The Legislature: The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws. If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those year. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London). A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted. A "direct election" can include seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure*/*de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the *de facto* state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the *de jure* state of affairs.

Upper Chamber: The following questions pertain to the upper chamber of the legislature (if bicameral; please only code for those years where v2lgbicam is 2). The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber", typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the senate or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

One or both houses: The following questions pertain to one or both houses.

Lower chamber: The following questions pertain to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature. The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber", is typically the more numerous chamber and also more directly representative of the general population.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

Country experts will find the name (proper noun) of the lower chamber of the legislature in the first question (following this page). To see the name, click on any year in the grid. All subsequent questions in this section pertain to that body.

3.6.1 General

3.6.1.1 Legislature bicameral (A*) (v2lgbicam)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

Clarification: The number of chambers have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the score has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating. If there is a change in the number of chambers, this is coded on the

exact date of when the change occurred, for example the exact date of when a legislature was dissolved, or when the lower and/or upper chamber was established (usually coded on the date when the new legislature first meets; otherwise on the date of the legislative election where the composition of the new legislature was decided).

Responses:

0: 0 chambers.
1: 1 chamber.
2: 2 or more chambers.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); Nohlen & Stöver (2010), websites of national parliaments.

Notes: For the country-year aggregation of the dataset, we have taken the minimum value of v2lgbicam. Constituent assemblies that perform other functions except for drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are coded as 1 (1 chamber). In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are listed in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.2 Legislature dominant chamber (C) (v2lgdomchm)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.69 to -0.83	0	The lower chamber is clearly dominant.
-0.83 to 0.18	1	The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
0.18 to 1.35	2	They are roughly co-equal in power.
1.35 to 2.25	3	The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
2.25 to 3.05	4	The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.3 Legislature questions officials in practice (C) (v2lgqstexp)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

Clarification: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.32 to -0.17	0	No — never or very rarely.
-0.17 to 2.49	1	Yes — routinely.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.4 Legislature investigates in practice (C) (v2lginvstp)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.98 to -1.16	0	Extremely unlikely.
-1.16 to -0.02	1	Unlikely.
-0.02 to 0.76	2	As likely as not.
0.76 to 2.31	3	Likely.
2.31 to 3.54	4	Certain or nearly certain.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.5 Executive oversight (C) (v2lgotovst)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.14 to -1.03	0	Extremely unlikely.
-1.03 to 0.01	1	Unlikely.
0.01 to 0.82	2	Very uncertain.
0.82 to 2.55	3	Likely.
2.55 to 3.28	4	Certain or nearly certain.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.6 Legislature corrupt activities (C) (v2lgcrrpt)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

Clarification: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.
Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.38 to -2.04	0	Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.
-2.04 to -0.62	1	Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
-0.62 to 0.72	2	Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.
0.72 to 2.27	3	Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.
2.27 to 3.78	4	Never, or hardly ever.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is ”0” and the most democratic is ”4”.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.7 Legislature opposition parties (C) (v2lgoppart)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.65 to -0.24	0	No, not at all.
-0.24 to 1.64	1	Occasionally.
1.64 to 3.42	2	Yes, for the most part.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.8 Legislature controls resources (C) (v2lgfunds)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.31 to 0	0	No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.
0 to 2.36	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.9 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (C) (v2lgdsadlo)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

Clarification: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be

considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.32 to -1.27	0	They have no representation at all.
-1.27 to 0.82	1	They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.
0.82 to 1.99	2	They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.
1.99 to 3.14	3	They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.
3.14 to 4.05	4	They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, the former category 0: There are no disadvantaged groups in the society, is coded as a separate variable (v2lgdsadlobin). The variable is then rebased to zero.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.6.1.10 Representation of disadvantaged social groups binary (C) (v2lgdsadlobin)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society?

Clarification: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered a disadvantaged member of a social group, one must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-7.43 to 0.73	0	No.
0.73 to 3.63	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.6.1.11 Relative power of the HOS (A) (v2ex_hosw)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Does the head of state HOS have more relative power than the head of government HOG over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

Responses:
0: No.
0.25: See notes.
0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.
1: Yes.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): v2exdfcbhs_rec v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

Notes: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex_hosw is 1.
From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.25.

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.12 HOG appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex_legconhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhg v2exaphogp

Data release: 5-16.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.13 HOS appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex_legconhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of state HOS appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhs v2exaphos

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.14 Legislature approval of treaties by law (A) (v2lgtreaty)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.1.15 Legislature declares war by law (A) (v2lgwarlaw)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to declare war?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 6-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.2 Upper Chamber

3.6.2.1 Upper chamber name (A*) (v2lgnameup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.
The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

Responses:
Text.

Notes: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable ”Lower chamber legislature name” (v2lgnamelo), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded ”House of Assembly”, and v2lgnameup enlists ”House of Representatives, House of Delegates”.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.2.2 Upper chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegpup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.14 to -1.35	0	No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.
-1.35 to 0.3	1	Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.
0.3 to 2.3	2	Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.2.3 Upper chamber elected (A) (v2lgelecup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

Clarification: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10 % of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010), websites of national parliaments.

Notes: Converted from B to A coding.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.2.4 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber (A) (v2lginelup)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

Clarification: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.
We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010), websites of national parliaments.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.2.5 Upper chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintbup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

Responses:
0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3 Unicameral or Lower Chamber

3.6.3.1 Lower chamber legislature name (A*) (v2lgnamelo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.
The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

Responses:
Text.

Notes: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable ”Lower chamber legislature name” (v2lgnamelo), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded ”House of Assembly”, and v2lgnameup enlists ”House of Representatives, House of Delegates”.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3.2 Lower chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegplo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.45 to -1.3	0	No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.
-1.3 to 0.18	1	Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.
0.18 to 2.56	2	Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3.3 Lower chamber committees (C) (v2lgcomslo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.74 to -1.84	0	No, there are no committees.
-1.84 to -0.81	1	Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.
-0.81 to 1.19	2	Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.
1.19 to 3.15	3	Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3.4 Lower chamber members serve in government (C) (v2lgsrvlo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.35 to -0.03	0	No.
-0.03 to 2.32	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3.5 Lower chamber staff (C) (v2lgstafflo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.47 to 0.05	0	No.
0.05 to 2.76	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.6.3.6 Lower chamber elected (A) (v2lgello)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

Clarification: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.
Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/ regional parliaments,
country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010), websites of national parliaments.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3.7 Lower chamber female legislators (A) (v2lgfemleg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What percentage (%) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Edgell (2019); Paxton et al. (2025); Carmichael et al. (2014).

Data release: 4-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.6.3.8 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber (A) (v2lginello)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

Clarification: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.
We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010), websites of national parliaments.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3.9 Lower chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintblo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

Responses:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce bills.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Constitute Project (2026), V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.6.3.10 Lower chamber gender quota (A) (v2lgqugen)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a strong sanction would be the rejection of a party's list. Countries with both candidate quotas and reserved seats are recorded at the stronger level. This variable records quotas from the date of implementation. The quota adoption date may be earlier, sometimes by several years. Data on quota adoption is available from the QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017) while the theoretical implications of adoption vs. implementation are discussed in Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018).

Responses:

0: No national level gender quota.
1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance.
2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance.
3. Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance.
4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

Ordering: If you answer 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2lgqugens]. If you answer 0, skip to question [v2lgleglo].

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Quota Project (2025); Hughes et al. (2017); International IDEA (2026a), coding by project manager.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.6.3.11 Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (A) (v2lgqugens)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature contain a placement mandate?

Clarification: A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Ordering: Only answer this question if you answered 1-4 on previous question [v2lgqugen].

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Quota Project (2025); Hughes et al. (2017); International IDEA (2026a), coding by project manager.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1947-2025

3.6.3.12 Lower chamber gender quota threshold (A) (v2lgqugent)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: What is the threshold of the quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: A quota is the minimum threshold, understood as the percentage (%) of the total seats in the legislature reserved for women or the percentage of female candidates to be nominated. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Quota Project (2025); Hughes et al. (2017); International IDEA (2026a), coding by project manager.

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1947-2025

3.7 Deliberation

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Deliberation: The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

3.7.1 General

3.7.1.1 Reasoned justification (C) (v2dlreason)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, *i.e.* before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.61 to -1.26	0	No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."
-1.26 to 0.32	1	Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]
0.32 to 1.91	2	Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."
1.91 to 3.79	3	Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.7.1.2 Common good (C) (v2dlcommon)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.08 to -1.56	0	Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.
-1.56 to -0.75	1	Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.
-0.75 to 0.12	2	Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.
0.12 to 1.3	3	Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.
1.3 to 3.28	4	Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.7.1.3 Respect counterarguments (C) (v2dlcountr)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.52 to -1.44	0	Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.
-1.44 to -0.36	1	Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.
-0.36 to 0.97	2	Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.
0.97 to 1.64	3	Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
1.64 to 2.98	4	Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.
2.98 to 3.67	5	Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.7.1.4 Range of consultation (C) (v2dlconslt)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at *elite levels*?

Clarification: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.19 to -1.52	0	No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
-1.52 to 0.02	1	Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
0.02 to 0.83	2	Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
0.83 to 1.31	3	Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
1.31 to 2.61	4	Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
2.61 to 4.18	5	Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.7.1.5 Engaged society (C) (v2dlengage)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.24 to -1.44	0	Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
-1.44 to -0.26	1	Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
-0.26 to 0.61	2	Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.
0.61 to 1.54	3	Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.
1.54 to 2.53	4	Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.
2.53 to 3.78	5	Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.7.1.6 Particularistic or public goods (C) (v2dlencmps)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelistic", or "private goods."
Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.
Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.93 to -1.46	0	Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
-1.46 to -0.27	1	Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods.
-0.27 to 0.47	2	Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
0.47 to 1.77	3	Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.
1.77 to 3.5	4	Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.7.1.7 Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C) (v2dlunivl)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.
A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (*e.g.*, when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.
The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.46 to -1.2	0	There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).
-1.2 to -0.58	1	Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.
-0.58 to 0.13	2	Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
0.13 to 0.73	3	The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.
0.73 to 1.81	4	Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., 1/4 or 1/3) are means-tested.
1.81 to 3.52	5	Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.8 The Judiciary

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Judiciary: This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless otherwise prompted, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system at every level, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, *e.g.* an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Seven of the questions about the judiciary concern high courts. By "high court" we are asking you to consider the country's constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the court of last resort for constitutional matters. If there is no court in your country with constitutional jurisdiction, please consider the highest ordinary court of the state.

For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia in the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court or review body. The Supreme Court is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider it to be the high court of the United States. smallskip If your country's highest judicial body has separate divisions, only one of which is dedicated to final constitutional review, please consider that division to be the high court if its judges are permanently assigned to that division only. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If a new high court was established in a given year, please consider that court as the high court for the purposes of these questions only if the court was functioning for the majority of the calendar year. If a new high court was established in a given year, but did not start functioning until a subsequent year, please do not consider the new court as the high court until it was functioning for the majority of the given calendar year. If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (*e.g.*, the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (*e.g.*, the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens "on the ground"). In order to clarify the *de jure*/*de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

3.8.1 General

3.8.1.1 Judicial reform (C) (v2jureform)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton
Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?

Clarification: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.77 to -1.29	0	The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was reduced via institutional reform.
-1.29 to 1.24	1	There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.
1.24 to 3.57	2	The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was enhanced via institutional reform.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.8.1.2 Judicial purges (C) (v2jupurge)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (*i.e.*, when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.3 to -2.15	0	There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.
-2.15 to -1.01	1	There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.
-1.01 to -0.2	2	There were limited arbitrary removals.
-0.2 to 0.89	3	Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.
0.89 to 2.97	4	Judges were not removed from their posts.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this

document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.8.1.3 Government attacks on judiciary (C) (v2jupoatck)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

Clarification: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.29 to -2.55	0	Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.
-2.55 to -1.56	1	Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.
-1.56 to -0.43	2	Attacks occurred more than once.
-0.43 to 0.84	3	There were attacks, but they were rare.
0.84 to 3.14	4	There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.8.1.4 Court packing (C) (v2jupack)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (*i.e.* when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.22 to -2.19	0	There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.
-2.19 to -1.22	1	There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.
-1.22 to -0.45	2	There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.
-0.45 to 2.16	3	Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: A previous version of the variable contained category "4: There was no increase". As of November 2014, all responses in category "4" are assigned to category "3", since the two responses have the same meaning in practice.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.8.1.5 Judicial accountability (C) (v2juaccnt)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.88 to -1.6	0	Never.
-1.6 to 0.3	1	Seldom.
0.3 to 0.85	2	About half of the time.
0.85 to 2.69	3	Usually.
2.69 to 3.88	4	Always.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.6 Judicial corruption decision (C) (v2jucorrdc)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.24 to -2.79	0	Always.
-2.79 to -0.78	1	Usually.
-0.78 to 0.09	2	About half of the time.
0.09 to 2.22	3	Not usually.
2.22 to 3.74	4	Never.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.7 High court name (A*) (v2juhcname)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Please enter the name of the high court.

Clarification: As accurately as possible, please provide a literal translation of the name of the court in English, followed by the name in the native language, or a transcription transliteration thereof, within parentheses.

Responses:
Text.

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A(C)) from version 7. Where possible, data was pre-coded, and CEs were asked to add their answers to the remaining gaps.

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.8 High court independence (C) (v2juhcind)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?

Clarification: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without "merely reflecting" those wishes, *i.e.* a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. By "merely reflect the wishes of the government" we mean that the court's own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view of the record.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.52 to -1.54	0	Always.
-1.54 to -0.12	1	Usually.
-0.12 to 0.54	2	About half of the time.
0.54 to 2.17	3	Seldom.
2.17 to 3.49	4	Never.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.9 Lower court independence (C) (v2juncind)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When judges *not* on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.32 to -1.58	0	Always.
-1.58 to -0.06	1	Usually.
-0.06 to 0.68	2	About half of the time.
0.68 to 2.48	3	Seldom.
2.48 to 3.23	4	Never.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.10 Compliance with high court (C) (v2juhccomp)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.75 to -1.89	0	Never.
-1.89 to -0.56	1	Seldom.
-0.56 to 0.07	2	About half of the time.
0.07 to 1.99	3	Usually.
1.99 to 3.15	4	Always.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.11 Compliance with judiciary (C) (v2jucomp)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

Clarification: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.59 to -2.06	0	Never.
-2.06 to -0.64	1	Seldom.
-0.64 to 0.08	2	About half of the time.
0.08 to 2.21	3	Usually.
2.21 to 3.3	4	Always.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.12 Judicial review (C) (v2jureview)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (*e.g.* statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.72 to 0.52	0	No.
0.52 to 2.01	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.8.1.13 Codeable (A) (v2jucodable)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Can we generate a flowchart describing the appointment process from this constitutional event?

Clarification: This variable indicates the reasons we could or could not create a visual flowchart representing the selection procedure.

Responses:

1. Yes
2. No, the event is in a language the coder can not read
3. No, there is no appointment or removal information
4. No, the process is explicitly left to be developed via a statute
5. Yes, but much of the process is left to law

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in Elkins & Ginsburg (2025).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1901-2015

3.8.1.14 Corresponding flowchart (A) (v2juflow)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Is a flowchart of the process available?

Clarification: This variable indicates if a flowchart summarizing the appointment process was generated and is available.

Responses:

0. No
1. Yes

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in Elkins & Ginsburg (2025).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1901-2015

3.8.1.15 Language (A) (v2julanguage)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: In which language is the constitutional event written?

Clarification: If the Comparative Constitutions Project had the same constitutional event in both an English and a non-English language, we used the English version.

Responses:

1. English
2. French
3. German
4. Spanish
27. Arabic
43. Azerbaijani
82. Czech
229. Korean
245. Latvian
249. Lithuanian
282. Maltese

306. Nepali
312. Norwegian Nynorsk; Nynorsk, Norwegian
343. Polish
345. Portuguese
357. Romanian; Moldavian; Moldovan
382. Slovak
409. Swahili
410. Swedish
441. Turkish
485. Greek
113. German
121. Dutch; Flemish
130. Estonian
136. Persian
151. Georgian
170. Hebrew
180. Hungarian
185. Icelandic

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in Elkins & Ginsburg (2025).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1901-2015

3.8.1.16 Team translated (A) (v2juteamtr)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: For constitutions not available in English, did our coders translate the relevant sections of a non-English event?

Clarification: This variable indicates whether someone on our coding team read the constitutional event in a non-English language and translated information in order to collect the necessary information.

Responses:

0: No
1: Yes, this event was translated by our team

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in Elkins & Ginsburg (2025).

Data release: 9-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1901-2015

3.9 Civil Liberty

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Civil Liberty: The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*). Note that if there is significant variation in the respect for a particular civil liberty across the territory, the score should reflect the "average situation" across the territorial scope of the country unit (for each period) as defined in the coder instructions.

3.9.1 Personal Integrity Rights

3.9.1.1 Freedom from torture (C) (v2cltort)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there freedom from torture?

Clarification: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (*e.g.*, police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.34 to -1.55	0	Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.
-1.55 to -0.34	1	Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.
-0.34 to 0.46	2	Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.
0.46 to 2.14	3	Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.
2.14 to 3.61	4	Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.1.2 Freedom from political killings (C) (v2clkill)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there freedom from political killings?

Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.43 to -1.56	0	Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
-1.56 to -0.51	1	Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.
-0.51 to 0.26	2	Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
0.26 to 1.58	3	Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.
1.58 to 3.47	4	Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.1.3 Freedom from forced labor for men (C) (v2clslavem)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.11 to -2.04	0	Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
-2.04 to -1.02	1	Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
-1.02 to -0.02	2	Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.
-0.02 to 1.24	3	Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
1.24 to 3.06	4	Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.1.4 Freedom from forced labor for women (C) (v2clslavef)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.
This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.22 to -2.06	0	Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
-2.06 to -0.94	1	Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
-0.94 to 0.11	2	Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.
0.11 to 1.44	3	Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
1.44 to 3.01	4	Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.2 Impartial Enforcement

3.9.2.1 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (C) (v2cltrnslw)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

Clarification: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.94 to -1.86	0	Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.
-1.86 to -0.69	1	Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.
-0.69 to 0.72	2	Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.
0.72 to 2.25	3	Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.
2.25 to 4.04	4	Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.9.2.2 Rigorous and impartial public administration (C) (v2clrspct)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

Clarification: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (*i.e.*, nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).
The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.62 to -1.96	0	The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.
-1.96 to -0.52	1	The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.
-0.52 to 0.63	2	The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.
0.63 to 2.18	3	The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.
2.18 to 4.01	4	The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.2.3 Access to justice for men (C) (v2clacjstm)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.
This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.39 to -2.23	0	Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.
-2.23 to -0.78	1	Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.
-0.78 to 0.61	2	Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
0.61 to 2	3	Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.
2 to 3.8	4	Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.2.4 Access to justice for women (C) (v2clacjstw)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.
This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus,

it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.92 to -1.99	0	Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.
-1.99 to -0.49	1	Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.
-0.49 to 0.8	2	Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
0.8 to 2.18	3	Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
2.18 to 3.94	4	Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.2.5 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (C) (v2clacjust)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.06 to -0.93	0	Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.
-0.93 to 0.11	1	Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.
0.11 to 1.01	2	Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.
1.01 to 2.32	3	Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.
2.32 to 3.37	4	Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.2.6 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clsocgrp)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.16 to -1.24	0	Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
-1.24 to -0.24	1	Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.
-0.24 to 0.57	2	Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.
0.57 to 1.7	3	Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.
1.7 to 3.49	4	Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.2.7 Subnational civil liberties unevenness (C) (v2clrgunev)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.11 to -0.92	0	Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.
-0.92 to 0.74	1	Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.
0.74 to 2.97	2	No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: If answer is "2" skip remaining civil liberties questions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.2.8 Stronger civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgstch)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger*?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_1]
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_2]
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_3]
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_4]
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_5]
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_6]
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_7]
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_8]
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_9]
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_10]
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_11]
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_12]
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_13]
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_14]
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_15]
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_16]
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_21]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.9.2.9 Weaker civil liberties population (C) (v2clsnlpct)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker* than the country average?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.9.2.10 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgwkch)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker*?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_1]
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_2]
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_3]
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_4]
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_5]
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_6]
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_7]
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_8]
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_9]
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_10]
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_11]
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_12]
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_13]
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_14]
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_15]
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_16]
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_21]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.9.3 Private and Political Liberties

3.9.3.1 Freedom of discussion for men (C) (v2cldiscm)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.
This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is

possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.68 to -1.89	0	Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
-1.89 to -0.72	1	Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
-0.72 to 0.27	2	Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
0.27 to 1.48	3	Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.
1.48 to 3.61	4	Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.3.2 Freedom of discussion for women (C) (v2cldiscw)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.78 to -1.92	0	Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
-1.92 to -0.75	1	Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
-0.75 to 0.22	2	Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
0.22 to 1.47	3	Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.
1.47 to 3.47	4	Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.3.3 Freedom of academic and cultural expression (C) (v2clacfree)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.42 to -1.54	0	Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.
-1.54 to -0.46	1	Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.
-0.46 to 0.51	2	Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.
0.51 to 1.96	3	Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.
1.96 to 3.63	4	Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this

document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.3.4 Freedom of religion (C) (v2clrelig)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there freedom of religion?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.85 to -2.33	0	Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.
-2.33 to -1.11	1	Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.
-1.11 to -0.16	2	Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.
-0.16 to 1.06	3	Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.
1.06 to 2.99	4	Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.3.5 Freedom of foreign movement (C) (v2clfmove)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.91 to -2.22	0	Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.
-2.22 to -0.96	1	Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.
-0.96 to -0.02	2	Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.
-0.02 to 0.91	3	Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.
0.91 to 2.94	4	Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.3.6 Freedom of domestic movement for men (C) (v2cldmovem)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.83 to -2.85	0	Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea).
-2.85 to -1.67	1	Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
-1.67 to -0.56	2	Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.
-0.56 to 0.48	3	Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
0.48 to 2.71	4	Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.3.7 Freedom of domestic movement for women (C) (v2cldmovew)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.65 to -2.75	0	Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).
-2.75 to -1.37	1	Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
-1.37 to -0.26	2	Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.
-0.26 to 0.82	3	Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
0.82 to 2.71	4	Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem*

Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.4 Property Rights

3.9.4.1 State ownership of economy (C) (v2clstown)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

Clarification: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.
It does *not* measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.25 to -2.54	0	Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.
-2.54 to -1.05	1	Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.
-1.05 to 0.21	2	Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.
0.21 to 2.07	3	Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.
2.07 to 3.31	4	Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.4.2 Property rights for men (C) (v2clprptym)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property. This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is

possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.38 to -2.83	0	Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.
-2.83 to -1.38	1	Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
-1.38 to -0.68	2	Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
-0.68 to -0.18	3	More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.
-0.18 to 0.7	4	Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
0.7 to 2.69	5	Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.9.4.3 Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property. This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.84 to -2.08	0	Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
-2.08 to -0.65	1	Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
-0.65 to 0	2	Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
0 to 0.52	3	More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.
0.52 to 1.42	4	Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
1.42 to 3.28	5	Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10 Sovereignty/State

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Sovereignty: This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the state. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

Sovereignty – Historical clarification: This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

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A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff – in this context termed the state administrators.

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3.10.1 General

3.10.1.1 Domestic autonomy (C) (v2svdomaut)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

Clarification: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (*e.g.*, NATO), international organizations (*e.g.*, the WTO), or confederations (*e.g.*, the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.45 to -1.61	0	Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power (e.g. Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (e.g., the USSR during WW II).
-1.61 to 0.02	1	Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (e.g., protectorates and limited home government).
0.02 to 2.24	2	Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.2 International autonomy (C) (v2svinlaut)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.29 to -1.41	0	Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).
-1.41 to 0.22	1	Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (e.g. Austria following WWII).
0.22 to 2.39	2	Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.3 State authority over territory (C) (v2svstterr)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?

Clarification: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, *e.g.* where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (*e.g.*, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (*e.g.* opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (*e.g.*, contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.
By "officially part of the country" we refer to international law. In cases where international

law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6, 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2svindep is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.4 State fiscal source of revenue (C) (v2stfisccap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: On which of the following sources of revenue does the central government primarily rely to finance its activities?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.3 to -2.23	0	The state is not capable of raising revenue to finance itself.
-2.23 to -0.69	1	The state primarily relies on external sources of funding (loans and foreign aid) to finance its activities.
-0.69 to 0.48	2	The state primarily relies on directly controlling economic assets (natural resource rents, public monopolies, and the expropriation of assets within and outside the country) to finance its activities.
0.48 to 1.27	3	The state primarily relies on taxes on property (land taxes) and trade (customs duties).
1.27 to 3.14	4	The state primarily relies on taxes on economic transactions (such as sales taxes) and/or taxes on income, corporate profits and capital.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.5 Bureaucratic remuneration (C) (v2strenadm)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?

Clarification: A state administrator is anyone who works for the state administration. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work; work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes; private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the administration; contractors being paid on an irregular basis; or "parastatals" (those working for state-owned companies), since the latter are not paid directly

out of the state coffers. Note that the question refers to the practices obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.46 to -3.7	0	None or almost none are salaried state employees.
-3.7 to -1.52	1	A small share is salaried state employees.
-1.52 to -0.66	2	About half are salaried state employees.
-0.66 to 0.43	3	A substantial number are salaried state employees.
0.43 to 2.25	4	All or almost all are salaried state employees.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.6 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (C) (v2stcritrecadm)

Project Manager(s): Agnes Cornell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?

Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.2 to -1.93	0	All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
-1.93 to -0.11	1	Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
-0.11 to 1.01	2	Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
1.01 to 3.3	3	Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit.
3.3 to 3.72	4	None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem*

Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.7 Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (C) (v2stcritapparm)

Project Manager(s): Agnes Cornell, Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?

Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.06 to -2.51	0	All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
-2.51 to -0.69	1	Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
-0.69 to 0.2	2	Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
0.2 to 2.2	3	Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit.
2.2 to 3.09	4	None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: Ordinal.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.8 Remuneration in the Armed Forces (C) (v2strenarm)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Agnes Cornell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are members of the armed forces salaried employees?

Clarification: By members of the armed forces, we mean members of all ranks, excluding conscripts.

By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work, work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes, or private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the armed forces.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.35 to -3.86	0	None or almost none are salaried employees
-3.86 to -2.25	1	A small share is salaried employees
-2.25 to -1.39	2	About half are salaried employees
-1.39 to -0.43	3	A substantial number are salaried employees
-0.43 to 1.8	4	All or almost all are salaried employees

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: Ordinal.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.10.1.9 Independent states (A) (v2svindep)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Bernhard

Question: Is the polity an independent state?

Clarification: We use Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) coding of independent states. Their definition recognizes that listing independent states relies at least in part on subjective evaluations. A state is considered to be an independent polity if it (a) has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, (b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on. Polities excluded from the list are: colonies; states that have some form of limited autonomy (*e.g.* Scotland); are alleged to be independent but are contiguous to the dominant entity (Ukraine and Belarus prior to 1991); *de facto* independent polities but recognized by at most one other state (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). Occupations or foreign rule are considered to be an actual loss of statehood when they extend beyond a decade. This means that cases such as the Baltic Republic during Soviet occupation are not considered independent states, but independent statehood is retained for European countries occupied during World War II.

Responses:

0: No
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025),Gleditsch & Ward (1999); Gleditsch & Ward (2013); International IDEA (2026c).

Notes: V-Dem uses the updated List of independent states (v.5.0), including the tentative list of microstates, posted on Gleditsch's webpage on 14 March 2013. We have reconciled Gleditsch and Ward's data with the V-Dem country definitions (see the document "V-Dem Countries v1.1").

Data release: 3-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11 Civil Society

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Civil society organization: The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

Civil society organization – Historical clarification: The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

If no CSOs exist at all for a particular time period, code the following relevant questions as giving the "lowest score" (indicating, for instance, strong repression or no consultation, a 0).

Religious organizations: In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

3.11.1 General

3.11.1.1 CSO entry and exit (C) (v2cseeorgs)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.27 to -1.42	0	Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.
-1.42 to -0.16	1	Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.
-0.16 to 0.74	2	Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.
0.74 to 1.88	3	Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.
1.88 to 3.66	4	Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.2 CSO repression (C) (v2csreprss)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.72 to -1.96	0	Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.
-1.96 to -0.66	1	Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.
-0.66 to 0.27	2	Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.
0.27 to 1.47	3	Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.
1.47 to 3.34	4	No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: For reasons of consistency, as of December 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.3 CSO consultation (C) (v2cscnsult)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.54 to -0.19	0	No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.
-0.19 to 1.68	1	To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.
1.68 to 3.7	2	Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.4 CSO structure (C) (v2csstruc)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

Responses:

0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_0]

1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_1]

2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_2]

3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_3]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.5 CSO participatory environment (C) (v2csprtcpt)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations

(CSOs)?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.49 to -1.26	0	Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.
-1.26 to -0.12	1	Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.
-0.12 to 1.35	2	There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.
1.35 to 3.22	3	There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.6 CSO women's participation (C) (v2csgender)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Clarification: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.68 to -1.9	0	Almost always.
-1.9 to -0.93	1	Frequently.
-0.93 to -0.31	2	About half the time.
-0.31 to 0.84	3	Rarely.
0.84 to 2.66	4	Almost never.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

3.11.1.7 CSO anti-system movements (C) (v2csantimv)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?

Clarification: An anti-system opposition movement is any movement — peaceful or armed — that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, *e.g.*, from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a "movement" character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.
If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.34 to -1.31	0	No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.
-1.31 to -0.01	1	There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.
-0.01 to 0.96	2	There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.
0.96 to 1.89	3	There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.
1.89 to 4.04	4	There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: If coded "0", skip the following questions focused on anti-system movements.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.8 CSO anti-system movement character (C) (v2csanmvch)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

Clarification: Check all that apply.

Responses:

0: Works through legal channels, for the most part. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_0]
1: Participates in elections. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_1]
2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_2]
3: Insurrectionary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_3]
4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_4]
5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_5]
6: Leftist, socialist, communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_6]

7: Rightist, conservative, party of order. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_7]
8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_8]
9: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_9]
10: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_10]
11: Paramilitary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_11]
12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, *e.g.*, narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_12]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.9 Religious organization repression (C) (v2csrlgrep)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.06 to -2.28	0	Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.
-2.28 to -1.11	1	Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).
-1.11 to -0.24	2	Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.
-0.24 to 0.85	3	Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.
0.85 to 3.1	4	No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.11.1.10 Religious organization consultation (C) (v2csrlgcon)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.17 to -0.63	0	No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.
-0.63 to 1.1	1	To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.
1.1 to 3.06	2	Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.12 The Media

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Media: Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

Historical clarification: Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

3.12.1 General

3.12.1.1 Government censorship effort — Media (C) (v2mecenefm)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

Clarification: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.
We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.12 to -1.03	0	Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
-1.03 to -0.32	1	Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
-0.32 to 0.41	2	Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
0.41 to 1.88	3	Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
1.88 to 3.49	4	The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.12.1.2 Internet censorship effort (C) (v2mecenefi)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

Clarification: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.04 to -2.26	0	The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.
-2.26 to -1.15	1	The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.
-1.15 to 0.22	2	The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.
0.22 to 2.31	3	The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, the former category "0 There is no internet" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1993-2025

3.12.1.3 Internet binary (C) (v2mecenefibin)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there Internet in this country?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.65 to 1.03	0	No.
1.03 to 2.75	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this

document).

Years: 1993-2025

3.12.1.4 Print/broadcast media critical (C) (v2mecrit)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.41 to -1.74	0	None.
-1.74 to -0.28	1	Only a few marginal outlets.
-0.28 to 1.47	2	Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.
1.47 to 3.42	3	All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.12.1.5 Print/broadcast media perspectives (C) (v2merange)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.19 to -1.22	0	The major media represent only the government's perspective.
-1.22 to -0.28	1	The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.
-0.28 to 1.2	2	The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.
1.2 to 2.95	3	All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.12.1.6 Female journalists (C) (v2mefemjrn)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Please estimate the percentage (%) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.12.1.7 Harassment of journalists (C) (v2meharjrn)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are individual journalists harassed — *i.e.*, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.33 to -1.78	0	No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
-1.78 to -0.32	1	Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.
-0.32 to 1.22	2	Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.
1.22 to 2.8	3	It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.
2.8 to 4.13	4	Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.12.1.8 Media self-censorship (C) (v2meslfcen)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.26 to -1.35	0	Self-censorship is complete and thorough.
-1.35 to -0.02	1	Self-censorship is common but incomplete.
-0.02 to 1.73	2	There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.
1.73 to 3.45	3	There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.12.1.9 Media bias (C) (v2mebias)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

Clarification: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered "more or less impartial" when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.35 to -1.5	0	The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.
-1.5 to -0.58	1	The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.
-0.58 to 0.28	2	The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.
0.28 to 1.66	3	The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates.
1.66 to 3.08	4	The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.12.1.10 Media corrupt (C) (v2mecorrpt)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.37 to -1.29	0	The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.
-1.29 to -0.62	1	Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.
-0.62 to 0.27	2	It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.
0.27 to 1.77	3	It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.
1.77 to 3.43	4	Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.13 Political Equality

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Political Equality: This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

3.13.1 General

3.13.1.1 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C) (v2pepwrses)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.36 to -1.43	0	Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
-1.43 to -0.27	1	Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.
-0.27 to 0.88	2	Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.
0.88 to 2.38	3	Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.
2.38 to 3.52	4	Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.13.1.2 Power distributed by social group (C) (v2pepwrsoc)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.84 to -1	0	Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
-1 to 0.04	1	Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
0.04 to 1.01	2	Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
1.01 to 2.45	3	Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another — but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.
2.45 to 3.3	4	All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.13.1.3 Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrgen)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.89 to -1.01	0	Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
-1.01 to 0.36	1	Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
0.36 to 1.79	2	Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
1.79 to 3.6	3	Men have somewhat more political power than women.
3.6 to 3.96	4	Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

3.13.1.4 Power distributed by sexual orientation (C) (v2pepwrort)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

Clarification: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as "heterosexual" and (B) as "LGBT."
Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.55 to -0.43	0	LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).
-0.43 to 1.06	1	LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.
1.06 to 2.1	2	LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.
2.1 to 4.36	3	LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.
4.36 to 4.91	4	LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem*

Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.13.1.5 Educational equality (C) (v2peedueq)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.45 to -1.49	0	Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
-1.49 to -0.27	1	Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
-0.27 to 0.71	2	Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
0.71 to 1.91	3	Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
1.91 to 3.57	4	Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.13.1.6 Health equality (C) (v2pehealth)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.55 to -1.62	0	Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
-1.62 to -0.24	1	Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
-0.24 to 0.66	2	Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
0.66 to 2	3	Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (percent) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
2 to 3.67	4	Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (percent) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.13.1.7 Primary school enrolment (A) (v2peprisch)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Question: What percentage of the primary school-aged population is enrolled in primary school?

Clarification: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on primary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

Source(s): Barro & Lee (2013).

Data release: 6-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1820-2010

3.13.1.8 Secondary school enrolment (A) (v2pesecsch)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Question: What percentage of the secondary school-aged population is enrolled in secondary school?

Clarification: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on secondary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

Source(s): Barro & Lee (2013).

Data release: 6-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1820-2010

3.13.1.9 Tertiary school enrolment (A) (v2petersch)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Question: What percentage of the tertiary school-aged population is enrolled in tertiary school?

Clarification: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on tertiary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

Source(s): Barro & Lee (2013).

Data release: 6-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1820-2010

3.14 Exclusion

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Exclusion: The following survey contains questions pertaining to exclusion. Political, economic and social well-being may depend on whether groups or individuals are excluded from positions of power, the state's protection of rights and freedoms, access to public goods and services, and opportunities to work or do business with the state.

Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for all members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

Political groups are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward the incumbent's political supporters and punish non-supporters.

Socio-Economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

Geographic group refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer and there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

3.14.1 Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group

3.14.1.1 Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position (C) (v2peapsecon)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to socioeconomic position?

Clarification: This question asks if socio-economic position is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular socio-economic position, the code should be "4" (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a socio-economic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.1.2 Access to state jobs by socio-economic position (C) (v2peasjsoecon)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

Clarification: Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, makes 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.1.3 Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position (C) (v2peasbecon)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

Clarification: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income makes 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income makes 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.2 Exclusion by Gender

3.14.2.1 Gender equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clgencl)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

0: Women enjoy much fewer civil liberties than men.
1: Women enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than men.
2: Women enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than men.
3: Women enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than men.
4: Women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.2.2 Access to public services distributed by gender (C) (v2peapsgen)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to gender?

Clarification: This question asks if gender is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between gender, the code should be "4" (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that women are denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (%) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (%) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (%) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (%) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (%) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.2.3 Access to state jobs by gender (C) (v2peasjgen)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of gender?

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.2.4 Access to state business opportunities by gender (C) (v2peasbgen)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of gender?

Clarification: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their gender, 5 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.3 Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location

3.14.3.1 Power distributed by urban-rural location (C) (v2pepwrgeo)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is political power distributed according to urban-rural location?

Clarification: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

Responses:

0: People living in urban areas have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: People living in urban areas have a dominant hold on political power. Those living in rural areas have only marginal influence.

2: People living in urban areas have much more political power but those living in rural areas have some areas of influence.

3: People living in urban areas have somewhat more political power than those living in rural areas.

4: People living in any area have roughly equal political power or people living in rural areas have more access to political power than those in urban areas.

5: People living in rural areas have much more political power but those living in urban areas have some areas of influence.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.3.2 Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clgeocl)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do those who reside in rural areas enjoy same level of civil liberties as those residing in urban areas?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across geographic areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road (World Development Report, 2009: 54). Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

0: Those who live in rural areas enjoy much fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
1: Those who live in rural areas enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
2: Those who live in rural areas enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
3: Those who live in rural areas enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
4: Residents of rural areas enjoy the same level of civil liberties as those in urban areas.
5: Residents of rural areas enjoy more civil liberties than those in urban areas.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.3.3 Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (C) (v2peapsgeo)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across urban and rural areas?

Clarification: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54). This question asks if geographic group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between urban and rural areas, the code should be "4" (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a geographic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population

lack access to basic public services of good quality.
4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
5: Rural-Bias: Because they live in urban areas, 25% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.3.4 Access to state jobs by urban-rural location (C) (v2peasjgeo)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their rural or urban location?

Clarification: Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

Responses:
0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.3.5 Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (C) (v2peasbegeo)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of their rural or urban locations?

Clarification: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public

procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.4 Exclusion by Political Group

3.14.4.1 Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clpolcl)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do members of all political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of enjoyment of civil liberties. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

0: Some political groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

1: Some political groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

2: Some political groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

3: Some political groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than other political groups.

4: All political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.4.2 Access to public services distributed by political group (C) (v2peapspol)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups?

Clarification: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be "4" (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.4.3 Access to state jobs by political group (C) (v2peasjpol)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political group?

Clarification: A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.4.4 Access to state business opportunities by political group (C) (v2peasbepol)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of an individual's association with a political group?

Clarification: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of access to power. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack equal access to state business opportunities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.5 Exclusion by Social Group

3.14.5.1 Access to public services distributed by social group (C) (v2peapssoc)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across social groups?

Clarification: This question asks if social group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular social groups, the code should be "4" (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a social group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.5.2 Access to state jobs by social group (C) (v2peasjsoc)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of social group?

Clarification: Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
1: Unequal. Because of their social group identity, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group identity, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group identity, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
4: Equal. Because of their social group identity, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.5.3 Access to state business opportunities by social group (C) (v2peasbsoc)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of social group?

Clarification: State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public

procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.6 Legitimation

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Legitimation strategies: Governments make legitimacy claims–provide justifications for the form of rule under which they govern. In the following section we are interested in the nature of the legitimacy claims made by the sitting government. Please note that the government's claims to legitimacy - their legitimation strategies - are the object of inquiry here. We are not asking you to assess how ordinary people judge the legitimacy of their rulers. Do not assume that governments make legitimacy claims on only one basis. We are interested in multi-track and hybrid legitimation strategies. The regime is understood as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their exercise of power. The government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants.

3.14.6.1 Ideology (C) (v2exl_legitideol)

Project Manager(s): Marcus Tannenberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?

Responses:

0: Not at all.

1: To a small extent.

2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.

3: To a large extent but not exclusively.

4: Almost exclusively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Tannenberg et al. (2021); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.6.2 Ideology character (C) (v2exl_legitideolcr)

Project Manager(s): Marcus Tannenberg

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?

Clarification: Check all that apply.

Responses:

0: Nationalist (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr_0]
1: Socialist or communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr _1]
2: Restorative or conservative. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr _2]
3: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr _3]
4: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl_legitideolcr _4]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Tannenberg et al. (2021); V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.6.3 Person of the Leader (C) (v2exl_legitlead)

Project Manager(s): Marcus Tannenberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?

Clarification: The Chief Executive refers to the Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office. We are interested in the key leadership figure.

Responses:

0: Not at all.
1: To a small extent.
2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
4: Almost exclusively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Tannenberg et al. (2021); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.6.4 Performance legitimation (C) (v2exl_legitperf)

Project Manager(s): Marcus Tannenberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?

Responses:
0: Not at all.
1: To a small extent.
2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
4: Almost exclusively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Tannenberg et al. (2021); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.14.6.5 Rational-legal legitimation (C) (v2exl_legitratio)

Project Manager(s): Marcus Tannenberg

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place?

Clarification: This question pertains to legal norms and regulations as laid out for instance in the constitution regarding access to power (e.g. elections) as well as exercise of power (e.g. rule of law). Electoral regimes may score high on this question as well as non-electoral regimes that emphasize their rule-boundedness.

Responses:
0: Not at all.
1: To a small extent.
2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
4: Almost exclusively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Tannenberg et al. (2021); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

3.15 Civic and Academic Space

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Civic and Academic Space: In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

3.15.1 Civic Space

3.15.1.1 Political polarization (C) (v2cacamps)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?

Clarification: Here we refer to the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.81 to -2.13	0	Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.
-2.13 to -0.83	1	Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.
-0.83 to 0.17	2	Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.
0.17 to 1.34	3	Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.
1.34 to 3.94	4	Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.1.2 Political violence (C) (v2caviol)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?

Clarification: We understand political violence as the use of physical force to achieve political objectives by non-state actors. The restriction to political objectives excludes profit-driven crime-related violence, for instance. By non-state actors we refer to individuals or entities that are not formally part of the state. Thus, politically oriented militias and youth groups count as non-state actors even though they might potentially be informally affiliated with the ruling party or the state. Political violence against persons excludes psychological and symbolic violence (e.g. destruction of objects).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.43 to -1.63	0	Not at all. Non-state actors did not use political violence.
-1.63 to -0.19	1	Rare. Non-state actors rarely used political violence.
-0.19 to 0.89	2	Occasionally. Non-state actors occasionally used political violence.
0.89 to 1.87	3	Frequently. Non-state actors frequently used political violence.
1.87 to 4.32	4	Often. Non-state actors often used political violence.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.15.1.3 Freedom of peaceful assembly (C) (v2caassemb)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly?

Clarification: This question focuses on the ability to assemble publically in practice. An assembly is "an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose" (ODIHR and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.47 to -1.73	0	Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them.
-1.73 to -0.71	1	Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them.
-0.71 to 0.26	2	Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.
0.26 to 1.64	3	Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.
1.64 to 3.49	4	Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem*

Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.1.4 State of emergency (C) (v2casoe)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Was a national state of emergency in place at any point this year?

Clarification: A state of emergency is a formal legal act that enables state actors and institutions to change their roles during times of international or domestic crisis. Our definition of state of emergency includes the application of martial law. If there was more than one state of emergency, code the one that was in place for the longer time. Select one option.

Responses:

0: The legal framework does not allow for a declaration of a national state of emergency. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_0]

1: There was no state of emergency in place at any point this year, even though provisions for a declaration of a national state of emergency exist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_1]

2: A national state of emergency was in place due to a natural disaster. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_2]

3: A national state of emergency was in place due to a terrorist attack. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_3]

4: A national state of emergency was in place due to an armed conflict/war, domestically or internationally. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_4]

5: A national state of emergency was in place due to mass protest/popular uprising. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_5]

6: A national state of emergency was in place for reasons other than those listed above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe_6]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.2 Mass Mobilization

The following four questions concern the participation of citizens in events of political mass mobilization, such as demonstrations, strikes, protests, riots, and sit–ins.

We first ask generally about participation in events of mass mobilization and then distinguish between mass mobilization for two different aims: democratic and autocratic.

These events are typically organized by non–state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

3.15.2.1 Mass mobilization (C) (v2cagenmob)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization been?

Clarification: This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.57 to -1.4	0	There have been virtually no events.
-1.4 to -0.23	1	There have been several small-scale events.
-0.23 to 0.35	2	There have been many small-scale events.
0.35 to 1.56	3	There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.
1.56 to 4.1	4	There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.2.2 Mass mobilization concentration (C) (v2caconmob)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Were mass mobilization events concentrated in the capital?

Clarification: This question is about the geographic location of the events and not their intensity. In the unlikely event that no event at all took place, code option 2. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.07 to -0.77	0	Yes. Events of mass mobilization were much more frequent in the capital.
-0.77 to 0.37	1	Somewhat. Events of mass mobilization were somewhat more frequent in the capital.
0.37 to 1.82	2	No. Events of mass mobilization were as common in many cities across the country as in the capital or did not take place at all.
1.82 to 4.01	3	No. Events of mass mobilization were more common in cities other than the capital.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.15.2.3 Mobilization for democracy (C) (v2cademmob)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims been?

Clarification: Events are pro-democratic if they are organized with the explicit aim to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections with multiple parties, and courts and parliaments; or if they are in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.37 to -1.02	0	There have been virtually no events.
-1.02 to 0	1	There have been several small-scale events.
0 to 0.57	2	There have been many small-scale events.
0.57 to 1.68	3	There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.
1.68 to 4.64	4	There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Hellmeier & Bernhard (2022); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.2.4 Mobilization for autocracy (C) (v2caautmob)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-autocratic aims been?

Clarification: Events are pro-autocratic if they are organized explicitly in support of non-democratic rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy, or are generally aiming to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.52 to -0.33	0	There have been virtually no events.
-0.33 to 0.6	1	There have been several small-scale events.
0.6 to 1.1	2	There have been many small-scale events.
1.1 to 2.22	3	There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.
2.22 to 4.72	4	There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Hellmeier & Bernhard (2022); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

3.15.3 Citizen Engagement

The following four questions concern citizen engagement in a variety of associations. We are not concerned with mere membership in such organizations, but with the extent to which citizens actively participate in such organizations. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

We distinguish between four types of associations. State-administered mass organizations are created and led by the government with compulsory or voluntary membership for specific societal groups. The other three types of associations—trade unions, political associations and non-political associations—are all independent from the state and membership is always voluntary.

3.15.3.1 Engagement in state-administered mass organizations (C) (v2castate)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What share of the population is regularly active in state-administered mass associations, such as women, worker or youth leagues?

Clarification: State-administered mass associations are civilian organizations created and led by the government or the ruling party. Large shares of specific societal groups are voluntary or compulsory members of these associations. Examples include youth leagues such as the Hitlerjugend in Nazi Germany and the pioneers in the Soviet Union, women leagues such as the Women's Federation in China or the Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas and official trade unions in the Soviet Union. Such organizations are formally or informally affiliated with the state and/or with the ruling party. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.39 to -1.54	0	Virtually no one.
-1.54 to -0.26	1	A small share of the population (less than 5%).
-0.26 to 0.7	2	A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
0.7 to 1.52	3	A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
1.52 to 3.8	4	A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.3.2 Engagement in independent trade unions (C) (v2catrauni)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions?

Clarification: An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.15 to -1.43	0	Virtually no one.
-1.43 to 0.06	1	A small share of the population (less than 5%).
0.06 to 1.27	2	A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
1.27 to 2.31	3	A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
2.31 to 3.62	4	A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.3.3 Engagement in independent political associations (C) (v2capolit)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?

Clarification: Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.06 to -1.05	0	Virtually no one.
-1.05 to 0.8	1	A small share of the population (less than 5%).
0.8 to 2.05	2	A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
2.05 to 3.17	3	A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
3.17 to 3.92	4	A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.3.4 Engagement in independent non-political associations (C) (v2canonpol)

Project Manager(s): Sebastian Hellmeier

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups, or support groups?

Clarification: Non-political associations include all associations whose main purpose is not the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties, or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting activity or event at least twice a year.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.66 to -1.89	0	Virtually no one.
-1.89 to -0.15	1	A small share of the population (less than 5%).
-0.15 to 1.02	2	A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
1.02 to 2.05	3	A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
2.05 to 3.51	4	A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4 Academic Space

University: "Universities" are all higher education institutions, both public and private. They include institutions such as research universities, universities of applied sciences, undergraduate colleges, polytechnic universities and international campuses.

The questions in the following section ask you to generalize across universities in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that circumstances may vary between institutions and geographic regions. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the prevailing practices and conditions are. Thus, when generalizing across diverse types of institutions, it is important to bear in mind their relative importance in the higher education sector of the country.

Scholar: By "scholar" or "academic", we understand qualified researchers and lecturers affiliated with a university.

Non-academic actor: By "non-academic actor", we mean individuals and groups that are not a scientifically trained university affiliate. Non-academic actors include individuals and groups such as politicians, party secretaries, externally appointed university management, businesses, foundations, other private funders, religious groups and advocacy groups.

In some countries, the first university was only founded during the coding period (1900-2019). In this case, you will only be shown the coding grid starting with the first year of the existence of universities. If you have any corrections to this pre-coded data, please add them in the comments field below.

In the event that all universities were closed down in a given year, please add a note in the comments field at the end of the section. Then assess the closure's impact on the academic space by following the indicators introduced below. The impact will differ depending on the reason for closure.

3.15.4.1 Existence of universities (A*) (v2cauni)

Project Manager(s): Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel

Question: Have universities existed in this country?

Clarification: This indicator captures if universities have (ever) existed in this country. Thus, even if all universities were temporarily closed in a given year, this indicator is coded as 1 ("yes").

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Apfeld (2019) drawing on Atuzzo (2019); International Association of Universities (2026), various country-specific sources.

Notes: Country-specific sources were consulted where 4icu.org and whed.net suggested conflicting years of establishment of first university.

Data release: 10-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4.2 Total number of universities (A) (v2canuni)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Brendan Apfeld

Question: What is the total number of universities?

Clarification: The total number of universities founded in or before the given year. Universities are considered to be degree-granting institutions of higher education that grant at least one bachelor's degree or its equivalent, corresponding to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 6-8.

Responses:
Numeric

Scale: Interval

Source(s): Apfeld (2019) drawing on Atuzzo (2019).

Data release: 10-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2016

3.15.4.3 Constitutional protection for academic freedom (A) (v2caprotac)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Janika Spannagel

Question: Do constitutional provisions for the protection of academic freedom exist?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
95: Constitution suspended.
97: Other, or undetermined.
99: Missing.

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): Spannagel (2023); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025).

Notes: This variable was substantially revised in Version 13 on the basis of new available data. For the online graphing tools, all values but 0 or 1 are set to missing.

Data release: 10-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4.4 Freedom to research and teach (C) (v2cafres)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are scholars free to develop and pursue their own research and teaching agendas without interference?

Clarification: Examples of interference include research agendas or teaching curricula being drafted, restricted, or fully censored by a non-academic actor; scholars being externally induced, through possible reprisals, to self-censor; or the university administration abusing its position of power to impose research or teaching agendas on individual academics. It also includes public pressure on academics - offline and online. We do not consider as interference restrictions that are due to research priorities, as well as ethical and quality standards, freely defined by the scholarly community as well as the development of standardized curricula by academics that aim to structure and enhance teaching.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.75 to -2.21	0	Completely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, across all disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
-2.21 to -0.78	1	Severely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, in some disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
-0.78 to 0.27	2	Moderately restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are occasionally subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
0.27 to 1.84	3	Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
1.84 to 3.41	4	Fully free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are not subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4.5 Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (C) (v2cafexch)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are scholars free to exchange and communicate research ideas and findings?

Clarification: Free academic exchange includes uncensored access to research material, unhindered participation in national or international academic conferences, and the uncensored publication of academic material. Free dissemination refers to the unrestricted possibility for scholars to share and explain research findings in their field of expertise to non-academic audiences through media engagement or public lectures.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.79 to -2.46	0	Completely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, across all disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
-2.46 to -0.96	1	Severely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, in some disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
-0.96 to 0.05	2	Moderately restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is occasionally subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
0.05 to 1.55	3	Mostly free. Academic exchange and dissemination is rarely subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
1.55 to 3.09	4	Fully free. Academic exchange and dissemination is not subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4.6 Institutional autonomy (C) (v2cainsaut)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent do universities exercise institutional autonomy in practice?

Clarification: Institutional autonomy "means the independence of institutions of higher education from the State and all other forces of society, to make decisions regarding its internal government, finance, administration, and to establish its policies of education, research, extension work and other related activities" (Lima Declaration). Note that institutional autonomy does not preclude universities from accepting state or third party funding, but does require that they remain in charge of all types of decisions listed above. Institutional autonomy does also not preclude a public oversight role by the state over universities' spending of public funds.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.76 to -1.97	0	No autonomy at all. Universities do not exercise any degree of institutional autonomy; non-academic actors control decision-making.
-1.97 to -0.52	1	Minimal autonomy. Universities exercise only very limited institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere extensively with decision-making.
-0.52 to 0.71	2	Moderate autonomy. Universities exercise some institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere moderately with decision-making.
0.71 to 2.45	3	Substantial autonomy. Universities exercise institutional autonomy to a large extent; non-academic actors have only rare and minimal influence on decision-making.
2.45 to 3.16	4	Complete autonomy. Universities exercise complete institutional autonomy from non-academic actors.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4.7 Campus integrity (C) (v2casurv)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements?

Clarification: "Campus" refers to all university buildings as well as digital research and teaching platforms. Campus integrity means the preservation of an open learning and research environment marked by an absence of an externally induced climate of insecurity or intimidation on campus. Examples of infringements of campus integrity are politically motivated on-campus or digital surveillance, presence by intelligence or security forces, presence of student militias, or violent attacks by third parties, if specifically targeting universities to repress academic life on campus. Note that we are only interested in politically motivated infringements and targeted attacks on campus integrity, not in non-political security concerns or proportionate security measures taken on campus to address these.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.58 to -2.22	0	Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.
-2.22 to -0.85	1	Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and intimidation, at times including violence or closures.
-0.85 to 0.23	2	Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.
0.23 to 1.81	3	Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.
1.81 to 3.35	4	Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4.8 Academics as critics (C) (v2cacritic)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent do scholars and university students publicly criticize government policies?

Clarification: This question is only about the extent scholars and students actually criticize government policies – irrespective of how free they are to do so and whether they are met with repression or not. We ask you simply to consider to what extent scholars and students are noticeable as government critics in the public discourse.

Public criticism of government policies can be conveyed for example through the publication of op-eds or social media posts on current affairs, the signing of open letters or petitions, the taking part in or organization of public protests, or the holding of critical lectures to students or the public.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.36 to -1.69	0	Not at all. Scholars and university students do not publicly express criticism of government policies.
-1.69 to -0.27	1	To a small extent. Scholars and university students publicly express minor criticism of government policies.
-0.27 to 0.76	2	To a moderate extent. Scholars and university students publicly express moderate criticism of government policies.
0.76 to 1.97	3	To a large extent. Scholars and university students publicly express substantive criticism of government policies.
1.97 to 3.35	4	To a major extent. Scholars and university students publicly express fundamental criticism of government policies.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 10-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

3.15.4.9 International legal commitment to academic freedom under ICESCR (A) (v2caacadfree)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel

Question: Is the state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) without reservations to article 15 (right to science)?

Clarification: This indicator captures the country's international legal commitment to academic freedom. It indicates whether the country is party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without having made explicit reservations to its article 15 (right to science), which stipulates, among other things, that states parties "undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research".

Responses:

0: State not a party to ICESCR, or made reservations to article 15.
1: State is party to ICESCR without reservations to article 15, but treaty not yet in force.
2: ICESCR in force and signed without reservations to article 15.
3: ICESCR in force and ratified without reservations to article 15.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): United Nations (2025*b*).

Notes: Coded is the ratification status as of December 31st of each year.

Data release: 10-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1966-2025

4 Historical V-Dem

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the *Organization and Management* document or the *Historical V-Dem* page. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present. In this part of the codebook, however, you will find the following types of variables, all of which have "v3" (rather than "v2") as the variable prefix:

1. Section 4.1-4.7: A number of new A, A* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.

2. Section 4.8: V-Dem indicators that are different to their contemporary counterparts, for the purpose of gathering additional relevant information for the historical period in Historical V-Dem. These variables are also merged into their v2 equivalents.

   First, In contrast to contemporary V-Dem, Historical V-Dem codes upper chamber elections and thus also includes eltype category 2. Those observations are treated as missing in the historical-contemporary merged version of v2eltype. Due to election specific variables being cleaned by v2eltype, these do not include upper chamber elections either. In order to include historical data on upper chamber elections we thus also provide v3eltype and v3 election specific variables that are cleaned by v3eltype.

   Second, Historical V-Dem codes additional chambers compared to contemporary V-Dem. When merging v2lgbicam and v3lgbicam the categories get recoded as follows:

   - Categories 3 (tricameral) and 4 (quadricameral) become category 2 for the merged v2lgbicam.
   - Category 9 (Other types of legislature) becomes category 0 for the merged v2lgbicam.

   In order to include historical data on additional chambers, we thus also provide v3lgbicam and v3 chamber specific variables that are cleaned by v3lgbicam.

3. Section 4.9: Finally, the dataset includes A and A* variables where there is a discrepancy in the coding of some observations between the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding for the overlap period (typically 1900-1920). The v2-versions of these variables, reported elsewhere in the codebook, report the Contemporary V-Dem scores in cases of discrepancies in the overlap period.

For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in section 3 (V-Dem Indicators).

4.1 Elections

4.1.1 Minimum candidate age lower chamber (A) (v3canagelc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature?

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen et al. (1999); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Mackie & Rose (1991).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1968

4.1.2 Minimum candidate age upper chamber (A) (v3canageuc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the upper chamber?

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1962

4.1.3 Minimum voting age presidency (A) (v3elagepr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for presidential elections?

Clarification: Leave blank if there are no presidential elections.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Presidential election dates (v3eltype_6, v3eltype_7)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1792-1920

4.1.4 Minimum voting age upper chamber (A) (v3elageuc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for the upper chamber of the national parliament?

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan

& Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Upper chamber election dates (v3eltype_2, v3eltype_3)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1849-1920

4.1.5 Voting, voice or ballot (C) (v3elbalpap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How are votes cast?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.94 to -2.93	0	Votes are cast verbally (viva voce).
-2.93 to -1.98	1	Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but verbal voting is more common.
-1.98 to -1.17	2	Voice voting and paper ballots are both common.
-1.17 to -0.51	3	Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but paper ballots are more common.
-0.51 to 1.34	4	All votes are cast on paper ballots.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following question (v3elbalstat), meaning: jump to v3elecsedf.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Mean

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.6 Ballot printing (C) (v3elbalstat)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Who prints ballot papers?

Clarification: Leave blank if all or nearly all voting is verbal (viva voce).

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.83 to -0.89	0	Political parties or candidates print all (or nearly all) the ballot papers.
-0.89 to -0.15	1	Both the state and parties or candidates print the ballot papers.
-0.15 to 1.75	2	The state prints all (or nearly all) ballot papers.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3elbalpap is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.7 Compulsory voting (C) (v3elcomvot)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-0.9 to 1.61	0	No.
1.61 to 3.08	1	Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.
3.08 to 5.17	2	Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.
5.17 to 5.51	3	Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.8 Direct lower chamber (unicameral) elections (A) (v3eldirelc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the mode of election of the parliament/lower chamber?

Responses:

0: Indirect
1: Direct
2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000); Library of Congress (2025), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1930

4.1.9 Direct presidential elections (A) (v3eldirepr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the mode of election of the president in popular elections?

Clarification: Cases in which the constitution provides that the president is elected by the legislature, including those in which the legislature elects only if none of the candidates obtains some minimum threshold of votes, should be coded according to the provisions concerning popular elections.

Responses:
0: Indirect
1: Direct
2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Library of Congress (2025), websites of national parliaments, various country-specific sources, constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1792-1920

4.1.10 Direct upper chamber elections (A) (v3eldireuc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the mode of election of the upper chamber?

Responses:
0: Indirect
1: Direct
2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Library of Congress (2025), websites of national parliaments, various country-specific sources, constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.1.11 Secret ballot (de facto) (C) (v3elecsedf)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are polling stations organized to guarantee voters a secret, anonymous choice?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.85 to -1.34	0	No. Voters cannot make a secret, anonymous choice.
-1.34 to -0.23	1	No. Some voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in most instances violated.
-0.23 to 0.92	2	Mixed. Voting secrecy and anonymity is assured to roughly the same extent as it is violated.
0.92 to 2.46	3	Yes. Most voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in some instances violated.
2.46 to 2.52	4	Yes. All voters can make a secret, anonymous choice.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.12 Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elmalalc)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there a large discrepancy in the vote/seat ratio across electoral districts for the lower (or unicameral) chamber?

Clarification: "Malapportionment" characterizes a situation in which voters in some districts have more power by virtue of a more favorable vote/seat ratio. For example, if seats have not been reapportioned in a long time rural areas may be over-represented relative to urban areas simply because the latter have grown more rapidly than the former. (This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria.) Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.39 to -2.32	0	There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50
1.		
-2.32 to -0.88	1	There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10
1.		
-0.88 to 0.39	2	There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2
1.		
0.39 to 1.66	3	There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2
1.		

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.13 Malapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elmalauc)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the electoral system (including the size of electoral districts) involve large differences in the ratios of votes to representatives in elections for the upper chamber?

Clarification: This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria but only the relationship between votes and seats. Leave blank if no upper chamber.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.04 to -1.04 1.	0	There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50
-1.04 to -0.1 1.	1	There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10
-0.1 to 1.24 1.	2	There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2
1.24 to 2.05 1.	3	There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.14 Minority or majority government (A) (v3elncbmaj)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, did the political parties that were represented in the cabinet hold a majority of the seats in the (lower chamber of) the legislature?

Responses:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: No, the parties represented in cabinet held less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

2: Yes, the parties represented in cabinet held half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

3: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, and the factions represented in government hold less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

4: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, but the factions represented in government hold half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025), various country specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.1.15 Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elreapplc)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

Clarification: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no lower (or unicameral) chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.17 to 0.67	0	No.
0.67 to 2.39	1	Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.
2.39 to 2.54	2	Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.16 Reapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elreappuc)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the upper chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

Clarification: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no upper chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-0.82 to 1.88	0	No.
1.88 to 3.05	1	Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.
3.05 to 3.5	2	Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.1.17 Candidate exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elrstrlc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to run as a candidate to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

0: Literacy [v3elrstrlc_0]
1: Property [v3elrstrlc_1]
2: Income [v3elrstrlc_2]
3: Tax payment [v3elrstrlc_3]
4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elrstrlc_4]
5: Slave [v3elrstrlc_5]
6: Ethnicity, race [v3elrstrlc_6]
7: Religion [v3elrstrlc_7]
8: Region [v3elrstrlc_8]
9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrlc_9]
10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrlc_10]
11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrlc_11]
12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrlc_12]
13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrlc_13]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1968

4.1.18 Candidate exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elrstrpr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to run as a candidate in presidential elections restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no direct presidential elections. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

0: Literacy [v3elrstrpr_0]
1: Property [v3elrstrpr_1]
2: Income [v3elrstrpr_2]
3: Tax payment [v3elrstrpr_3]
4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elrstrpr_4]
5: Slave [v3elrstrpr_5]
6: Ethnicity, race [v3elrstrpr_6]

7: Religion [v3elrstrpr_7]
8: Region [v3elrstrpr_8]
9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrpr_9]
10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrpr_10]
11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrpr_11]
12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrpr_12]
13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrpr_13]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1804-1938

4.1.19 Candidate exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elrstrup)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to run as a candidate to the upper chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no upper chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

0: Literacy [v3elrstrup_0]
1: Property [v3elrstrup_1]
2: Income [v3elrstrup_2]
3: Tax payment [v3elrstrup_3]
4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elrstrup_4]
5: Slave [v3elrstrup_5]
6: Ethnicity, race [v3elrstrup_6]
7: Religion [v3elrstrup_7]
8: Region [v3elrstrup_8]
9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrup_9]
10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrup_10]
11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrup_11]
12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrup_12]
13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrup_13]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1795-1962

4.1.20 De jure ballot secrecy (A) (v3elsec)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there ballot secrecy by law?

Responses:

0: no.
1: Yes.
2: Secrecy optional.
3: Varies spatially and/or hierarchically.

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): International IDEA (2026c); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026), various country specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.1.21 Upper chamber election turnover (A) (v3eltvriguc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Did control of the upper chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

Responses:

0: No. The same party/group/coalition remained in control of the majority of seats.

1: Partly. The leading position within a coalition changed. Or, a new coalition includes some old groups/parties and some new groups/parties.

2: Yes. Another party/group/coalition gained control of the majority of seats.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1831-1900

4.1.22 Upper chamber election seats (A) (v3elupseat)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the upper chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1900

4.1.23 Upper chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v3elupstsl)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1900

4.1.24 Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v3elupstsm)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election, how many seats in the upper chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1900

4.1.25 Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtlg)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010), websites of national parliaments; websites of national bureau of statistics; various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1894-1900

4.1.26 Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtsm)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1894-1900

4.1.27 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elvstrlc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to vote for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons?

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*).
It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800).
If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) category. Thus, if most regions of a country imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2.
Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) parliament.

Responses:
0: Literacy [v3elvstrlc_0]
1: Property [v3elvstrlc_1]
2: Income [v3elvstrlc_2]
3: Tax payment [v3elvstrlc_3]
4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstrlc_4]
5: Slave [v3elvstrlc_5]
6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrlc_6]
7: Religion [v3elvstrlc_7]
8: Region [v3elvstrlc_8]
9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrlc_9]
10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrlc_10]
11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrlc_11]
12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrlc_12]
13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrlc_13]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1968

4.1.28 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elvstrpr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to vote in the presidential election restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if the head of state is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

0: Literacy [v3elvstrpr_0]
1: Property [v3elvstrpr_1]
2: Income [v3elvstrpr_2]
3: Tax payment [v3elvstrpr_3]
4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstrpr_4]
5: Slave [v3elvstrpr_5]
6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrpr_6]
7: Religion [v3elvstrpr_7]
8: Region [v3elvstrpr_8]
9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrpr_9]
10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrpr_10]
11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrpr_11]
12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrpr_12]
13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrpr_13]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1938

4.1.29 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elvstruc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to vote for the upper house of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800). If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) situation. Thus, if most regions imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2. Leave blank if there is no upper chamber or if upper chamber is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

0: Literacy [v3elvstruc_0]
1: Property [v3elvstruc_1]
2: Income [v3elvstruc_2]
3: Tax payment [v3elvstruc_3]
4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstruc_4]
5: Slave [v3elvstruc_5]
6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstruc_6]
7: Religion [v3elvstruc_7]
8: Region [v3elvstruc_8]
9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstruc_9]
10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstruc_10]
11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstruc_11]
12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstruc_12]
13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstruc_13]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Posada-Carbó (2019); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Mackie & Rose (1991); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Rokkan & Meyriat (1969); Sternberger et al. (1969); Flora (1983), and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1795-1962

4.1.30 Election women in the cabinet (A) (v3elwomcab)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (%) of the ministers was female?

Clarification: A "minister" is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025), various country specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.1.31 Total votes (A) (v3ttlvote)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the total number of votes cast in this election.

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.2 Political Parties

4.2.1 Party identification (C) (v3partyid)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Do voters identify with a political party?

Clarification: When party identification is strong, vote choice is largely determined by a voter's party affiliation (and his/her affiliation with that party) rather than attachments to particular candidates, non-partisan issue-positions, or material incentives (*e.g.*, vote-buying). Likewise, when party identification is strong, voters retain loyalty to a single party rather than switching from one party to another across elections or across offices in the same election (ticket-splitting). In this fashion we can somewhat crudely distinguish between partisans and non-partisans. Note that this question refers only to voters, not to members of the population who do not vote (because they are disenfranchised, choose not to vote, or are discouraged from voting). Leave this question blank if there are no national elections.

Responses:

0: There are national elections, but there are no political parties.
1: Only one party is allowed to participate in national elections.
2: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are non-partisans.
3: More than one party participates, and most voters are non-partisans.
4: More than one party participates, and voters are equally divided between partisans and non-partisans.
5: More than one party participates, and most voters are partisans.
6: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are partisans.

Scale: Nominal, but categories 2—6 constitute ordinal.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.2.2 Party age largest (A) (v3psagefirst)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party that holds the most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

Clarification: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.2.3 Party age executive (A) (v3psagepm)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party controlling the executive was formed?

Clarification: If there is a coalition government, you should count the party of the prime minister was counted. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.2.4 Party age second largest (A) (v3psagesecond)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party that holds the second most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

Clarification: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.2.5 Party age third largest (A) (v3psagethird)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party that holds the third most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

Clarification: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1791-1920

4.3 The Legislature

4.3.1 Lower chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudglo)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is the lower chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

Clarification: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50% of those voting approve the measure.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.85 to 0.8	0	No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the lower house or ignores its actions.
0.8 to 1.33	1	Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.3.2 Upper chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudgup)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is the upper chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

Clarification: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50% of those voting approve the measure.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.72 to 0.37	0	No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the upper house or ignores its actions.
0.37 to 1.53	1	Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.3.3 Legislature other than uni- or bicameral (A) (v3lgcamoth)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the cameral structure of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide the names of all chambers, as well as how they are grouped into a "upper" and "lower" chamber. For example, in Sweden prior to 1866, the names would be Estates of Nobility, Clergy, Burghers and Peasantry, where the Estates of Nobility and Clergy are grouped into the "upper" chamber, those of the Burghers and Peasantry into the "lower" chamber.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1919

4.3.4 Lower chamber in session (C) (v3lginses)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: During the year, for how long was the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in session?

Clarification: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all session during the year.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.27 to -2.08	0	It did not convene at all during the year.
-2.08 to -1.01	1	It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.
-1.01 to -0.08	2	It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.
-0.08 to 1.68	3	It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.
1.68 to 2.7	4	It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.
2.7 to 3.14	5	It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.3.5 Upper chamber in session (C) (v3lginsesup)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: During the year, for how long was the upper chamber of the legislature in session?

Clarification: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all sessions during the year.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.3 to -1.86	0	It did not convene at all during the year.
-1.86 to -0.88	1	It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.
-0.88 to -0.07	2	It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.
-0.07 to 1.42	3	It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.
1.42 to 2.76	4	It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.
2.76 to 3.15	5	It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.3.6 Lower chamber quota for social groups (A) (v3lgqumin)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: These quotas are sometimes informally known as "minority quotas." Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group). Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code "yes" only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

Responses:

0: No national level quota for any social group.
1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Constitute Project (2026); Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.4 The Judiciary

4.4.1 High court existence (A*) (v3juhcourt)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is there a high court?

Clarification: Note that in some cases we consider an institution to be the Highest Court in a given country, even though we acknowledge that its jurisdiction covers most though not all the territory of the country. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the rating and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Ordering: If answer is "0", skip to v2juncind.

Source(s): Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.5 Civil Liberty

4.5.1 Labor rights (C) (v3cllabrig)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does labor enjoy the right to organize freely and bargain collectively?

Clarification: Refers to actual practice not formal (*de jure*) rights. If practices vary across the country, or across sectors, please consider the overall situation of labor.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.74 to -0.59	0	Independent labor unions (free from state or ruling party control) are not allowed.
-0.59 to 0.89	1	Independent labor unions are allowed, at least in some sectors of the economy or some sections of the country. However, they are subject to harassment by the police, paramilitary groups, business associations, or other groups. Harassment refers to systematic beatings, imprisonment, outlawing of specific unions, and other actions that seriously impinge upon the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively.
0.89 to 2.42	2	Independent labor unions are allowed and they do not face violent repression but the legal climate is not friendly (e.g., "closed shop" rules are widespread), making it difficult to organize and bargain collectively.
2.42 to 3.08	3	Independent labor unions are allowed and may organize freely in all sectors of the economy.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.5.2 Slavery (A) (v3clslavery)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is slavery legal?

Clarification: Refers to the *de jure* status of slavery, not its actual practice.

Responses:

0: Yes.
1: No.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2015

4.5.3 Serfdom de jure/slavery de jure (A) (v3serfdeju)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is serfdom legal?

Clarification: Refers to the *de jure* status of serfdom, not its actual practice.

Responses:

0. Yes.
1. No.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2015

4.6 Sovereignty/State

4.6.1 Census (A) (v3stcensus)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Was there a national census in this year?

Clarification: In order to count as a "census", the following four criteria needs to be satisfied:

1. Universality: the census attempted to cover the entire population and not just a sample.
2. Individual Enumeration: the census enumerates each individual separately and records his or her characteristics separately. If the census only produces aggregate or summarised information, it is only a population count and should not count as a census. For example, A population count of a household with 4 people would produce the following results:

- Age—Adults: 2; Children: 2
- Sex—Males: 2; Females: 2
- Instead, an individual enumeration would look like this:
  - Head of household-male-adult
  - Spouse-female-adult
  - Son-male-child
  - Daughter-female-child
  - The key difference is that only in the individual enumeration the data on various characteristics can be cross-tabulated.
- 3. Defined Territory: The territory covered, along with any changes in its area is clearly stated.
- 4. Simultaneity and Specified Time: Each person is enumerated as nearly as possible to the same well-defined point in time, and the collected data should refer to a well-defined reference period.

Code "1" if a national census was completed in this year – but not if it was aborted or was not national in scope.

Responses:

0. No.
1. Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Brambor et al. (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2015

4.6.2 Citizenship laws (A) (v3stcitlaw)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Are there laws specifying who is a citizen and who is not and establishing procedures for naturalization?

Responses:

0. No.
1. Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous
Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Observatory (2026), various country-specific sources.
Data release: 8-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-1920

4.6.3 Flag (A) (v3stflag)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring
Question: Is there a national flag?
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
Scale: Dichotomous
Source(s): Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Smith (1975); CIA (n.d.).
Data release: 8-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2015

4.6.4 National anthem (A) (v3stnatant)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring
Question: Is there a national anthem?
Responses:
0: No. There may be popular songs identified with the nation but there is no official, state-recognized national anthem.
1: Yes. There is an official, state-recognized national anthem.
Scale: Dichotomous
Source(s): Bristow (2006); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); CIA (n.d.).
Data release: 8-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2015

4.6.5 National bank (A) (v3stnatbank)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring
Question: Is there a national bank?
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
Scale: Dichotomous
Source(s): Various country-specific sources.
Data release: 8-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2015

4.6.6 Rulers' involvement in the state administration (C) (v3struinvadm)

Project Manager(s): Agnes Cornell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are day-to-day decisions made by state administrators subject to intervention from political elites?

Clarification: By political elites we mean members of the executive, members of the legislature and political elites at local and regional levels. Note that the focus on the day-to-day decisions of the state administration implies interference in specific operational decisions in a meticulous manner. Decisions taken by rulers about the general direction of the state administration should not be considered. Note that the question refers to the *de facto* situation.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.14 to -1.63	0	Constantly. Day-to-day decisions taken by state administrators are constantly subject to intervention.
-1.63 to -0.12	1	Often. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are often subject to intervention.
-0.12 to 0.65	2	About half. Approximately half of the day-to-day decisions in the state administration are subject to intervention.
0.65 to 2.47	3	Occasionally. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are occasionally subject to intervention.
2.47 to 2.83	4	Never, or hardly ever. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are never or hardly ever subject to intervention.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.6.7 Statistical agency (A) (v3ststatag)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Is there a national statistical agency?

Clarification: A statistical agency is an official government organization exclusively devoted to gathering numerical information in a variety of subjects about the country. This may be a completely independent agency or a distinguishable office or department within another governmental agency.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Brambor et al. (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2015

4.6.8 State steering capacity (C) (v3ststeecap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Can the state oversee and regulate the economy?

Clarification: This refers to the state's ability to keep track of economic activities in its territory and potentially influence them by shaping the incentives and constraints that private firms face to do business; *e.g.*, through licensing, granting exploitation rights, taxing, imposing market barriers, building infrastructure, offering subsidies, adjudicating conflicts, or enforcing regulations.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.52 to -1.85	0	Most economic activities happen outside the reach of the state
-1.85 to -0.41	1	The state steers some economic activities
-0.41 to 0.46	2	The state steers a substantial share – but less than half – of the national economy
0.46 to 1.49	3	The state steers about half or more than half, of the national economy
1.49 to 2.33	4	The state steers all or almost all economic activities

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.6.9 Statistical yearbook covered (A) (v3ststybcov)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Was this year covered by a published statistical yearbook?

Clarification: By "covered" we mean whether, based on the title of the yearbook, information about this year was included in a statistical yearbook. For example, if a yearbook was published in 1914, according to its title covering 1911-1914, then v3ststybpub should be coded as 1 for 1914 only, 0 for 1911-1913, but v3ststybcov as 1 for 1911-1914.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Brambor et al. (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2015

4.6.10 Statistical yearbook published (A) (v3ststybpub)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Was there a statistical yearbook issued this year?

Clarification: A statistical yearbook is a recurrent publication of a government agency published annually or less frequently which contain statistical tables in more than one of the following categories:
1. Physical environment; 2. Demography; 3. Economic Affairs; 4. Political Affairs; and 5. Cultural Affairs.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: Brambor et al. (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2015

4.7 Political Equality

4.7.1 Equal vote legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3equavolc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Are ballots in elections for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

Responses:
0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavolc_0]
1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavolc_1]
2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavolc_2]
3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavolc_3]

Scale: Nominal

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.7.2 Equal vote upper chamber (C) (v3equavouc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Are ballots in elections for the upper chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

Responses:
0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavouc_0]
1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavouc_1]
2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavouc_2]
3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavouc_3]

Scale: Nominal

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.7.3 Child labor laws (A) (v3pechilabl)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there national regulation prohibiting child labor?

Responses:

0: No.
1: For nonagricultural employment only.
2: For all sectors.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Hindman (2014); Fass (2013); Schmitz et al. (2004).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.7.4 Minimum wage (A) (v3peminwage)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Is there a minimum wage?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes, the state imposes a minimum wage (legislation, regulations).
2: Yes, there are corporate bargaining arrangements that effectively ensure a minimum wage.
3: Yes, there is a tripartite committee that sets the wage (representatives from union, employer, government).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): International Labour Organization (2025); Packard & Van Nguyen (2014)

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2015

4.7.5 Minimum wage restriction (A) (v3peminwagerestr)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: If there is a minimum wage provision, are there any explicit exceptions based on one or more of the following categories?

Clarification: Code as missing if there is no minimum wage.

Responses:

0: Rural/urban area [v3peminwagerestr_0]
1: Region of the country [v3peminwagerestr_1]
2: Trade (industry) [v3peminwagerestr_2]
3: Gender [v3peminwagerestr_3]
4: Ethnicity [v3peminwagerestr_4]
5: Age [v3peminwagerestr_5]
6: Public/private sector [v3peminwagerestr_6]
7: Other characteristic [v3peminwagerestr_7]
8: There are no exceptions. [v3peminwagerestr_8]

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): International Labour Organization (2025); Packard & Van Nguyen (2014); Commission (2011)

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1899-2015

4.8 Historical V-Dem Modified

4.8.1 Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v3elloelsy)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, The New International IDEA Handbook (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) – downloadable, free of charge, at www.idea.int/publications/esd/.

Responses:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50% + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50% +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot)

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size > 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.
10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.
Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen et al. (1999); Golder (2006); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Kollman et al. (2011); Colomer & Grofman (2016); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); International IDEA (2026c), various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1902

4.8.2 Lower chamber election seats (A) (v3elloseat)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.3 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v3ellostlg)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.4 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (A) (v3ellostsl)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.5 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v3ellostsm)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.6 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (A) (v3ellostss)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.7 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3ellovtlg)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.8 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3ellovtsm)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.9 Effective number of cabinet parties (A) (v3elncbpr)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

Responses:

0: Parties are not allowed.
1: One party.
2: Two parties.
3: Three parties.
4: Four or more parties.

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Library of Congress (2025), various country specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.10 Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v3elparlel)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Responses:

0: Majoritarian.
1: Proportional.
2: Mixed.
3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen et al. (1999); Golder (2006); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Kollman et al. (2011); Colomer & Grofman (2016); Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2025); International Foundations for Electoral System (IFES) (2026); International IDEA (2026c), various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1902

4.8.11 Election turnout (A) (v3eltrnout)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): International IDEA (2026b); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Hyde & Marinov (2012); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Library of Congress (2025), websites of national parliaments, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1920

4.8.12 Lower chamber election turnover (A) (v3eltvrig)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

Responses:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 % of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 % of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, constitutions, websites of National Parliament.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype_0, v3eltype_1)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-1912

4.8.13 Election type (A*) (v3eltype)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What type of election was held on this date?

Clarification: The date and type of each election has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same elections.

If the election unfolds across more than one day, the date for the first day is entered. If the precise date was unavailable, the first of the month is entered. If the month is unknown, January 1 is entered. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately, *i.e.*, as separate elections. More than one election in a single year is accommodated by listing each election with a separate calendar date. When elections to more than one office occur on the same day these are listed separately (though naturally with the same date).

Responses:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. [v3eltype_0]
1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. [v3eltype_1]
2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. [v3eltype_2]
3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. [v3eltype_3]

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. [v3eltype_4]
5: Constituent Assembly, second round. [v3eltype_5]
6: Presidential, first or only round. [v3eltype_6]
7: Presidential, second round. [v3eltype_7]
8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. [v3eltype_8]
9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. [v3eltype_9]

Answer-type: Multiple-selection

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000); Kollman et al. (2011); Lindvall-Larson (2000); Election Politique Citoyen (http://www.election-politique.com); websites of national parliaments; various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.14 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3elvotlrg)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the winning candidate in the first round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.
Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Presidential election dates (v3eltype_6, v3eltype_7)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1792-1919

4.8.15 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3elvotsml)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.
Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010);

Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Presidential election dates (v3eltype_6, v3eltype_7)

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1792-1919

4.8.16 Legislature bicameral (A*) (v3lgbicam)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

Clarification: The answer to this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the code and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

Responses:

0: No legislature exists (or the legislature is shut down).
1: Unicameral
2: Bicameral
3: Tricameral
4: Quadricameral
9: Other type of legislature

Ordering: If all years are (0), skip to The Judiciary (v2juintro). If (1) is chosen, skip to v2lgintro2.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources, websites of national parliaments.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.17 Lower chamber committees (C) (v3lgcomslo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.17 to -1.45	0	No, there are no committees.
-1.45 to 0.15	1	Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.
0.15 to 1.54	2	Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.
1.54 to 2.19	3	Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.18 Legislature corrupt activities (C) (v3lgcrrpt)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

Clarification: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.
Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.44 to -2.19	0	Never, or hardly ever.
-2.19 to -0.73	1	Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.
-0.73 to 0.58	2	Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.
0.58 to 1.72	3	Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
1.72 to 2.41	4	Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.19 Legislature dominant chamber (C) (v3lgdomchm)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.77 to -1	0	The lower chamber is clearly dominant.
-1 to 0.08	1	The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
0.08 to 1.56	2	They are roughly co-equal in power.
1.56 to 2.71	3	The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
2.71 to 2.79	4	The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.20 Upper chamber elected (A) (v3lgelecup)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

Clarification: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.8.21 Lower chamber elected (A) (v3lgello)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

Clarification: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.
We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.8.22 Legislature controls resources (C) (v3lgfunds)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.27 to -0.39	0	No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.
-0.39 to 1.93	1	Yes

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.23 Lower chamber indirectly elected (A) (v3lginello)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What percentage of the lower chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

Clarification: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.
We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.8.24 Upper chamber indirectly elected (A) (v3lginelup)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

Clarification: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.
We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000), websites of national parliaments, websites of national bureau of statistics, various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.8.25 Legislature investigates in practice (C) (v3lginvstp)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.8 to -0.62	0	Extremely unlikely.
-0.62 to 0.58	1	Unlikely.
0.58 to 1.55	2	As likely as not.
1.55 to 3.07	3	Likely.
3.07 to 3.2	4	Certain or nearly certain.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.26 Lower chamber legislates in practice (C) (v3lglegplo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.21 to -1.53	0	No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.
-1.53 to 0.65	1	Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.
0.65 to 2.01	2	Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.27 Upper chamber legislates in practice (C) (v3lglegpup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.49 to -1.72	0	No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.
-1.72 to -0.03	1	Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.
-0.03 to 1.47	2	Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.28 Lower chamber legislature name (A*) (v3lgnamelo)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (2002); Nohlen (2005); Caramani (2000); Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources, websites of national partliaments.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.29 Upper chamber name (A*) (v3lgnameup)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Nohlen et al. (1999); Nohlen et al. (2002), Nohlen (2005); Nohlen & Stöver (2010); Caramani (2000); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.30 Legislature opposition parties (C) (v3lgoppart)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.55 to -0.27	0	No, not at all.
-0.27 to 1.79	1	Occasionally.
1.79 to 2.29	2	Yes, for the most part.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.31 Executive oversight (C) (v3lgotovst)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.47 to -0.16	0	Extremely unlikely.
-0.16 to 1.03	1	Unlikely.
1.03 to 1.98	2	Very uncertain.
1.98 to 3.83	3	Likely.
3.83 to 4.12	4	Certain or nearly certain.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.32 Legislature questions officials in practice (C) (v3lgqstexp)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

Clarification: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.3 to -0.31	0	No - never or very rarely.
-0.31 to 1.94	1	Yes - routinely.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.8.33 Lower chamber members serve in government (C) (v3lgsrvlo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-1.37 to -0.08	0	No.
-0.08 to 1.94	1	Yes.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Data release: 8-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9 Historical V-Dem – Overlap Period Discrepancies

4.9.1 Local government elected (A*) (v3ellocelc)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: At the local level, are government offices elected in practice?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.
"Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An assembly is a larger body of officials.
"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are considered to be non-elected.
In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:
0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.
1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.
2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.
3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.
4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.
5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Usry, Shirley (2025); HathiTrust (2026); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9.2 Local government exists (A*) (v3ellocgov)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Is there a local government?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.
Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Source(s): Usry, Shirley (2025); HathiTrust (2026); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9.3 Local government name (A*) (v3ellocnam)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Usry, Shirley (2025); HathiTrust (2026); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9.4 Regional government exists (A*) (v3elreggov)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Is there a regional government?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.
Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.
Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.
Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, this question is coded as "0" for the appropriate time period.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

Source(s): Usry, Shirley (2025); HathiTrust (2026); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9.5 Regional government name (A*) (v3elregnam)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Usry, Shirley (2025); HathiTrust (2026); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9.6 Regional government elected (A*) (v3elsrgel)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.
"Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An assembly is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.
"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be non-elected.
In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:

0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.
1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.
2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.
3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.
4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.
5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

Source(s): Usry, Shirley (2025); HathiTrust (2026); Library of Congress (2025), various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2010

4.9.7 HOS age (A) (v3exagehos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell
Question: In what year was the head of state born?
Scale: Interval
Answer-type: Date - year only
Source(s): Cahoon, Ben (2026).
Data release: 8-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum
Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-1938

4.9.8 HOS = HOG (A*) (v3exhoshog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell
Question: Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?
Clarification: Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, the question pertains to each one of them.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Ordering: If HOS=HOG (answer is "yes") for all years: skip to "Introduction to entire executive." (v2exintro3)
Source(s): Henisz (2002); Elkins & Ginsburg (2025); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999).
Data release: 8-16.
Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1789-2010

4.9.9 HOG name (A*) (v3exnamhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell
Question: What is the name of the head of government?
Clarification: The identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Only heads of government in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of government is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple heads of government were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Henisz (2002); Cahoon, Ben (2026); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1990

4.9.10 HOS name (A*) (v3exnamhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the head of state?

Clarification: The identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.
Only heads of states in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of state is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Henisz (2002); Henisz (2000); Goemans et al. (2009); Lentz (1999); Lentz (1994); Cahoon, Ben (2026).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9.11 HOS appointment in practice (A) (v3expathhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How did the head of state reach office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

Responses:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.
1: Appointed by a foreign power.
2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
3: Appointed by a royal council.
4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.
6: Appointed by the legislature.
7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
8: Other.

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1933

4.9.12 Title of HOG (A*) (v3extithog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

Clarification: Again, the titles of the heads of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Henisz (2002); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999); Cahoon, Ben (2026).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1990

4.9.13 HOS title (A*) (v3extithos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the head of state?

Clarification: Again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Henisz (2002); Henisz (2000); Lentz (1994); Lentz (1999).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

4.9.14 High court name (A*) (v3juhcname)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Please enter the name of the high court.

Clarification: An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the court in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within

parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1995

4.9.15 Legislature amends constitution (A) (v3lgamend)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution without the involvement of any other body?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Constitute Project (2026); Library of Congress (2025), various country specific sources.

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.9.16 Legislature amnesties (A) (v3lgamnsty)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Constitute Project (2026); Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.9.17 Lower chamber introduces bills (A) (v3lgintblo)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Constitute Project (2026); Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.9.18 Lower chamber legislates by law (A) (v3lglegllo)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Constitute Project (2026); Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

4.9.19 Upper chamber legislates by law (A) (v3lgleglup)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: By law, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Constitute Project (2026); Library of Congress (2025).

Data release: 8-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Cleaning: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-1920

5 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data

This section includes indices that are created using data from V-Dem but are not subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices presented in section 2.1. Please see Appendix A for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

5.1 Regimes of the World (RoW)

5.1.1 Regimes of the world – the RoW measure (D) (v2x_regime)

Project Manager(s): Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I Lindberg

Question: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

Responses:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).

2: Electoral democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

3: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg v2xex_elecreg v2eltype v2elmulpar_osp v2elfrfair_osp v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2ex_hosw v2x_polyarchy v2x_liberal v2clacjstm_osp v2clacjstw_osp v2cltrnslw_osp v2exaphogp

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: Electoral democracies score above 2 on the indicators for multi–party (v2elmulpar_osp) and free and fair elections (v2elfrfair_osp), as well as above 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy). Liberal democracy meets the criteria for Electoral democracy but also satisfy the liberal dimensions by a score above 0.8 on the V–Dem Liberal Component index (v2x_liberal), as well as a score above 3 on transparent law enforcement (v2cltrnslw_osp), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm_osp) and women (v2clacjstw_osp). Electoral autocracies fail to meet one or more of the above–mentioned criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive and the legislature to de–jure multiparty elections as indicated by a score above 1 on the V–Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmulpar_osp). Closed autocracy if either no multiparty elections for the legislature take place (v2xlg_elecreg == 0) or the chief executive is not elected in direct or indirect multiparty elections. To identify whether this is the case, we take into account if there is no basic multiparty competition in elections (v2elmulpar_osp < 1) and the relative power of the Head of State (HoS) and the Head of Government (HoG) as well as the appointment procedures. The V–Dem variable v2ex_hosw identifies if the HoS (v2ex_hosw > 0.5) or HoG (v2ex_hosw < or equal to 0.5) is the chief executive. If the HoG is the chief executive, the variable v2expathhg indicates whether the HoG is directly (8) or indirectly (7) elected or appointed by the HoS (6). In the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex_elecreg == 0) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place (v2xlg_elecreg == 0) and in the third case how HoS is selected as follows. The variable

v2expathhs indicates whether the HoS is directly (7) or indirectly (6) elected. Thus, in the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex_elecreg) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place and the legislature approves on HoG (v2xlg_elecreg == 0 and v2exaphog == 0). This also applies for the cases if the HoS is the chief executive.

Citation: Lührmann et al. (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.1.2 Regimes of the world – the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases (D) (v2x_regime_amb)

Project Manager(s): Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I Lindberg, Valeriya Mechkova

Question: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

Responses:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies.

2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies.

3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).

4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.

5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral autocracies.

6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal democracies.

8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies.

9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg v2xex_elecreg v2eltype v2elmulpar_osp v2elfrfair_osp v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2ex_hosw v2x_polyarchy v2x_liberal v2clacjstm_osp v2clacjstw_osp v2cltrnslw_osp

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: Same as for "Regimes of the World Measure– the RoW Measure " (v2x_regime) above. In order to account for ambiguity this version of the regime type index reflects the upper and lower bounds of the point estimates used to aggregate the index in intermediate categories.

Citation: Lührmann et al. (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.2 Accountability

5.2.1 Accountability index (D) (v2x_accountability)

Project Manager(s): Kyle L. Marquardt, Valeriya Mechkova

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Government accountability is understood as constraints on the government's use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions. We organize the sub-types of accountability spatially. Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state's population to hold its government accountable through elections, horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances between institutions; and diagonal accountability captures oversight by civil society organizations and media activity.

Scale: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by *_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp v2ex_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprtcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x_suffr v2xex_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three sub-indices of accountability: vertical (v2x_veracc), horizontal (v2x_horacc) and diagonal accountability (v2x_diagacc). This strategy assumes that overall accountability is a function of all variables included in each sub-index, though the sub-indices structure this relationship.

Citation: Lührmann et al. (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.2.2 Vertical accountability index (D) (v2x_veracc)

Project Manager(s): Kyle L. Marquardt, Valeriya Mechkova

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: To what extent is the ideal of vertical government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Vertical accountability captures the extent to which citizens have the power to hold the government accountable. The mechanisms of vertical accountability include formal political participation on part of the citizens — such as being able to freely organize in political parties — and participate in free and fair elections, including for the chief executive.

Scale: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by *_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar

v2elfrfair v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2x_suffr v2exaphogp v2ex_hosw v2x_suffr v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: Vertical accountability consists of two main components: elections and political parties. We operationalize electoral accountability with three components: 1) an aggregate measure the quality of elections; 2) the percent of enfranchised population and 3) whether the chief executive is directly or indirectly elected. We model non-electoral regimes as having no suffrage and the quality of elections as a function of having an electoral regime (v2x_elecreg). Quality of elections consists of seven variables measuring different aspects of national elections for the executive and legislature. Specifically, we include autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) and (v2elembcap); accuracy of the voter registry (v2elrgstry), intentional irregularities conducted by the government and opposition (v2elirreg); intimidation and harassment by the government and its agents (v2elintim); to what extent the elections were multi-party in practice (v2elmulpar); and an overall measure for the freedom and fairness of elections (v2elfrfair). This is a modified version of the V-Dem Clean elections index (v2xel_frefair). We added the variable v2elmulpar, which is theoretically important for accountability, and we removed v2elvotbuy and v2elpeace, as they have low loadings.

We measure suffrage as the percentage of people that have the legal right to vote (v2x_suffr) to proxy the inclusivity of the exercise of electoral accountability. To account for the differences between states which have an executive subject to elections, we include a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the head of the executive either the head of state or head of government — whoever has more relative power over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers as measured by v2ex_hosw is subjected to direct or indirect elections (v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp).

The second form of vertical accountability focuses on political parties, which we model as a hierarchical node. This node includes variables that capture whether there are barriers to forming a party and how restrictive they are (v2psparban) and (v2psbars), as well as the degree to which opposition parties are independent of the ruling regime (v2psoppaut).

Citation: Lührmann et al. (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.2.3 Diagonal accountability index (D) (v2x_diagacc)

Project Manager(s): Kyle L. Marquardt, Valeriya Mechkova

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: To what extent is the ideal of diagonal government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations CSOs, and an independent media can use to hold the government accountable. These mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism to enhance vertical and horizontal accountability.

Scale: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by *_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprtcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: We model this form of accountability as a function of four hierarchical nodes: media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to which citizens are engaged in politics.

The media freedom node incorporates variables representing two broad dimensions. The first dimension regards the extent to which the government attempts to censor the media (v2mecenefm) and information on the Internet (v2mecenefi), as well as the extent to which government and other powerful actors harass journalists (v2meharjrn). The second dimension

concerns the work of the media itself, namely the extent to which: the media criticizes the government at least occasionally (v2mecrit); there is bias against opposition candidates (v2mebias); the media offers a wide array of political perspectives in their coverage (v2merange); and there is self-censorship on salient issues for the government (v2meslfcen). The media freedom node is an expanded version of the V-Dem Alternative sources of information index (v2xme_altinf).

Finally, we use the components of the V-Dem core index of civil society to account for the opportunity of citizens to channel their interests and potentially oppose the government and its policies in an organized way through a robust, self-organized and autonomous civil society organizations. The indicators included in this node are: popular and voluntary participation in CSOs, (v2csprtcpt), government control to the entry and exit of CSOs into the public life, (v2cseeorgs), and government oppression of CSOs (v2csreprss).

The freedom of expression node incorporates variables regarding the degree to which men and women are free to discuss political issues without fear of harassment (v2cldiscm and v2cldiscw), as well as an indicator on the freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Finally, we incorporate a variable representing engaged society (v2dlengage), which gives information on the width and depth of public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered.

Citation: Lührmann et al. (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.2.4 Horizontal accountability index (D) (v2x_horacc)

Project Manager(s): Kyle L. Marquardt, Valeriya Mechkova

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.

Scale: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by *_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgbicam v2lgqstexp

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: We capture the extent to which the judiciary, the legislature and other oversight agencies hold the government to account by modeling each of these factors as separate hierarchical nodes.

The judiciary node speaks to the degree to which members of the executive compromise horizontal accountability by "unlawfully encroaching" on the legitimate authority of the judiciary branch. To capture that we use the indicators from the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x_jucon).

To model the degree to which a legislature facilitates horizontal accountability we model whether or not a legislature exists a dichotomized version of v2lgbicam, and legislature activities as a function of this variable. The key function of a legislature in terms of horizontal accountability is to scrutinize government officials' potential misconduct by demanding information for their policies and decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. We use as baseline the indicators from the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg_legcon): the degree to which: 1 the legislature routinely questions the executive (v2lgqstexp); and 2 a legislature is likely to investigate and produce a decision unfavorable to the executive, if the latter were engaged in an illegal or unethical activity

(v2lginvstp). We exclude the legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart) as this aspect is part of vertical accountability.
Finally, we include a variable regarding the degree to which other state bodies comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman are likely to investigate and report on potential illegal or unethical activities on part of the executive (v2lgotovst).

Citation: Lührmann et al. (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.3 Executive Bases of Power

5.3.1 Confidence dimension index (D) (v2x_ex_confidence)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive' determined by the confidence of the legislature?

Clarification: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the dismissal of the chief executive depends on the confidence of the legislature.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp_ord v2exrmhsol_2 v2exrmhsol_3 v2exrmhsol_4 v2exhoshog v2ex_hosw

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" can be dismissed by the legislature (without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other agency). In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

Citation: Teorell & Lindberg (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.3.2 Direct election dimension index (D) (v2x_ex_direlect)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by direct election?

Clarification: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the chief executive is appointed through direct popular election (regardless of the quality or extension of suffrage of that election).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp_ord v2exrmhsol_2 v2exrmhsol_3 v2exrmhsol_4 v2exhoshog v2ex_hosw

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was directly elected. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

Citation: Teorell & Lindberg (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.3.3 Hereditary dimension index (D) (v2x_ex_hereditary)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by hereditary succession?

Clarification: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on hereditary rule.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp_ord v2exrmhsol_2 v2exrmhsol_3 v2exrmhsol_4 v2exhoshog v2ex_hosw

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed through hereditary sucession or by a royal council, and (b) can be dismissed by a royal council. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

Citation: Teorell & Lindberg (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.3.4 Military dimension index (D) (v2x_ex_military)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by the military?

Clarification: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on the threat or actual use of military force.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp_ord v2exrmhsol_2 v2exrmhsol_3 v2exrmhsol_4 v2exhoshog v2ex_hosw v2exremhog v2exrmhgnp_2 v2exrmhgnp_3 v2exrmhgnp_4 v2ex_elechos v2ex_elechog v2ex_hogw

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed through a coup, rebellion or by the miliyary, and (b) can be dismissed by a the military. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

Citation: Teorell & Lindberg (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.3.5 Ruling party dimension index (D) (v2x_ex_party)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by a ruling party?

Clarification: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present

in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which a ruling party appoints and dismisses the chief executive.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp_ord v2exrmhsol_2 v2exrmhsol_3 v2exrmhsol_4 v2exhoshog v2ex_hosw

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed by the ruling party, and (b) can be dismissed by the ruling party. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

Citation: Teorell & Lindberg (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.4 Neopatrimonialism

5.4.1 Neopatrimonial Rule Index (D) (v2x_neopat)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is rule based on personal authority?

Clarification: Neopatrimonial rule reflects the idea that personalistic forms of authority pervade formal regime institutions (Clapham, 1985). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) a neopatrimonialism regime is one that combines clientelistic political relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents and the use of public resources for political legitimation. The index is constructed using Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing these three concepts. The sixteen indicators are those included in the three sub-indices: Clientelism, Presidentialism and Regime Corruption. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc v2x_elecreg

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more neopatrimonialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps), party linkages (v2psprlnks), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature controls resources (v2lgfunds), legislature investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp), high court independence (V2juhcind), low court independence (v2jucnind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), electoral management body autonomy (v2elembaut), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez), executive bribes and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.4.2 Clientelism Index (D) (v2xnp_client)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?

Clarification: Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2x_elecreg

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more clientelism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote-buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps) and whether party linkages are programmatic or clientelistic (v2psprlnks).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.4.3 Presidentialism Index (D) (v2xnp_pres)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the regime characterized by presidentialism?

Clarification: Presidentialism means the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 63). It relates closely to V-Dem's index of Horizontal Accountability (v2x_horacc) but focuses more specifically on the extent to which the President is free from constraints by other institutions or actors. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2lgbicam

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more presidentialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respect for the constitution (v2exrescon), whether there are mechanisms for oversight of the executive other than the legislature (v2lgotovst). For legislative constraints, the index includes an indicator of whether the legislature controls its own resources (v2lgfunds) and investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp). There are four indicators of judicial constraints on the executive: high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2jucnind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp) and compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp). Finally, the index includes a measure of autonomy of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) that captures whether or not the President can influence its decisions and actions.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.4.4 Regime corruption (D) (v2xnp_regcorr)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?

Clarification: In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (v2x_corr), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more regime corruption) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive executive embezzlement (v2exembez), executive bribes (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2xlgcrrpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2017); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.5 Civil liberties

5.5.1 Civil liberties index (D) (v2x_civlib)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

Clarification: Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_clpriv v2x_clphy v2x_clpol

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of physical violence index (v2x_clphy), political civil liberties index (v2x_clpol), and private civil liberties (v2x_clpriv).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.5.2 Physical violence index (D) (v2x_clphy)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

Clarification: Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cltort v2clkill

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from torture (v2cltort) and freedom from political killings (v2clkill).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.5.3 Political civil liberties index (D) (v2x_clpol)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are political liberties respected?

Clarification: Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xcl_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.5.4 Private civil liberties index (D) (v2x_clpriv)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are private liberties respected?

Clarification: Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xcl_slave v2xcl_prpty v2clfmove v2xcl_dmove v2clrelig v2csrlgrep

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), religious organization repression (v2csrlgrep), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and

freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.6 Exclusion

5.6.1 Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group (D) (v2xpe_exlecon)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Index of (political) exclusion by socio-economic group

Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

Source(s): v2pepwrses v2clacjust v2peapsecon v2peasjsoecon v2peasbecon

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socio-economic group (v2pepwrses), soci-economic position equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), access to public services by socio-economic group (v2peapsecon), access to state jobs by socio-economic group (v2peasjsoecon), and access to state business opportunities by socio-economic group (v2peasbecon).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

5.6.2 Exclusion by Gender index (D) (v2xpe_exlgender)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Index of (political) exclusion by gender

Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

Source(s): v2pepwrgen v2clgencl v2peapsgen v2peasjgen v2peasbgen

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed bygender (v2pepwgen), equality in respect for civil

liberties by gender (v2clgencl), access to public services by gender (v2peapsgen), access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen), and access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

5.6.3 Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location index (D) (v2xpe_exlgeo)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Index of (political) exclusion by urban-rural location

Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

Source(s): v2pepwrgeo v2clgeocl v2peapsgeo v2peasjgeo v2peasbegeo

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo), urban-rural equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl), access to public services by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo), access to state jobs byurban-rural location (v2peasjgeo), and access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbgeo).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

5.6.4 Exclusion by Political Group index (D) (v2xpe_exlpol)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Index of (political) exclusion by political group

Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

Source(s): v2clpolcl v2peapspol v2peasjpol v2peasbepol

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group

(v2peasjpol), and access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbpol).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

5.6.5 Exclusion by Social Group index (D) (v2xpe_exlsocgr)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Index of (political) exclusion by social group

Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

Source(s): v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peapssoc v2peasjsoc v2peasbsoc

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), access to public services by social group (v2peapssoc), access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc), and access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2023

5.7 Corruption

5.7.1 Political corruption index (D) (v2x_corr)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How pervasive is political corruption?

Clarification: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive at the level of the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_pubcorr v2x_execorr v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x_execorr); (c) the indicator for legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. We replace missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of a, b and d.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: McMann et al. (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.7.2 Executive corruption index (D) (v2x_execorr)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exbribe v2exembez

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembez).

Citation: McMann et al. (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.7.3 Public sector corruption index (D) (v2x_pubcorr)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2excrptps v2exthftps

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: public sector bribery (v2excrptps) and embezzlement (v2exthftps).

Citation: McMann et al. (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.8 Women's Empowerment

5.8.1 Women political empowerment index (D) (v2x_gender)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How politically empowered are women?

Clarification: Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_gencl v2x_gencs v2x_genpp

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of women's civil liberties index (v2x_gencl), women's civil society participation index (v2x_gencs), and women's political participation index (v2x_genpp).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sundström et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.8.2 Women civil liberties index (D) (v2x_gencl)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

Clarification: Women's civil liberties are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cldmovew v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), and access to justice for women (v2clacjstw).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); Sundström et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.8.3 Women civil society participation index (D) (v2x_gencs)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

Clarification: Women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), CSO women's participation (v2csgender), and female journalists (v2mefemjrn).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); Sundström et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.8.4 Women political participation index (D) (v2x_genpp)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

Clarification: Women's political participation is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2lgfemleg v2pepwrgen v2lgbicam

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators (v2lgfemleg, standardized) and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen). In the calculation of v2x_genpp, v2lgfemleg is set to 0 when v2lgibcam is missing or 0.

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Sundström et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.9 Rule of Law

5.9.1 Rule of law index (D) (v2x_rule)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exrescon v2exbribe v2exembez v2excrptps v2exthftps v2juaccnt v2jucorrdc v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2cltrnslw v2clrspct v2xcl_acjst

Data release: 9-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), judicial accountability (v2juaccnt), judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc), public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps), public sector theft (v2exthftps), executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.9.2 Access to justice (D) (v2xcl_acjst)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clacjstm v2clacjstw

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: access to justice for men (v2clacjstm) and women (v2clacjstw).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.9.3 Property rights (D) (v2xcl_prpty)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Do citizens enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them; customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clprptym v2clprptyw

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: property rights for men (v2clprptym) and women (v2clprptyw).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.10 Direct Democracy

5.10.1 Popular initiative index (D) (v2xdd_i_ci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the *popular initiative utilized*?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmci v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddthreci

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of popular initiatives, where each term obtains a maximum value of one. The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexci,
- The number of signatures needed v2ddsigpci, and
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures v2ddsigdci.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartci,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprci, and

- Supermajority v2ddspmci.

For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman (2017). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmci. Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexci, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreci. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$
\begin{aligned}
v2xdd_i_ci = [&(IF\ v2ddlexci\ > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigpci)) \\
&\times (IF\ v2ddsigdci\ = 0, 1, 0.5 + v2ddsigdci/365/2) \\
&+ (v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmci)] \\
&\times (0.5 + 1 - v2ddadmci/2)] \\
&\times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, 1 \times IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful \\
&event < 6, then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06 \\
&then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year \\
&until\ 0.1;\ if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years \\
&v2ddthrerci{=}0.9,\ afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1 \\
&units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)
\end{aligned}
$$

Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

5.10.2 Popular referendum index (D) (v2xdd_i_rf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: To what extent is the *referendum* utilized?
Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-2).
Source(s): v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmrf v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddthrerf
Data release: 7-16.
Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one. The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexrf,
- The number of signatures needed v2ddsigprf,
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures v2ddsigdrf.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartrf,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprrf, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmrf. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2016.

The resulting score is then multiplied with d district majority v2ddadmrf. Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexrf, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthrerf. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this *formula*:

$$
\begin{aligned}
v2xdd_i_rf = [&(IF\ v2ddlexrf > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigprf) \\
&\times (IF\ v2ddsigdrf = 0, 1, .5 + (v2ddsigdrf \times 2)/365) \\
&+ (v2ddpartrf \cap v2ddapprrf \cap v2ddspmrf)] \times (0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmrf)/2) \\
&\times (IF\ v2ddlexrf = 1, .75, 1) \times (IF\ \textit{years since last successful event}\ < 6, \\
&\textit{then } v2ddthrerf = 1, \textit{afterwards decreases by } .06 \textit{units per year until } .1, \\
&\textit{if the event was not successful during the first years } v2ddthrerf = .9, \\
&\textit{afterwards decreases by } 0.1 \textit{units per year until } .1)
\end{aligned}
$$

Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

5.10.3 Obligatory referendum index (D) (v2xdd_i_or)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: To what extent is the *obligatory referendum* utilized?
Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-2).
Source(s): v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddthreor
Data release: 7-16.
Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of obligatory referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexor.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartor

- Approval quorum v2ddappor, and
- Supermajority V2ddspmor. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmor.
Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexor, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreor.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_i_or = (IF\ v2ddlexor > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartor) \cap v2ddappor \cap V2ddspmor)$$
$$\times ((.5 + (1 - v2ddadmor)/2) \times (IF\ v2ddlexor = 1, .75, 1)$$
$$\times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthreor = 1,$$
$$afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1,$$
$$if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthreor = .9,$$
$$afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)$$

Country–Year Aggregation: Last
Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Years: 1900-2025

5.10.4 Plebiscite index (D) (v2xdd_i_pl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman
Question: To what extent is the *plebiscite* utilized?
Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-2).
Source(s): v2ddlexpl v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddyrpl v2ddthrepl
Data release: 7-16.
Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of plebiscites, where each term obtains a maximum value of one. The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexpl.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartpl,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprpl, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmpl. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmpl.
Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexpl), and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (v2ddthrepl). The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_i_pl = (IF\ v2ddlexpl > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartpl \cap v2ddapprpl \cap v2ddspmpl)$$
$$\times ((0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmpl)/2)) \times (IF\ v2ddlexpl = 1, 0.75, 1)$$
$$\times (IF\ \textit{years since last successful event}\ < 6, \textit{then}\ v2ddthrepl = 1,$$
$$\textit{afterwards decreases by}\ 0.06\ \textit{units per year until}\ 0.1,$$
$$\textit{if the event was not successful during the first years}\ v2ddthrepl = 0.9,$$
$$\textit{afterwards decreases by}\ 0.1\ \textit{units per year until}\ 0.1)$$

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.10.5 Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_cic)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the Citizen Initiated Component utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xdd_i_ci v2xdd_i_rf

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of citizen-initiated mechanism of direct democracy popular initiatives and referendums. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2017. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_cic = [v2xdd_i_ci + v2xdd_i_rf]/4$$

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.10.6 Top-Down component of direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_toc)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the Top-Down Component utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xdd_i_pl v2xdd_i_or

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of mechanism of direct democracy which are not citizen-initiated obligatory referendums and plebiscites. For

an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2016. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_toc = [v2xdd_i_pl + v2xdd_i_or]/4$$

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.11 Civil Society

5.11.1 Core civil society index (D) (v2xcs_ccsi)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How robust is civil society?

Clarification: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprtcpt

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12 Elections

5.12.1 Electoral regime index (A) (v2x_elecreg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Clarification: Coded 0 until an executive or legislative election is held, defined by v2xel_elecpres and v2xel_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x_hosabort and v2x_legabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that either the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2xlg_leginter, or there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election. The operational indicator of an ”aborted” executive election (v2x_hosabort) is that v2expathhs did not turn 7 within 12 months after the election, for a legislative election (v2x_legabort) that v2lgbicam did not turn positive within 12 months after the election. An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the HOS, *e.g.* a coup d'etat, is indicated by v2x_hosinter as a change in v2xel_elecpres, meaning v2expathhs turned from 7 to something else, with the exception of 6, approval by the legislature (in case the legislature remained in place). An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through

the legislature is defined by v2xlg_leginter based on v2lgbicam turning 0. We note that the coding of v2x_elecreg does not merely follow mechanically from the scores on these other variables, as the coding of v2x_elecreg has also been cross-checked and validated by research assistants. An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, and vice versa.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2xel_elecparl v2xlg_leginter v2xel_elecpres v2x_hosinter v2x_hosabort v2x_legabort v2ex_elechos v2ex_elechog

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.2 Executive electoral regime index (A) (v2xex_elecreg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the executive on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Clarification: Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of executive electoral regimes. Coded 0 until an executive election is held, defined by v2x_elecpres, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x_hosabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2xex_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2xel_elecpres v2x_hosinter v2x_hosabort v2ex_elechog

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.3 Legislative electoral regime index (A) (v2xlg_elecreg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the legislature on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Clarification: Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of legislative electoral regimes. Coded 0 until a legislative election is held, defined by v2xel_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x_legabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2xlg_leginter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2xel_elecparl v2xlg_leginter v2x_legabort

Data release: 5-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.4 Electoral component index (D) (v2x_EDcomp_thick)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

Data release: 3-16.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:
$v2x_EDcomp_thick =$
$.125 * v2x_frassoc_thick + .125 * v2x_suffr + .125 * v2xel_frefair + .125 * v2x_elecoff +$
$.5 * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2xel_frefair * v2x_elecoff$

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.5 Freedom of expression index (D) (v2x_freexp)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl_disc v2clacfree

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.6 Presidential election aborted (D) (v2x_hosabort)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Have presidential election results been aborted?

Clarification: Aborted election results usually occur when the President-elect does not reach office from the direct elections, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'etat interferes with inaugural passage.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2ex_elechog v2ex_elechos v2xel_elecpres

Notes: The calculation of this variable checks if there has been a presidential election (v2xel_elecpres = 1) and if the HOS is not directly elected (v2ex_elechos = 0), then the election counts as aborted. If a directly elected HOS is appointed within 365 days of the election in question, the election does not count as abort. The calculations are crosschecked by research assistants for quality control.

Data release: 2-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.12.7 Chief executive no longer elected (D) (v2x_hosinter)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive no longer elected?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.8 Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted (D) (v2x_legabort)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Have legislative election results been aborted?

Clarification: Aborted election results usually occur when the elected members do not reach office after election occurs, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'etat interferes with inaugural session.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2lgbicam v2xel_elecparl

Notes: The calculation of this variable checks if there has been a legislative or constituent assembly (v2xel_elecparl = 1) and if a legislative or constituent assembly is not in place (v2lgbicam = 0), then the election counts as aborted.If a directly elected legislative or constituent assembly is appointed within 365 days of the election in question, the election does not count as abort. The calculations are crosschecked by research assistants for quality control.

Data release: 2-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.12.9 Freedom of discussion (D) (v2xcl_disc)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Are citizens able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc. without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cldiscm v2cldiscw

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm) and women (v2cldiscw).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.10 Freedom of domestic movement (D) (v2xcl_dmove)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Do citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.
Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem) and women (v2cldmovew).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.11 Freedom from forced labor (D) (v2xcl_slave)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Are adult citizens free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clslavem v2clslavef

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from forced labor for men (v2clslavem) and women (v2clslavef).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.12 Legislative or constituent assembly election (D) (v2xel_elecparl)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Did a legislative or constituent assembly election take place this year?

Clarification: In the country-date data set v2xel_elecparl is coded only on the specific election date.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2eltype_0 v2eltype_1 v2eltype_4 v2eltype_5

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.13 Presidential election (D) (v2xel_elecpres)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Did a presidential election take place this year?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2eltype_6 v2eltype_7

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Date specific: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.14 Legislature directly elected (D) (v2xex_elecleg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the legislature directly or indirectly elected?

Clarification: If the legislature is unicameral, v2xex_elecleg is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged.
Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition.
This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily

be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. Since the variables coding the share of directly and indirectly elected legislators are not yet fully in sync for all country dates, a few observations now receive an index value larger than 1.

Responses:
Proportion.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exapup v2exapupap

Data release: 5, 7-16.

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.15 Legislature closed down or aborted (D) (v2xlg_leginter)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Has the legislature been closed down or aborted?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2lgbicam v2lgello

Data release: 1-16.

Country–Year Aggregation: Maximum

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.12.16 Alternative sources of information index (D) (v2xme_altinf)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.13 Party Institutionalization

5.13.1 Party institutionalization index (D) (v2xps_party)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

Clarification: Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a

country, *e.g.*, level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.
This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, *i.e.*, those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

Data release: 1-16. Release 1-6 Party system institutionalization index, release 7 changed to Party institutionalization index.

Aggregation: The index is formed by adding scaled indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages (v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv, set to missing when the lower chamber of legislature (v2lgello) does not exist). The index is then converted to its CDF in order to range from 0 to 1.

Citation: Bizzarro Neto et al. (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.14 Consensual Democracy Dimensions

5.14.1 Divided party control index (D) (v2x_divparctrl)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are the executive and legislature controlled by different political parties?

Clarification: This variable is a reordered version of the continuous measurement model estimates for indicator v2psnatpar: National party control. After reordering, the positive extreme signifies Divided party control. A Different parties or individuals unconnected to parties control the executive and the legislature or B Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister. The intermediate values signify Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats. And the negative extreme signifies "Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats."

Scale: Interval, from low to high.

Source(s): v2psnatpar v2psnatpar_ord

Notes: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

Data release: 6-16. For Version 6 as Divided party control of legislature index v2x_lgdivparctrl, 7 modified to Divided party control index.

Aggregation: The reordering is accomplished in two steps. First, 5 is subtracted from v2psnatpar when the ordinal version of this variable, v2psnatpar_ord, is 2. This moves the ordinal score corresponding to unified party control to the lowest values. Then the result is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Country–Year Aggregation: Last

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.14.2 Division of power index (D) (v2x_feduni)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local or regional governments, or where all or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at any local or regional level that exists. A high score would be accorded to a country in which both local and regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local or regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. A medium score can be achieved in various ways: there are strong elected governments at the local level but not the regional level, or vice versa; or both local and regional governments elect an executive but not an assembly; or elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local and regional levels; or various combinations of these scenarios.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ellocgov v2elreggov v2ellocelc v2elsrgel v2ellocpwr v2elrgpwr

Notes: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: This index is an equally weighted average of a local government index and a regional government index. The local government index is the product of a dummy variable for the existence of local government (v2ellocgov), a recoded version of Local government elected (v2ellocelc), and a CDF of local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr). Local governments are recoded as unelected 0 if they did not exist or if data is missing. They are coded 0.5 if an executive is elected but no assembly, and 1 if an assembly is elected, with or without an executive. The regional government index is calculated the same way but using the existence of regional government (v2elreggov), regional government elected (v2elsrgel), and regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

5.15 Academic Freedom

5.15.1 Academic Freedom Index (D) (v2xca_academ)

Project Manager(s): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is academic freedom respected?

Clarification: Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel). The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

Data release: 10-16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach (v2cafres), freedom of

academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch), institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut), campus integrity (v2casurv), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.16 Electoral Integrity Index

5.16.1 Electoral Integrity Index (D) (v2x_electoral_integrity)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein, Juraj Medzihorsk

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral integrity achieved?

Clarification: Electoral integrity is a set of principles to be achieved in elections which empower the everyday citizen and help to realize the ideals of democracy. There are four principles of electoral integrity: 1) Contestation; 2) Participation; 3) Deliberation; and 4) Adjudication.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

Source(s): v2psbars v2psparban v2elrstrct v2elintim v2elmulpar v2asuffrage v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2pepwrgen v2pepwrort v2eltrnout v2elvaptrn v2elrgstry v2caassemb v2x_freexp_altinf v2elpeace v2dlengage v2dlreason v2psprlnks v2smpardom v2edplural v2dlcountr v2edpoledprim v2edpoledsec v2csprtcpt v2x_rule v2elembaut v2eldommon v2elintmon v2elembcap

Data release: 16.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a one-stage Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators.

Citation: Medzihorsky et al. (2025); James & Garnett (2025); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

5.17 Stock Version of Indices

5.17.1 Deliberative Democracy Stock (D) (v2x_delibdem_stock)

Project Manager(s): Vanessa Boese-Schlosser, Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: What is the country's accumulated stock of deliberative democracy?

Clarification: A country's accumulated stock of deliberative democracy accounts for the cumulative sum of all past values on the Deliberative Democracy Index, with a one-percent annual depreciation rate. This measure reflects the extent to which a country has accumulated experience over time with deliberative democracy, compared to a hypothetical country that has always attained the ideal of deliberative democracy to the fullest extent. A higher value indicates longer or more consistent deliberative democracy, even if recent levels have fluctuated.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_delibdem

Data release: 16.

Aggregation: This index is formed by taking the sum of all past values on the Deliberative Democracy Index using a 1% annual depreciation rate and then rescaling into a 0-1 interval. We assume that cases enter the sample with no accumulated stock. For each subsequent year, we calculate stock as the previous year's depreciated stock plus the prior year's level of deliberative democracy (v2x delibdem). To improve interpretability and cross-country comparability, we rescale stock variable to fall within the 0–1 interval. The stock index is calculated using the following formula: The procedure for filling gaps is as follows:

$$v2x_delibdem_stock = (0.01)\sum_{s=0}^{t-1} 0.99^{\,t-1-s}\, v2x_delibdem_{i,s}$$

(1) Historical recoding (e.g., based on colonial or occupying regimes) is applied where appropriate, following V-Dem Country Coding Units guidance. These decisions aim to balance historical continuity with transparency. (2) Missing values are filled forward up to five years if there is sufficient prior information (at least five years of data before the gap). (3) If no prior data exist or the gap exceeds five years, stock is left missing. Full documentation of missing value handling is available in the demstock package and in Edgell et al. (2025).

Citation: Wilson et al. (2025); Edgell et al. (2025); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1901-2025

5.17.2 Egalitarian Democracy Stock (D) (v2x_egaldem_stock)

Project Manager(s): Vanessa Boese-Schlosser, Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: What is the country's accumulated stock of egalitarian democracy?

Clarification: A country's accumulated stock of egalitarian democracy accounts for the cumulative sum of all past values on the Egalitarian Democracy Index, with a one-percent annual depreciation rate. This measure reflects the extent to which a country has accumulated experience over time with egalitarian democracy, compared to a hypothetical country that has always attained the ideal of egalitarian democracy to the fullest extent. A higher value indicates longer or more consistent egalitarian democracy, even if recent levels have fluctuated.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_egaldem

Data release: 16.

Aggregation: This index is formed by taking the sum of all past values on the Egalitarian Democracy Index using a 1% annual depreciation rate and then rescaling into a 0-1 interval. We assume that cases enter the sample with no accumulated stock. For each subsequent year, we calculate stock as the previous year's depreciated stock plus the prior year's level of egalitarian democracy (v2x egaldem). To improve interpretability and cross-country comparability, we rescale stock variable to fall within the 0–1 interval. The stock index is calculated using the following formula:

$$v2x_egaldem_stock = (0.01)\sum_{s=0}^{t-1} 0.99^{\,t-1-s}\, v2x_egaldem_{i,s}$$

The procedure for filling gaps is as follows: (1) Historical recoding (e.g., based on colonial or occupying regimes) is applied where appropriate, following V-Dem Country Coding Units guidance. These decisions aim to balance historical continuity with transparency. (2) Missing values are filled forward up to five years if there is sufficient prior information (at least five years of data before the gap). (3) If no prior data exist or the gap exceeds five years, stock is left missing. Full documentation of missing value handling is available in the demstock package and in Edgell et al. (2025).

Citation: Wilson et al. (2025); Edgell et al. (2025); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1901-2025

5.17.3 Liberal Democracy Stock (D) (v2x_libdem_stock)

Project Manager(s): Vanessa Boese-Schlosser, Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: What is the country's accumulated stock of liberal democracy?

Clarification: A country's accumulated stock of liberal democracy accounts for the cumulative sum of all past values on the Liberal Democracy Index, with a one-percent annual depreciation rate. This measure reflects the extent to which a country has accumulated experience over time with liberal democracy, compared to a hypothetical country that has always attained the ideal of liberal democracy to the fullest extent. A higher value indicates longer or more consistent liberal democracy, even if recent levels have fluctuated.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_libdem

Data release: 16.

Aggregation: This index is formed by taking the sum of all past values on the Liberal Democracy Index using a 1% annual depreciation rate and then rescaling into a 0-1 interval. We assume that cases enter the sample with no accumulated stock. For each subsequent year, we calculate stock as the previous year's depreciated stock plus the prior year's level of liberal democracy (v2x libdem). To improve interpretability and cross-country comparability, we rescale stock variable to fall within the 0–1 interval. The stock index is calculated using the following formula: The procedure for filling gaps is as follows:

$$v2x_libdem_stock = (0.01) \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} 0.99^{\,t-1-s}\, v2x_libdem_{i,s}$$

(1) Historical recoding (e.g., based on colonial or occupying regimes) is applied where appropriate, following V-Dem Country Coding Units guidance. These decisions aim to balance historical continuity with transparency. (2) Missing values are filled forward up to five years if there is sufficient prior information (at least five years of data before the gap). (3) If no prior data exist or the gap exceeds five years, stock is left missing. Full documentation of missing value handling is available in the demstock package and in Edgell et al. (2025).

Citation: Wilson et al. (2025); Edgell et al. (2025); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

5.17.4 Participatory Democracy Stock (D) (v2x_partipdem_stock)

Project Manager(s): Vanessa Boese-Schlosser, Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: What is the country's accumulated stock of participatory democracy?

Clarification: A country's accumulated stock of participatory democracy accounts for the cumulative sum of all past values on the Participatory Democracy Index, with a one-percent annual depreciation rate. This measure reflects the extent to which a country has accumulated experience over time with participatory democracy, compared to a hypothetical country that has always attained the ideal of participatory democracy to the fullest extent. A higher value indicates longer or more consistent participatory democracy, even if recent levels have fluctuated.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_participdem

Data release: 16.

Aggregation: This index is formed by taking the sum of all past values on the Participatory Democracy Index using a 1% annual depreciation rate and then rescaling into a 0-1 interval. We assume that cases enter the sample with no accumulated stock. For each subsequent year, we calculate stock as the previous year's depreciated stock plus the prior year's level of participatory democracy (v2x partipdem). To improve interpretability and cross-country comparability, we rescale stock variable to fall within the 0–1 interval. The stock index is calculated using the following formula:

$$v2x_partipdem_stock = (0.01) \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} 0.99^{\,t-1-s}\, v2x_participdem_{i,s}$$

The procedure for filling gaps is as follows: (1) Historical recoding (e.g., based on colonial or occupying regimes) is applied where appropriate, following V-Dem Country Coding Units guidance. These decisions aim to balance historical continuity with transparency. (2) Missing values are filled forward up to five years if there is sufficient prior information (at least five years of data before the gap). (3) If no prior data exist or the gap exceeds five years, stock is left missing. Full documentation of missing value handling is available in the demstock package and in Edgell et al. (2025).

Citation: Wilson et al. (2025); Edgell et al. (2025); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

5.17.5 Electoral Democracy Stock (D) (v2x_polyarchy_stock)

Project Manager(s): Vanessa Boese-Schlosser, Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson

Additional versions: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

Question: What is the country's accumulated stock of electoral democracy?

Clarification: A country's accumulated stock of electoral democracy accounts for the cumulative sum of all past values on the Electoral Democracy Index, with a one-percent annual depreciation rate. This measure reflects the extent to which a country has accumulated experience over time with electoral democracy, compared to a hypothetical country that has always attained the ideal of electoral democracy to the fullest extent. A higher value indicates longer or more consistent electoral democracy, even if recent levels have fluctuated.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 16.

Aggregation: This index is formed by taking the sum of all past values on the Electoral Democracy Index using a 1% annual depreciation rate and then rescaling into a 0-1 interval. We assume that cases enter the sample with no accumulated stock. For each subsequent year, we calculate stock as the previous year's depreciated stock plus the prior year's level of electoral democracy (v2x polyarchy). To improve interpretability and cross-country comparability, we rescale stock variable to fall within the 0–1 interval. The stock index is calculated using the following formula: The procedure for filling gaps is as follows:

$$v2x_polyarchy_stock = (0.01)\sum_{s=0}^{t-1} 0.99^{\,t-1-s}\, v2x_polyarchy_{i,s}$$

(1) Historical recoding (e.g., based on colonial or occupying regimes) is applied where appropriate, following V-Dem Country Coding Units guidance. These decisions aim to balance historical continuity with transparency. (2) Missing values are filled forward up to five years if there is sufficient prior information (at least five years of data before the gap). (3) If no prior data exist or the gap exceeds five years, stock is left missing. Full documentation of missing value handling is available in the demstock package and in Edgell et al. (2025).

Citation: Wilson et al. (2025); Edgell et al. (2025); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1790-2025

6 Party Systems

The following indices refer to a variety of latent positions that party systems have on several policy orientations and governance. The Party Systems indices are designed by aggregating individual parties' policy orientations in a given country-election-year using data from the Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party, v2) during the period between 1970-2019 for 178 countries. To find out more about this data and/or the component variables that underly these indicies, please visit `https://www.v-dem.net/data/v-party-dataset/`.
The indices in this section have been developed by Fabio Angiolillo and Felix Wiebrecht.
The following applies to all indices in this section:

- These indices are only computed for election-years, as identified by V-Party. They are not calculated for non-election years as the aggregation equation relies on political parties' institutional positions which can change across the legislature.
- The codehigh and codelow versions of the indices are derived by simply using the corresponding versions from each component. This propagates the uncertainty measurement from the component variables to the indices.
- All country-election-year components used for the party systems indices are weighted by the seat shares for each political party within a given party system (v2passeatshare). In the equations for each index, the weights are denoted by *ws* and are indexed by *gp* for government parties, *op* for opposition parties, and *t* for election-year. These components are weighted in order to adjust for the size of each party in influencing the party system.

6.1 Party-System Democracy Index (D) (v2xpas_democracy)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent does the party system show commitment to democratic norms prior to elections?

Clarification: The Party-System Democracy Index (PSDI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more authoritarian party systems and higher values with more democratic party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xpa_antiplural v2paseatshare v2pagovsup v2x_polyarchy

Notes: The PSDI is calculated by using two V-Party variables: (1) the anti-pluralist index for each political party in a given party system (v2xpa_antiplural) and (2) the seat shares for each political party within that party system (v2paseatshare). Political parties are further divided into those in the government (v2pagovsup = 0, 1, or 2) or those in the opposition (v2pagovsup = 3). To account for hegemonic or competitive authoritarian regimes that allow opposition parties to exist, missing values for a non-existent opposition are replaced with 0 if the electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) scores lower than 0.5 for that country-election-year. Consequently, these missing values are separated from missing values due to delayed formation of the executive, or inability for parties to reach a governmental coalition resulting in missing values for the opposition. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) or opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The PSDI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSDI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[\left(\sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2xpa_antiplural}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}}) \right) + \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2xpa_antiplural}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}}) \right]$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo et al. (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.2 Government Coalition Democracy Index (D) (v2xpas_democracy_government)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent do the parties in the government show commitment to democratic norms prior to elections?

Clarification: The Government Coalition Democracy Index (GCDI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more authoritarian governmental coalitions and higher values with more democratic governmental coalitions. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xpa_antiplural v2paseatshare v2pagovsup v2x_polyarchy

Notes: The GCDI is a restricted version of the PSDI index. It only captures the democratic levels for parties in a governmental coalition. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The GCDI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{GCDI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2xpa_antiplural}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo et al. (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.3 Opposition Parties Democracy Index (D) (v2xpas_democracy_opposition)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent do the parties in the opposition show commitment to democratic norms prior to elections?

Clarification: The Opposition Parties' Democracy Index (OPDI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more authoritarian opposition parties and higher values with more democratic opposition parties. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where the country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xpa_antiplural v2paseatshare v2pagovsup v2x_polyarchy

Notes: The OPDI is a restricted version of the PSDI index. It only captures the democratic levels for parties in the opposition. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The OPDI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{OPDI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2xpa_antiplural}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo et al. (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.4 Party-System Religion Index (D) (v2xpas_religion)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent do political parties in the party system invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify their policy positions?

Clarification: The Party-System Religion Index (PSREI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with less religious party systems and higher values with more religious party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2parelig v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The PSREI is calculated by using two V-Party indicators: (1) the religious principle indicator for each political party in a given party system (v2parelig) and (2) the seat shares for each political party within that party system (v2paseatshare). Parties are further divided into those in the government (v2pagovsup = 0,1, or 2) or in the opposition (v2pagovsup = 3). The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) or opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The PSREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSREI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[\left(\sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2parelig}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}}) \right) + \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2parelig}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}}) \right]$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.5 Government Coalition Religion Index (D) (v2xpas_religion_government)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent do political parties in the governing coalition invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify their policy positions?

Clarification: The Government Coalition Religion Index (GCREI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with less religious governmental coalition and higher values with more religious governmental coalition. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2parelig v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The GCREI is a restricted version of the PSREI index. It captures only religious levels for parties in the governmental coalition. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The GCREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{GCREI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \sum_{p=1}^{N}(\text{v2parelig}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.6 Opposition Parties Religion Index (D) (v2xpas_religion_opposition)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent do political parties in the opposition invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify their policy positions?

Clarification: The Opposition Parties' Religion Index (OPREI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with less religious opposition parties and higher values with more religious opposition parties. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2parelig v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The OPREI is a restricted version of the PSREI index. It only captures the religious levels for parties in the opposition. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The OPREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{OPREI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \sum_{p=1}^{N}(\text{v2parelig}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.7 Party-System Exclusion Index (D) (v2xpas_exclusion)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent does the party system reject cultural superiority and support immigration policies and the equal participation of women in the labor market?

Clarification: The Party-System Exclusion Index (PSEXI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more inclusive party systems and higher values with more exclusive party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2paculsup v2paimmig v2pawomlab v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The PSEXI is calculated by using three V-Party variables: v2paculsup, v2paimmig, and v2pawomlab. Using these variables a measure of political parties' exclusion preferences is calculated. Then, seat shares for each political party within that party system (v2paseatshare) is used to weigh the index and parties are divided into those in the government (v2pagovsup = 0,1, or 2) or those in the opposition (v2pagovsup = 3). The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) or opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The PSEXI is a derivative of the measure party_exclusion_index_PS, which is calculated using the following formula:

$$\text{party_exclusion_index}_{\text{PS}} = 2(\text{v2paculsup}) + 0.5(\text{v2paimmig} + \text{v2pawomlab})$$

The PSEXI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSEXI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \left[\left(\sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{party_exclusion_index}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}}) \right) + \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{party_exclusion_index}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}}) \right]$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.8 Government Coalition Exclusion Index (D) (v2xpas_exclusion_government)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent do parties in the governing coalition reject cultural superiority and support immigration policies and the equal participation of women in the labor market?

Clarification: The Government Coalition Exclusion Index (GCEXI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with government coalitions' more inclusive stances and higher values with government coalitions' more exclusive stances. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2paculsup v2paimmig v2pawomlab v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The GCEXI is a restricted version of the PSEXI index. It captures only the aggregated positions on exclusion for parties in the government. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The GCEXI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{GCEXI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{party_exclusion_index}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.9 Opposition Parties Exclusion Index (D) (v2xpas_exclusion_opposition)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: To what extent do opposition parties reject cultural superiority and support immigration policies and the equal participation of women in the labor market?

Clarification: The Opposition Parties' Exclusion Index (OPEXI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more inclusive opposition parties and higher values with opposition parties advocating for more exclusion. As this index is calculated for country-election-year,

we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2paculsup v2paimmig v2pawomlab v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The OPEXI is a restricted version of the PSEXI index. It only captures the aggregated exclusion positions for parties in the opposition. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The OPREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{OPREI}_{\text{PS}} = 1 - \sum_{p=1}^{N}(\text{party_exclusion_index}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.10 Party-System Left-Right Index (D) (v2xpas_economic)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: Where are parties in the party system located on their overall ideological stance on economic issues?

Clarification: The Party-System Left-Right Index (PSLRI) ranges from 0 to 1, where lower values are associated with more left-leaning party systems and higher values with more right-leaning party systems. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2pariglef v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The PSLRI is calculated by using two V-Party indicators: (1) the economic left-right scale indicator for each political party in the party system (v2pariglef) and (2) the seat shares for each political party within that party system (v2paseatshare). Parties are further divided into those in the government (v2pagovsup = 0,1, or 2) or those in the opposition (v2pagovsup = 3). The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) or opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The PSREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{PSREI}_{\text{PS}} = \left[\left(\sum_{p=1}^{N}(\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}})\right) + \sum_{p=1}^{N}(\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}})\right]$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.11 Government Coalition Left-Right Index (D) (v2xpas_economic_government)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: Where are parties in the governing coalition located on their overall ideological stance on economic issues?

Clarification: The Government Coalition Left-Right Index (GCLRI) ranges from approximately -4 to 4, where lower values are associated with more left-leaning government coalitions and higher values with more right-leaning government coalitions. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2pariglef v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The GCLRI is a restricted version of the PSLRI index. It only captures the aggregated economic position levels for parties in the government. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the government coalition (*gp*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The GCLRI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{GCLRI}_{\text{PS}} = \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{gpt}} \cdot ws_{\text{gpt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

6.12 Opposition Parties Left-Right Index (D) (v2xpas_economic_opposition)

Project Manager(s): Fabio Angiolillo

Question: Where are opposition parties located on their overall ideological stance on economic issues?

Clarification: The Opposition Parties' Left-Right Index (OPLRI) ranges from approximately -4 to 4, where lower values are associated with more left-leaning opposition parties and higher values with more right-leaning opposition parties. As this index is calculated for country-election-year, we advise caution using it for years where a country does not have a general election (lower house).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2pariglef v2paseatshare v2pagovsup

Notes: The OPLRI is a restricted version of the PSLRI index. It only captures the aggregated economic position levels for parties in the opposition. The symbol *ws* denotes the weight for the seatshare of the opposition (*op*) for a given election-year (*t*).

Data release: 14-16.

Aggregation: The OPREI is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{OPREI}_{\text{PS}} = \sum_{p=1}^{N} (\text{v2pariglef}_{\text{opt}} \cdot ws_{\text{opt}})$$

Date specific: Election-specific dates (V-Party v2 election dates).

Citation: Angiolillo & Wiebrecht (2023); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1970-2019

7 Digital Society Survey

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit `https://digitalsocietyproject.org/`.

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Digital society: The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even "off-book" work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider "major political parties," you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

7.1 Coordinated Information Operations

7.1.1 Government dissemination of false information domestic (C) (v2smgovdom)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.64 to -2.26	0	Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.
-2.26 to -0.94	1	Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.
-0.94 to -0.18	2	About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.
-0.18 to 1.41	3	Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.
1.41 to 3.21	4	Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.1.2 Government dissemination of false information abroad (C) (v2smgovab)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.38 to -2.12	0	Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.
-2.12 to -0.91	1	Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.
-0.91 to -0.18	2	About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.
-0.18 to 1.43	3	Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.
1.43 to 2.96	4	Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.1.3 Party dissemination of false information domestic (C) (v2smpardom)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.24 to -1.93	0	Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.
-1.93 to -0.57	1	Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.
-0.57 to 0.44	2	About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
0.44 to 2.2	3	Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
2.2 to 3.25	4	Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.1.4 Party dissemination of false information abroad (C) (v2smparab)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.62 to -2.83	0	Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.
-2.83 to -1.35	1	Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.
-1.35 to -0.4	2	About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
-0.4 to 1.18	3	Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
1.18 to 2.96	4	Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.1.5 Foreign governments dissemination of false information (C) (v2smfordom)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.88 to -2.57	0	Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.
-2.57 to -1.21	1	Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.
-1.21 to -0.44	2	About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
-0.44 to 1.44	3	Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
1.44 to 3.21	4	Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.1.6 Foreign governments ads (C) (v2smforads)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.79 to -3.23	0	Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.
-3.23 to -1.7	1	Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.
-1.7 to -0.89	2	About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
-0.89 to 0.93	3	Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
0.93 to 2.65	4	Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

7.2 Digital Media Freedom

7.2.1 Government Internet filtering capacity (C) (v2smgovfilcap)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to censor information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites) if it decided to?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.25 to -2.24	0	The government lacks any capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet.
-2.24 to -0.48	1	The government has limited capacity to block access to a few sites on the Internet.
-0.48 to 0.85	2	The government has adequate capacity to block access to most, but not all, specific sites on the Internet if it wanted to.
0.85 to 2.94	3	The government has the capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.2 Government Internet filtering in practice (C) (v2smgovfilprc)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How frequently does the government censor political information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites)?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.73 to -2.43	0	Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to remove political content, except to sites that are pro-government.
-2.43 to -1.33	1	Often. The government commonly removes online political content, except sites that are pro-government.
-1.33 to -0.3	2	Sometimes. The government successfully removes about half of the critical online political content.
-0.3 to 1.14	3	Rarely. There have been only a few occasions on which the government removed political content.
1.14 to 2.69	4	Never, or almost never. The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.3 Government Internet shut down capacity (C) (v2smgovshutcap)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to actively shut down domestic access to the Internet if it decided to?

Clarification: A domestic Internet connection is any connection originating physically within the country, whether over wired, wireless, or satellite networks. This question asks what proportion of potential Internet connections of domestic origin the government has the capacity to render inoperable.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.51 to -1.93	0	The government lacks the capacity to shut down any domestic Internet connections.
-1.93 to -1.14	1	The government has the capacity to shut down roughly a quarter of domestic access to the Internet.
-1.14 to -0.48	2	The government has the capacity to shut down roughly half of domestic access to the Internet.
-0.48 to 0.25	3	The government has the capacity to shut down roughly three quarters of domestic access to the Internet.
0.25 to 2.46	4	The government has the capacity to shut down all, or almost all, domestic access to the Internet.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.4 Government Internet shut down in practice (C) (v2smgovshut)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often does the government shut down domestic access to the Internet?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.9 to -3.34	0	Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down domestic access to the Internet.
-3.34 to -2.06	1	Often. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year.
-2.06 to -1.15	2	Sometimes. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet several times this year.
-1.15 to 0.04	3	Rarely but there have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shut down domestic access to Internet.
0.04 to 2.1	4	Never, or almost never. The government does not typically interfere with the domestic access to the Internet.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.5 Government social media shut down in practice (C) (v2smgovsm)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often does the government shut down access to social media platforms?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.83 to -3.1	0	Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down access to social media.
-3.1 to -1.96	1	Often. The government shuts down access to social media numerous times this year.
-1.96 to -1.04	2	Sometimes. The government shuts down access to social media several times this year.
-1.04 to 0.1	3	Rarely. There have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shuts down access to social media.
0.1 to 2.12	4	Never, or almost never. The government does not interfere with the access to social media, except in the cases mentioned in the clarifications section.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.6 Government social media alternatives (C) (v2smgovsmalt)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How prevalent is the usage of social media platforms that are wholly controlled by either the government or its agents in this country?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.69 to -2.67	0	Essentially all social media usage takes place on platforms controlled by the state.
-2.67 to -1.34	1	Most usage of social media is on state-controlled platforms, although some groups use non-state-controlled alternatives.
-1.34 to -0.32	2	There is significant usage of both state-controlled and non-state-controlled social media platforms.
-0.32 to 0.78	3	While some state-controlled social media platforms exist, their usage only represents a small share of social media usage in the country.
0.78 to 2.52	4	Practically no one uses state-controlled social media platforms.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.7 Government social media monitoring (C) (v2smgovsmmon)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How comprehensive is the surveillance of political content in social media by the government or its agents?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.59 to -2.49	0	Extremely comprehensive. The government surveils virtually all content on social media.
-2.49 to -1.02	1	Mostly comprehensive. The government surveils most content on social media, with comprehensive monitoring of most key political issues.
-1.02 to 0.04	2	Somewhat comprehensive. The government does not universally surveil social media but can be expected to surveil key political issues about half the time.
0.04 to 1.55	3	Limited. The government only surveils political content on social media on a limited basis.
1.55 to 2.99	4	Not at all, or almost not at all. The government does not surveil political content on social media, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.8 Government social media censorship in practice (C) (v2smgovsmcenprc)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what degree does the government censor political content (i.e., deleting or filtering specific posts for political reasons) on social media in practice?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.52 to -3.61	0	The government simply blocks all social media platforms.
-3.61 to -2.21	1	The government successfully censors all social media with political content.
-2.21 to -0.98	2	The government successfully censors a significant portion of political content on social media, though not all of it.
-0.98 to 0.46	3	The government only censors social media with political content that deals with especially sensitive issues.
0.46 to 2.42	4	The government does not censor political social media content, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.9 Government cyber security capacity (C) (v2smgovcapsec)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the government have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber-security threats?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.6 to -2.3	0	No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.
-2.3 to -0.74	1	Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.
-0.74 to 0.69	2	Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.
0.69 to 2.12	3	Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.
2.12 to 3.72	4	Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.2.10 Political parties cyber security capacity (C) (v2smpolcap)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do the major political parties have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber security threats?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.1 to -1.53	0	No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.
-1.53 to 0.06	1	Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.
0.06 to 1.34	2	Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.
1.34 to 2.57	3	Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.
2.57 to 4.55	4	Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.3 State Internet Regulation Capacity and Approach

7.3.1 Internet legal regulation content (C) (v2smregcon)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What type of content is covered in the legal framework to regulate Internet?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.62 to -2.21	0	The state can remove any content at will.
-2.21 to -1.29	1	The state can remove most content, and the law protects speech in only specific, and politically uncontroversial contexts.
-1.29 to -0.12	2	The legal framework is ambiguous. The state can remove some politically sensitive content, while other is protected by law.
-0.12 to 0.76	3	The law protects most political speech, but the state can remove especially politically controversial content.
0.76 to 2.73	4	The law protects political speech, and the state can only remove content if it violates well-established legal criteria.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.3.2 Privacy protection by law exists (C) (v2smprivex)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does a legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data exist?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.05 to 0.86	0	No. (Skip to v2smregcap)
0.86 to 1.84	1	Yes

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: if 0 no, Skip to v2smregcap

Scale: yes/no

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.3.3 Privacy protection by law content (C) (v2smprivcon)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What does the legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data stipulate?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.6 to -2.41	0	The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access any type of personal data on the Internet.
-2.41 to -1.4	1	The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access most types of personal data on the Internet.
-1.4 to -0.52	2	The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access many types of personal data on the Internet.
-0.52 to 0.45	3	The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access only a few types of personal information on the Internet.
0.45 to 2.33	4	The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access personal information on the Internet only in extraordinary circumstances.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.3.4 Government capacity to regulate online content (C) (v2smregcap)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the government have sufficient staff and resources to regulate Internet content in accordance with existing law?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.35 to -1.93	0	No, almost all online activity happens outside of reach of the state, where it lacks the capacity to remove illegal content.
-1.93 to -0.37	1	Not really. The state has extremely limited resources to regulate online content.
-0.37 to 0.84	2	Somewhat. The state has the capacity to regulate only some online content or some portions of the law.
0.84 to 2.28	3	Mostly. The state has robust capacity to regulate online content, though not enough to regulate all content and all portions of the law.
2.28 to 3.64	4	Yes, the government has sufficient capacity to regulate all online content.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem

Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.3.5 Government online content regulation approach (C) (v2smregapp)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the government use its own resources and institutions to monitor and regulate online content or does it distribute this regulatory burden to private actors such as Internet service providers?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.16 to -1.21	0	All online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state.
-1.21 to -0.06	1	Most online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, though the state involves private actors in a limited way.
-0.06 to 1.19	2	Some online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, but the state also involves private actors in monitoring and regulation in various ways.
1.19 to 2.77	3	The state does little online content monitoring and regulation, and entrusts most of the monitoring and regulation to private actors.
2.77 to 3.78	4	The state off-loads all online content monitoring and regulation to private actors.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.3.6 Defamation protection (C) (v2smlawpr)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Does the legal framework provide protection against defamatory online content, or hate speech?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.65 to -1.93	0	No. The law provides no protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.
-1.93 to -0.72	1	Not really. The law provides a weak protection and to very limited range of circumstances.
-0.72 to 0.33	2	Somewhat. The law provides some protection against Internet defamation and hate speech but in limited circumstances, or only to particular groups of people.
0.33 to 1.48	3	Mostly. The law provides protection against Internet defamation and hate speech under many circumstances, and to most groups of people.
1.48 to 2.99	4	Yes. The law provides comprehensive protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.3.7 Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (C) (v2smdefabu)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent do elites abuse the legal system (e.g., defamation and copyright law) to censor political speech online?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.48 to -2.44	0	Regularly. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet as regular practice.
-2.44 to -1.21	1	Often. Elites commonly abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.
-1.21 to -0.2	2	Sometimes. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet about half the time.
-0.2 to 1.29	3	Rarely. Elites occasionally abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.
1.29 to 2.85	4	Never, or almost never. Elites do not abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.4 Online Media Polarization

7.4.1 Online media existence (C) (v2smonex)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do people consume domestic online media?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.39 to -3.42	0	Not at all. No one consumes domestic online media. Skip next question if this answer is selected.
-3.42 to -1.06	1	Limited. Domestic online media consumption is limited.
-1.06 to 0.88	2	Relatively extensive. Domestic online media consumption is common.
0.88 to 3.03	3	Extensive. Almost everyone consumes domestic online media.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Ordering: if 0, skip v2smonper

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.4.2 Online media perspectives (C) (v2smonper)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do the major domestic online media outlets represent a wide range of political perspectives?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.85 to -2.39	0	The major domestic online media outlets represent only the government's perspective.
-2.39 to -1.28	1	The major domestic online media outlets represent only the perspectives of the government and a government approved, semi-official opposition party.
-1.28 to 0	2	The major domestic online media outlets represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.
0 to 1.47	3	All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major domestic online media outlets.
1.47 to 2.87	4	All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in many major domestic online media outlets.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

Convergence: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

7.4.3 Online media fractionalization (C) (v2smmefra)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major (political) news?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.59 to -2.28	0	No. The major domestic online media outlets give opposing presentation of major events.
-2.28 to -0.87	1	Not really. The major domestic online media outlets differ greatly in the presentation of major events.
-0.87 to 0.08	2	Sometimes. The major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events about half the time.
0.08 to 1.56	3	Mostly. The major domestic online media outlets mostly give a similar presentation of major events.
1.56 to 3.41	4	Yes. Although there are small differences in representation, the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5 Social Cleavages

7.5.1 Online harassment groups (C) (v2smhargr)

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: Which groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

Clarification: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Women [v2smhargr_0]
1: LGBTQ groups and individuals [v2smhargr_1]
2: Specific religious groups [v2smhargr_2]
3: Specific ethnic groups [v2smhargr_3]
4: Specific caste [v2smhargr_4]
5: Specific language groups [v2smhargr_5]
6: Specific race [v2smhargr_6]
7: People with physical or cognitive disabilities [v2smhargr_7]
8: People from specific regions [v2smhargr_8]
9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smhargr_9]
10: No group is a specific target [v2smhargr_10]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.2 Other online harassment groups (C) (v2smhargrtxt)

Question: Which other groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

Clarification: Skip if the question does not apply to this country.

Scale: Text.

Data release: 9-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.5.3 Use of social media to organize offline violence (C) (v2smorgviol)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do people use social media to organize offline violence?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.57 to -1.84	0	Frequently. There are numerous cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.
-1.84 to 0.78	1	Sometimes. There are a few cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.
0.78 to 3.14	2	Never. People have never used social media to organize offline violence.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.4 Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (C) (v2smorgavgact)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do average people use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.78 to -1.86	0	Never or almost never. Average people have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.
-1.86 to -0.63	1	Rarely. Average people do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.
-0.63 to 0.5	2	Sometimes. There are a few cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.
0.5 to 1.71	3	Often. There have been several cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.
1.71 to 3.51	4	Regularly. There are numerous cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation

at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.5 Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (C) (v2smorgelitact)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do domestic elites use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.09 to -1.93	0	Never or almost never. Elites have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.
-1.93 to -0.66	1	Rarely. Elites do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.
-0.66 to 0.45	2	Sometimes. There are a few cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.
0.45 to 1.66	3	Often. There have been several cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.
1.66 to 3.27	4	Regularly. There are numerous cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.6 Types of organization through social media (C) (v2smorgtypes)

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: What types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

Clarification: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Petition signing [v2smorgtypes_0]
1: Voter turnout [v2smorgtypes_1]
2: Street protests [v2smorgtypes_2]
3: Strikes/labor actions [v2smorgtypes_3]
4: Riots [v2smorgtypes_4]
5: Organized rebellion [v2smorgtypes_5]
6: Vigilante Justice (e.g., mob lynching, stalking harassment) [v2smorgtypes_6]
7: Terrorism [v2smorgtypes_7]
8: Ethnic cleansing/genocide [v2smorgtypes_8]
9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smorgtypes_9]

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.7 Other types of organization through social media (C) (v2smorgtypestxt)

Question: What other types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

Clarification: Skip if the question does not apply to this country.

Scale: Text.

Data release: 9-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.5.8 Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (C) (v2smcamp)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent do major political parties and candidates use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-4.45 to -3.02	0	None. Major political parties and candidates do not use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.
-3.02 to -1.53	1	A little. Major political parties and candidates rarely use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.
-1.53 to -0.31	2	Somewhat. Major political parties and candidates sometimes use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.
-0.31 to 2.17	3	Substantial. Major political parties and candidates frequently use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.9 Arrests for political content (C) (v2smarrest)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: If a citizen posts political content online that would run counter to the government and its policies, what is the likelihood that citizen is arrested?

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.32 to -1.77	0	Extremely likely.
-1.77 to -0.23	1	Likely.
-0.23 to 1.29	2	Unlikely.
1.29 to 3	3	Extremely unlikely.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.10 Polarization of society (C) (v2smpolsoc)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?

Clarification: While plurality of views exists in all societies, we are interested in knowing the extent to which these differences in opinions result in major clashes of views and polarization or, alternatively, whether there is general agreement on the general direction this society should develop.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-2.9 to -0.9	0	Serious polarization. There are serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues, which result in major clashes of views.
-0.9 to 0.09	1	Moderate polarization. There are differences in opinions in society on many key political issues, which result in moderate clashes of views.
0.09 to 1.12	2	Medium polarization. Differences in opinions are noticeable on about half of the key political issues, resulting in some clashes of views.
1.12 to 2.87	3	Limited polarization. There are differences in opinions on only a few key political issues, resulting in few clashes of views.
2.87 to 4.25	4	No polarization. There are differences in opinions but there is a general agreement on the direction for key political issues.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

7.5.11 Political parties hate speech (C) (v2smpolhate)

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do major political parties use hate speech as part of their rhetoric?

Clarification: Hate speech is any speech that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate members of specific groups, defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, or similar trait.

Responses:

Estimate Ranges	*Survey Scale*	*Survey Response*
-3.19 to -2.37	0	Extremely often.
-2.37 to -1	1	Often.
-1 to 0.28	2	Sometimes.
0.28 to 1.5	3	Rarely.
1.5 to 3.43	4	Never, or almost never.

Note: Ranges show how on average measurement model point estimates (interval scale) map onto the ordinal scale. For further clarification see Variable Versions and Suffixes.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 9-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

Country–Year Aggregation: Day-weighted mean

Citation: Mechkova et al. (2019); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2025

8 Varieties of Indoctrination

The Varieties of Indoctrination (V-Indoc) dataset is constructed based on an expert survey fielded in collaboration with V-Dem and led by the ERC-funded project "Democracy under Threat: How Education can Save it" (DEMED). The dataset contains indices and indicators that measure indoctrination efforts in education and the media across 160 countries from 1945 to 2021. The indices capture broad dimensions of indoctrination such as indoctrination potential and indoctrination content, while the indicators cover topics related to the curriculum, teachers, schools, and the media.

The principal investigators are Anja Neundorf, Eugenia Nazrullaeva, Ksenia Northmore-Ball, Katerina Tertytchnaya, and Wooseok Kim.

For more information, please visit `https://www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/democracyresearch/`.

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

We will ask you 27 questions mainly related to the education system of your country of expertise. For each question we will ask you to provide annual responses for the years between 1945 and 2021. We will also ask you to rate how certain you are about each answer.

We are interested in formal public or publicly-funded education: that is, schools that are controlled, managed and funded by the public sector (a relevant national / sub-national / local public authority), as well as schools that are partially funded or subsidized by the public sector but operated by a private body (for example, schools that charge tuition but also receive some public funds or subsidies). We are not interested in schools fully controlled, managed and funded by a private body (for example, a non-governmental organization, a religious body, a special interest group, a foundation, a business enterprise). This means, for example, that religious schools will be included in our definition only if they are operated by a public authority or publicly-funded or subsidized by the public sector.

Unless clearly stated, our questions relate to formal education at the primary and secondary level, not distinguishing between the two levels. If there are substantive differences between the primary and secondary education levels, please provide the response that is most accurate for the majority of students.

Some questions distinguish between primary and secondary education. In cases, where upper secondary education is specialized, please think about lower secondary education. In defining different education levels, we use the International Standard Classification of Education classification adopted by UNESCO: primary education (ISCED level 1); secondary education (lower secondary ISCED level 2 and upper secondary ISCED level 3); tertiary education (ISCED level 6 and higher, that is, bachelor's, master's, doctoral or equivalent levels). We also define: post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED level 4); non-university level tertiary education (ISCED level 5, short-cycle tertiary education).

We are interested in changes over time at the aggregate country level. Please make sure your answers reflect educational reforms or changes in teaching practices over time.

We intend for all questions to concern the majority or plurality of public or publicly funded schools, teachers and pupils in a given country and year. For each question, please try to think of what would be expected in the most typical school. In cases where sub-national differences exist due to decentralized education systems, please consider policies and practices in the most populous sub-national units.

Many of our questions pertain to the official curriculum. The official curriculum (set by national / sub-national / local authorities / school administrations) may include: textbooks, topics covered in subject syllabi, teaching materials, as well as the list of subjects that are to be taught by schools and the amount of time that should be devoted to each subject.

8.1 Indoctrination Indices

8.1.1 Indoctrination potential in education (D) (v2xed_ed_inpt)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How strong is the potential for indoctrination in education?

Clarification: The potential of regimes to successfully indoctrinate through education is based on their control over the structures and processes of the education system. The index is a function of the coherence of the regime's doctrine (whether it be democratic or autocratic) and the effort devoted to political education. Greater coherence and political education efforts are expected to generate higher potential for indoctrination.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xed_ed_poed v2xed_ed_inco

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indices: v2xed_ed_poed and v2xed_ed_inco.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.2 Political education effort in education (D) (v2xed_ed_poed)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Are political values and ideology emphasized in education?

Clarification: This index measures the extent to which the regime attempts to teach its core political values and ideologies through education based on political education in primary and secondary schools, and the teaching of a dominant ideology in the history curriculum.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2edpoledprim v2edpoledsec v2edideol

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate this index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2edpoledprim v2edpoledsec v2edideol.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.3 Indoctrination coherence in education (D) (v2xed_ed_inco)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How coherent are the means of indoctrination in education?

Clarification: This index measures the extent to which a coherent single doctrine of political values and model citizenship is known and promoted by educational agents. The index is a function of the centralization of the education system and the regime's control over educational agents. Greater centralization and control are expected to lead to a more coherent doctrine being taught through education.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xed_ed_cent v2xed_ed_ctag

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indices: v2xed_ed_cent and v2xed_ed_ctag.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.4 Centralization of the education system (D) (v2xed_ed_cent)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Is control over educational structures and resources centralized?

Clarification: This index measures the extent to which the regime has control over education structures and resources based on the centralization of the curriculum and textbooks.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2edcentcurrlm v2edcenttxbooks

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: v2edcentcurrlm and v2edcenttxbooks.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.5 Control over educational agents (D) (v2xed_ed_ctag)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How strong is state-control over agents in education?

Clarification: This index measures the extent to which the regime is able to control teachers and teaching practices inside the classroom based on the strength of teacher autonomy and unions, and the hiring/firing of teachers.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2edteautonomy v2edteunionindp v2edtehire v2edtefire

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2edteautonomy, v2edteunionindp, v2edtehire, and v2edtefire.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.6 Indoctrination content in education (D) (v2xed_ed_con)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the indoctrination content in education democratic (and not patriotic)?

Clarification: This index combines indicators from the democratic and patriotic indoctrination content indices in education (i.e., v2xed_ed_dmcon and v2xed_ed_ptcon). This index should be used if patriotic principles are considered to be at odds with democratic principles, i.e., higher values of the patriotic content indicators will be associated with lower values of this index. If democratic and patriotic indoctrination content are considered to be orthogonal, v2xed_ed_dmcon and v2xed_ed_ptcon should be used instead.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2edpoledrights v2edideolch_rec v2edcritical v2edplural v2edpatriot v2edscpatriotcb

Notes: The scales of v2edpatriot and v2edscpatriotcb have been reversed to accommodate the direction of the index.

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the variables: v2edpoledrights v2edideolch_rec v2edcritical v2edplural v2edpatriot v2edscpatriotcb.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.7 Democratic indoctrination content in education (D) (v2xed_ed_dmcon)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the indoctrination content in education democratic?

Clarification: Indoctrination content in education can range from being democratic (participatory, critical, pluralist) to autocratic (loyal/obedient, uncritical, single view/ideology). This index measures the democratic/autocratic character of the regime's doctrine based on the core teaching principles and the level of contestation promoted in education.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2edpoledrights v2edideolch_rec v2edcritical v2edplural

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate this index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2edpoledrights, v2edideolch_rec, v2edcritical, and v2edplural.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.8 Patriotic indoctrination content in education (D) (v2xed_ed_ptcon)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the indoctrination content in education patriotic?

Clarification: Patriotism is another key tool that regimes can use to build political support for the broader political community. This index measures the extent of patriotic content in education by focusing on patriotic content in the curriculum as well as the celebration of patriotic symbols in schools more generally.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2edpatriot v2edscpatriotcb

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: v2edpatriot and v2edscpatriotcb.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.9 Patriotic indoctrination content in education and the media (D) (v2xed_ptcon)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: To what extent is the indoctrination content in education and the media patriotic?

Clarification: This is an aggregate index of patriotic indoctrination across education and the media that combines the patriotism indicators in education (v2edpatriot and v2edscpatriotcb) and the media (v2medpatriot).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2edpatriot v2edscpatriotcb v2medpatriot

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate this index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2edpatriot, v2edscpatriotcb, and v2medpatriot.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.10 Indoctrination potential in education and the media (D) (v2xedvd_inpt)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How strong is the potential for indoctrination in education and the media?

Clarification: This is an aggregate index of indoctrination potential across education and the media that combines the indices that make up the indoctrination potential in education index (v2xed_ed_inpt) and indoctrination potential in media index (i.e., v2xedvd_me_inco).

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xed_ed_poed v2xed_ed_inco v2xedvd_me_inco

Notes: The component v2xedvd_me_inco includes supplementary V-Dem indicators. See the variable description of v2xedvd_me_inco for more information.

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indices: v2xed_ed_poed, v2xed_ed_inco, and v2xedvd_me_inco.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.11 Indoctrination coherence (potential) in the media (D) (v2xedvd_me_inco)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How coherent are the means of indoctrination in the media?

Clarification: This index measures the extent to which a coherent single doctrine of political values and model citizenship can be delivered through the media. The index is a function of the centralization of the media in the hands of the regime and the regime's control over media agents. Greater centralization and control are expected to lead to a more coherent doctrine being delivered through the media.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xedvd_me_cent v2xedvd_me_ctag

Notes: Indoctrination potential in the media can be measured using v2xed_me_inco. See Neundorf et al. (2023b) for more information. The components v2xedvd_me_cent and v2xedvd_me_ctag include supplementary V-Dem indicators. See the variable descriptions of these indices for more information.

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by averaging two indices: v2xedvd_me_cent and v2xedvd_me_ctag.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.12 Centralization of media control (D) (v2xedvd_me_cent)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: Is control over the media centralized?

Clarification: This index measures the extent to which the media is centralized under and can be regulated by the regime.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2medpolstate v2medpolnonstate v2mecenefm v2merange

Notes: This index combines variables from V-Dem and V-Indoc. The following variables are sourced from V-Dem: v2mecenefm and v2merange. The scales of these variables have been reversed to accommodate the direction of the index.

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2medpolstate, v2medpolnonstate, v2mecenefm, and v2merange.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.1.13 Control over media agents (D) (v2xedvd_me_ctag)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

Question: How strong is state-control over agents in the media?

Clarification: This index measures the extent to which the regime is able to control various media agents.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2medstateprint v2medstatebroad v2medentrain v2meharjrn v2meslfcen

Notes: This index combines variables from V-Dem and V-Indoc. The following variables are sourced from V-Dem: v2meharjrn and v2meslfcen. The scales of these variables have been reversed to accommodate the direction of the index.

Data release: 13-16.

Aggregation: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2medstateprint, v2medstatebroad, v2medentrain, v2meharjrn, and v2meslfcen.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.2 General Curriculum

8.2.1 Centralized curriculum (C) (v2edcentcurrlm)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent does a national authority set the official curriculum framework for schools?

Clarification: The official curriculum may only be a framework, to which individual schools can contribute.
For this question, we are interested in all school subjects across levels of primary and secondary public education. If there are substantive differences between the primary and secondary education levels, please provide the response that is most accurate for the majority of schools.
A national (or federal) authority can include a state body organized under the auspices of a Ministry of Education.
The sub-national level includes states, provinces, districts, municipalities, villages, local educational authorities, etc.

Responses:
0: A national authority does not set the official curriculum framework, that is, the curriculum framework is completely set by sub-national authorities.
1: Sub-national authorities mostly set the official curriculum framework, with some input from the national authority.
2: A national authority mostly sets the official curriculum framework, with some input from sub-national authorities.
3: A national authority fully sets the official curriculum framework.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.2.2 Centralized textbook approval (C) (v2edcenttxbooks)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What proportion of school textbooks across core subjects does a national authority approve centrally?

Clarification: For this question, we are interested in core subjects, such as languages, mathematics, science, arts, social studies, history, geography. We are not interested in textbooks teaching foreign languages that could be subcontracted to a foreign publisher.
Please consider school subjects across levels of formal primary and secondary public education. If there are substantive differences between the primary and secondary education levels, please provide the response that is most accurate for the majority of schools.
Examples of ways in which textbook production is centrally approved or authorized include: a national public authority reviews textbook content and approves textbooks for use in schools; there is a state-mandated national list of textbooks that schools are recommended to use; the Ministry of Education directly publishes textbooks. A national (or federal) authority can include a public authority organized under the auspices of a Ministry of Education or a different authority.

Responses:
0: No textbooks are centrally approved by a national authority.

1: Some textbooks are centrally approved by a national authority.
2: All textbooks are centrally approved by a national authority.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3 Specialized Subject Curriculum

8.3.1 Political education, primary school (C) (v2edpoledprim)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are primary school students required to study at least one subject that predominately focuses on teaching political values?

Clarification: Examples of subjects that focus on teaching political values include specific subjects in political education, as well subjects where political values are integrated in the curriculum: for example, moral, religious, and civic education; ethics and civics; 'knowledge about society' with elements of sociology, politics, legal studies, or economics. This does not include history as a subject. We are not interested in *de jure* subject labels but in *de facto* subject content: a course does not need to be entitled "political values" to be considered here.
Political values refer to goals that are the desirable purposes for socio-political organizations such as the political community, the nation-state, and regime. Political values guide an individual's or group's general behavior/attitudes toward political 'objects' (e.g. leaders, events, ideologies).

Responses:
0: No. There is no general requirement for the majority of primary school students to study at least one subject predominately focused on political values.
1: Yes. The majority of primary school students are required to study at least one subject that is predominately focused on political values.

Scale: Binary, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.2 Political education, secondary school (C) (v2edpoledsec)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are secondary school students required to study at least one subject that predominately focuses on teaching political values?

Clarification: Examples of subjects that focus on teaching political values include specific subjects in political education, as well subjects where political values are integrated in the curriculum: for example, moral, religious, and civic education; ethics and civics; 'knowledge about society'

with elements of sociology, politics, legal studies, or economics. This does not include history as a subject. We are not interested in *de jure* subject labels but in *de facto* subject content: a course does not need to be entitled "political values" to be considered here.
In cases, where upper secondary education is specialized, please only consider lower secondary education.
Political values refer to goals that are the desirable purposes for socio-political organizations such as the political community, the nation-state, and regime. Political values guide an individual's or group's general behavior/attitudes toward political 'objects' (e.g. leaders, events, ideologies).

Responses:
0: No. There is no general requirement for the majority of secondary school students to study at least one subject predominately focused on political values.
1: Yes. The majority of secondary school students are required to study at least one subject that is predominately focused on political values.

Scale: Binary, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.3 Political rights and duties in the curriculum (C) (v2edpoledrights)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent does the curriculum of subjects that include the teaching of political values cover topics related to individuals' political rights and duties?

Clarification: In this question we are asking about the subjects you considered in the previous two questions, on average across primary and secondary education. Again, these subjects may be specifically focused on political education or may be subjects into which the teaching of political values is only integrated.
Political rights and duties include: guarantees of equal political opportunities and equal protection under the law, regardless of race, religion, gender, or other personal attributes; the right or duty to vote; the right to organize and protest; or the right to join labor unions.

Responses:
0: These subjects do not cover these topics.
1: These subjects rarely cover these topics.
2: These subjects cover these topics, but not at depth.
3: These subjects cover these topics in some depth.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.4 Patriotic education in the curriculum (C) (v2edpatriot)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often does the language curriculum promote patriotism?

Clarification: We are interested in the curriculum for core subjects in language studies, common to a majority of students, for example, teaching the official language(s) of the country. We are not interested in foreign languages.
By promoting patriotism, we mean encouraging feelings of love, pride, loyalty and commitment to one's country. For example, promoting patriotism can take the form of teaching narratives that celebrate the country's military past, national origin stories, the majority ethnic or religious group, or accomplishments in economic or technological sectors. Patriotic education could be part of the texts used to teach basic literacy skills (e.g. handwriting exercises), language textbooks, assigned readings in the literature curriculum, as well as in accompanying teaching manuals.
Please consider a typical situation for students in primary and secondary schools. If the situation varies across educational levels, please provide the response that is most accurate for the majority of students.

Responses:
0: Rarely or never.
1: Sometimes.
2: Often.
3: Extensively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.5 Ideology in the curriculum (C) (v2edideol)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often does the history curriculum promote a specific societal model or ideology?

Clarification: A societal model or ideology is generally a codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular social and political order, for example, socialism, democracy, liberalism, fascism or social orders related to a specific religion.
The history curriculum can promote a specific ideology or societal model by often referring to it and clearly interpreting one model as better than other alternatives.
We are not just interested in *de jure* history subjects, but also in the *de facto* subject content.
Please consider a typical situation for students in primary and secondary schools. If the situation varies across educational levels, please provide the response that is most accurate for the majority of students.

Responses:
0: Rarely or never.
1: Sometimes.
2: Often.
3: Extensively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf,

Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.6 Ideology character in the curriculum (C) (v2edideolch)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_nr

Question: How would you characterize the dominant societal model(s) or ideology(ies) promoted through the history curriculum, identified in the question for v2edideol?

Clarification: Select up to two options that apply if the history curriculum promotes more than one dominant social model or ideology, focusing on the most important. Please refer to the curriculum taught in a typical school.

Responses:

1: Nationalist [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_1].
2: Socialist or communist [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_2].
3: Restorative or conservative [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_3].
4: Democratic norms, e.g. liberalism or pluralism [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_4].
5: Democratic institutions, e.g. elections [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_5].
6: Personality cult [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_6].
7: Religious [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_7].
8: Ethnicity, clan or tribe [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_8].
9: Other societal model or ideology [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_9].
10: The history curriculum does not promote a specific societal model or ideology [No=0, Yes=1, v2edideolch_10].

Scale: Mean-aggregated scores of dichotomized variable.

Answer-type: Multiple selection.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.7 Ideology character in the curriculum (C) (v2edideolch_rec)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How would you characterize the dominant societal model(s) or ideology(ies) promoted through the history curriculum, identified in the question for v2edideol?

Responses:

0: Autocratic.
1: Democratic.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: This variable is a recoded version of v2edideolch so that if either of the democratic alternatives (4 or 5) are selected this variable is set to 1. Otherwise it equals 0. If a 4 or 5 is selected together with a 10 we set it to 0.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem*

Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.8 Pluralism in the curriculum (C) (v2edplural)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: When historical events are taught, to what extent are students exposed to diverse views and/or interpretations of these events?

Clarification: We are not interested in *de jure* history subjects but in the *de facto* subject content, that is, in history-related subjects or in subjects that are predominantly focused on teaching history.
We are interested in how much space is given to alternative viewpoints, such as alternative political ideologies, in the teaching of history. For example, if the major international conflict is taught, it can be studied exclusively from the perspective of the country's now-dominant power.

Responses:
0: Rarely or never.
1: Sometimes.
2: Often.
3: Extensively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.9 Critical engagement with education content (C) (v2edcritical)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent do students have opportunities to discuss what they are taught in history classes?

Clarification: This question regards the degree to which students are *de facto* given the opportunity to engage in debates which question the material and content of their history classes, as well as being able to voice disagreement with each other. Critical engagement with the content can be expressed by engaging in discussions with the teacher or other students, in oral presentations, or in written work (for example, exams and essays).
Opportunity means that critically engaging with the content would not bring down students' marks.

Responses:
0: Students are never or rarely given the opportunity to discuss what they are taught.
1: Students are sometimes given the opportunity to discuss what they are taught.
2: Students are often given the opportunity to discuss what they are taught.
3: Students are extensively given the opportunity to discuss what they are taught.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley,

Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.10 Teacher autonomy in the classroom (C) (v2edteautonomy)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do history teachers have autonomy to deviate from the content of the official curriculum in the classroom?

Clarification: Here we aim to capture the degree to which teachers have autonomy to *de facto* deviate from the intended or official curriculum in their classes. Examples of how teachers can deviate from the content of the official curriculum: selecting textbooks that are different from those authorized or recommended by a central authority; diverging from the official curriculum in terms of the amount of time allocated to different topics, or supplement/expand on the official curriculum.
In cases where there is no official history curriculum, or the official history curriculum sets only loose restrictions on teachers' autonomy, please code this question as zero (generally autonomous).

Responses:
0: They are free to deviate to a large extent: teachers are generally autonomous.
1: They are free to deviate to a moderate extent: teachers' autonomy is somewhat restricted.
2: They are free to deviate to a small extent: teachers' autonomy is mostly restricted.
3: They are not at all free to deviate: teachers' autonomy is completely restricted.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.3.11 Mathematics and science education (C) (v2edmath)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_mode, *_nr

Question: What proportion of instructional weekly hours is dedicated to mathematics and natural sciences in primary education?

Clarification: For this question, please approximate the proportion of instructional hours across grades of primary education.
Mathematics includes arithmetic, geometry, algebra, calculus.
Natural sciences include chemistry, biology, physics, as well as classes in computing and engineering.

Responses:
0: A small proportion (less than 25%).
1: A large proportion (about 25% or more).

Scale: Binary, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: For the mode version of this variable, we assign an observation a value of 0.5 if the mode is not unique, i.e., a value of 0.5 represents a multimodal response distribution.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem*

Methodology).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.4 Teachers

8.4.1 Education requirements for primary school teachers (C) (v2edtequal)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: What are the *de facto* education requirements to become a primary school teacher?

Clarification: If there is substantive variation at the sub-national or local levels, please consider the education requirements for the majority of primary school teachers in the country. Some countries may require a degree/diploma in education and others may accept a degree in any subject – indicate the completed education level required regardless of specialization. Please consider initial requirements to be a teacher not those for further professional development.

Responses:

0: There are no educational requirements for aspiring teachers beyond proof of basic literacy and/or numeracy skills (ISCED Level 2 or lower).

1: Aspiring teachers must have completed a secondary school level education (ISCED Level 3).

2: Aspiring teachers must have achieved an education at the post-secondary, non-university level (for example, technical or vocational institutions) (ISCED Level 4).

3: Aspiring teachers must have completed at least one degree program taught at the university level (ISCED Level 5 and above).

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: In defining different education levels, we use the ISCED classification adopted by UNESCO, the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.4.2 Teacher inspection (C) (v2temonitor)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Is there a comprehensive monitoring system in place for public authorities to conduct external teacher inspection?

Clarification: This question concerns the formal monitoring efforts of the relevant public/government authorities (national / sub-national / local authorities / school district administration) to conduct external inspection of teachers, that is, it concerns the operations of a formal bureaucratic hierarchy outside of school that works to inspect teachers. We are not interested in peer review observations of teachers working in the same school. We are not interested in *de jure* formal procedures but whether they are *de facto* carried out in practice. Teacher inspection can include external inspectors conducting teaching observations inside the classroom or during a class, before a class (audits of teachers' lesson plans) or after a class (for example, audits of students' notebooks and teachers' assessment of students' schoolwork). We define a comprehensive inspection in the following way(s): inspections are regular,

conducted according to standardized and transparent protocols, with impartial and objective judgements; inspection results are reported to relevant national or sub-national government offices, etc.
If there are substantive differences between the primary and secondary education levels, please provide the response that is most accurate for the majority of schools.

Responses:
0: There is no external teacher inspection.
1: While there is a system in place for external teacher inspection, it is not comprehensive.
2: There is a generally comprehensive system in place for external teacher inspection.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.4.3 Presence of teacher unions (C) (v2edteunion)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_mode, *_nr

Question: Do officially recognized teacher unions exist in this country?

Clarification: Please answer this question without taking into account the nature of the union. That is, for the purposes of this question it is irrelevant if the teacher union is distinct or part of a larger union (e.g. a trade union federation). This question does not concern why a teacher's union does or does not exist. It is irrelevant if a union does not exist because (teacher) unionization is formally prohibited, teacher unionization can be allowed *de jure* but prohibited *de facto* due to government pressure, or there can be a lack of organization capacity among teachers.

Responses:
0: No officially recognized teacher unions exist.
1: Officially recognized teacher unions exist.

Ordering: If answer is 0 in a given year, please skip v2edteunionindp for this year.

Scale: Binary, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: This is a filtering question for v2edteunionindp. For the mode version of this variable, we assign an observation a value of 0.5 if the mode is not unique, i.e., a value of 0.5 represents a multimodal response distribution.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.4.4 Independent teacher unions (C) (v2edteunionindp)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Are officially recognized teacher unions independent from political authorities?

Clarification: Please answer this question regardless of the nature of teacher unions, that is, it is irrelevant if teacher unions are distinct or part of a comprehensive union (e.g. trade union federations). In cases where there is substantive sub-national variation, please consider teacher unions in the most populous sub-national units.
Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders such as presidents, prime minister or ministers.
This question does not distinguish between different mechanisms that can lead to teacher unions being dependent on the state. It is irrelevant if the relationship with the state was due to coercion, co-optation, or voluntary strategic alliances.

Responses:
0: Teacher unions are fully independent.
1: Teacher unions are mostly independent.
2: Teacher unions are somewhat independent.
3: Teacher unions are not independent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: Please answer this question only when option 1 was selected for v2edteunion.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2edteunion is 0.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.4.5 Political teacher hiring (C) (v2edtehire)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: To what extent are hiring decisions for teachers based on their political views and/or political behavior and/or moral character?

Clarification: Please consider hiring decisions across all subjects.
This question concerns actual practice (*de facto*, not legislation pertaining to the recruitment procedures for teachers).
This question concerns hiring decisions based on political views, or statements, participation in political protests, or membership in political parties or other organizations on the part of hiring candidates. Note that these behaviors can result in either a) relevant candidates not being hired (for example, being denied a teaching job due to a party affiliation) and b) only specific candidates being hired (for example, being hired due to pro-regime ideological affinities, party membership or moral character). Note that sometimes "moral character" is used as a pretext for political hiring decisions. In such cases, treat this pretext as political.
Please consider the situation for both primary and secondary school teachers. If there are substantive differences between the primary and secondary education levels, please provide the response that applies to the majority of teachers.

Responses:
0: Rarely or never.
1: Sometimes.
2: Often.
3: Almost exclusively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley,

Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.4.6 Political teacher firing (C) (v2edtefire)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How likely is it that teachers would be fired if they were to publicly express political views that contradict the dominant political order?

Clarification: This question pertains to firings of teachers on the basis of their political views, statements or membership in parties or organizations. We are not interested in firings for reasons related to their performance or professional competencies.
Dominant political order: A country's political norms and key political institutions and authorities. We are not interested in the violations of predominant social, cultural and moral norms unless they are explicitly politicized.
Public expression of political views can happen at school or outside of school (for example, public tweets, participation in a protest).

Responses:
0: Teachers would almost never be fired.
1: Teachers would sometimes be fired.
2: Teachers would likely be fired.
3: Teachers would almost certainly be fired.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.5 Schools

8.5.1 Presence of patriotic symbols in schools (C) (v2edscpatriot)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_mode, *_nr

Question: Are patriotic symbols displayed in schools?

Clarification: Examples of patriotic symbols include: the national flag, a picture or bust of current or past country leaders, singing the national anthem or reciting national pledges, and celebrations of national days, heroes, historical or military events (for example, victory in a war). It further includes symbols associated with the ruling party, royal family, military junta, or other group/entity representing the political regime (e.g., party logo, symbol for royal family, military symbol tied to the particular regime, symbol of specific ethnic group or class dominating the regime). Patriotic symbols include religious symbols if (and only if) religious and state authorities are closely interlinked.
Here we refer to the school building(s) and classrooms and not to the content of learning material, such as textbooks.
If there is significant variation in the use of patriotic symbols across the territory, the answer should reflect the average or typical school across the sub-national units.

Responses:
0: Patriotic symbols are usually not displayed.

1: Patriotic symbols are displayed.

Ordering: If answer is 0 in a given year, please skip v2edscpatriotcb for this year.

Scale: Binary, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: This is a filtering question for v2edscpatriotcb. For the mode version of this variable, we assign an observation a value of 0.5 if the mode is not unique, i.e., a value of 0.5 represents a multimodal response distribution.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.5.2 Celebration of patriotic symbols (C) (v2edscpatriotcb)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often are patriotic symbols or dates celebrated in schools?

Clarification: To celebrate patriotic symbols can be: to explicitly draw students' attention to the symbols or to regularly remind students about the symbols. Examples include: flag raising ceremonies, reciting a pledge of allegiance, or broadcasting or singing the national anthem.

Responses:

0: Never.
1: Once per year or less.
2: Several times per year.
3: At least once per week.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: Please answer this question only when 1 is selected in a given year for v2edscpatriot.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Cleaning: Set to 0 when v2edscpatriot is 0.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.5.3 Extracurricular activities (C) (v2edscextracurr)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do schools promote involvement in extracurricular civic and/or political activities?

Clarification: Extracurricular civic activities can include (but are not limited to): joining a political organization, a specific political party, the army, a civil society organization, a labor union, a grassroots activist organization, volunteering in the local community, leadership activities, school-community partnerships.

Schools can promote these activities by providing such opportunities (e.g. by having a school council), or encouraging pupils to get involved in these outside of school (e.g. by emphasizing the importance of volunteering).

Responses:

0: Schools do not promote extracurricular civic and/or political activities.
1: Schools promote extracurricular civic and/or political activities to some extent, but these activities are not considered an integral part of education.
2: Schools promote extracurricular civic and/or political activities as an integral part of education.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.6 Media

8.6.1 State-owned print media (C) (v2medstateprint)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Out of the top four national print media with the highest readership, how many are state-owned?

Clarification: If there are fewer than four national print media, please provide your answer based on the number of existing national print media.
By print media, we refer to newspapers, magazines, or printed journals whose content can be consumed through their printed or online editions. In this question, we are only interested in state ownership of the media – not in the extent to which the state may control editorial decisions.
State ownership takes different forms. For example, state-owned media can be funded by government license fees and advertising. They can also be directly controlled by government agencies (e.g. the Ministry of Information and Culture). The state, the ruling party, or the Head of Government / the Head of State, can also be the owner of media in this context.

Responses:
0: There are no state-owned print media outlets.
1: State-owned outlets make up a minority of print media outlets.
2: There is an equal share of state- and non-state owned print media outlets.
3: State-owned outlets make up the majority of print media outlets.
4: All print media outlets are state-owned.

Ordering: If v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both set to 0 do not answer v2medpolstate. If both are set to 4 do not answer v2medpolnonstate.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: This is a filtering question for v2medpolstate and v2medpolnonstate.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.6.2 State-owned broadcast media (C) (v2medstatebroad)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Out of the top four national broadcast media with the largest audience, how many are state-owned?

Clarification: If there are fewer than four national broadcast media, please provide your answer based on the number of existing national broadcast media.
Broadcast media includes radio and television stations whose content can be consumed offline or online, for example, through station's websites. Here, we are only interested in state ownership of the media – not in the extent to which the state may control editorial decisions.
State ownership takes different forms. For example, state-owned media can be funded by government license fees and advertising. They can also be directly controlled by government agencies (e.g. the Ministry of Information and Culture). The state, the ruling party, or the Head of Government / the Head of State, can also be the owner of media in this context.

Responses:
0: There are no state-owned broadcast media outlets.
1: State-owned outlets make up a minority of media broadcast outlets.
2: There is an equal share of state- and non-state owned broadcast media outlets.
3: State-owned outlets make up the majority of broadcast media outlets.
4: All broadcast media outlets are state-owned.

Ordering: If v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both set to 0 do not answer v2medpolstate. If both are set to 4 do not answer v2medpolnonstate.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: This is a filtering question for v2medpolstate and v2medpolnonstate.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.6.3 Political influence, state-owned media (C) (v2medpolstate)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: For the print and broadcast media outlets owned by the state, how often do political authorities influence how these outlets cover political issues?

Clarification: Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers. Political authorities can influence which political issues state-media cover, how, and how much they cover them. For example, they can exert influence by directly or indirectly controlling the hiring and firing of producers, directors, writers, editors, and announcers; by manipulating the resources these media require; by withholding resources required for printing or broadcast. Political authorities can also directly dictate content and make editorial decisions.

Responses:
0: Political authorities (almost) never influence the coverage of political issues.
1: Political authorities sometimes influence the coverage of political issues.
2: Political authorities often influence the coverage of political issues.
3: Political authorities almost always influence the coverage of political issues.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: Please answer this question only when both v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are not both 0.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem*

Methodology).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both 0.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.6.4 Political influence, non state-owned media (C) (v2medpolnonstate)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: For the print and broadcast media outlets NOT owned by the state, how often do political authorities influence how these cover political issues?

Clarification: Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers. Political authorities can influence the coverage of non-state owned outlets both directly and indirectly. Indirect forms of control might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities (e.g. subsidized newsprint) and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, and prohibitive tariffs. They might also include tax privileges, bribery, and cash payments. Indirect forms of control may also include the intimidation of owners, advertisers, and editors, through the use of threats and violence.

Responses:

0: Political authorities (almost) never influence the coverage of key political issues.
1: Political authorities sometimes influence the coverage of key political issues.
2: Political authorities often influence the coverage of key political issues.
3: Political authorities almost always influence the coverage of key political issues.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: Please answer this question only when both v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are not both 4.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Cleaning: Set to missing when v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both 4.

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.6.5 Patriotism in the media (C) (v2medpatriot)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: How often do media outlets promote patriotism?

Clarification: Promotion of patriotism can be associated with promotion of patriotic consciousness, the love of the country, national pride, loyalty and commitment. For example, specific narratives can celebrate the country's military past, national origin stories, or accomplishments in economic or technological sectors. Patriotism can be promoted in news, movies, TV shows, radio shows, music, or magazines.
For this question, please consider all (state-owned as well as not state-owned) broadcast and print media outlets.

Responses:

0: Rarely or never.
1: Sometimes.
2: Often.
3: Extensively.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

8.6.6 Control of entertainment content (C) (v2medentrain)

Project Manager(s): Anja Neundorf

Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

Question: Do political authorities have control over the production of entertainment content?

Clarification: Entertainment includes both broadcast and print content, such as movies, TV shows, radio shows, music, and magazines.
Here we distinguish between entertainment content and news content (although, in some cases news content can have an entertainment component, and vice versa), focusing on entertainment.
Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers.
It is irrelevant how political authorities came to exert the control over the entertainment content.

Responses:
0: Political authorities exert almost no control over the production of entertainment content.
1: Political authorities exert some control over the production of entertainment content.
2: Political authorities exert a high level of control over the production of entertainment content.
3: Political authorities almost exclusively control the production of entertainment content.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 13-16.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023); Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023); Pemstein et al. (2026); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1945-2021

9 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

9.1 Ordinal Versions of Indices

9.1.1 Additive polyarchy index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_api)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Additive polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.
For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".
For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".
For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_api

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES
0.0: if v2x_api>=0 and v2x_api<=0.25
0.0: if v2x_api>0.25 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar_osp<=2.5
0.0: if v2x_api>0.25 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>=0 and v2elfrfair _osp<=2
0.5: if v2x_api>0.25 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>2.5 and v2elmulpar_osp<=4
0.5: if v2x_api>0.25 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elfrfair_osp>2 and v2elfrfair_osp<=4
0.5: if v2x_api>0.5 and v2x_api<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair_osp<3
1.0: if v2x_api>0.5 and v2x_api<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>=3 and v2elfrfair_osp<=4

4 CATEGORIES
0.00: if v2x_api>=0 and v2x_api<=0.25
0.00: if v2x_api>0.25 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar_osp<=2
0.00: if v2x_api>0.25 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>=0 and v2elfrfair _osp<=2
0.33: if v2x_api>=0.250001 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>2 and v2elmulpar_osp<=4
0.33: if v2x_api>0.25 and v2x_api<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>2 and v2elfrfair _osp<=4
0.67: if v2x_api>0.5 and v2x_api<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>2 and v2elfrfair _osp<3 and v2elmulpar_osp>2
1.00: if v2x_api>0.5 and v2x_api<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>3 and v2elmulpar_osp>3

5 CATEGORIES
0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2

0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4
0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6
0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8
1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.2 Civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_civlib)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_civlib

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.3 Physical violence index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clphy)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem physical violence index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_clphy

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.4 Political civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clpol)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent are political liberties respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_clpol

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.5 Private liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clpriv)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent are private liberties respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem private civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_clpriv

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.6 Political corruption index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_corr)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: How pervasive is political corruption?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_corr

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.7 Civil society participation index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_cspart)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csprtcpt v2csgender

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.8 Deliberative democracy index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_delibdem)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.
For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".
For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

9.1.9 Electoral component index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_EDcomp_thick)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral component index. There are three versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) categories respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_EDcomp_thick

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for v2x_polyarchy_3C /_4C /_5C.

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.10 Egalitarian component index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_egal)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2xeg_eqprotec v2xeg_eqdr

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

9.1.11 Egalitarian democracy index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_egaldem)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.
For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".
For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".
For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

9.1.12 Elected officials index (de jure) ordinal (D) (e_v2x_elecoff)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem elected executive index (*de jure*). The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

Data release: 7-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.13 Executive corruption index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_execorr)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem executive corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_execorr

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.14 Division of power index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_feduni)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem division of power index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_feduni

Data release: 6-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.15 Freedom of association (thick) index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_frassoc_thick)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of association (thick) index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.16 Freedom of expression index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_freexp)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.17 Expanded freedom of expression index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_freexp_altinf)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem expanded freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.18 Women civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_gencl)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2cldmovew v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.19 Women civil society participation index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_gencs)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.20 Women political empowerment index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_gender)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: How politically empowered are women?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political empowerment index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_gencl v2x_gencs v2x_genpp

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.21 Women political participation index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_genpp)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2lgfemleg v2pepwrgen

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.22 Judicial constraints on the executive index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_jucon)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.23 Liberal democracy index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_libdem)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.
For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".
For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".
For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_libdem

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES
0.0: if I >=0 and I <=0.25
0.5: if I >0.25 and I <=0.5
1.0: if I >0.5 and I <=1

4 CATEGORIES
0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.25
0.33: if I >0.25 and I <=0.5
0.67: if I >0.5 and I <=0.75
1.00: if I >0.75 and I <=1

5 CATEGORIES
0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2
0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4
0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6
0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8
1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.24 Liberal component index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_liberal)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2xcl_rol v2x_jucon v2xlg_legcon

Data release: 1-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.25 Multiplicative polyarchy index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_mpi)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Multiplicative polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.
For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".
For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".
For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_mpi

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES
0.0: if v2x_mpi>=0 and v2x_mpi<=0.25
0.0: if v2x_mpi>0.25 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar_osp<=2.5
0.0: if v2x_mpi>0.25 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>=0 and v2elfrfair _osp<=2
0.5: if v2x_mpi>0.25 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>2.5 and v2elmulpar_osp<=4
0.5: if v2x_mpi>0.25 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elfrfair_osp>2 and v2elfrfair_osp<=4
0.5: if v2x_mpi>0.5 and v2x_mpi<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair_osp<3
1.0: if v2x_mpi>0.5 and v2x_mpi<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>=3 and v2elfrfair_osp<=4

4 CATEGORIES
0.00: if v2x_mpi>=0 and v2x_mpi<=0.25
0.00: if v2x_mpi>0.25 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar_osp<=2
0.00: if v2x_mpi>0.25 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>=0 and v2elfrfair _osp<=2
0.33: if v2x_mpi>=0.250001 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>2 and v2elmulpar_osp<=4
0.33: if v2x_mpi>0.25 and v2x_mpi<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>2 and v2elfrfair _osp<=4
0.67: if v2x_mpi>0.5 and v2x_mpi<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>2 and v2elfrfair _osp<3 and v2elmulpar_osp>2

1.00: if v2x_mpi>0.5 and v2x_mpi<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>3 and v2elmulpar_osp>3

5 CATEGORIES
0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2
0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4
0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6
0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8
1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.26 Participatory component index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_partip)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_cspart v2xdd_dd v2xel_locelec v2xel_regelec

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.27 Participatory democracy index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_partipdem)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.
For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".
For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".
For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_partidem

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.28 Electoral democracy index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_polyarchy)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.
For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian",

and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".
For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".
For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES
0.0: if v2x_polyarchy>=0 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.25
0.0: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar_osp<=2.5
0.0: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>=0 and v2elfrfair _osp<=2
0.5: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>2.5 and v2elmulpar_osp<=4
0.5: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elfrfair_osp>2 and v2elfrfair_osp<=4
0.5: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x_polyarchy<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>=0 and v2elfrfair_osp<3
1.0: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x_polyarchy<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>=3 and v2elfrfair_osp<=4

4 CATEGORIES
0.00: if v2x_polyarchy>=0 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.25
0.00: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>=0 and v2elmulpar_osp<=2
0.00: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>=0 and v2elfrfair _osp<=2
0.33: if v2x_polyarchy>=0.250001 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elmulpar_osp>2 and v2elmulpar_osp<=4
0.33: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 and v2x_polyarchy<=0.5
and v2elfrfair _osp>2 and v2elfrfair _osp<=4
0.67: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x_polyarchy<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>2 and v2elfrfair _osp<3 and v2elmulpar_osp>2
1.00: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x_polyarchy<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>3 and v2elmulpar_osp>3

5 CATEGORIES
0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2
0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4
0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6
0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8
1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.29 Public sector corruption index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_pubcorr)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem public sector corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions

with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_pubcorr

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.30 Share of population with suffrage ordinal (D) (e_v2x_suffr)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem share of population with suffrage. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2elsuffrage

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.31 Equality before the law and individual liberty index ordinal (D) (e_v2xcl_rol)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equality before the law and individual liberty index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clrelig v2clfmove v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.32 Core civil society index ordinal (D) (e_v2xcs_ccsi)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: How robust is civil society?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem core civil society index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprtcpt

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.33 Direct popular vote index ordinal (D) (e_v2xdd_dd)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem direct popular vote index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmci v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmrf v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyrpl v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror, v2ddthreor, v2ddthrerf, v2ddthrepl

Data release: 5-16. Release 7 (new aggregation formula).

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

9.1.34 Deliberative component index ordinal (D) (e_v2xdl_delib)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

9.1.35 Equal distribution of resources index ordinal (D) (e_v2xeg_eqdr)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: How equal is the distribution of resources?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal distribution of resources index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2pepwrgen

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2025

9.1.36 Equal protection index ordinal (D) (e_v2xeg_eqprotec)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal protection index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2xcl_acjst v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clsnlpct

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.37 Clean elections index ordinal (D) (e_v2xel_frefair)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent are elections free and fair?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem clean elections index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2el_frefair

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_polyarchy_3C/_4C/_5C" above.

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.38 Local government index ordinal (D) (e_v2xel_locelec)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem local government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.39 Regional government index ordinal (D) (e_v2xel_regelec)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem regional government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.40 Legislative constraints on the executive index ordinal (D) (e_v2xlg_legcon)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (*e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.41 Alternative sources of information index ordinal (D) (e_v2xme_altinf)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem alternative sources of information index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.1.42 Party institutionalization index ordinal (D) (e_v2xps_party)

Available versions: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

Question: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem party institutionalization index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

Data release: 5-16.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

9.2 Political Regimes

9.2.1 Democracy (BMR) (E) (e_boix_regime)

Question: Is a country democratic?

Clarification: Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Source(s): Miller et al. (2022).

Notes: This variable is taken from version 4 of the Boix-Miller-Rosato dataset. Last update, January 2022.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Miller et al. (2022).

Years: 1800-2020

9.2.2 Democratic breakdowns (E) (e_democracy_breakdowns)

Question: How many previous democratic breakdowns occurred?

Responses:
Numeric.

Source(s): Miller et al. (2022).

Notes: This variable is taken from version 4 of the Boix-Miller-Rosato dataset. Last update, January 2022.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Miller et al. (2022)

Years: 1800-2020

9.2.3 Omitted data (E) (e_democracy_omitteddata)

Question: Is the country a democracy?

Clarification: This is the same measure as democracy, except it records an "NA" for countries occupied during an international war (*e.g.*, the Netherlands 1940-44) or experiencing state collapse during a civil war (*e.g.*, Lebanon 1976-89). The democracy variable instead fills in these years as continuations of the same regime type.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes
2: NA

Source(s): Miller et al. (2022).

Notes: This variable is taken from version 4 of the Boix-Miller-Rosato dataset. Last update, January 2022.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Miller et al. (2022)

Years: 1800-2020

9.2.4 Democratic transition (E) (e_democracy_trans)

Question: Was there a democratic transition?

Responses:
-1: Democratic breakdown
0: No change
1: Democratic transition

Source(s): Miller et al. (2022).

Notes: This variable is taken from version 4 of the Boix-Miller-Rosato dataset. Last update, January 2022.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Miller et al. (2022).

Years: 1800-2020

9.3 Freedom House

9.3.1 Civil liberties (E) (e_fh_cl)

Clarification: Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years.

Responses:
Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

Source(s): Freedom House (2025), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 and flipped for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Freedom House (2025).

Years: 1972-2024

9.3.2 Political rights (E) (e_fh_pr)

Clarification: Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years.

Responses:
Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

Source(s): Freedom House (2025), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 and flipped for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Freedom House (2025).

Years: 1972-2024

9.3.3 Rule of law (E) (e_fh_rol)

Clarification: The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population.

Responses:
Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

Source(s): Freedom House (2025), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Freedom House (2025).

Years: 2005-2024

9.3.4 Status (E) (e_fh_status)

Responses:
1: Free.
2: Partly Free.
3: Not Free.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Freedom House (2025), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Notes: Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free", and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free". Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free", 3.0 to 5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free". This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Freedom House (2025).

Years: 1972-2024

9.4 World Bank Governance Indicators

9.4.1 Control of corruption — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_cce)

Clarification: "Control of Corruption" measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of "additional payments to get things done", to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring "grand corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in "state capture".

Source(s): Kaufmann & Kraay (2024), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2024).

Years: 1996-2024

9.4.2 Government effectiveness (E) (e_wbgi_gee)

Clarification: "Government Effectiveness" combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

Source(s): Kaufmann & Kraay (2024), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2024).

Years: 1996-2024

9.4.3 Political stability — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_pve)

Clarification: "Political Stability" combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

Source(s): Kaufmann & Kraay (2024), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2024).

Years: 1996-2024

9.4.4 Rule of law — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_rle)

Clarification: "Rule of Law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

Source(s): Kaufmann & Kraay (2024), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2024).

Years: 1996-2024

9.4.5 Regulatory quality — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_rqe)

Clarification: "Regulatory Quality" includes measures of the incidence of marketunfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

Source(s): Kaufmann & Kraay (2024), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2024).

Years: 1996-2024

9.4.6 Voice and accountability — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_vae)

Clarification: "Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

Source(s): Kaufmann & Kraay (2024), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2024).

Years: 1996-2024

9.5 Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy

9.5.1 Lexical index (E) (e_lexical_index)

Question: What is the lexical index of democracy in the country?

Responses:

0: No elections
1: No party or one-party elections
2: Multi-party elections for legislature
3: Multi-party elections for legislature and executive
4: Minimally competitive elections
5: Male or female suffrage
6: Universal suffrage

Source(s): Skaaning (2025).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Skaaning (2025).

Years: 1789-2024

9.6 Unified Democracy Score

9.6.1 Unified democracy score posterior (E) (e_uds)

Additional versions: *_mean, *_pct025, *_pct975

Clarification: The posterior median of the Unified democracy score.

Source(s): Pemstein et al. (2010).

Notes: The dataset also contains posterior mean as well as 2,5 and 97,5 posterior percentile.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2010).

Years: 1946-2012

9.7 Political Institutions and Political Events

9.7.1 Coups (E) (e_coups)

Clarification: Number of successful coups d'état during a given year. A coup is any event resulting in an irregular removal or resignation of the chief executive that involves a violent action or an explicit threat of resorting to it, by an armed organization. Assassinations of the chief executive are not considered coups unless the group responsible for the action takes over the office. Whenever the rules about the replacement of the chief executive are either not codified or unclear, the force criterion prevails. The definition excludes resignations under pressure of popular mobilization if no armed group (legal or not) is involved (resignation of Carlos Mesa in Bolivia). Similarly, irregular transfers of power among civilians that do not entail force (such as changes of communist leaders) are not considered coups. We place no restriction on whether the armed group causing the replacement is domestic or foreign, nor on the identity of the incoming ruler. In particular, any military intervention of foreign powers producing a replacement of the chief executive is coded as a coup, even if they restore a previously elected ruler (French troops overthrowing Bokassa in Central African Republic). As a general rule, any replacement of a military chief executive by another military man is considered a coup, unless the succession occurred according to pre-established rules (Figueirido replacing Geisel in Brazil). Specifically, resignations of the military chief executive caused by votes of non-confidence of irregular military bodies are considered coups (Galtieri replacing Viola in Argentina). The variable is compatible to other conventional sources such as Powell and Thyne (2011), Marshall and Marshall (2009), and Svolik and Akcinaroglu (2010) for the period 1950. 2008, with some difference in the interpretation of specific events. Information for the pre–1950 era is more scarce and therefore the coding may be less reliable.

Source(s): Przeworski et al. (2013).

Notes: Where there is more than one observation per country–year, the maximum of the variable for this period is taken.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Przeworski et al. (2013).

Years: 1789-2008

9.7.2 Number of Parties in legislature (E) (e_legparty)

Clarification: Number of parties in the legislature. By "party" we take here any recognizable, named grouping, regardless whether and how they appeared in elections. This variable is coded regardless whether the legislature was elected or appointed.

Responses:

-1: if no legislature.
0: if none (including cases where parties are officially banned).
1: if one (including cases where other parties are officially banned).
2: if more.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski et al. (2013).

Notes: During the early period candidates typically competed in elections on an individual basis, without any kind of centralized party organizations or shared programs. Within legislatures, however, they often coalesced into groups, currents, factions, "sentiments," etc. Hence, subjective judgments are inevitable in coding this variable. Our rule of thumb was to code as parties any kind of groups that bare a label that survived over two consecutive legislatures. This was true in several countries of "Liberals" and "Conservatives." In other countries, notably France between 1815 and 1848, however, the divisive issues, the parliamentary groups, and their labels changed frequently, and such cases are coded as "none." A legislature consisting of one party and independents is coded as one party. When there is more than one observation per country–year, the one which has higher value is taken.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Przeworski et al. (2013).

Years: 1789-2008

9.8 Polity 5

9.8.1 Institutionalized autocracy (E) (e_autoc)

Question: Is the polity an institutionalized autocracy?

Clarification: Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints.

Responses:
Numeric.

Source(s): Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website. Standarized authority codes (i.e. -66, -77, -88) are set to missing for the online graphs.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Years: 1789-2018

9.8.2 Institutionalized democracy (E) (e_democ)

Question: Is the polity an institutionalized democracy?

Clarification: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.
The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (XROPEN and XRCOMP), and constraints on the chief executive (XCONST).

Responses:
Numeric.

Source(s): Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website. Standarized authority codes (i.e. -66, -77, -88) are set to missing for the online graphs.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Years: 1789-2018

9.8.3 Polity combined score (E) (e_p_polity)

Question: What is the Polity score?

Clarification: The Polity score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The resulting unified POLITY scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Notes: Standarized authority codes (i.e. -66, -77, -88) are set to missing for the online graphs.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Years: 1789-2018

9.8.4 Political competition (E) (e_polcomp)

Question: Is there any (institutionalized) political competition?

Clarification: This variable combines information presented in two component variables: the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition (e_parreg) and the extent of government restriction on political competition (e_parcomp).

Responses:

1: Repressed Competition: While no significant political activity is permitted outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, nevertheless, some organized political participation occurs within the regime through highly circumscribed institutional channels.

2: Restricted Competition: Some organized political activity occurs outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, but the regime systematically limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups from participating in the political arena and/or suppresses the contestation of rival political interests.

3: Authoritarian-guided liberalization of repressed or restricted competition or the deepening of hegemonic control: Used to indicate either the concerted effort on the part of hegemonic regimes to open up their political systems to limited (and typically factional) political competition or the transformation of factional-based "quasi-democracies" or "weak authoritarian regimes" into more repressive hegemonic systems in which political competition is increasingly institutionalized and restricted.

4: Uninstitutionalized Competition: Political participation is decentralized and fluid in character — revolving around personalities, regional interests, and religious/ethnic/clan groups. There are no enduring national political organizations and systematic regime control of political activity is limited, that is, a situation characterized by a coincidence of weak state and weak society. In the contemporary context, uninstitutionalized competition is most likely to occur in resource poor countries and/or following the collapse of central authority under a (former) repressive, authoritarian state.

5: Gradual transition from uninstitutionalized (unregulated) competition to more regulated forms of political competition (the increasing regulation of competition may be centrally-guided or decentralized through the gradual development of political parties and interest groups).

6: Factional/Restricted Competition: Polities that oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions: that is, when one faction secures power it uses that power to promote its exclusive interests and favor group members while restricting the political access and activities of other, excluded groups, until it is displaced in turn.

7: Factional Competition: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level — parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups — but particularistic/parochial agendas tend to be exclusive and uncompromising with limited social integration or accommodation across identity boundaries. Factional competition is distinguished by a relative balance of group capabilities that prevents any one

of the groups from capturing state power and imposing restrictions on other groups.
8: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: persistent over coercion: relatively coercive/restrictive transitions either from factional/restricted competition to institutionalized competitive participation or from institutionalized competitive participation to factional/restricted competition. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally democratic polities.
9: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: limited and/or decreasing overt coercion: This code is used to indicate relatively peaceful transitions either to or from institutionalized competitive participation. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally open electoral polities.
10: Institutionalized open electoral participation: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence with little use of coercion. No significant or substantial groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

Source(s): Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Notes: Standarized authority codes (i.e. -66, -77, -88) are set to missing for the online graphs.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Years: 1789-2018

9.8.5 Polity revised combined score (E) (e_polity2)

Question: What is the Revised Polity score?

Clarification: This variable is a modified version of the combined annual Polity score by applying a simple treatment to convert instances of standardized authority scores (*i.e.*, -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (*i.e.*, within the range, -10 to +10). The revised version of the Polity variable are designed to facilitate the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. The values have been converted according to the following rule set:
-66: Cases of foreign interruption are treated as system missing.
-77: Cases of interregnum, or anarchy, are converted to a neutral Polity score of 0.
-88: Cases of transition are prorated across the span of the transition.
For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Source(s): Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Marshall & Gurr (2020).

Years: 1789-2018

9.9 Others

9.9.1 Democratic breakdown (E) (e_bnr_dem)

Clarification: Countries that meet the minimum conditions for democracy (see below) enter the dataset and are coded "0." When countries cease to meet those minimum criteria they are coded "1" and exit from the dataset.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Bernhard et al. (2001). Taken from Teorell et al. (2022)

Notes: If, after a democratic breakdown, a country again meets our minimum criteria it re-enters the data as a new democratic episode. The time frame onset in 1913 is a function of when the first country (Norway) meets the minimum conditions. All series terminate in either in a

breakdown in various years or right censorship in 2005. The minimal conditions are based on Dahl's notion of polyarchy (competitiveness, inclusiveness) combined with Linz and Stepan's stateness criteria. Competitiveness: Like Przeworski *et al.* we include countries that hold elections for both the executive and legislature, and in which more than one party contests the elections. However, we exclude cases in which we detected outcome changing vote fraud, in which there was either extensive or extreme violence that inhibited voters' preference expression, or in which political parties representing a substantial portion of the population were banned. Inclusiveness: We only include competitive polities in which at least fifty percent of all adult citizens are enfranchised to vote in our set of democracies. Stateness: We also considered questions of sovereignty, not including colonial states, where founding elections were held prior to the granting of independence, and countries experiencing internal wars in which twenty percent or greater of the population or territory was out of control of the state.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Bernhard et al. (2001).

Years: 1946-2005

9.9.2 Democracy (E) (e_chga_demo)

Clarification: A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is *de facto* existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (*e.g.* unconstitutional closing of the lower house or extension of incumbent's term by postponing of subsequent elections). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

Responses:
1: Democracy.
0: Otherwise.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cheibub et al. (2010).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Cheibub et al. (2010).

Years: 1946-2008

9.9.3 Corruption perception index (E) (e_ti_cpi)

Clarification: The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

Source(s): Transparency International (2024), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Notes: The data spans 2012–present due to the methodological incomparability with the data prior 2012.

Data release: 7-16.

Citation: Transparency International (2024).

Years: 2012-2024

9.9.4 Index of Democratization (E) (e_vanhanen)

Question: How democratic is a country, as measured by competition and participation?

Clarification: The index of democratization is formed by multiplying the competition and the participation variables and then dividing the outcome by 100. See the original citation for a

description.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2019), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 13-16.

Citation: Vanhanen (2019).

Years: 1946-2018

10 Background Factors (E)

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

10.1 Education

10.1.1 Education 15+ (E) (e_peaveduc)

Question: What is the average years of education among citizens older than 15?

Clarification: The Average years of education in the total population aged 15 years and older.

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018) drawing on Mitchell (1998*c*); Mitchell (1998*b*); Mitchell (1998*a*); United States Census Bureau (2025); UNESCO (1999); Földvári & van Leeuwen (2014); van Leeuwen et al. (2011); van Leeuwen et al. (2012*a*); van Leeuwen et al. (2012*b*); Didenko et al. (2012).

Notes: Missing data within a time–series is interpolated using linear interpolation for each country. In addition to this, from the last recorded data point to nowadays the data is extrapolated.

Data release: 2-16.

Citation: Clio-Infra (2018).

Years: 1820-2010

10.1.2 Educational inequality, Gini (E) (e_peedgini)

Question: How unequal is the level of education achieved by the population aged 15 years and older?

Clarification: Gini coefficient of educational inequality estimated from average education data using the method as suggested by Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000), Checchi (2004) and Castelló and Doménech (2002: 4). Van Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari (N.d.) provide a more detailed explanation in the Clio-Infra codebook.

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018) drawing on Mitchell (1998*c*); Mitchell (1998*b*); Mitchell (1998*a*); United States Census Bureau (2025); UNESCO (1999); Földvári & van Leeuwen (2014); van Leeuwen et al. (2011); van Leeuwen et al. (2012*a*); van Leeuwen et al. (2012*b*); Didenko et al. (2012).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Clio-Infra (2018).

Years: 1850-2010

10.2 Geography

10.2.1 Land area (E) (e_area)

Question: What is the land area of a country?

Clarification: Country land area in square kilometers.

Source(s): Haber & Menaldo (2011); Schvitz et al. (2021).

Notes: Uses v2.0 of R package cshapes; Where several values were available per country–year, the latest one was chosen for the dataset. If both sources procide a value for a country-year, the one from cshapes are used.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Schvitz et al. (2021).

Years: 1886-2019

10.2.2 Region (geographic) (E) (e_regiongeo)

Question: In which geographic region is this country located?

Clarification: Regions are described based on geographic location.

Responses:
1: Western Europe
2: Northern Europe
3: Southern Europe
4: Eastern Europe
5: Northern Africa
6: Western Africa
7: Middle Africa
8: Eastern Africa
9: Southern Africa
10: Western Asia
11: Central Asia
12: Eastern Asia
13: South-Eastern Asia
14: Southern Asia
15: Oceania (including Australia and the Pacific)
16: North America
17: Central America
18: South America
19: Caribbean (including Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Guyana)

Source(s): United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

Notes: For the countries coded only in the historical project or for which the UN does not have the code, the region is coded by V-Dem Data Manager in accordance with the position of the neighboring countries.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

Years: 1789-2025

10.2.3 Region (politico-geographic) (E) (e_regionpol)

Question: In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

Clarification: This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with Cyprus, German Democratic Republic, and Mongolia being recoded from original coding) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

Responses:
1: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia, Mongolia, and German Democratic Republic)
2: Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)
3: North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel and Türkiye, but excluding Cyprus)
4: Sub–Saharan Africa
5: Western Europe and North America (including Australia, New Zealand, and Cyprus, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
6: Eastern Asia (including Japan, excluding Mongolia)
7: South–Eastern Asia
8: Southern Asia
9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
10: The Caribbean (including Guyana and Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)

Source(s): Teorell et al. (2025), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Notes: The values are filled backwards to the first year of coding.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Teorell et al. (2025).

Years: 1789-2025

10.2.4 Region (politico-geographic 6-category) (E) (e_regionpol_6C)

Question: In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

Clarification: Regions are described as politico-geographic in the sense that they are based on geographical proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratization (e.g. post-Communist). This is a modification of *e_regionpol* above.

Responses:

1: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Mongolia and German Democratic Republic)
2: Latin America and the Caribbean
3: The Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Türkiye, excluding Cyprus)
4: Sub-Saharan Africa
5: Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
6: Asia and Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand; see 5)

Source(s): Teorell et al. (2025). This is a modification of e_regionpol above.

Notes: The values are filled backwards to the first year of coding.

Data release: 9-16.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

10.2.5 Region (politico-geographic 7-category) (E) (e_regionpol_7C)

Question: In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

Clarification: Regions are described as politico-geographic in the sense that they are based on geographical proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratization (e.g. post-Communist). This is a modification of *e_regionpol* above.

Responses:

1: Eastern Europe (including German Democratic Republic, including the Caucasus)
2: Latin America and the Caribbean
3: The Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Türkiye, excluding Cyprus)
4: Sub-Saharan Africa
5: Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
6: East Asia and the Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand)
7: South and Central Asia

Source(s): Teorell et al. (2025). This is a modification of e_regionpol above.

Notes: The values are filled backwards to the first year of coding.

Data release: 14-16.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2025

10.3 Economics

10.3.1 Exports (E) (e_cow_exports)

Question: What is the total value of a country's exports?

Clarification: Total exports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

Source(s): Barbieri et al. (2009); Barbieri & Keshk (2016).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Barbieri et al. (2009); Barbieri & Keshk (2016).

Years: 1870-2014

10.3.2 Imports (E) (e_cow_imports)

Question: What is the total value of a country's imports?

Clarification: Total imports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

Source(s): Barbieri et al. (2009); Barbieri & Keshk (2016).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Barbieri et al. (2009); Barbieri & Keshk (2016).

Years: 1870-2014

10.3.3 GDP (E) (e_gdp)

Additional versions: *_sd

Clarification: Point estimate from latent variable model of Gross Domestic Product based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

Source(s): Fariss et al. (2021).

Data release: 12-16.

Citation: Fariss et al. (2021).

Years: 1789-2019

10.3.4 GDP per capita (E) (e_gdppc)

Additional versions: *_sd

Clarification: Point estimate from latent variable model of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

Source(s): Fariss et al. (2021).

Data release: 12-16.

Citation: Fariss et al. (2021).

Years: 1789-2019

10.3.5 Inflation (E) (e_miinflat)

Question: What is the annual inflation rate?

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018), based on Abad, Davies & Luiten Van Zanden (2012); Abad, Davies & van Zanden (2012); MOxLAD (2017); de Zwart (2011); de Zwart (2012); Reinhart & Rogoff (2011); van den Hout (2023); World Bank (2025).

Notes: Missing data within a time–series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Clio-Infra (2018).

Years: 1789-2010

10.3.6 Population (E) (e_pop)

Additional versions: *_sd

Clarification: Point estimate from latent variable model of Population based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

Source(s): Fariss et al. (2021).

Data release: 12-16.

Citation: Fariss et al. (2021).

Years: 1789-2019

10.4 Natural Resource Wealth

10.4.1 Petroleum, coal, and natural gas production per capita (E) (e_total_fuel_income_pc)

Question: What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, and natural gas production?

Clarification: Real value of petroleum, coal, and natural gas produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Years: 1900-2006

10.4.2 Petroleum production per capita (E) (e_total_oil_income_pc)

Question: What is the real value of a country's petroleum production?

Clarification: Real value of petroleum produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Years: 1800-2006

10.4.3 Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita (E) (e_total_resources_income_pc)

Question: What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production?

Clarification: Real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Years: 1900-2006

10.5 Infrastructure

10.5.1 Radios (E) (e_radio_n)

Question: What is the number of radio sets?

Clarification: Original source doesn't specify if the indicators considers total number of radio sets or only radio sets in use.

Source(s): Comin & Hobijn (2009).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Comin & Hobijn (2009).

Years: 1815-2000

10.6 Demography

10.6.1 Fertility rate (E) (e_miferrat)

Question: What is the fertility rate?

Clarification: The fertility rate (*i.e.* total fertility rate, period total fertility rate, total period fertility rate) of a population is the mean number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if (a) she were to experience the current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and (b) she were to survive through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by adding single-year age-specific rates at a given time.

Source(s): United Nations Population Division (2019) via Gapminder (2026).

Data release: 2-16.

Citation: Gapminder (2026).

Years: 1800-2025

10.6.2 Population total (E) (e_mipopula)

Question: What is the total population (in thousands)?

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018); Goldewijk et al. (2010); Hyde (2024).

Notes: Missing data within a time–series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Data release: 2-16.

Citation: Clio-Infra (2018).

Years: 1800-2000

10.6.3 Urbanization (E) (e_miurbani)

Question: What is the urbanization rate?

Clarification: Ratio of Urban Population (e_miurbpop) to Population (e_mipopula).

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018); Goldewijk et al. (2010); Hyde (2024); Bairoch et al. (1988); Chandler (1987); De Vries (1984); Etter et al. (2008); Grigg (1980); Maddison (2001); Rozman (1973); United Nations (2009); Urquhart & Buckley (1965); van Zanden (2012).

Data release: 2-16.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1800-2000

10.6.4 Urban population (E) (e_miurbpop)

Question: What is the total urban population?

Clarification: The population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria of each area or country (United Nations, with reference to 1950-present).

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018), based on Bairoch et al. (1988); Chandler (1987); De Vries (1984); Hyde (2024); Etter et al. (2008); Grigg (1980); Goldewijk et al. (2010); Maddison (2001); Rozman (1973); United Nations (2009); United Nations Population Division (2019); Urquhart & Buckley (1965); van Zanden (2012).

Notes: No definition is provided by sources used by Clio-Infra for years prior to 1950. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Clio-Infra (2018).

Years: 1800-2000

10.6.5 Child mortality rate (E) (e_pechmor)

Question: What is the child mortality rate?

Clarification: Deaths of children under age five (per 1000 live births).

Source(s): UN Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME) (2025); United Nations Population Division (2019) via Gapminder (2026).

Notes: Missing data within a time–series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Data release: 14-16.

Citation: Gapminder (2026).

Years: 1800-2025

10.6.6 Life expectancy, female (E) (e_pefeliex)

Question: What is the life expectancy at birth among women?

Clarification: Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates.

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2025); Human Life-Table Database (2025); World Bank (2025); Gapminder (2026); MOxLAD (2017).

Notes: Missing data within a time–series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Clio-Infra (2018).

Years: 1800-2000

10.6.7 Life expectancy (E) (e_pelifeex)

Question: What is the life expectancy?

Clarification: The average number of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same.

Source(s): United Nations Population Division (2019) via Gapminder (2026).

Notes: Missing data within a time–series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Data release: 2-3, 7-16.

Citation: Gapminder (2026).

Years: 1800-2025

10.6.8 Maternal mortality rate (E) (e_pematmor)

Question: What is the maternal mortality rate?

Clarification: The number of maternal deaths divided by the number of live births in a given year, multiplied by 100000. Maternal death is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days after the termination of that pregnancy, regardless of the length and site of the pregnancy, from a cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy.

Source(s): United Nations Population Division (2019) via Gapminder (2026).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Gapminder (2026).

Years: 1800-2013

10.6.9 Population (E) (e_wb_pop)

Question: What is the total population?

Clarification: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates.

Scale: Continuous

Source(s): United Nations Population Division (2019); United Nations Statistics Division (2013), World Bank (2025); United States Census Bureau (2025); Pacific Community (2026); Eurostat (2026), census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices, , downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 9-16.

Citation: World Bank (2025).

Years: 1960-2024

10.7 Conflict

10.7.1 Civil war (E) (e_civil_war)

Question: Was there a civil war?

Clarification: Civil war — at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 battle deaths for each country-year.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Source(s): Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Haber & Menaldo (2011).

Years: 1816-2006

10.7.2 Armed conflict, international (E) (e_miinteco)

Question: Did the country participate in an international armed conflict?

Clarification: Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018), drawing on Brecke (2001).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Brecke (2001).

Years: 1789-2000

10.7.3 Armed conflict, internal (E) (e_miinterc)

Question: Did the country experience an internal armed conflict?

Clarification: Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

Source(s): Clio-Infra (2018), drawing on Brecke (2001).

Data release: 5-16.

Citation: Brecke (2001).

Years: 1789-2000

10.7.4 Cumulative Fatalities (Best Estimates) in Organized Violence (E) (e_ovctd)

Question: What is the best estimates for fatalities in organized violence within the borders of the country in this year?

Clarification: This variable covers fatality estimates from state-based, non-state, and one-sided violence.

Responses:
Numeric.

Source(s): Yilmaz (2025), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 16.

Citation: Yilmaz (2025); Davies et al. (2025); Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Years: 1989-2024

10.7.5 Existence of Organized Violence (E) (e_ovexist)

Question: Did the country experience any type of organized violence?

Responses:
0: Intrastate State-based Violence. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ovexist_0]
1: Interstate State-based Violence. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ovexist_1]
2: Non-state Violence. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ovexist_2]
3: One-sided Violence. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ovexist_3]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): Yilmaz (2025), downloaded through *DEMSCORE* (v6).

Data release: 16.

Citation: Yilmaz (2025); Davies et al. (2025); Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Years: 1989-2024

10.7.6 Number of successful coup attempts in a year (E) (e_pt_coup)

Question: How many successful coup d'etat where recoreded in this year?

Clarification: According to the source, how many successful coup attempts where recorded in this year? The maximum count of this derived variable is four and its minimum is zero. Coups d'etat are defined as "overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means (. . .) there is no minimal death threshold for defining a coup. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days" (Powell & Thyne 2011:252).

Scale: Numeric

Source(s): Powell & Thyne (2011).

Notes: This variable is derived from the sourced dataset. For every country-year we sum the number of recorded successful coup attempts. The variable e_pt_coup_attempts sums the number of coup attempts.

Data release: 9-16.

Citation: Powell & Thyne (2011).

Years: 1950-2025

10.7.7 Number of coups attempts in a year (E) (e_pt_coup_attempts)

Question: How many coup attempts where recorded in this year?

Clarification: According to the source, how many coup attempts where recorded in this year? The maximum value of this derived variable is four and its minimum value is zero. Coups d'etat are defined as "overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means (. . .) there is no minimal death threshold for defining a coup. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days" (Powell & Thyne 2011:252).

Scale: Numeric

Source(s): Powell & Thyne (2011).

Notes: This variable is derived from the sourced dataset. For every country-year we sum the number of recorded coup attempts, successful or not. The variable e_pt_coup sums the number of successful coups.

Data release: 13-16.

Citation: Powell & Thyne (2011).

Years: 1950-2025

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12 Appendix A: Structure of Aggregation

12.1 V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Index Name	Lower-Level Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Electoral democracy index				v2x_polyarchy	
	Additive polyarchy index			v2x_api	
	Multiplicative polyarchy index			v2x_mpi	
		Elected officials index**		v2x_elecoff	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber	v2exapup	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval	v2exapupap	
			HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
			HOG appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdjcbhg	
			HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
			HOG directly elected	v2ex_elechog	
			HOG dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdshg	
			HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
			HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
			HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
			HOS appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdfcbhs	
			HOS directly elected	v2ex_elechos	
			HOS dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdmhs	
			HOS selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphos	
			Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
			Legislature directly elected	v2xex_elecleg	
			Lower chamber elected	v2lgello	
			Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber	v2lginello	
			Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber	v2lginelup	
			Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
			Upper chamber elected	v2lgelecup	
		Clean elections index		v2xel_frefair	
			EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	0.484
			EMB capacity	v2elembcap	0.529
			Election free and fair	v2elfrfair	0.304
			Election government intimidation	v2elintim	0.348
			Election other electoral violence	v2elpeace	0.640
			Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg	0.325
			Election voter registry	v2elrgstry	0.433
			Election vote buying	v2elvotbuy	0.554
			Electoral Regime Index	v2x_elecreg	
		Freedom of expression and alternative sources of information index		v2x_freexp_altinf	
			Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	0.355
			Freedom of discussion	v2xcl_disc	0.290
			Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm	0.334
			Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	0.351
			Media bias	v2mebias	0.313
			Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	0.331
			Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	0.291
			Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	0.311
		Freedom of association index (thick)		v2x_frassoc_thick	
			Barriers to parties	v2psbars	0.285
			CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.385
			CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.452
			Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar	0.043
			Electoral Regime Index	v2x_elecreg	
			Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	0.023
			Party ban	v2psparban	0.422
		Share of population with suffrage		v2x_suffr	
			Percent of population with suffrage	v2elsuffrage	

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Index Name	Lower-Level Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Liberal democracy index				v2x_libdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Liberal component index			v2x_liberal	
			Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
		Equality before the law and individual liberty index		v2xcl_rol	
			Access to justice	v2xcl_acjst	0.257
			Freedom from forced labor	v2xcl_slave	0.515
			Freedom from political killings	v2clkill	0.456
			Freedom from torture	v2cltort	0.385
			Freedom of domestic movement	v2xcl_dmove	0.423
			Freedom of foreign movement	v2clfmove	0.441
			Freedom of religion	v2clrelig	0.593
			Property rights	v2xcl_prpty	0.463
			Rigorous and impartial public administration	v2clrspct	0.503
			Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	v2cltrnslw	0.399
		Judicial constraints on the executive index		v2x_jucon	
			Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.338
			Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.335
			Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.549
			High court independence	v2juhcind	0.407
			Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.397
		Legislative constraints on the executive index		v2xlg_legcon	
			Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	0.372
			Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	0.274
			Legislature opposition parties	v2lgoppart	0.439
			Legislature questions officials in practice	v2lgqstexp	0.523
Participatory democracy index				v2x_partipdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Participatory component index			v2x_partip	
		Civil society participation index		v2x_cspart	
			CSO consultation	v2cscnsult	0.417
			CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	0.417
			CSO women's participation	v2csgender	0.663
			Candidate selection, National/local	v2pscnslnl	0.797
		Direct popular vote index**		v2xdd_dd	
			Enforcement of constitutional changes popular vote	v2ddlexor	
			Initiatives administrative threshold	v2ddadmci	
			Initiatives approval threshold	v2ddapprci	
			Initiatives participation threshold	v2ddpartci	
			Initiatives permitted	v2ddlexci	
			Initiatives signature-gathering period	v2ddsigdci	
			Initiatives signature-gathering time limit	v2ddsiglci	
			Initiatives signatures %	v2ddsigpci	
			Initiatives super majority	v2ddspmci	
			Obligatory referendum administrative threshold	v2ddadmor	
			Obligatory referendum approval threshold	v2ddappor	
			Obligatory referendum credible threat	v2ddthreor	
			Obligatory referendum participation threshold	v2ddpartor	
			Obligatory referendum super majority	v2ddspmor	
			Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year	v2ddyrci	
			Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year	v2ddyror	
			Occurrence of plebiscite this year	v2ddyrpl	
			Occurrence of referendum this year	v2ddyrrf	
			Plebiscite administrative threshold	v2ddadmpl	
			Plebiscite approval threshold	v2ddapprpl	
			Plebiscite credible threat	v2ddthrepl	
			Plebiscite participation threshold	v2ddpartpl	
			Plebiscite permitted	v2ddlexpl	
			Plebiscite super majority	v2ddspmpl	
			Popular initiative credible threat	v2ddthreci	
			Popular referendum credible threat	v2ddthrerf	
			Referendums administrative threshold	v2ddadmrf	
			Referendums approval threshold	v2ddapprrf	
			Referendums participation threshold	v2ddpartrf	

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Index Name	Lower-Level Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
			Referendums permitted	v2ddlexrf	
			Referendums signature-gathering period	v2ddsigdrf	
			Referendums signatures %	v2ddsigprf	
			Referendums super majority	v2ddspmrf	
		Local government index		v2xel_locelec	
			Local government elected	v2ellocelc	
			Local government exists	v2ellocgov	
			Local offices relative power	v2ellocpwr	
		Regional government index		v2xel_regelec	
			Regional government elected	v2elsrgel	
			Regional government exists	v2elreggov	
			Regional offices relative power	v2elrgpwr	
Deliberative democracy index				v2x_delibdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Deliberative component index			v2xdl_delib	
			Common good	v2dlcommon	0.596
			Engaged society	v2dlengage	0.241
			Range of consultation	v2dlconslt	0.246
			Reasoned justification	v2dlreason	0.338
			Respect counterarguments	v2dlcountr	0.330
Egalitarian democracy index				v2x_egaldem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Egalitarian component index			v2x_egal	
		Equal access index		v2xeg_eqaccess	
			Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrgen	0.574
			Power distributed by social group	v2pepwrsoc	0.479
			Power distributed by socioeconomic position	v2pepwrses	0.454
		Equal distribution of resources index		v2xeg_eqdr	
			Educational equality	v2peedueq	0.276
			Health equality	v2pehealth	0.194
			Means-tested vs. universalistic policy	v2dlunivl	0.678
			Particularistic or Public good	v2dlencmps	0.646
		Equal protection index		v2xeg_eqprotec	
			Social class equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clacjust	0.194
			Social group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clsocgrp	0.548
			Weaker civil liberties population	v2clsnlpct	0.903

*Unmodeled Variance. Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.
** This index does not use the standard our standard BFA modeling approach, therefore we do not report uniqueness scores here. Additional details regarding model fit can be found in the index's Codebook entry and on the V-Dem GitHub page V-Dem Institute GitHub.

12.2 Indices Created Using V-Dem Data

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
*Regimes of the World index***		v2x_regime	
	Access to justice for men (Original Scale Version)	v2clacjstm_osp	
	Access to justice for women (Original Scale Version)	v2clacjstw_osp	
	Electoral democracy index	v2x_polyarchy	
	Election free and fair (Original Scale Version)	v2elfrfair_osp	
	Elections multiparty (Original Scale Version)	v2elmulpar_osp	
	Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg	
	Election type	v2eltype	
	Executive electoral regime index	v2xex_elecreg	
	HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOS appointed by legislature	v2ex_legconhos	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	Legislative electoral regime index	v2xlg_elecreg	
	Liberal component index	v2x_liberal	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (Original Scale Version)	v2cltrnslw_osp	
*Accountability index***		v2x_accountability	
	Barriers to parties	v2psbars	
	CSO entry and exit	v2csessorgs	
	CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	
	CSO repression	v2csreprss	
	Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	
	Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	
	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	
	EMB capacity	v2elembcap	
	Election free and fair	v2elfrfair	
	Election government intimidation	v2elintim	
	Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg	
	Elections voter registry	v2elrgstry	
	Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar	
	Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	
	Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg	
	Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	
	Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	
	Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	
	Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	
	Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
	HOS appointment by legislature	v2ex_legconhos	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	
	High court independence	v2juhcind	
	Internet censorship effort	v2mecenefi	
	Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
	Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	
	Legislature questions officials in practice	v2lgqstexp	
	Legislative electorial regime index	v2xlg_elecreg	
	Lower court independence	v2juncind	
	Media bias	v2mebias	
	Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	
	Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	
	Party Ban	v2psparban	
	Percentage of population with suffrage	v2elsuffrage	
	Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	
	Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
	Share of population with suffrage	v2x_suffr	

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
*Vertical accountability index***		v2x_veracc	
	Barriers to parties	v2psbars	
	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	
	EMB capacity	v2elembcap	
	Election free and fair	v2elfrfair	
	Election government intimidation	v2elintim	
	Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg	
	Election voter registry	v2elrgstry	
	Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar	
	Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
	HOS appointed by legislature	v2ex_legconhos	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	
	Party ban	v2psparban	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
	Share of population with suffrage	v2x_suffr	
*Diagonal accountability index***		v2x_diagacc	
	CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	
	CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	
	CSO repression	v2csreprss	
	Engaged society	v2dlengage	
	Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	
	Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	
	Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	
	Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm	
	Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	
	Internet censorship effort	v2mecenefi	
	Media bias	v2mebias	
	Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	
	Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	
	Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	
*Horizontal accountability index***		v2x_horacc	
	Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	
	Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	
	Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	
	Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	
	High court independence	v2juhcind	
	Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
	Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	
	Legislature questions officials in practice	v2lgqstexp	
	Lower court independence	v2juncind	
*Confidence dimension index***		v2x_ex_confidence	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
	HOS removal by party (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
	HOS removal by royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
	HOS removal by military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_4_mean	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
*Direct election dimension index***		v2x_ex_direlect	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
	HOS removal by party (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
	HOS removal by royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
	HOS removal by military (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_4_mean	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
*Hereditary dimension index***		v2x_ex_hereditary	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
	HOS removal by party (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
	HOS removal by royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
	HOS removal by military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_4_mean	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
*Military dimension index***		v2x_ex_military	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOG directly elected	v2ex_elechog	
	HOG removal by legislature in practice	v2exremhog	
	HOG removal by party (Mean)	v2exrmhgnp_2_mean	
	HOG removal by a royal council (Mean)	v2exrmhgnp_3_mean	
	HOG removal by military (Mean)	v2exrmhgnp_4_mean	
	HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	HOS directly elected	v2ex_elechos	
	HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
	HOS removal by party (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
	HOS removal by royal council (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
	HOS removal by military (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_4_mean	
	Relative power of the HOG	v2ex_hogw	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
*Ruling party dimension index***		v2x_ex_party	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
	HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
	HOS removal by party (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
	HOS removal by royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
	HOS removal by military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_4_mean	
	Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
Neopatrimonial rule index		v2x_neopat	
	Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.450
	Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.393
	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	0.656
	Election vote buying	v2elvotbuy	0.590
	Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	0.560
	Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembez	0.510
	Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	0.522
	Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.437
	High court independence	v2juhcind	0.463
	Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	0.601
	Legislature controls resources	v2lgfunds	0.762
	Legislature corrupt activities	v2lgcrrpt	0.655
	Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	0.532
	Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.477
	Particularistic or public goods	v2dlencmps	0.721
	Party linkages	v2psprlnks	0.753
Clientelism index		v2xnp_client	
	Election vote buying	v2elvotbuy	0.423
	Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg	
	Particularistic or public goods	v2dlencmps	0.683
	Party linkages	v2psprlnks	0.516

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Presidentialism index		v2xnp_pres	
	Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.394
	Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.364
	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	0.550
	Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	0.514
	Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.493
	High court independence	v2juhcind	0.407
	Legislature controls resources	v2lgfunds	3.052
	Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	2.527
	Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.420
Regime corruption index		v2xnp_regcorr	
	Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	0.268
	Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembez	0.298
	Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	0.499
	Legislature corrupt activities	v2lgcrrpt	0.462
Civil liberties index		v2x_civlib	
	Physical violence index	v2x_clphy	
	Political civil liberties index	v2x_clpol	
	Private civil liberties index	v2x_clpriv	
Physical violence index		v2x_clphy	
	Freedom from political killings	v2clkill	
	Freedom from torture	v2cltort	
Political civil liberties index		v2x_clpol	
	Barriers to parties	v2psbars	0.453
	CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.310
	CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.332
	Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	0.325
	Freedom of discussion	v2xcl_disc	0.240
	Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm	0.359
	Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	0.382
	Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	0.396
	Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	0.437
	Party ban	v2psparban	0.564
Private civil liberties index		v2x_clpriv	
	Freedom from forced labor	v2xcl_slave	0.472
	Freedom of domestic movement	v2xcl_dmove	0.275
	Freedom of foreign movement	v2clfmove	0.406
	Freedom of religion	v2clrelig	0.524
	Property rights	v2xcl_prpty	0.382
	Religious organization repression	v2csrlgrep	0.565
Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group		v2xpe_exlecon	
	Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position	v2peapsecon	0.364
	Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position	v2peasbecon	0.324
	Access to state jobs by socio-economic position	v2peasjsoecon	0.276
	Power distributed by socio-economic position	2pepwrses	0.601
	Social class equality in respect for civil liberty	v2clacjust	0.473
Exclusion by Gender index		v2xpe_exlgender	
	Access to public services distributed by gender	v2peapsgen	0.451
	Access to state business opportunities by gender	v2peasbgen	0.247
	Access to state jobs by gender	v2peasjgen	0.235
	Gender equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clgencl	0.333
	Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrgen	0.443
Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location index		v2xpe_exlgeo	
	Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location	v2peapsgeo	0.296
	Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location	v2peasbegeo	0.286
	Access to state jobs by urban-rural location	v2peasjgeo	0.372
	Power distributed by urban-rural location	v2pepwrgeo	0.604
	Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clgeocl	0.408

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Exclusion by Political Group index		v2xpe_exlpol	
	Access to public services distributed by political group	v2peapspol	0.442
	Access to state business opportunities by political group	v2peasbepol	0.311
	Access to state jobs by political group	v2peasjpol	0.251
	Political group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clpolcl	0.538
Exclusion by Social Group index		v2xpe_exlsocgr	
	Access to public services distributed by social group	v2peapssoc	0.409
	Access to state business opportunities by social group	v2peasbsoc	0.306
	Access to state jobs by social group	v2peasjsoc	0.298
	Power distributed by social group	v2pepwrsoc	0.511
	Social group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clsocgrp	0.522
*Political corruption index***		v2x_corr	
	Executive corruption index	v2x_execorr	
	Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	
	Legislature corrupt activities	v2lgcrrpt	
	Public sector corruption index	v2x_pubcorr	
Executive corruption index		v2x_execorr	
	Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	
	Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembez	
Public sector corruption index		v2x_pubcorr	
	Public sector corrupt exchanges	v2excrptps	
	Public sector theft	v2exthftps	
*Women political empowerment index***		v2x_gender	
	Women civil liberties index	v2x_gencl	
	Women civil society participation index	v2x_gencs	
	Women political participation index	v2x_genpp	
Women civil liberties index		v2x_gencl	
	Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	0.387
	Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavef	0.432
	Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew	0.417
	Property rights for women	v2clprptyw	0.402
Women civil society participation index		v2x_gencs	
	CSO womens participation	v2csgender	0.183
	Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	0.668
	Percent female journalists	v2mefemjrn	0.594
*Women political participation index***		v2x_genpp	
	Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
	Lower chamber female legislators	v2lgfemleg	
	Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrgen	
Rule of law index		v2x_rule	
	Access to justice	v2xcl_acjst	0.481
	Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.518
	Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.455
	Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	0.495
	Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembez	0.426
	Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.471
	High court independence	v2juhcind	0.577
	Judicial accountability	v2juaccnt	0.667
	Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	0.543
	Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.593
	Public sector corrupt exchanges	v2excrptps	0.460
	Public sector theft	v2exthftps	0.455
	Rigorous and impartial public administration	v2clrspct	0.401
	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	v2cltrnslw	0.482
Access to justice		v2xcl_acjst	
	Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm	
	Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Property rights		v2xcl_prpty	
	Property rights for men	v2clprptym	
	Property rights for women	v2clprptyw	
*Popular initiative index***		v2xdd_i_ci	
	Initiatives administrative threshold	v2ddadmci	
	Initiatives approval threshold	v2ddapprci	
	Initiatives participation threshold	v2ddpartci	
	Initiatives permitted	v2ddlexci	
	Initiatives signature-gathering period	v2ddsigdci	
	Initiatives signature-gathering time limit	v2ddsiglci	
	Initiatives signatures %	v2ddsigpci	
	Initiatives super majority	v2ddspmci	
	Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year	v2ddyrci	
	Popular initiative credible threat	v2ddthreci	
*Popular referendum index***		v2xdd_i_rf	
	Occurrence of referendum this year	v2ddyrrf	
	Popular referendum credible threat	v2ddthrerf	
	Referendums administrative threshold	v2ddadmrf	
	Referendums approval threshold	v2ddapprrf	
	Referendums participation threshold	v2ddpartrf	
	Referendums permitted	v2ddlexrf	
	Referendums signature-gathering period	v2ddsigdrf	
	Referendums signatures %	v2ddsigprf	
	Referendums super majority	v2ddspmrf	
*Obligatory referendum index***		v2xdd_i_or	
	Enforcement of constitutional changes through popular vote	v2ddlexor	
	Obligatory referendum administrative threshold	v2ddadmor	
	Obligatory referendum approval threshold	v2ddappor	
	Obligatory referendum credible threat	v2ddthreor	
	Obligatory referendum participation threshold	v2ddpartor	
	Obligatory referendum super majority	v2ddspmor	
*Plebiscite index***		v2xdd_i_pl	
	Occurrence of plebiscite this year	v2ddyrpl	
	Plebiscite administrative threshold	v2ddadmpl	
	Plebiscite approval threshold	v2ddapprpl	
	Plebiscite credible threat	v2ddthrepl	
	Plebiscite participation threshold	v2ddpartpl	
	Plebiscite permitted	v2ddlexpl	
	Plebiscite super majority	v2ddspmpl	
*Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index***		v2xdd_cic	
	Popular initiative index	v2xdd_i_ci	
	Popular referendum index	v2xdd_i_rf	
*Top-Down component of direct popular vote index***		v2xdd_toc	
	Obligatory referendum index	v2xdd_i_or	
	Plebiscite index	v2xdd_i_pl	
Core civil society index		v2xcs_ccsi	
	CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.187
	CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	0.519
	CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.332
Electoral regime index		v2x_elecreg	
	Chief executive no longer elected	v2x_hosinter	
	HOG directly elected	v2ex_elechog	
	HOS directly elected	v2ex_elechos	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election	v2xel_elecparl	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted	v2x_legabort	
	Legislative closed down or aborted	v2xlg_leginter	
	Presidential election	v2xel_elecpres	
	Presidential election aborted	v2x_hosabort	

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Executive electoral regime index		v2xex_elecreg	
	Chief executive no longer elected	v2x_hosinter	
	HOG directly elected	v2ex_elechog	
	Presidential election	v2xel_elecpres	
	Presidential election aborted	v2x_hosabort	
Legislative electoral regime index		v2xlg_elecreg	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election	v2xel_elecparl	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted	v2x_legabort	
	Legislature closed down or aborted	v2xlg_leginter	
*Electoral component index***		v2x_EDcomp_thick	
	Clean elections index	v2xel_frefair	
	Elected officials index	v2x_elecoff	
	Freedom of association index (thick)	v2x_frassoc_thick	
	Share of population with suffrage	v2x_suffr	
Freedom of expression index		v2x_freexp	
	Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	0.297
	Freedom of disccusion	v2xcl_disc	0.231
	Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm	0.330
	Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	0.354
	Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	0.381
Presidential election aborted		v2x_hosabort	
	HOG directly elected	v2ex_elechog	
	HOS directly elected	v2ex_elechos	
	Presidential election	v2xel_elecpres	
Chief executive no longer elected		v2x_hosinter	
	HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
	HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog	
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted		v2x_legabort	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election	v2xel_elecparl	
	Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
Freedom of discussion		v2xcl_disc	
	Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	
	Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	
Freedom of domestic movement		v2xcl_dmove	
	Freedom of domestic movement for men	v2cldmovem	
	Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew	
Freedom from forced labor		v2xcl_slave	
	Freedom from forced labor for men	v2clslavem	
	Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavef	
Legislative or constituent assembly election		v2xel_elecparl	
	Election type (Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round)	v2eltype_0	
	Election type (Legislative, lowever, sole, or both chambers, second round)	v2eltype_1	
	Election type (Constituent assembly, first or only round)	v2eltype_4	
	Election type (Constituent assembly, second round)	v2eltype_5	
Presidential election		v2xel_elecpres	
	Election type (Presidential, first or only round)	v2eltype_6	
	Election type (Presidential, second round)	v2eltype_7	
Legislature directly elected		v2xex_elecleg	
	Chief executive appointment by upper chamber	v2exapup	
	Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval	v2exapupap	
	Lower chamber directly elected	v2lgello	
	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber	v2lginello	
	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber	v2lginelup	
	Upper chamber direclty elected	v2lgelecup	

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
Legislature closed down or aborted		v2xlg_leginter	
	Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
	Lower chamber elected	v2lgello	
Alternative sources of information index		v2xme_altinf	
	Media bias	v2mebias	0.280
	Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	0.257
	Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	0.251
*Party institutionalization index***		v2xps_party	
	Distinct party platforms	v2psplats	
	Legislative party cohesion	v2pscohesv	
	Lower chamber elected	v2lgello	
	Party branches	v2psprbrch	
	Party linkages	v2psprlnks	
	Party organizations	v2psorgs	
*Divided party control of legislature index***		v2x_divparctrl	
	National party control	v2psnatpar	
	National party control (Ordinal version)	v2psnatpar_ord	
*Division of power index***		v2x_feduni	
	Local government elected	v2ellocelc	
	Local government exists	v2ellocgov	
	Local offices relative power	v2ellocpwr	
	Regional government elected	v2elsrgel	
	Regional government exists	v2elreggov	
	Regional offices relative power	v2elrgpwr	
Academic Freedom Index		v2xca_academ	
	Campus integrity	v2casurv	0.298
	Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	0.372
	Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination	v2cafexch	0.176
	Freedom to research and teach	v2cafres	1.175
	Institutional autonomy	v2cainsaut	0.318
*Electoral Integrity Index***		v2x_electoral_integrit	
	Barriers to parties	v2psbars	
	CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	
	Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language	v2elrstrct	
	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	
	EMB capacity	v2elembcap	
	Election VAP turnout	v2elvaptrn	
	Election domestic election monitors	v2eldommon	
	Election government intimidation	v2elintim	
	Election international monitors	v2elintmon	
	Election other electoral violence	v2elpeace	
	Election turnout	v2eltrnout	
	Election voter registry	v2elrgstry	
	Election multiparty	v2elmulpar	
	Engaged society	v2dlengage	
	Freedom of expression and alternatives sources of infromation index	v2x_freexp_altinf	
	Freedom of peaceful assembly	v2caassemb	
	Party ban	v2psparban	
	Party dissemination of false infromation domestic	v2smpardom	
	Party linkages	v2psprlnks	
	Pluralism in the curriculum	v2edplural	
	Political education, primary school	v2edpoledprim	
	Political education, secondary school	v2edpoledsec	
	Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrgen	
	Power distributed by sexual orientation	v2pepwrort	
	Power distributed by social group	v2pepwrsoc	
	Power distributed by socioeconomic position	v2pepwrses	
	Reasoned justification	v2dlreason	
	Respect counterarguments	v2dlcountr	
	Rule of law index	v2x_rule	
	Suffrage	v2asuffrage	

Index Name	Component Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
*Deliberative Democracy Stock***		v2x_delibdem_stock	
	Deliberative democracy index	v2x_delibdem	
*Egalitarian Democracy Stock***		v2xps_egaldem_stock	
	Egalitarian democracy index	v2x_egaldem	
*Liberal Democracy Stock***		v2x_libdem_stock	
	Liberal democracy index	v2x_libdem	
*Participatory Democracy Stock***		v2x_partipdem_stock	
	Participatory democracy index	v2x_participdem	
*Electoral Democracy Stock***		v2x_polyarchy_stock	
	Electoral democracy index	v2x_polyarchy	

*Unmodeled Variance. Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.
** This index does not use the standard our standard BFA modeling approach, therefore we do not report uniqueness scores here. Additional details regarding model fit can be found in the index's Codebook entry and on the V-Dem GitHub page V-Dem Institute GitHub.

12.3 Party Systems Indices

Index Name	Component Name	Tag
*Party-System Democracy Index****		v2xpas_democracy
	Anti-Pluralist Index	v2xpa_antiplural
	Electoral Democracy Index	v2x_polyarchy
	Government support	v2pagovsup
	Seat share	v2paseatshare
*Party-System Religion Index****		v2xpas_religion
	Government support	v2pagovsup
	Religious principle	v2parelig
	Seat share	v2paseatshare
*Party-System Exclusion Index****		v2xpas_exclusion
	Cultural superiority	v2paculsup
	Government support	v2pagovsup
	Immigration	v2paimmig
	Seat share	v2paseatshare
	Working women	v2pawomlab
*Party-System Left-Right Index****		v2xpas_economic
	Economic Left-Right scale	v2pariglef
	Government support	v2pagovsup
	Seat share	v2paseatshare

***All Party System indices are created using mostly components and indices from the V-Party dataset. Consult the V-Party codebook for details on their aggregation.

12.4 Varieties of Indoctrination Indices

Index Name	Component Name	Tag
Indoctrination potential in education		v2xed_ed_inpt
	Indoctrination coherence in education	v2xed_ed_inco
	Political education effort in education	v2xed_ed_poed
Political education effort in education		v2xed_ed_poed
	Ideology in history curriculum	v2edideol
	Political values in primary schools	v2edpoledrim
	Political values in secondary schools	v2edpoledsec
Indoctrination coherence in education		v2xed_ed_inco
	Centralization of the education system	v2xed_ed_cent
	Control over education agents	v2xed_ed_ctag
Centralization of the education system		v2xed_ed_cent
	Centralisation textbooks	v2edcentcurrlm
	Textbook approval	v2edcenttxbooks
Control over education agents		v2xed_ed_ctag
	History teacher autonomy	v2edteautonomy
	Political teacher firing	v2edtefire
	Political teacher hiring	v2edtehire
	Teacher union independence	v2edteunionindp
Indoctrination content in education		v2xed_ed_con
	Celebration of patriotic symbols	v2edscpatriotcb
	Discussion in history classes	v2edcritical
	Ideology model	v2edideolch_rec
	Patriotism in language curriculum	v2edpatriot
	Pluralism in the curriculum	v2edplural
	Political rights and duties	v2edpoledrights
Democratic indoctrination content in education		v2xed_ed_dmcon
	Discussion in history classes	v2edcritical
	Ideology model	v2edideolch_rec
	Pluralism in the curriculum	v2edplural
	Political rights and duties	v2edpoledrights
Patriotic indoctrination content in education		v2xed_ed_ptcon
	Celebration of patriotic symbols	v2edscpatriotcb
	Patriotism in language curriculum	v2edpatriot
Patriotic indoctrination content in education and the media		v2xed_ptcon
	Celebration of patriotic symbols	v2edscpatriotcb
	Media patriotism	v2medpatriot
	Patriotism in language curriculum	v2edpatriot
Indoctrination potential in education and the media		v2xedvd_inpt
	Indoctrination coherence (potential in the media)	v2xedvd_me_inco
	Indoctrination coherence in education	v2xed_ed_inco
	Political education effort in education	v2xed_ed_poed
Indoctrination coherence (potential) in the media		v2xedvd_me_inco
	Centralization of media control	v2xedvd_me_cent
	Control over media agents	v2xedvd_me_ctag
Centralization of media control		v2xedvd_me_cent
	Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm
	Non-state owned media political	v2medpolnonstate
	Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange
	State-owned media political	v2medpolstate
Control over media agents		v2xedvd_me_ctag
	Broadcast media state-owned	v2medstatebroad
	Entertainment industry independence	v2medentrain
	Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn
	Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen
	Print media state-owned	v2medstateprint

13 Appendix B: Glossary

Attributes: This section includes the most specific conceptual building blocks we use to discuss democracy and related concepts. Many of our survey questions attempt to ask about a single attribute, for example, "What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?" Although any of these questions could also be seen as a compendium of multiple attributes (What does it mean to be a legislature? What is a "popular" election?), in a project covering all countries for more than a century, there are degrees of specificity that it is not practical to approach, so attributes are the most specific concepts that we consider feasible to measure.

Chief Executive: The Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office.

Civil Society: An organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state and private life. Civil society is composed of voluntary associations of people joined together in common purpose. Four varieties of organizations should *not* be considered part of civil society:

- A: Any organization that has forced membership for some class of people (*e.g.* transmission belt organizations under totalitarian, post-totalitarian regimes, or authoritarian regimes).
- B: Economic firms (whether private or public). However, if owners or workers of firms organize for their mutual interest such organizations are part of civil society. Illustration–General Motors is not part of civil society, but any producers association it takes part in, or any labor union which its workers belong to, clearly is.
- C: Those parts of religious organizations devoted to the practice of spirituality. However, organizations devoted to social or political ends that are based in common religious belief or affiliation (the Moral Majority, CARE, American Friends Service Committee, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Anti-Defamation League, or the Council on American-Islamic Relations) are clearly part of civil society. To clarify: the Catholic Church should not be considered a civil society organization, but in many societies there are a multitude of Catholic organizations, linked to the Church in varying degrees, that are a part of civil society. Such public activities even when physically housed in places of worship should be considered civil society organizations (*e.g.*, charitable or social action committees that are physically located on ecclesiastical property).
- D: Criminal Associations. Such associations may influence or even capture elements within the state or political society. They are not to be considered part of civil society. Examples include narcotics cartels, smuggling organizations, and slavery networks. Civic associations that are declared criminal by political authorities for carrying out civic or political activities should not be conflated with criminal associations.

Component and Subcomponent: Relative concepts that are useful when describing the structure of either a concept or an index. For example, egalitarianism is a component of egalitarian democracy, but egalitarianism in turn has its own components, including health and educational equality, which are therefore subcomponents of egalitarian democracy. The V-Dem conceptual scheme sometimes distinguishes five or more levels of specificity. Because these terms are relative, knowing whether a concept is a component or a subcomponent does not reveal how general or specific it is in an absolute sense.

Conceptions: The most general concepts of democracy. These are more complex notions that allow for a version of democracy to embrace multiple properties and dimensions. They are attempts to define more holistic, thick concepts that approach natural-language understandings of democracy. In doing so, they tend to overlap with other general concepts of democracy. For example, our conceptions of liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy all include electoral democracy and therefore overlap quite a bit.

Country: A sovereign state or semi-sovereign territory. All political units of concern to V-Dem are referred to as countries, even though their status in international law varies—some being colonies others being nation-states or empires.

Cyber Security Threats: Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (*e.g.*, tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (*e.g.*, exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (*e.g.*, embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (*e.g.*, exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Dimension: A property with an added empirical characteristic: it describes a straight line connecting two poles of a concept. It is practically synonymous with scale. Often we reserve the term dimension for properties whose attributes also can be arrayed between the same two poles. For example, if "civil liberty" is a dimension, many specific civil liberties are correlated: if a case has a high degree of freedom of discussion, it tends to have high degrees of freedom of movement, freedom to organize, freedom from political murder, and so on. There are exceptions, however, when there are accepted ways of reducing multidimensional attributes to a single dimension. For example, male suffrage and female suffrage vary somewhat independently but they can be combining into a dimension of adult suffrage.

Disadvantage: Refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, a group or individual is judged disadvantaged if their annual income is significantly below the median national income.

Domestic Online Media: Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Exclusion: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for *all* members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

Geographic Group: Geographic group refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

Government: The executive branch of the government, including its head of state (HOS) and/or head of government (HOG)—whichever is most prominent, or both if they are both powerful—along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants. We are only concerned here with the government that actually resides within the country or semi-sovereign territory. Thus, in a typical British colony the government would include the governor-general and his local administration but not the King/Queen of England or the government of England.

Government and its Agents: The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even "off-book" work, on behalf of the government.

Head of Government (HOG): A head of government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of its government, typically presiding over a cabinet. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions respect to the head of government that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local prime minister in a British colony, not the prime minister in London).

Head of State (HOS): A head of state (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions with respect to the head of state that is seated within the territory in question (such as the governor-general in a British colony, not the King/Queen of England).

High Court: By high court we mean the constitutional court of your country or the highest ordinary court. Specifically, if your country has a constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to that court. If there is no constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to the country's highest ordinary court. For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and in Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court, tribunal, or review body. The Supreme Court of the United States is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore we consider it to be the high court of the United States.

Sometimes a country's highest judicial body has separate chambers or divisions. If the court's judges do not rotate between divisions, and only one division possesses jurisdiction over constitutional matters, then please only consider that division in your responses. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If the state is a federation, please focus on the federal judiciary. Finally, if you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to highest ordinary court seated within the territory in question, not abroad (*i.e.*, do not consider a colonial court like the Privy Council for British Colonies).

Index (Plural: indices): A measure constructed from multiple variables or indicators.

Internet: We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Legislature: A collective body, commonly associated with national governments, having the formal right to propose, amend, enact, and repeal legislation that is binding for the entire political unit. It is typically distinct from other branches of government such as the judiciary and the executive. Advisory bodies that do not have the formal authority to legislate—as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the

constitution, or common law precedent—are not considered legislatures. Legislative bodies typically have the power to decide on one or more of the following:

- National budget
- Domestic taxation
- International treaty ratification
- Instituting states of emergency
- Declaring war
- Territorial integrity and national sovereignty
- Executive oversight

Membership of a legislative body may be the result of a popular election, selection by lower level bodies, or appointment by representatives of the executive. A legislature may be organized as one or more chambers, often though not always, having distinct responsibilities.

A legislature is a permanent body, considered to exist from the day it has first convened until the end of its legal mandate; or until another date when the body is dissolved for another reason or when it is practically incapacitated during protracted states of emergency, civil wars, or similar conditions; or when its legal existence is eliminated by a suspension of the constitutional order.

Local Government: The lowest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. Situated below regional government (if there is a regional government). Refers to government at the level of towns, cities, and counties/communes (all-inclusive).

Lower Chamber: The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," typically means the more numerous chamber that is also more directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

Major Political Parties: Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider "major political parties", you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

National Government: The highest level of aggregation recognized by the V-Dem project. Refers to the national government of a sovereign state or the territorial level of government for a semi-sovereign colony or territory. Thus, the "national" government of India prior to independence—the British Raj—was situated in New Delhi, *not* in London—even though decisions affecting the Indian colony were often made in London.

Ordinary Court: A court with general jurisdiction or a court with civil and/or criminal jurisdiction.

Political Groups: Political groups are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward incumbent political supporters and punish non-supporters.

Political Party: An organization that nominates candidates for public office. The term includes a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituencies then it should be considered the same organization.

Popular Election: A process of direct leadership selection in which voters choose parties or individuals to serve in executive offices or as representatives in legislative or constitutional assemblies. The only accepted mediation is the situation where voters select a body of electors, who are pledged to support specific candidates, and whose sole purpose is to intermediate the leadership selection process, as in US presidential elections.

The electorate (those allowed to vote) in a popular election may include all adult citizens or it may be restricted to particular groups (*e.g.*, men, property holders, racial or ethnic groups). The extent of suffrage is not what qualifies an election as popular (so long as the number of voters is much larger than the number of representatives being selected). Likewise, the freeness or fairness of an election is not at issue. A popular election may be restricted to a single party or candidate, for example, but does not include referendums on term extensions for incumbents.

Principles: Properties with normative connotations. When we wish to make reference to the various intellectual traditions that have fostered debate about what democracy should be, we prefer the term principles to properties. For example, when describing theories of deliberative democracy, it is necessary to refer to philosophers such as Habermas who argue for the principle that governments must earn their authority to rule by respectfully providing citizens with rationales for their decisions—a normative claim. However, by referring to various principles we are not endorsing them, only saying that others do. Principles are not necessarily dimensions, as realizing a principle can require achieving a high standard on more than one dimension; and dimensions are not necessarily principles; but both are special types of properties.

Properties: Concepts that are more general than attributes. We speak of the participatory property of participatory democracy, for example, to call attention to the participatory aspects of participatory democracy, as distinct from the other features that it may share with egalitarian, liberal, electoral, or deliberative democracy. Because they are at a relatively high level of generality, properties tend to contain many attributes.

Public Authorities: Includes the government as well as subnational governments, agencies, parastatals, and the like. Compare State.

Regional Government: The second-highest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. A regional government is situated below the national government. Regional units may be referred to as cantons, departments, provinces, regions, or states. Note that some countries are so small that they do not have regional governments, or did not have regional governments for some portion of the 20th century.

Semisovereign Territory: This refers to a country that is not fully sovereign but nonetheless exercises some—at least minimal—level of self-determination. Many of the countries of concern to this project began as colonies of an empire. If a country moved from semi-sovereign status to sovereign status over the course of the twentieth century—maintaining comparable borders—then we want to code both entities. Likewise, we want to include countries like Taiwan that are not universally recognized as sovereign but nonetheless enjoy self-determination (in part or in full).

Most questions pertaining to semi-sovereign territories ask you to reflect on the practices and institutions located within that territory—rather than the empire or nation-state that may claim ultimate sovereignty over the territory. Thus, a question about the government or judicial bodies seated within a British colony would refer to the governor-general and his local administration rather than the King/Queen or government of England.

Social Group: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood—by those residing within that society—to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

Social Media: Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Socio-Economic Position: Socio-Economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

Specialized Court: Specialized courts have jurisdiction restricted to particular areas of the law outside of criminal and civil law. Examples of specialized courts include administrative, commercial, immigration or environmental courts. We exclude constitutional courts from this category.

State: A political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis.

Upper Chamber: The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please consider the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the "senate" or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

Variable: A measure of a small number of attributes. Synonymous with "indicator."

Variety of Democracy: A loose term that could refer both to conceptions of democracy (as defined above) and to other notions of democracy, such as direct democracy (which in our conceptual scheme is a property of participatory democracy).

14 Appendix C: Background Notes

This section of the document lays out background information about various topics undertaken in the questionnaire and in the V-Dem project at large: (1) Civic and Academic Space, (2) Civil Liberty, (3) Civil Society Organizations, (4) Deliberation, (5) Direct Democracy, (6) Elections, (7) Exclusion, (8) Executive, (9) Judiciary, (10) Legislature, (11) Media, (12) Political Equality, (13) Political Parties, (14) Sovereignty, (15) Subnational Democracy, and (16) Voting and Representation.

We list the V-Dem Project Manager who constructed the indicators for that topic, scholars whose work has influenced our thinking (some of whom were personally consulted in the process of designing these indicators), organizations that collect data on these subjects (if any), and existing studies or datasets that relate to the subject (if any).

14.1 Civic and Academic Space

Project manager: Anna Lührmann
Scholars: Sebastian Hellmeier, Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel, Jean Lachapelle, Olga Onuch, Michael Bernhard, Kyle Marquardt, Anja Neundorf, Jennifer McCoy.
Organizations: Scholars at Risk, Global Public Policy Institute, Civicus Studies, Comparative Constitutions Project, Competitive Authoritarian Protest Research Network (CAPRN).
Studies, datasets: Bjørnskov, C. and S. Voigt (2016); Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016); State of Emergency Mapping Project (STEMP), Zwitter, Fister and Groeneweg (2017); McCoy, and Somer (2019); Hellmeier, and Weidmann, (2020)

14.2 Civil Liberty

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning
Scholars: David Beetham (U. of Leeds, emeritus), David Cingranelli (SUNY, Binghamton), Christian Davenport (U. of Notre Dame), Todd Landman (Essex), David Richards (U. of Connecticut).
Organizations: Amnesty International, Freedom House, Hauge Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), Human Rights Watch, Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, World Justice Project.
Studies, datasets: Annual Reports (Amnesty International); Annual Reports (Human Rights Watch); Arat (1991); Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Foundation); Cederman *et al. (2010)*; Cingranelli and Richards (1999; 2014); Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit, Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom House); Freedom House (2006); Gibney and Dalton (1996); Green (2001); Landman (2004); Landman, Carvalho (2010); Skaaning (2006a, 2006b, 2008); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US Department of State).

14.3 Civil Society Organizations

Project manager: Michael Bernhard
Scholars: Sheri Berman (Barnard College), Lena Blomstrand (Head of Civil Society Center, Sida), David Campbell (Notre Dame), Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard), Andrew Green (independent scholar), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Marc Howard (Georgetown), Jude Howell (Director, Centre for Civil Society, LSE), Jan Kubik (Rutgers), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Susan Stokes (Yale), Lucan Way (University of Toronto), Meredith Weiss (SUNY Albany).
Organizations: Center for Civil Society (UCLA), Centre for Civil Society (LSE), Civil Society Center (Sida, Sweden), National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, DC), Center for Civil Society and Democracy (Georgetown), Center for Civil Society Studies (Johns Hopkins University).
Studies, datasets: Anheier (2004); Andrew Green (proposal); The Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project, Ekiert, Kubik (2001); Helmke, Levitsky (2004); Civil Society Index (CIVICUS); Civil

Society Ratings (the Civil Society Center at Sida and Helmut K. Anheier); European Social Survey; Freedom House; Nations in Transit; The U.S. "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" Survey; World Values Survey.

14.4 Deliberation

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg
Scholars: Andre Bächtiger (University of Luzern), John Dryzek (ANU), Jurg Steiner (UNC, Chapel Hill).
Studies, datasets. Bächtiger (2005); Dryzek (2009); Mutz (2008); Ryfe (2005); Steiner *et al.* (2004); Thompson (2008).

14.5 Direct Democracy

Project manager: David Altman
Scholars: Shaun Bowler (UC Riverside), Anita Breuer (Cologne), Todd Donovan (Western Washington), Markus Freitag (Konstanz), Archon Fung (Kennedy School of Gov, Harvard), Elisabeth Gerber (Michigan), Sara Hobolt (Oxford), Simon Hug (Geneve), John Matsusaka (USC), Maija Setälä (Turku), Caroline J. Tolbert (Iowa), Adrian Vatter (Zurich).
Organizations: Centre for Democracy (C2D), IRI-USA.
Studies, datasets: Suchmaschine für direkte Demokratie; National Conference of State Legislatures (US only).

14.6 Elections

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg
Scholars: Matthijs Bogaards (Jacobs University, Bremen), Jörgen Elklit (Aarhus U., Denmark), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Susan Hyde (Yale), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Judith Kelly (Duke), Gerry Munck (USC), Andrew Reynolds (UNC), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Rakesh Sharma (IFES). *Organizations:* ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Carter Center, IFES, National Democratic Institute (NDI), OAS Department of Cooperation and Electoral Observation. *Studies, datasets:* Bjornlund (2004); Carter Center *et al.* (2005); Elklit, Reynolds (2005); Eriksson (2002); European Union (2007); Gerken (2009); Hyde and Malinov (2009); Kelley, Kolev (2010); Kollman *et al.* (2011); Lindberg (2009); Munck (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Polity 5 (Marshall, Jaggers 2020); Project on International Election Monitoring; Schedler (2006).

14.7 Exclusion

Project manager: Rachel Sigman
Scholars: Melani Cammett, Lahra Smith, Kanchan Chandra, Lars-Erik Cedermann, Andreas Wimmer.
Organizations: World Bank, ETH-Zurich.
Studies, datasets: World Bank, World Development Report 2017 Ethnic Power Relations Datasets; Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin. (2015).

14.8 Executive

Project manager: Jan Teorell
Scholars: Kirk Bowman (Georgia Institute of Technology), John Carey (Dartmouth), Steven Fish (UC Berkeley), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Fabrice Lehoucq (UNC Greensboro), Gerardo Munck (USC), Anibal Perez-Linan (U. of Pittsburgh), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Matthew Shugart

(UCSD).
Studies, datasets: Amorim Neto (1998); the ARCHIGOS project (Goemans, Gleditsch, Chiozza 2009); Banks, Müller, Overstreet and Isacoff (2009); Bienen and van de Walle (1991); Bowman, Lehoucq and Mahoney (2005); CCP (Elkins *et al. 2014*), CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014) (Elkins *et al.* 2009); van Cranenburgh (2008); DPI (Beck *et al.* 2001); the ACLP dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010); Henisz (2000; 2002); the Institutions and Elections Project, IAEP (Regan *et al.* 2009); Lentz (1994; 1999); Metcalf (2000); Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (dataset); Schemmel (rulers.org); Siaroff (2003); UNDP (2004:77-84); worldstatesmen.org.

14.9 Judiciary

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton *Scholars:* Vanessa Baird (Colorado-Boulder), Rebecca Bill-Chavez (Navy), Dan Brinks (UT-Austin), Clifford J. Carrubba (Emory), Matthew Gabel (Washington U.), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Jeffrey Lax (Columbia), Andrew Martin (Washington U.), Georg Vanberg (UNC).
Organizations: Human Rights Watch; The World Justice Project (American Bar Association); World Bank. See also organizations listed under Civil Liberties.
Studies, datasets: American Bar Association (2007); Bertelsmann (2008); Carrubba, Gabel, Helmke, Martin, Staton (2008); Cingranelli and Richards (2014); Clague *et al.* (1999); Elkins and Ginsburg (2009); Executive Opinion Survey of the Global Competitiveness Report (available for 80 countries in 2002); Feld and Voigt (2003); Gwartney and Lawson (2007); Henisz (2000); Howard and Carey (2004); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009); Keith (2012); La Porta *et al* (2004); Ríos-Figueroa (2006); Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2009); Tate and Keith (2007); Tate *et al.* (2002); Vera Institute of Justice (2003).

14.10 Legislature

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Scholars: Joel Barkan (University of Iowa), John Carey (Dartmouth), Scott Desposato (UCSD), John Huber (Columbia), Mark Jones (Rice), Lanny Martin (Rice), Robert Mattes (U. of Cape Town), Scott Morgenstern (U. of Pittsburgh), Shaheen Mozaffar (Bridgewater State College).
Organizations: IPU.
Studies, datasets: African Legislatures Project (ALP); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014); Fish, Kroenig (2009).

14.11 Media

Project manager: Michael Coppedge / Holli Semetko
Scholars: Devra Moehler (Annenburg School, University of Pennsylvania), Erik Nisbet (Ohio State), Pippa Norris (Kennedy School of Government); Wisdom Tettey (University of Calgary).
Organizations: IREX.
Studies, datasets: IREX Media Sustainability Index (www.irex.org/msi/index.asp); Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index; Index of internet freedom (Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University).

14.12 Political Parties

Project manager: Allen Hicken
Scholars: Stefano Bartolini (EU Institute, Florence), Pradeep Chhibber (UC Berkeley), Kenneth Janda (Northwestern), Mark Jones (Rice), Richard S. Katz (Johns Hopkins University), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Herbert Kitschelt (Duke), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame), Peter Mair (EU Institute, Florence), Karen Remmer (Duke), Kenneth Roberts (Cornell), Erik Wibbels (Duke).

Studies, datasets: John Carey (dataset); Comparative Manifestoes Project; Michael Coppedge (classification of Latin American parties); DPI (Beck *et al.* 2001); Kenneth Janda (dataset); Wiesehomeier-Benoit (dimensions of party competition), CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011).

14.13 Political Equality

Project manager: John Gerring
Scholars: Kathryn Hochstetler (University of New Mexico), Ayesha Jalal (History and Sociology, Tufts), Raúl Madrid (Texas-Austin), Mick Moore (Center for the Future State/Institute for Development Studies, Sussex), Alex Pacek (Texas A&M), Deborah Yashar (Princeton).

14.14 Sovereignty

Project manager: Michael Bernhard
Scholars: Karen Adams (U. of Montana), Tanisha Fazal (Columbia), Erik Gartzke (UCSD), Robert Jackson (Boston University), Stephen Krasner (Stanford), Douglas Lemke (Penn State), Kunle Owolabi (Villanova).
Organizations: Correlates of War project.
Studies, datasets: Karen Adams (dataset); Correlates of War (dataset); List of Independent States (Gleditsch, Ward).

14.15 Subnational Democracy

Project manager: Kelly McMann
Scholars: Andrew Barnes (Kent State University), Caroline Beer (University of Vermont), Karen Beckwith (Case Western Reserve University), Dan Berger (University of Chicago), Justin Buchler (Case Western Reserve University), Ernesto Calvo (University of Maryland, College Park), Rebecca Bill Chavez (U.S. Navel Academy), Todd Eisenstadt (American University), Carlos Gervasoni (Universidad Torcuato), Agustina Giraudy (American University), Brian Grodsky (University of Maryland, Baltimore), Matt Ingram (State University of New York, Albany), Pierre Landry (University of Pittsburgh), Tomila Lankina (De Montfort University), Alfred Montero (Carleton College), Bryon Moraski (University of Florida), Nikolai Petrov (Carnegie Center Moscow), Elizabeth Remick (Tufts University), Karen Remmer (Duke University), Aseema Sinha (Claremont-McKenna College), Oxana Shevel (Tufts Unviersity), Lily Tsai (MIT).
Organizations: United Cities and Local Government, Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralization.
Studies, datasets: Ammons (2001); Bardhan, Mookherjee (2006); Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan (1997); Campbell (2003); Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot (1998); Commonwealth Local Government Forum ; Council of Europe (Local democracy reports for member states) ; Crook, Manor (1998); Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project; Globalization and World Cities; John (2001); Kaufmann, Leautier, Mastruzzi (2005); McCarney, Stren (2003); Montero, Samuels (2004); Municipal Development Partnership (PDM, seat in Cotonou, Benin) ; Olowu, Wunsch (2004); Oxhorn (2004); Soos (2002); UN Habitat (various years); World Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy, aka the Gold Report.

14.16 Voting and Representation

Project manager: Pamela Paxton
Scholars: Kenneth Bollen (UNC), Drude Dahlerup (Stockholm), Matt Golder (Florida State U.), (Rochester), Melanie Hughes (Pittsburgh); Tatu Vanhanen (University of Tampere, Finland, emeritus).
Organizations: IDEA, IPU, U.S. Department of State.
Studies, datasets: Cederman et al. (2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP

(Elkins *et al.* 2014); IDEA (Global Survey of Voter Turnout); IDEA Quota Database; Moon *et al.* (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Paxton *et al.* (2003); Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2008); US Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service (2001); U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports; Vanhanen (2000).

15 Appendix D: Post-Survey Questionnaire

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Post-survey questionnaire: Please answer this set of questions after you have completed all other sections of the survey. It consists of questions about your personal background and political perspectives, as well as some general questions about democracy. Answers to personal questions will remain strictly confidential.

Principles of democracy: There are many ways of conceptualizing democracy. In the following section, we ask about your own views of this subject. Specifically, we ask you to consider seven conceptions of democracy—electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensus, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. After a short description of each conception, we ask you to rate how strongly you support this conception of democracy on a standard Likert scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree).

We are interested in your own views of the subject, *i.e.*, how closely these various conceptualizations fit with your intuitive sense of what democracy means, or should mean. When you say "democracy," what do you mean to communicate? How do you think the concept is most usefully defined?

Post-survey questionnaire – Historical: Please answer this set of questions after you have completed all other sections of the survey. It consists of questions about your personal background and political perspectives, as well as some general questions about democracy. Answers to personal questions will remain strictly confidential.

Principles of democracy – Historical: There are many ways of conceptualizing democracy. In the following section, we ask about your own views of this subject. Specifically, we ask you to consider seven conceptions of democracy-electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensus, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. After a short description of each conception, we ask you to rate how strongly you support this conception of democracy on a standard Likert scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree).

We are interested in your own views of the subject, *i.e.*, how closely these various conceptualizations fit with your intuitive sense of what democracy means, or should mean. When you say "democracy," what do you mean to communicate? How do you think the concept is most usefully defined?

15.1 Contemporary PSQ

15.1.1 Today's date (C) (v2zzdate)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is today's date?

Responses:

Date.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.2 Gender (C) (v2zzgender)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your gender?

Responses:

0: Male
1: Female
2: Non-binary

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.3 Education (C) (v2zzedlev)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your level of education?

Responses:

0: None.
1: Incomplete primary.
2: Primary completed.
3: Incomplete secondary.
4: Secondary completed.
5: Post-secondary trade/vocational school.
6: University undergraduate degree incomplete.
7: University undergraduate degree completed.
8: Masters degree (MA).
9: Ph.D.
10: Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business).

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.4 Current educational status (C) (v2zzcurred)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Are you currently enrolled in a degree program?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.5 Country of education (C) (v2zzedcnt)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In which country are you currently attending school or — if no longer in school — in which country did you complete your highest educational degree (*e.g.*, BA, MA, PhD)?

Responses:

Country (chosen from menu).

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.6 Year of birth (C) (v2zzborn)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In what year were you born?

Responses:

Numeric.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.7 Country of birth (C) (v2zzbornin)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In which country were you born?

Responses:
Country (chosen from menu).

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.8 Country of residence (C) (v2zzreside)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In what country do you live today?

Clarification: If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.

Responses:
Country (chosen from menu)

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.9 Years in country (C) (v2zztimein)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How much total time, in years, have you spent in the country that you worked on for this project?

Clarification: Please count time in residence and time visiting. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as ”years”, ”months”, or ”days”.

Responses:
Numeric.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.10 Years away from country (C) (v2zzyrsout)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since you most recently lived in or visited the country you will be working on?

Clarification: If you are there now, enter 0. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as ”years”, ”months”, or ”days”.

Responses:
Numeric.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.11 Country of employer or university (C) (v2zzempcnt)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is your current employer or university located in the country on which you are working for this project?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
2: Unemployed/Retired.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.12 Employer (C) (v2zzemploy)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: For whom do you currently work?

Responses:

0: Self-employed, unemployed, or retired.
1: The current executive (presidential administration/cabinet).
2: A ministry, board, or agency within the central government.
3: A ministry, board, or agency within the local/regional government.
4: A state-owned enterprise or another branch of the public administration.
5: A public university.
6: A private university.
7: A private-sector company.
8: An NGO or non-profit private organization.
9: Full-time student.
10: Other.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.13 Democracy Scores (C) (v2zzdemsc)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What democracy score would you assign to the following countries on a 0-100 scale?

Clarification: Imagine a scale that measures the degree of democracy-autocracy in countries around the world, stretching from 0 to 100. 0 represents the most extreme autocracy in the world and 100 represents the most democratic country in the world.

These scores are meant to represent the state of regimes across the world, not ideal-types. Thus, countries could become, over time, more autocratic than the most autocratic country in the world, or more democratic than the most democratic country. And they may have been so in the past. All we are concerned about here is the state of regimes.

Because some regimes are undergoing rapid change, it is important to clarify a specific date. Your coding should reflect the state of democracy in a country on 1 January, 2012.

In assigning scores we ask that you apply your understanding of democracy. This need not accord with the vision of democracy embraced by existing indices (Freedom House, Polity, *et al.*) or with the perspective of the V-Dem project (which embraces a variety of models of democracy).

All we ask is that you consider democracy-autocracy on a unidimensional scale. Of course, we realize that democracy is much more complicated than this. But we feel nonetheless that important information can be captured in a single dimension and we want to know how you view the subject.

We realize that you know more about some of these countries than about others. Do not be concerned by this. Simply enter the score that represents your best estimate.

Responses:

0: The country you worked on Range (Regional managers (RMs) should insert here the country that they know best within the region they are assigned to work on. Leave this question blank if you are working on numerous countries across multiple regions.) [v2zzdemyc]
1: Costa Rica Range [v2zzdemcr]
2: Cuba Range [v2zzdemcu]
3: India Range [v2zzdemin]
4: Nigeria Range [v2zzdemni]
5: North Korea Range [v2zzdemnk]
6: Russia Range [v2zzdemru]
7: Saudi Arabia Range [v2zzdemsar]
8: South Africa Range [v2zzdemsaf]
9: Sweden Range [v2zzdemswe]
10: Switzerland Range [v2zzdemswz]
11: United Kingdom Range [v2zzdemuk]

12: United States Range [v2zzdemus]
13: Venezuela Range [v2zzdemvz]

Answer-type: Multiple-input, cluster question. No confidence is recorded for this question in either format.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.14 Free markets (C) (v2zzfremrk)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Consider the following statement: "The free market, the protection of property rights, and private ownership of businesses are fundamental principles of a free society." How strongly do you agree or disagree?

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.15 Electoral democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzelcdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The electoral principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The electoral principle — also known as contestation, competition, elite, minimal, realist, or Schumpeterian — is the idea that democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the electorate's approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are the crucial instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing electoral contestation, *e.g.*, civil liberties, an active media, a written constitution, an independent judiciary (to enforce the rules of the game), and so forth. However, these factors are viewed as secondary to electoral institutions.

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.16 Liberal democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzlibdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The liberal principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The liberal principle identifies democracy with limited government, rule of law, and the preservation of individual liberties. The liberal model assumes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. Principles and procedures must be established so as to ensure that rule by the majority does not result in the loss of individual liberties.

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.17 Majoritarian democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzmajdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The majoritarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The majoritarian principle (aka responsible party government) reflects the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign. The many should prevail over the few. To facilitate this, political institutions must concentrate power (within the context of competitive elections). In practical terms, this means strong and centralized parties, a unitary rather than federal constitution, plurality rather than proportional electoral laws (or PR with high statutory thresholds), and so forth.

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.18 Consensus democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzcondem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The consensus principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The consensus principle is the idea that democracy is achieved when consensus is achieved. This means that new policies should not be adopted by a polity unless and until a consensus (or near consensus) is reached. In order to assure that the principle of consensus is honored institutions should be set up in such a way as to assure that power is dispersed across numerous independent (or quasi-independent) bodies. In practical terms, this means a large party system or diffusely organized parties, a federal constitution, proportional electoral rules, and so forth (directly contrary to the majoritarian conception).

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.19 Participatory democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzprtdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The participatory principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The motivation for participatory democracy is uneasiness about delegating complete authority to representatives. Direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the participatory component is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model of democracy thus highlights the importance of voting, but also of citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen engagement.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.20 Deliberative democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzdeldem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The deliberative principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The deliberative principle focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. In this conception, democracy requires more than a mindless aggregation of existing preferences; there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. Some political institutions have a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.21 Egalitarian democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzegldem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The egalitarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy stresses that formal political rights and civil liberties are insufficient for political equality. The polity should also address material and immaterial inequalities that inhibit the actual exercise of these rights and liberties. Ideally, groups — as defined by income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive characteristics — should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not already exist, the egalitarian principle requires state efforts to make the distribution of socio-economic resources, education, and health more equal so as to enhance political equality. (This principle does not entail equality of power between leaders and citizens, as

leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.)

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.22 Time spent for coding (C) (v2zztimespent)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: Approximately how much focused work time did it take you to complete your coding work in this V-Dem annual update, including time spent preparing as well as time spent in the data entry tool?

Responses:
Range 1-30 hours.

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.23 Coding experience (C) (v2zzsatisf)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: How satisfied are you with your experience coding for V-Dem?

Responses:
0: Very dissatisfied
1: Somewhat dissatisfied
2: Neither
3: Somewhat satisfied
4: Very satisfied

Data release: 1-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.24 Reason of satisfaction (C) (v2zzreasatisf)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: What influenced your level of satisfaction regarding coding for V-Dem?

Responses:
Text.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.25 Another reason for coding (C) (v2zzanfirstreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: If you had another reason that you code for V-Dem, please specify here.

Responses:
Text.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.26 Another second reason for coding (C) (v2zzansecreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: If you had another reason that you code for V-Dem, please specify here.

Responses:

Text.

Data release: 1-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.27 Reason for coding (C) (v2zzfirstreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L. Marquardt

Question: Please select the most important reason you code for V-Dem.

Responses:

1) Coding for V-Dem provides me with extra income.
2) Coding for V-Dem is an experience that improves the quality of my work.
3) Coding for V-Dem provides me with additional work opportunities.
4) Being a part of the V-Dem network provides benefits for my reputation.
5) The V-Dem dataset is a valuable tool for scholars and policy makers.
6) Coding for V-Dem is fun.
7) It is important that there is accurate information about my country of expertise.
8) It is important that there is accurate information about my area of expertise (thematic, not country-specific).
9) Another reason (skip to v2zzanfirstreas)

Ordering: if 9 skip to v2zzanfirstreas

Data release: 9-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.28 Materials used (C) (v2zzmaterials)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L. Marquardt

Question: In completing the coding task for V-Dem, either this year or in the past, what materials did you use to gather your information? Select all that apply.

Responses:

1) Archival documents
2) Popular publications, such as books or magazine articles
3) Academic publications, such as books or journal articles
4) Government news sources from the country coded (e.g. newspapers, radio, websites or TV)
5) Private domestic news sources from country coded (e.g. newspapers, radio, websites or TV)
6) International news sources (e.g. newspapers, radio, websites or TV)
7) Official government data or reports
8) Domestic NGO data or reports
9) Data or reports from international sources, either governmental or non-governmental.
10) Direct personal experiences
11) Personal experiences of friends, family, or acquaintances

Answer-type: Multiple selection

Data release: 9-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.1.29 Second reason for coding (C) (v2zzsecreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L. Marquardt

Question: Please select the second most important reason you code for V-Dem.

Responses:

1) Coding for V-Dem provides me with extra income.

2) Coding for V-Dem is an experience that improves the quality of my work.
3) Coding for V-Dem provides me with additional work opportunities.
4) Being a part of the V-Dem network provides benefits for my reputation.
5) The V-Dem dataset is a valuable tool for scholars and policy makers.
6) Coding for V-Dem is fun.
7) It is important that there is accurate information about my country of expertise.
8) It is important that there is accurate information about my area of expertise (thematic, not country-specific).
9) Another reason (skip to v2zzansecreas)

Ordering: if 9 skip to v2zzansecreas

Data release: 9-16. Available in coder–level dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2 Historical PSQ

15.2.1 Year of birth (C) (v3zzborn)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In what year were you born?

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.2 Country of birth (C) (v3zzbornin)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In which country were you born?

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.3 Consensus democracy (C) (v3zzcondem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The consensus principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The consensus principle is the idea that democracy is achieved when consensus is achieved. This means that new policies should not be adopted by a polity unless and until a consensus (or near consensus) is reached. In order to assure that the principle of consensus is honored institutions should be set up in such a way as to assure that power is dispersed across numerous independent (or quasi-independent) bodies. In practical terms, this means a large party system or diffusely organized parties, a federal constitution, proportional electoral rules, and so forth (directly contrary to the majoritarian conception).

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.4 Current educational status (C) (v3zzcurred)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Are you currently enrolled in a degree program?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.5 Today's date (C) (v3zzdate)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is today's date?

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.6 Deliberative democracy (C) (v3zzdeldem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The deliberative principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The deliberative principle focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. In this conception, democracy requires more than a mindless aggregation of existing preferences; there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. Some political institutions have a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.7 Country of education (C) (v3zzedcnt)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In which country are you currently attending school or – if no longer in school – in which country did you complete your highest educational degree (*e.g.*, BA, MA, PhD)?

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.8 Education (C) (v3zzedlev)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your level of education?

Responses:
0: None.
1: Incomplete primary.
2: Primary completed.

3: Incomplete secondary.
4: Secondary completed.
5: Post-secondary trade/vocational school.
6: University undergraduate degree incomplete.
7: University undergraduate degree completed.
8: Masters degree (MA).
9: Ph.D.
10: Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business).

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.9 Egalitarian democracy (C) (v3zzegldem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The egalitarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy stresses that formal political rights and civil liberties are insufficient for political equality. The polity should also address material and immaterial inequalities that inhibit the actual exercise of these rights and liberties. Ideally, groups – as defined by income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive characteristics – should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not already exist, the egalitarian principle requires state efforts to make the distribution of socio-economic resources, education, and health more equal so as to enhance political equality. (This principle does not entail equality of power between leaders and citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.)

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.10 Electoral democracy (C) (v3zzelcdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The electoral principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The electoral principle — also known as contestation, competition, elite, minimal, realist, or Schumpeterian — is the idea that democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the electorate's approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are the crucial instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing electoral contestation, *e.g.*, civil liberties, an active media, a written constitution, an independent judiciary (to enforce the rules of the game), and so forth. However, these factors are viewed as secondary to electoral institutions.

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.11 Country of employer or university (C) (v3zzempcnt)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is your current employer or university located in the country on which you are working for this project?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.
2: Unemployed/Retired.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.12 Employer (C) (v3zzemploy)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: For whom do you currently work?

Responses:

0: Self-employed, unemployed, or retired.
1: The current executive (presidential administration/cabinet).
2: A ministry, board, or agency within the central government.
3: A ministry, board, or agency within the local/regional government.
4: A state-owned enterprise or another branch of the public administration.
5: A public university.
6: A private university.
7: A private-sector company.
8: An NGO or non-profit private organization.
9: Full-time student.
10: Other.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.13 Free markets (C) (v3zzfremrk)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Consider the following statement: "The free market, the protection of property rights, and private ownership of businesses are fundamental principles of a free society." How strongly do you agree or disagree?

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.14 Gender (C) (v3zzgender)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your gender?

Responses:

0: Male
1: Female

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.15 Liberal democracy (C) (v3zzlibdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The liberal principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The liberal principle identifies democracy with limited government, rule of law, and the preservation of individual liberties. The liberal model assumes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. Principles and procedures must be established so as to ensure that rule by the majority does not result in the loss of individual liberties.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.16 Majoritarian democracy (C) (v3zzmajdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The majoritarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The majoritarian principle (aka responsible party government) reflects the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign. The many should prevail over the few. To facilitate this, political institutions must concentrate power (within the context of competitive elections). In practical terms, this means strong and centralized parties, a unitary rather than federal constitution, plurality rather than proportional electoral laws (or PR with high statutory thresholds), and so forth.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.17 Participatory democracy (C) (v3zzprtdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The participatory principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The motivation for participatory democracy is uneasiness about delegating complete authority to representatives. Direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the participatory component is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model of democracy thus highlights the importance of voting, but also of citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen engagement.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.

1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.18 Country of residence (C) (v3zzreside)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In what country do you live today?

Clarification: If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.19 Role in project (C) (v3zzrole)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your primary role in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project?

Responses:

0: Research assistant coding (or entering) factual data across many countries – type (A) coder.
1: Country research assistant – type (B) coder.
2: Country expert – type (C) coder.
3: Research assistant working at University of Gothenburg.
4: Research assistant working at University of Notre Dame.
5: Research assistant working at University of Oslo
6: Research assistant working at Lund University
7: Research assistant working at Aarhus University
8: Research assistant working at Harvard University
9: Research assistant working at Boston University
10: Other research assistant.
11: Regional manager (RM).
12: Project manager (PM).
13: Principal investigator (PI).
14: Not sure.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.20 Years in country (C) (v3zztimein)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How much total time, in years, have you spent in the country that you worked on for this project?

Clarification: Please count time in residence and time visiting. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as ”years”, ”months”, or ”days”.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2.21 Years away from country (C) (v3zzyrsout)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since you most recently lived in or visited the country you will be working on?

Clarification: If you are there now, enter 0. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as ”years”, ”months”, or ”days”.

Data release: 8-16. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

16 Appendix E: Changes Between Previous Versions of the Dataset

16.1 New in Version 15 compared to Version 14

- **New or modified information**
- V-Dem Dataset
  - Country-year aggregation has been changed from maximum to last for v2ex_elechos and 2ex_elechog.
  - The calculation method for v2x_hosabort and v2x_legabort has been modified to ensure greater accuracy for these variables.
  - e_regionpol_7C has been modified, including the Caucasus in Eastern Europe.

16.2 New in Version 14 compared to Version 13

- **New indicators and Indices**
- Party Systems
  - Indices:
    - Party-System Democracy Index (v2xpas_democracy)
    - Government Coalition Democracy Index (v2xpas_democracy_government)
    - Opposition Parties' Democracy Index (v2xpas_democracy_opposition)
    - Party-System Religion Index (v2xpas_religion)
    - Government Coalition Religion Index (v2xpas_religion_government)
    - Opposition Parties' Religion Index (v2xpas_religion_opposition)
    - Party-System Exclusion Index (v2xpas_exclusion)
    - Government Coalition Party-System Exclusion Index (v2xpas_exclusion_government)
    - Opposition Parties' Party-System Exclusion Index (v2xpas_exclusion_opposition)
    - Party-System Left-Right Index (v2xpas_economic)
    - Government Coalition Left-Right Index (v2xpas_economic_government)
    - Opposition Parties' Left-Right Index (v2xpas_economic_opposition)
- **New A variables**
  - Lower chamber 'base' or 'nominal' tier seats (v2ellobaseat)
  - Lower chamber 'base' tier electoral districts (v2ellobadis)
  - Lower chamber 'upper' tier electoral districts (v2elloupdis)
  - Lower chamber hybrid system reserved seats (v2elloreseat)
  - Lower chamber election district effective magnitude (v2ellodiseff)
- **New external variables**
  - Child Mortality Rate (e_pechmor)
  - Region (politico-geographic 7-category) (e_regionpol_7C)
- **Other new or modified information**
- V-Dem Datasets
  - Added coding on appointment date for the variables Head of State / Head of Government (v2exhoshog), Head of State Party Affiliation (v2exparhos), Head of Government Party Affiliation (v2expothog). These three variables are now coded on both appointment date and default date. This change will add additional rows in the country-date dataset.

- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Infant Mortality Rate (e_peinfmor)
  - Government Censorship Effort - Media (v3mecenefm) is no longer available as a stand alone variable. Instead, v3mecenefm is merged in with v2mecenefm.

16.3 New in Version 13 compared to Version 12

- **New indicators and Indices**
- V-Dem
  - Government censorship effort — Media (v3mecenefm)
- Varieties of Indoctrination
  - Indices:
    - Democratic indoctrination content in education (v2xed_ed_dmcon)
    - Control over educational agents (v2xed_ed_ctag)
    - Political education effort in education (v2xed_ed_poed)
    - Centralization of the education system (v2xed_ed_cent)
    - Indoctrination coherence in education (v2xed_ed_inco)
    - Patriotic indoctrination content in education (v2xed_ed_ptcon)
    - Patriotic indoctrination content in education and the media (v2xed_ptcon)
    - Indoctrination potential in education (v2xed_ed_inpt)
    - Control over media agents (v2xedvd_me_ctag)
    - Centralization of media control (v2xedvd_me_cent)
    - Indoctrination coherence (potential) in the media (v2xedvd_me_inco)
    - Indoctrination potential in education and the media (v2xedvd_inpt)
    - Indoctrination content in education (v2xed_ed_con)
  - General Curriculum:
    - Centralized curriculum (v2edcentcurrlm)
    - Centralized textbook approval (v2edcenttxbooks)
  - Specialized Subject Curriculum:
    - Political education, primary school (v2edpoledprim)
    - Political education, secondary school (v2edpoledsec)
    - Political rights and duties in the curriculum (v2edpoledrights)
    - Patriotic education in the curriculum (v2edpatriot)
    - Ideology in the curriculum (v2edideol)
    - Ideology character in the curriculum (v2edideolch)
    - Ideology character in the curriculum (v2edideolch_rec)
    - Pluralism in the curriculum (v2edplural)
    - Critical engagement with education content (v2edcritical)
    - Teacher autonomy in the classroom (v2edteautonomy)
    - Mathematics and science education (v2edmath)
  - Teachers:
    - Education requirements for primary school teachers (v2edtequal)
    - Teacher inspection (v2temonitor)
    - Presence of teacher unions (v2edteunion)
    - Independent teacher unions(v2edteunionindp)
    - Political teacher hiring (v2edtehire)
    - Political teacher firing (v2edtefire)
  - Schools:

    - Presence of patriotic symbols in schools (v2edscpatriot)
    - Celebration of patriotic symbols (v2edscpatriotcb)
    - Extracurricular activities (v2edscextracurr)
  - Media:
    - State-owned print media (v2medstateprint)
    - State-owned broadcast media (v2medstatebroad)
    - Political influence, state-owned media (v2medpolstate)
    - Political influence, non state-owned media (v2medpolnonstate)
    - Patriotism in the media (v2medpatriot)
    - Control of entertainment content (v2medentrain)

- **New external variables**
  - Number of coups attempts in a year (e_pt_coup_attempts)
  - Index of Democratization (e_vanhanen)
- **Other new or modified information**
- V-Dem Datasets
  - The country-date and coder-level datasets have both increased in size: since v13, we have inserted January 1st (*e.g.* 1990-01-01) for all variables except for those that are election date-specific. Before v13, observations at December 31st (*e.g.* 1990-12-31) could be interpreted as the score that applies to the full year. This is not the case any longer and thus no date for these variables have a special meaning. Finally, although the country-year datasets are aggregated from the country-date structure, it is not affected by this.
  - Election date-specific variables in the country-year datasets are now interpolated *between* elections and *across* years that belong to the same electoral regime (see v2x_elecreg). However, the country-date and coder-level datasets only have observations on the actual election-dates.
- Regimes survey
  - Bug fix for variables that are aggregated across coders using the mode: v2regoppploc, v2regproreg, v2regpower, v2regimpoppgroup, v2regantireg v2regsuploc, and v2regimpgroup. These variables now reflect the mode whereas in versions v9 to v11.1 the bug caused them to not always do so.
- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the "years" section for each variable entry.

16.4 New in Version 12 compared to version 11.1

- **New indicators**
  - Regime ID (v2regidnr)
  - Regime duration (v2regdur)
- **New external variables**
  - GDP (e_gdp)
  - GDP per capita (e_gdppc)
  - Population (e_pop)
- **Removed indicators**

  - COVID-19 government restrictions (v2cvgovres)
  - COVID-19 affected ratings (v2cvresp)

- **Removed external variables**
  - GDP growth (e_migdpgro)
  - GDP growth (rescaled) (e_migdpgrolns)
  - GDP per capita (e_migdppc)
  - GDP per capita, logged, base 10 (e_migdppcln)

- **Other new or modified information**
  - Updated *list of countries.*
  - Updated *citations* for V-Dem's reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the "years" section for each variable entry.

16.5 New in Version 11.1 compared to Version 11

- **Bug fix**
  - For v11 there was a mistake in aggregating a number of A and A* variables from country-date to country-year by using the wrong aggregation method, most often using maximum instead of last or last instead of maximum per country-year. Most indices were not affected by this as they get calculated using country-date inputs. The following indices were affected and were recalculated for v11.1, the number of changed observations in comparison to v11 are in parenthesis: v2x_horacc (all), v2x_accountability (all), v2x_veracc (all), v2x_diagacc (all), v2x_divparctrl (45), v2x_feduni (8), v2x_regime (24), v2x_regime_amb (25), v2x_ex_confidence (17), v2x_ex_direlect (8), v2x_ex_hereditary (21), v2x_ex_military (52), v2x_ex_party (27). The affected A and A* variables were re-aggregated using the correct method for v11.1.
  - The coder-level dataset has been reuploaded for v11.1 such that the coder_ids are comparable across coder-level datasets. Non-identifying post survey questionnaire variables have been added.

16.6 New in Version 11 compared to Version 10

- **New indicators**
  - HOS party affiliation (v2exparhos).
  - HOG party affiliation (v2expothog).
  - Gap index (gap_index).
  - Regime survey:
    - Regime support location (v2regsuploc).
    - Regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroups).
    - Explicit and active regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroupsact).
    - Regime most important opposition group (v2regimpoppgroup).
    - Regime opposition groups size (v2regoppgroupssize).
    - Regime opposition location (v2regoppploc).
    - Strongest pro-regime preferences (v2regproreg).

    - Strongest anti-regime preferences (v2regantireg).
    - Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (v2regpower).

- **Modified indices and indicators**
  - v2xdd_i_pi has been renamed to v2xdd_i_ci.
  - v2juhcname has been reintroduced.
- **Other new or modified information**
  - First public release of the dataset construction code (see *1.6.3*).
  - Updated *list of countries.*
  - Updated *citations* for V-Dem's reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.
- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the "years" section for each variable entry.
- **Postponed indicators**
  The following variables have not been included. We have discovered mistakes in the time series and hope to be able to correct them for upcoming versions of the dataset.
  - Lower chamber quota for social groups (v2lgqumin)
  - Election women in the cabinet (v2elwomcab)
  - Legislature amends constitution (v2lgamend)
  - Legislature amnesties (v2lgamnsty)
  - Lower chamber legislates by law (v2lglegllo)
  - Upper chamber legislates by law (v2lgleglup)

16.7 New in Version 10 compared to Version 9

- **New thematic areas**
  Civic and Academic Space.
- **New indices**
  - Academic Freedom Index (v2xca_academ)
- **New indicators**
  - Civic Space:
    - Political polarization (v2cacamps)
    - Political violence (v2caviol)
    - Freedom of peaceful assembly (v2caassemb)
    - State of emergency (v2casoe)
  - Mass Mobilization:
    - Mass mobilization (v2cagenmob)
    - Mass mobilization concentration (v2caconmob)
    - Mobilization for democracy (v2cademmob)
    - Mobilization for autocracy (v2caautmob)
  - Citizen Engagement:
    - Engagement in state-administered mass organizations (v2castate)

    - Engagement in independent trade unions (v2catrauni)
    - Engagement in independent political associations (v2capolit)
    - Engagement in independent non-political associations (v2canonpol)
  - Academic Space:
    - Existence of universities (v2cauni)
    - Total number of universities (v2canuni)
    - Constitutional protection for academic freedom (v2caprotac)
    - Freedom to research and teach (v2cafres)
    - Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch)
    - Institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut)
    - Campus integrity (v2casurv)
    - Academics as critics (v2cacritic)
    - International legal commitment to academic freedom under ICESCR (v2caacadfree)

- **Modified indices and indicators**
  - The Local government index (v2xel_locelec) has been modified.
  - Contemporary time series added for HOS year of death (v2exdeathos), now merged with v3exdeathos.
  - Contemporary time series added for HOG year of death (v2exdeathog), now merged with v3exdeathog.

- **Other new or modified information**
  - Previously, we only conducted bridge coding; as of v10, we also treat lateral codings as vignettes (see *V-Dem Methodology*). That is, while we use the information in lateral codings to estimate coder reliability and thresholds, they do not directly contribute to the estimation of country-year scores.
  - Updated *list of countries.*
  - Updated *citations* for V-Dem's reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the "years" section for each variable entry.

- **Postponed indicators**
  The following variables have not been included in version 10. We have discovered mistakes in the time series and hope to be able to correct them for upcoming versions of the dataset.
  - Lower chamber quota for social groups (v2lgqumin)
  - Election women in the cabinet (v2elwomcab)
  - Legislature amends constitution (v2lgamend)
  - Legislature amnesties (v2lgamnsty)
  - Lower chamber legislates by law (v2lglegllo)
  - Upper chamber legislates by law (v2lgleglup)

- **Discontinued indicators**
  - Lower chamber term limits (v2lgtrmlup)
  - Upper chamber term limits (v2lguchatrmlim)
  - HOG other appointing body in practice (v2exothhgl)
  - HOS other appointing body in practice (v2exothhs)
  - Election executive turnover nominal (v2eltvrexn)
  - HOS disadvantaged social group (v2exdighos)
  - HOG disadvantaged social group (v2exdighog)

16.8 New in Version 9 compared to Version 8

- **New country**
  Malta (Coded: 1900-2018).

- **New thematic areas**

  Exclusion, Legitimation and Digital Society.

- **The Digital Society Survey**

  The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

  For more information, please visit `https://digitalsocietyproject.org/`

- **New indices**
  - Exclusion by Gender (v2xpe_exlgender)
  - Exclusion by Social Group (v2xpe_exlsocgr)
  - Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location (v2xpe_exlgeo)
  - Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group (v2xpe_exlecon)
  - Exclusion by Political Group (v2xpe_exlpol)
  - Hereditary dimension index (v2x_ex_hereditary)
  - Military dimension index (v2x_ex_military)
  - Ruling party dimension index (v2x_ex_party)
  - Direct election dimension index (v2x_ex_direlect)
  - Confidence dimension index (v2x_ex_confidence)

- **New indicators**
  - Regime information (v2reginfo)
  - Regime end type (v2regendtype)
  - Ideology (v2exl_legitideol)
  - Person of the Leader (v2exl_legitlead)
  - Performance legitimation (v2exl_legitperf)
  - Rational-legal legitimation (v2exl_legitratio)
  - Exclusion variables:
    * Power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo)
    * Gender equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgencl)
    * Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl)
    * Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl)
    * Access to public services distributed by social group (v2peapssoc)
    * Access to public services distributed by gender (v2peapsgen)
    * Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position (v2peapsecon)
    * Access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol)
    * Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo)
    * Access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc)
    * Access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen)
    * Access to state jobs by socio-economic position (v2peasjsoecon)
    * Access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo)

    * Access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol)
    * Access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc)
    * Access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen)
    * Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position (v2peasbecon)
    * Access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbepol)
    * Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo)
  - Digital society variables:
    * Government dissemination of false information domestic (v2smgovdom)
    * Government dissemination of false information abroad (v2smgovab)
    * Party dissemination of false information domestic (v2smpardom)
    * Party dissemination of false information abroad (v2smparab)
    * Foreign governments dissemination of false information (v2smfordom)
    * Foreign governments ads (v2smforads)
    * Government Internet filtering capacity (v2smgovfilcap)
    * Government Internet filtering in practice (v2smgovfilprc)
    * Government Internet shut down capacity (v2smgovshutcap)
    * Government Internet shut down in practice (v2smgovshut)
    * Government social media shut down in practice (v2smgovsm)
    * Government social media alternatives (v2smgovsmalt)
    * Government social media monitoring (v2smgovsmmon)
    * Government social media censorship in practice (v2smgovsmcenprc)
    * Government cyber security capacity (v2smgovcapsec)
    * Political parties cyber security capacity (v2smpolcap)
    * Internet legal regulation content (v2smregcon)
    * Privacy protection by law exists (v2smprivex)
    * Privacy protection by law content (v2smprivcon)
    * Government capacity to regulate online content (v2smregcap) .
    * Government online content regulation approach (v2smregapp)
    * Defamation protection (v2smlawpr)
    * Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (v2smdefabu)
    * Online media existence (v2smonex)
    * Online media perspectives (v2smonper)
    * Online media fractionalization (v2smmefra)
    * Online harassment groups (v2smhargr)
    * Other online harassment groups (v2smhargrtxt)
    * Use of social media to organize offline violence (v2smorgviol)
    * Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgavgact)
    * Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgelitact)
    * Types of organization through social media (v2smorgtypes)
    * Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (v2smcamp)
    * Arrests for political content (v2smarrest)
    * Polarization of society (v2smpolsoc)
    * Political parties hate speech (v2smpolhate)

- **Modified indices and indicators**
  - The "Elected officials index" (v2x_elecoff) has been modfied.
  - All multiple selection questions coded by country experts are now dichotomized and aggregated by mean.
  - e_v2x_neopat has been renamed to v2x_neopat.
  - e_v2xnp_client has been renamed to v2xnp_client.

  - e_v2xnp_pres has been renamed to v2xnp_pres.
  - e_v2xnp_regcorr has been renamed to v2xnp_regcorr.
  - The scale for v2x_neopat, v2xnp_client, v2xnp_pres and v2xnp_regcorr has been reversed, i.e. lower scores now indicate lower levels of neopatrimonialism and higher scores indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism.
  - v2ex_elecleg has been renamed to v2xex_elecleg.
  - v2x_divparctrl was wrongly calculated for v7-v8 (too many observations were set to missing). This has been fixed for v9.

- Other new or modified information
  - Updated *list of countries.*
  - Updated list of variables.
  - Updated *citations* for V-Dem's reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Versions of election-specific variables for executive elections only (*_ex) and legislative elections only (*_leg) have been removed since these can easily be created (using v2xel_elecparl or v2xel_elecpres). For more information, please see section 3.1 *(Elections).*
  - Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the newly added "years" section for each variable entry.
  - Many external variables (E) were removed, since they were considered redundant. For a list of currently available variables, see the sections labeled *Background Factors* and *Other Democracy Indices and Indicators.*
  - Superfluous *_nr versions for multiple selection questions have been removed. There is now one *_nr version per multiple selection variable and not one for each category.

16.9 New in Version 8 compared to Version 7.1

- *Historical V-Dem*
  For this version of the dataset we are for the first time including Historical V-Dem. The integration of Historical V-Dem with V-Dem means that many countries have data coverage on numerous V-Dem indicators from 1789 to the present. Historical V-Dem also contains several extra, historical polities that have ceased to exist, such as Bavaria and the Two Sicilies. To find more details about which countries are coded for historical V-Dem please refer to the country table (p. 15) or the *Country Coding Units* document.

  Further, Historical V-Dem introduces several new indicators on various institutional features, some of which were particularly relevant for 19th century polities. To find more details on the Historical V-Dem variables please refer to the Historical V-Dem section of the codebook (p. 33).

  To read more about Historical V-Dem visit v-dem.net

- New indices and indicators
  - Neopatriamonialism index (e_v2x_neopat)
  - Clientelism index (e_v2xnp_client)
  - Presidentialism index (e_v2xnp_pres)
  - Regime Corruption (e_v2xnp_regcorr)
  - Rule of law index (v2x_rule)

  - State fiscal capacity (v2stfisccap)
  - Bureaucratic remuneration (v2strenadm)
  - Bureaucratic recruitment criteria (v2stcritrecadm)
  - Time-specific country name (histname), identifier variable
  - Judicial variables:
    * Codeable (v2jucodable)
    * Corresponding flowchart (v2juflow)
    * Language (v2julanguage)
    * Team translated (v2juteamtr)

- Modified indices and indicators
  - The aggregation formula for v2x_delibdem was changed to match the rest of the High-Level Democracy Indices. Previously, v2x_delib was erroneously being aggregated by a straight multiplication of v2x_polyarchy and v2x_delib.
  - The "Regimes in the World - the RIW measure" (e_v2x_regime) has been renamed to the "Regimes of the World index" (v2x_regime) and modified.
  - "Expanded freedom of expression index" (v2x_freexp_thick) has been renamed to "Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index" (v2x_freexp_altinf).
  - The post-survey questionnaire has been updated.
  - "Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval" (v2exapupap) has been corrected.
  - Updated aggregation rules for A, C variables, and indices. See Section 1.5 Aggregation.
  - The "Elected officials index" (v2xelecoff) has been modfied.
  - The "Legislature directly elected index" (v2ex_elecleg) has been modified.
  - The following quota variables has been corrected and reintroduced, however we advice you to not use any earlier version of these variabels:
    * Lower chamber gender quota (v2lgqugen)
    * Lower chamber gender quota threshold (v2lgqugent)
    * Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (v2lgqugens)

- Other new or modified information
  - Updated list of countries.
  - Updated list of variables.
  - Updated citations for V-Dem's reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

16.10 New in Version 7.1 Compared to Version 7

- **New indices and indicators**
  - Accountability index (v2x_accountability)
  - Vertical accountability index (v2x_veracc)
  - Horizontal accountability index (v2x_horacc)
  - Diagonal accountability index (v2x_diagacc)

- **Modified indices and indicators**
  - Errors with E type variables in version 7 have been fixed.
  - HOS and HOG appointment in practice variables (v2expathhs, v2expathhg) in the Country Year dataset have been corrected to be aggregated by the last observation within a year.

- **Other new or modified information**
  - The issue in v7 with identifiers for the main country coded by experts has been fixed.
  - Versions of Male suffrage (v2msuffrage), Female suffrage (v2fsuffrage) and Suffrage (v2asuffrage) into executive (*_ex) or legislative (*_leg) elections have been dropped from the dataset, since the original variables are not election specific.
  - Convergence problems with Vertical accountability index (v2x_veracc), please see "Cautionary Notes" for further details.

16.11 New in Version 7 Compared to Version 6

- **New indices and indicators**
  - Obligatory referendum index (v2xdd_i_or)
  - Popular initiative index (v2xdd_i_pi)
  - Popular referendum index (v2xdd_i_rf)
  - Plebiscite index (vx2dd_i_pl)
  - Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd_cic)
  - Top-down component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd_toc)
  - Equal access index (v2xeg_eqaccess)
  - Regimes In the World–the RIW Measure (E) (e_v2x_regime)
  - Regimes In the World–the RIW Measure with confidence intervals (E) (e_v2x_regime_ci)
  - High court size (by law) (v2juhcsizl)
  - High court size (in practice) (v2juhcsizp)
  - Female judges (v2jufemjdg)
  - First woman appointed (v2jufrstfm)
  - Lower chamber electoral system- 13 categories (v2elloelsy)
  - Lower chamber election district magnitude (v2elloeldm)
  - Constitutional changes popular vote (v2ddlexor)
  - Obligatory referendum participation threshold (v2ddpartor)
  - Obligatory referendum approval threshold (v2ddappor)
  - Obligatory referendum credible threat (v2ddthreor)
  - Plebiscite Credible Threat (v2ddthrepl)
  - Initiatives administrative threshold (v2ddadmci)
  - Popular Initiative Credible Threat (v2ddthreci)
  - Referendums signatures % (v2ddsigprf)
  - Referendums administrative threshold (v2ddadmrf)
  - Popular Referendum Credible Threat (v2ddthrerf)
  - Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (v2ddyror)
  - Occurrence of plebiscite this year (v2ddyrpl)
  - Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year (v2ddyrci)
  - Occurrence of referendum this year (v2ddyrrf)
  - HOS age (v2exagehos)
  - HOG age (v2exagehog)
  - Legislature declares war by law (v2lgwarlaw)
  - Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (v2exapup)
  - Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (v2exapupap)

- **Modified indices and indicators**
  - Direct popular vote index (v2xdd_dd) has been updated with a new aggregation formula.
  - Divided party control of legislature index has been corrected to Divided party control index (v2x_divparctrl).
  - Elected executive index (v2x_accex) has been replaced with Elected officials index (v2x_elecoff).
  - Party system institutionalization index (v2xps_party) has been renamed to Party institutionalization index and was modified with a new aggregation formula.
  - Equal protection index (v2xeg_eqprotec) has been modified to exclude equal access to justice for men and women (v2xcl_acjst).
  - Equal distribution of resources index (v2xeg_eqdr) has been modified to be formed by the indicators particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps), means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies (v2dlunivl), educational equality (v2peedueq) and health equality (v2pehealth).
  - Egalitarian component index (v2x_egal) is formed by equal protection index (v2xeg_eqprotec), equal distribution of resources (v2xeg_eqdr) and in version 7 additionally by equal access index (v2xeg_eqaccess).
  - Freedom of expression indices (v2x_freexp, _thick) are no longer including Media Internet censorship (v2mecenefi).
  - Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp) is divided into executive and legislative election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp_ex) (v2elfrcamp_leg).
  - The text for the subsets of Fraud allegations by Western monitors (v2elwestmon), has been changed to refer to Fraud allegations by Western monitors for executive/legislative elections only (v2elwestmon_ex) (v2elwestmon_leg).
  - Stronger respect for civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgstch) is renamed to Stronger civil liberties characteristics.
  - The variable tags of the following questions within Direct Democracy have been renamed:
    - Obligatory referendum super majority (v2ddspmjor) to (v2ddspmor)
    - Plebiscite permitted (v2ddlegpl) to (v2ddlexpl)
    - Plebiscite participation threshold (v2ddbindpl) to (v2ddpartpl)
    - Plebiscite approval threshold (v2ddthrcon) to (v2ddapprpl)
    - Plebiscite administrative threshold (v2dddistpl) to (v2ddadmpl)
    - Plebiscite super majority (v2ddspmlpl) to (v2ddspmpl)
    - Initiatives permitted (v2ddlegci) to (v2ddlexci)
    - Initiatives signatures (v2ddsigcin) to (v2ddsignci)
    - Initiatives signatures % (v2ddsigcip) to (v2ddsigpci)
    - Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (v2ddgrtlci) to (v2ddsiglci)
    - Initiatives signature-gathering period (v2ddgrgpci) to (v2ddsigdci)
    - Initiatives participation threshold (v2ddbindci) to (v2ddpartci)
    - Initiatives approval threshold (v2ddthreci) to (v2ddapprci)
    - Initiatives super majority (v2ddspmjci) to (v2ddspmci)
    - Referendums permitted (v2ddlegrf) to (v2ddlexrf)
    - Referendums signatures (v2ddsigrfn) to (v2ddsignrf)
    - Referendums signature-gathering limit (v2ddgrtlrf) to (v2ddsiglrf)
    - Referendums signature-gathering period (v2ddgrgprf) to (v2ddsigdrf)
    - Referendums participation threshold (v2ddbindrf) to (v2ddpartrf)
    - Referendums approval threshold (v2ddthrerf) to (v2ddapprrf)
    - Referendums super majority (v2ddspmjrf) to (v2ddspmrf)
    - Number of popular votes this year (v2ddnumvot) to (v2ddyrall)
    - Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (v2ddvotcrd) to (v2ddcredal)

  - The information in the codebook about Male suffrage (v2msuffrage), Female suffrage (v2fsuffrage) and Suffrage (v2asuffrage) has been corrected to indicate that responses are given in percent.
  - Income inequality, Gini (e_Unequal_UTIP) has been corrected to measure whether the Gini coefficient is above the mean.

- **Other new or modified information**
  - Updated list of countries.
  - Updated list of variables.
  - Updated citations for V-Dem Reference materials.
  - New citation for Ordinal versions of V-Dem's indices (Lindberg 2016).
  - Gaps in coding periods should be interpreted as including the start and end year of the gap. For example, Germany is coded 1900-1945, 1949-2016, which means that the years 1946, -47, and -48 are excluded from the dataset.
  - Freedom of expression index (v2x_freexp) was included in Electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) in v6. This has been fixed for v7, where the Expanded freedom of expression index (v2x_freexp_thick) instead is included in the Elecotral democracy index.

16.12 New in Version 6 Compared to Version 5

- **Changes:**
  - All CSV files are now encoded in UTF-8. When importing CSV data on platforms where UTF-8 is not the default, ensure that the correct encoding is specified in order to properly render diacritics for text variables.
  - v2x_suffrage and v2elsuffrage have been modified with small changes to their respective comprising indices.

- **Bug fixes:**
  - Superfluous variables corresponding to the means of the binary versions of the following variables have been removed: v2exdfdshg, v2exdfdshs, v2exdjcbhg, v2exctlhg, v2exctlhs, v2exrmhsol, v2exrmhgnp.
  - Country specific coding periods were previously incorrectly set for the 6.1 country-date dataset. As a result, 279 observations falling outside of the V-Dem coding periods have been removed.
  - Missing data for the variables v2expathhg and v2exaphogp for Serbia from 1900 to 1941 have been filled in.
  - A bug was fixed regarding the ordinalization of indices. Previously, for the corresponding 5 category ordinal variables, observations that were meant to be 0.75 were incorrectly set as 0.5.

- **New indices and indicators**
  - Civil liberties index
  - Private civil liberties index
  - Physical integrity rights index
  - Political civil liberties index
  - Additive polyarchy index
  - Multiplicative polyarchy index
  - Divided party control of legislature index
  - Division of power index
  - HOG term length by law

  - HOS term length by law
  - Election voter turnout
  - Primary school enrollment
  - Secondary school enrollment
  - Secondary tertiary enrollment
  - Political equality comments

- **Modified indices and indicators**
  - Electoral democracy index has been updated with a new aggregation formula.

- **Other new or modified information**
  - Providing a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, v2elmulpar_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.
  - Providing uniqueness scores to the structure of aggregations–all indices and indicators. Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables. It is equal to 1–communality (variance that is shared with other variables). Factor loadings are the weights and correlations between each variable and the factor. The higher the load the more relevant in defining the factor's dimensionality. A negative value indicates an inverse impact on the factor.
  - Updated lists of number of variables.
  - Updated list of countries.