



COUNTRY BRIEF GERMANY

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THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE



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About V-Dem

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. V-Dem's multidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges the complexity of the concept of democracy. The V-Dem project distinguishes among five high-level principles of democracy: *electoral*, *liberal*, *participatory*, *deliberative*, and *egalitarian*, which are disaggregated into lower-level components and specific indicators.

Key features of V-Dem:

- Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 22 lower-level components of democracy such as regular elections, judicial independence, direct democracy, and gender equality, consisting of more than 400 distinct and precise indicators;
- Covers all countries and dependent territories from 1900 to the present and provides an estimate of measurement reliability for each rating;
- Makes all ratings public, free of charge, through a user-friendly interface.

With four Principal Investigators, two Project Coordinators, fifteen Project Managers, more than thirty Regional Managers, almost 200 Country Coordinators, several Assistant Researchers, and approximately 2,600 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science data collection projects with a database of over 15 million data points. The database makes highly detailed analysis of virtually all aspects of democracy in a country, while also allowing for summary comparisons between countries based on aggregated indices for different dimensions of democracy. Users from anywhere are able to use the V-Dem online analysis tools which can be found at the project's website. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs can benefit from the nuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such as selecting country program priorities, informing program designs and monitoring impact of their programs.

Methodology:

Unlike extant data collection projects, which typically use a small group of experts who rate all countries or ask a single expert to code one country, the V-Dem project has recruited over 2,600 local and cross-national experts to provide judgments on various indicators about democracy. The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factual information from existing data sources about constitutional regulations and de jure situation with expert coding for questions that require evaluation. Experts' ratings are aggregated through an advanced statistical model that takes into account the possibilities that experts may make mistakes and have different scales in mind when coding. In addition, bridge-coders - experts who code multiple countries - are recruited to calibrate the scales of estimates cross-nationally.

Germany

Introduction

This V-Dem data brief illustrates the democratic development of Germany from 1900 to 2014. The purpose is to provide a concise overview of the V-Dem data collected for Germany. The historical development of the five V-Dem principles of democracy - *electoral, liberal, egalitarian, deliberative and participatory* – is analyzed, accompanied by an overview of the female rights index. In addition, the brief delves further into the different components and detailed indicators of the main principles of democracy¹. We anticipate that this brief will be a useful resource for policy-makers, practitioners and citizen-led democracy assessments.

Germany is currently Europe's biggest economy and the continent's second most populous country. The country has a long history of holding elections, but with varying levels of quality. At the turn of the 20th century, Germany was a monarchy under the rule of Wilhelm II. After Germany's defeat in the World War I, the monarchy was replaced by Germany's first democratic regime: The Weimar Republic (1918-1933). However, financial problems, staggering inflation, and political turmoil characterized the interwar years. With Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, a period of totalitarianism began. The covered territory by the V-Dem coding and in this brief includes the territory of Austria during the Anschluss (1938-1945) but does not include other areas occupied during (and in the year leading up to) World Wars I and II.

After the end of the World War II (1939 – 1945) Germany was occupied by the “Allied powers” (the US, the UK, France and the Soviet Union). In 1949, two German states were formed: the western Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the eastern German Democratic Republic (GDR). FRG is the legal successor of the German Reich and is the territory on which this brief focuses during the partition. The German Democratic Republic is coded as a separate polity from the division in 1949 and not included in this brief. Likewise, the years of allied occupation (1945-1949) are not included in this brief due to a lack of sovereignty. After the reunification in 1990, Germany retained the 1949 constitution of the Federal Republic with some amendments.


Principles of Democracy

The radar chart in **Figure 1**, gives an overview of the five V-Dem indices of democracy for Germany at four different points in time: 1905, 1950, 1995 and 2014. All indices in the figure range from 0 to 1, where a score of 0 suggests that a country did not evince the characteristics of democracy relevant to this particular index at this point in time, while 1 corresponds to the best possible situation for this index, according to the V-Dem measures.

In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component of democracy is fundamental and understood as an essential element of the other principles of representative democracy – *liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian*; without it, we cannot call a regime “democratic”. However, we recognize that countries can have “democratic qualities”, without being democracies. As a result, the aggregation formulae for *all* high-level principles of democracy include the measure of electoral democracy. Thus, for example, “Participatory Democracy” is a composite score of the electoral and the participatory components.

¹ All indicators and indices can be found in Glossary of Terms in Appendix I. For an overview of the structure of the indices, please see Appendix II.

Figure 1. Principles of Democracy Indices




In 1905 the scores for Germany on all indices included in Figure 1 are very low, between .1 and .2, reflecting minimal development in the characteristics captured with these V-Dem measures.

A significant change can be seen when comparing 1905 to the next point in time in the figure. By 1950 Germany (West) is an advanced democracy according to the scores of just below .8 on electoral democracy. At this point in time, electoral accountability has developed in the sense that those in power are held accountable by citizens through electoral competition, a greater freedom of expression and association are achieved. Values around .7 on egalitarian and deliberative, as well as liberal democracy, indicate overall similar democratic advancement. Thus, for the middle of the century the data reflects a situation of more or less equal political representation across groups; individual and minority rights are, for the most part, protected; and, finally, wide deliberation is common when important policy-changes are being considered. Participatory democracy scores lower meaning that, compared to the other democratic aspects, participatory aspects such as referendums and plebiscites are a less prominent feature of Germany democracy in 1950.

Between the years of 1995 and 2014 only minor changes can be noted. In both years Germany shows democratic advancement with slightly higher scores than in 1950, and significantly better than in 1905. Overall, the comparison between the different principles of democracy is similar to the one in 1950 with electoral democracy being the measure with the highest score closely followed by deliberative, egalitarian, and liberal democracy in descending order. Again participatory democracy is not as strong as the other aspects of democracy.

In **Figure 2** below, we look further into the aforementioned indices and graph the components that go into the five higher level principles indices of democracy: the electoral, liberal, egalitarian, participatory and deliberative aspects. The development of these components in Germany over more than one hundred years is displayed together with the female rights index². This overview describes how Germany went from an undemocratic country at the beginning of the 20th century to an established democracy in 2014.

² The scale of each index and indicator is specified within parentheses in the legend of each figure. In all indicators and indices graphed, a lower score corresponds to a less democratic level, while a higher score suggests a more democratic level. Please see Appendix I for more information on each of the indicators and indices.



Looking at the overview of 115 years of German democratic development, five main periods can be distinguished: The first period of more or less constant scores lasts from the beginning of the century through World War I and ends around 1918 with the establishment of the Weimar Republic. During this period all dimensions of democracy register significant improvements for the situation on the ground. This relatively democratic period ends with Hitler's rise to power in 1933 and is replaced by totalitarianism. The surrender of Germany in 1945 and the end of World War II ushers in the fourth period, the years of Allied occupation. Due to the absence of autonomous institutions in Germany for these years, there is a break in the V-Dem data. This is followed by the fifth and final period that captures the development of Western Germany from 1949 and onwards. The unification of Eastern and Western Germany in 1990 only affects the scores of the dimensions in Figure 2 to a small degree.

During the first period, liberal democracy is the highest scoring dimension with individual and minority rights being protected to a large extent, while the electoral component suffers from its greatest deficits as political power-holders are only held accountable by citizens to a small degree through electoral competition. After the establishment of the Republic in 1918, all democracy components expand, albeit to varying extents, with the electoral component showing the biggest improvement. However, this is also the component that shows the greatest fluctuations and drops during this period.

The takeover of power by Hitler and his National Socialist Party is reflected by rapid drops in democracy measures. From 1933 onwards, civil rights are replaced by totalitarian repression. Severe violations of human rights and democratic norms are reflected by the data up until the Allied occupation in 1945 when the time series is interrupted.


The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany is adopted in 1949 guaranteeing the principles of democracy, civil and political rights and the federal structure of government. After setting up the new institutions of the state, the country suffers no substantial reductions in the remaining period of the time series explored in this brief.

Participatory democracy shows slightly lower levels compared to the other democracy components of recent decades. Nevertheless, scores above .6 indicate that German citizens have some means for participating in the political development of their country, even through non-electoral processes.

In the following section we further explore each of the five components of democracy and the female rights index, by graphing the specific indicators and indices constituting them.

The Electoral Component

The V-Dem electoral democracy component index measures the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections; whether political and civil society organizations can operate freely; whether elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections. **Figure 3** displays the four sub-indices that constitute the electoral component index.



As indicated by the *elected executive index* (red line) in Figure 3, the head of the executive during the first years of the 20th century was not an elected official. The fall of the monarchy and the establishment of the Weimar Republic ushered in the first (indirectly) elected executive in Germany. During that period the directly elected president appointed a chancellor as Head of Government. After Hitler's appointment as chancellor in 1933, this procedure was not repeated. This interruption of the electoral cycle is reflected in the V-Dem data through a drop of the elected executive index to 0. The high-intermediate level of this indicator from 1949 reflects the indirect voting procedures for the election of head of state and head of government.

The jump in *share of the population with suffrage* in 1918 reflects the fact that suffrage was extended to women. The small drop between 1935 and 1945 registers the limitations on voting rights that were imposed on the Jewish population.


The *freedom of association index* reflects the extent to which people are free to form parties and civil society organizations. During the first two decades of the 20th century Germans had some freedom in this respect, which was considerably expanded during the Weimar Republic. During the Nazi regime, freedom of association was severely limited.

German elections in the beginning of the century were characterized by certain problems in terms of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and/or election violence, as suggested by the data in the *clean election* index. Election quality improved slightly after the end of the monarchy and declined again drastically towards the end of the Weimar Republic. After the Enabling Act of March 1933, the Nazi regime

virtually abolished the legislative powers of the Parliament and concentrated them in the hands of the executive. The V-Dem data reflects this degradation as an interruption of the electoral cycle with no data on the clean election index. After the establishment of Western Germany, elections were largely free and fair as indicated by the high levels on the clean elections index from 1949 onwards.

The Liberal Component

The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state. This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties and strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances by the judiciary and the legislature which limit the use of executive power. These aspects are captured by the three indices that constitute the V-Dem liberal component. **Figure 3** shows the development of these three indices over time in Germany.



The different aspects of liberal democracy in Figure 4 have mostly developed in tandem, and have largely similar scores throughout the years. All of the aspects start out at moderately high levels slightly above .5 and .6 in 1900.

Equality before the law and individual liberty index measure the extent to which laws are transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, as well as the extent to which citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion. This aspect of liberal democracy deteriorates during World War I.


After the war all aspects of liberal democracy improve slightly. Particularly, the legislature’s ability to monitor and question the executive is strengthened as portrayed by the index *legislative constrains on the executive*. However, with passage of the Enabling Act of March 1933, Hitler and his cabinet virtually took over the legislative powers allowing him to rule without oversight of either legislative chamber. Hence, since the functions of the German Parliament were aborted, data is missing from this index after 1933.

The fact that the executive did not respect the constitution and the judiciary was not able to operate independently of the executive after 1933, the index *judicial constraints on the executive* reflects only minimal scores.

Following World War II and the establishment of Western Germany in 1949, liberal democracy developed significantly, including adherence to the constitution, protection of individual liberties and a strong balance between the different branches of power.

The Participatory Component

The participatory dimension of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and active participation by citizens in all political processes; it emphasizes non-electoral forms of political participation such as through such channels as civil society organizations and through the mechanism of direct democracy.




At the start of the 20th century some aspects of participatory democracy are much more prominent than others, reflected in scores spread from zero to .6 in **Figure 5**. The highest score is that for civil society participation, and the score reflects the fact that civil society had a substantial role in German political life under the emperor. The role of civil society increases during the Weimar Republic only to diminish under the Nazis. In the period after the allied occupation, civil society participation again becomes a central feature of the German democracy.

Regional and local governments have, with the exception of the Nazi years been a fixture of German politics. The measures indicate whether there are elected subnational entities and, if they exist, to what extent they can operate without interference from unelected bodies at their respective levels. Throughout the years this has been the case more for the regional level than the local level, though in recent years there is less difference in the extent of their freedom from interference. The large freedom from interference in recent years is in stark contrast to the state of things before World War I when local governments, in particular, had limited freedom.

Direct popular vote refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues using a ballot. It includes initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites. The direct popular vote first becomes a feature in Germany after World War I, grows in prominence during the Weimar Republic, and is even repeatedly used by the Nazi regime. When Western Germany is established, direct popular vote is abolished at the national level.

The Deliberative Component

The *deliberative component of democracy* captures the core value that political decisions are guided by the pursuit of the public good and should be informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion.



Note, that the indicators displayed in **Figures 6, 7 and 8** have different scales, which are specified in parentheses in the legend of each figure. For example, reasoned justification and the range of consultations both have a score of around 2 at the beginning of the century, but in the case of reasoned justification this is a relatively high score, while it is a rather low score for the indicator range of consultations.

Reasoned justification (green line) measures the extent to which political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions on policies. Under the emperor this is fairly common, though less so during World War I. Increasingly elaborate justifications become common during the Weimar Republic, but with Hitler's rise to power, justifications again become more simplistic. With the establishment of Western Germany, justifications gradually improve in quality. From the 1970s onward, sophisticated and nuanced justifications tend to be offered by German leaders.

Common good (purple line) indicates whether the political elite's justifications refer to the common good or to more narrow interests. The purple line shows that, until the end of the allied occupation, justifications were a mixture of the common good and more specific groups, but that after occupation, the reasons given for policies mostly in reference to the common good, were understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number, or as helping the least advantaged in a society.


Another central aspect of deliberative democracy is the width and independence of the public deliberations on large political issues beyond the elite level, which is captured with the indicator *engaged society* (blue line). Until the end of World War I, public deliberation was not repressed but was, nevertheless, limited. During the Weimar Republic, debate and deliberation were encouraged, though, in practice, confined to certain segments of society. Under the Nazis, the policy process became largely shut off from the public, and after 1949, the debate grew in both depth and volume. Since unification in 1990, ordinary people and non-elite groups tend to

discuss major policies among themselves and in the media with grass-roots deliberation being common and unconstrained.

In the beginning of the 20th century the range of within-elite consultations in advance of policy decisions is limited to loyalists of the ruling elites, as portrayed by the data with the red line; as World War I ends, the *range of consultations* increases. In the FDR actors from across the political spectrum, as well as relevant actors in business and society, tend to be consulted when policies are being contemplated. The data for the *respect for counterarguments* measure closely follows the path of the range of consultations, though at a slightly lower level.

The Egalitarian Component

The *egalitarian* idea is that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual exercise of formal rights and liberties; hence a more equal distribution of resources, education, and health across socioeconomic groups should enhance political equality.



In **Figure 7** the eight indicators that compose the egalitarian democracy component are plotted. With the exception of power distributed by gender, all measures in Figure 7 show intermediate levels at the start of the series.

The low score for *power distributed by gender* (green line) indicates that, in the early 1900s and during the Nazi regime, men held a virtual monopoly on political power in Germany. Following World War I, women strengthened their position but still they had only marginal influence. After the end of Allied occupation, the distribution of power became gradually more gender equal. Nevertheless, the data suggests that even in 2014 power was still not being distributed equally by gender.

Germany's score on the measure *power distributed by social group* (black line) is just below 2 at the beginning of the century, reflecting that in the period before the war the political power in Germany was monopolized by a coalition of only select social groups. The Weimar Republic becomes more inclusive, but during the Nazi years large parts of the population are excluded. Since the establishment of Western Germany, and especially after 1970, social group characteristics such as ethnicity, race, and religion do not have great impact on politics.

When looking at *social group equality for civil liberties* (orange line) a similar pattern emerges. Before World War I, while some social groups had little political power, the civil liberties of most groups were almost equal. After Hitler's rise to power, the situation deteriorated quickly and, until the end of World War II, some groups had few if any civil liberties. In the newly established Western Germany there were few differences in civil liberties based on social group, and from the mid-1950s onward, all salient groups have had the same liberties.

Data on the indicator *power distributed by socioeconomic groups* suggests that socioeconomic position and class were salient factors in political life under the emperor. People with average or poor income had little influence, and, instead, the rich enjoyed a virtual monopoly on political power. In the Weimar Republic people of average and poor income were able to assert political influence to a larger extent than before, and when one's socioeconomic position became more important, as Hitler was coming to power, the shift became less dramatic than in other aspects of democracy. In the years after the war and the decades that followed, the wealthy had a great deal of political influence, to some extent, even more than other groups, but other segments were also able to assert a significant amount of political influence to an almost equal extent.


Health equality (purple line), and *educational equality* (dark blue line) measure whether some people due to poor health or poor educational quality are prevented from exercising their basic rights as adult citizens. The two are closely linked in Germany, which can be seen in Figure 7. From the beginning of the 20th century onward, there is a basic equality in terms of health and education, though for some the provisions of healthcare and education are inadequate and their abilities are undermined. This improves during the Weimar Republic, and the Nazi takeover in 1933 has only a small negative impact. After World War II, health no longer impedes the exercising of political rights, and education gradually improves to a level at which, by the end of the 1970s, only a small minority has an educational level that impedes their ability to exercise basic rights.

The indicator *means-tested vs. universalistic* (light blue line) aims to capture whether welfare programs are means-tested, targeting only the poor or underprivileged constituents (for example through cash-transfer programs) or whether they potentially benefit all members of the polity (such programs can include free education, national healthcare schemes, and retirement programs). In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, welfare programs that benefit everyone and do not stigmatize certain unprivileged groups, such as poor people, are more democratic from an egalitarian perspective than means-tested programs which only target these particular groups. Over the entire period, the score never drops below 3 and from 1949 onward, the score is above 4, indicating that at least half of the policies could be considered universalistic over time.

The indicator *particularistic or public goods* (yellow line) reflects the extent to which social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. The scores between two and three during the first half of the 20th century indicate that a majority of goods are provided as public goods. The score of just below 4 during the second half of the 20th century reflects that almost all policies are public.

Female Rights

Equality between women and men is indivisible from democracy at all levels, and is broadly recognized as a pre-condition for truly representative and responsive governments. The V-Dem *female rights index* focuses on political rights understood to include the ability of women to participate in the open discussion of political issues, to participate in civil society organizations, the freedom of movement, the right to private property, the access to justice, the freedom from forced labor, and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. **Figure 8** displays the seven indicators that constitute this index for Germany.



At the beginning of the 20th century and up to the Nazi takeover in 1933, German women largely enjoyed a *freedom of domestic movement* (black line), and a *freedom from forced labor* (orange line) as indicated by scores between 3 and 4. In 1933 both drop sharply. The movement of some minorities is restricted while many still retain this freedom. In two stages forced labor becomes more common and the Nazis introduce state sanctioned forced labor for some women as reflected in the score of zero from the end of the 1930s to 1945. Since the end of World War II, Germany is virtually free from forced labor for women.

Women's *property rights* (yellow line) varies in imperial Germany, but following the end of World War I, this right is made more equal. In 1933 levels start to deteriorate, but this is interrupted by the establishment of Western Germany. Since the late 1970s all, or almost all, women enjoy equal property rights. For much of the period in Figure 8 the development of *access to justice for women* (green line) has shadowed that of property rights for women (note that the scales are different).

CSO participation for women (red line) and *freedom of discussion for women* (purple line) are also two measures for which Germany follows a similar path. The former indicator measures women's freedom to engage in civil society organizations and whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life. The latter focuses on women's ability to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces. In imperial Germany and in the Weimar Republic, women were free to do both, with only a handful of exceptions. Following the end of World War II, there were few limits placed on debating or participating in civil society.

In the German Empire men had a virtual monopoly of political power, as indicated by the low score for *power distributed by gender* (light blue line in this figure). This changed as the imperial system gave way to the Weimar Republic and women started to gain influence. The Nazi regime largely put a stop to this, however, and until the end of Allied occupation women had limited political influence. Following the war, women embarked on a slow but constant process to gain more influence over politics in Germany. In 2014 they still have some ways to go before achieving de facto full equality.

Concluding Remarks

Based on data from key V-Dem indices and indicators, this data brief presents an overview of the democratic development of Germany from 1900 to 2014.

The democratic history of Germany reveals pattern of ups and downs over the past century. 19th century institutions survived to the end of World War I, when they were replaced by democratization efforts. During the Nazi regime these efforts were diminished, however, as the minimal scores on almost all V-Dem measures can attest. In the reconstruction years after the war this report follows Western Germany. A rapid advancement is achieved on many democracy aspects and already in the 1950s Germany starts to exhibit high scores on a number of V-Dem measures such as quality of elections, rule of law and protection of individual liberties. Other areas such as women's political influence and deliberation take more time to develop.

By the turn of the century, a reunified Germany is mostly rated as highly democratic by the multiple V-Dem coders. However, direct popular votes such as referendums could be utilized to a greater extent if the goal is to develop the participatory aspect of democracy in Germany. Women's participation in politics, together with grass-roots deliberations, is another area that could benefit from more focused attention.

Appendix I. List of variables.

This is a list of all the indices and indicators included in the country brief.

It contains the question and the question alternatives as well as information of aggregation, scale, data release and citation. These can also be found in the V-Dem codebook.

Variables included in Figure 1.

Electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarifications: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahls sub-components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index is aggregated using this formula:

v2x_polyarchy=

$$.1*v2x_suffr + .1*v2xel_frefair + .1*v2x_accex + .1*v2x_frassoc_thick + .1*v2x_freexp_thick + .5*v2x_suffr * v2xel_frefair * v2x_accex * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_freexp_thick.$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_freexp_thick v2x_EDcomp_thick

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal *democracy*, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_libdem = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} + .25 * v2x_liberal + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} * v2x_liberal$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_liberal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Participatory democracy index (D) (v2x_partipdem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory *democracy*, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_partipdem = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} + .25 * v2x_partip + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} * v2x_partip$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_polyarchy v2x_partip

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Deliberative democracy index (D) (v2x_delibdem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_delibdem = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} + .25 * v2x_delib + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} * v2x_delib$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4, 5.

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Egalitarian democracy index (D) (v2x_egalDEM)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality. To make it a measure of egalitarian *democracy*, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_egalDEM = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} + .25 * v2x_egal + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} * v2x_egal$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 2.

Electoral component index (D) (v2x_EDcomp_thick)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_EDcomp_thick = v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2xel_refair * v2x_accex.$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_refair v2x_accex

Data release: 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Participatory component index (D) (v2x_partip)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x_iccpart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power (v2xel_locelec), and elected regional government power (v2xel_regelec).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_iccpart v2xdd_dd v2xel_locelec v2xel_regelec

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Egalitarian component index (D) (v2x_egal)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position (v2pepwrse), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq), equal access to health (v2pehealth), power distribution according to gender (v2pepwrngen), share of budget allocated to public/common goods (v2dlencmps), and the share of welfare programs that provide universal rather than means-tested benefits (v2dlunivl).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2pepwrse v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrngen v2dlencmps v2dlunivl

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Liberal component index (D) (v2x_liberal)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties,

strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2xcl_rol v2x_jucon v2xlg_legcon

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Deliberative component index (D) (v2xdl_delib)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Female rights index (D) (v2x_gender)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: To what extent are women's political rights protected?

Clarifications: Political rights index focuses on the ability of women to participate in discussions of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, freedom of movement, the right to private property, access to justice, freedom from forced labor, representation in the ranks of journalists, and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO women's participation (v2csgender), female journalists (v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2cls slavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovev v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw
v2pepwrgen

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 3.

Freedom of association (thick) index (D) (v2x_frassoc_thick)

Project manager: Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x_frassoc)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Clean elections index (D) (v2xel_frefair)

Project managers: Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are elections free and fair?

Clarifications: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvtobuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg)

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvtobuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Share of population with suffrage (D) (v2x_suffr)

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as of January 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and – in the case of very poor information – the conditions in similar countries or colonies.

Aggregation: v2elsuffrage/100

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Source: v2elsuffrage

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Elected executive index (de jure) (D) (v2x_accex)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?

Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

Aggregation: There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected ($a=1$) or not ($a=0$). Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight defined by which house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral). Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state ($c1=1$, otherwise 0). Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government ($c2=1$, otherwise 0). Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state ($d=1$) or not ($d=0$). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected ($e=1$) or not

($e=0$). Define *hosw* as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government ($v2exhoshog=1$), $hosw=1$. If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then $hosw=1$; if the reverse is true, $hosw=0$. If they share equal power, $hosw=.5$. Define the weight for the head of government as $hogw=1-hosw$. The formula is:

$$v2x_accex = hosw * [\max(a1, b * c1)] + hogw * [\max(a1 * d, b * c1 * d, a2, b * c2)]$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 4.

Equality before the law and individual liberty index (D) (v2xcl_rol)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem, v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clrelig v2clfmov v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Legislative constraints on the executive index (D) (v2xlg_legcon)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Judicial constraints on the executive index (D) (v2x_jucon)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 5.

Civil society participation index (D) (v2x_cspart)

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

Clarifications: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection – national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’s participation (v2csgender).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csprtcpt v2csgender

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Local government (D) (v2xel_locelec)

Project managers: Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Question: Are there elected local governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.)

Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_dd)

Project manager: David Altman

Question: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

Clarification: Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy.

The term does *not* encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

Aggregation: This index measures how easy it is to initiate and approve a direct popular vote and how consequential that vote is (if approved)? Ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level of government (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorums pertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbndci), (c) supermajority (v2ddspmjci), and (d) district majority (v2dddctci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlegci), and (b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past (v2ddciniyr).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgrtci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbndci v2ddthreci v2ddspmjci v2dddctci v2ddlegci v2ddciniyr

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Regional government (D) (v2xel_regelec)

Project managers: Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Question: Are there elected regional governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.)

Aggregation: First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 6.

Reasoned justification (C) (v2dlreason, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

- 0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."
- 1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]
- 2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."
- 3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Respect counterarguments (C) (v2dlcountr, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

- 0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.
- 1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.
- 2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.
- 3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
- 4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.
- 5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Engaged society (C) (v2dlengage, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

Responses:

- 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
- 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
- 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.
- 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.
- 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.
- 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Common good (C) (v2dlcommon, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

- 0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.
- 1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.
- 2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.
- 3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.
- 4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Range of consultation (C) (v2dlconslt, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation *at elite levels*?

Clarification: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

Responses:

- 0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
- 1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
- 2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
- 3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
- 4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
- 5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 7.

Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C) (v2pepwrses, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

Responses:

- 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
- 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.
- 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.
- 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.
- 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clsocgrp, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

- 0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Health equality (C) (v2pehealth, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

Responses:

- 0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Particularistic or public goods (C) (v2dlencmps)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork," "clientelistic," or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

Responses:

- 0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.

- 1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is public-goods.
- 2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
- 3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) is particularistic.
- 4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Power distributed by social group (C) (v2pepwsoc, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

Responses:

- 0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another – but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.
- 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Educational equality (C) (v2peedueq, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

Responses:

- 0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrgen, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:

- 0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
- 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
- 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
- 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.
- 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C) (v2dlunivl, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean I)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

Responses:

- 0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).
- 1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.
- 2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
- 3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.
- 4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) are means-tested.
- 5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 8.

CSO women's participation (C) (v2csgender, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Clarification: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

Responses:

- 0: Almost always.
- 1: Frequently.
- 2: About half the time.
- 3: Rarely.
- 4: Almost never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom of discussion for women (C) (v2cldiscw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

- 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
- 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.
- 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and very minimal – property rights.

Responses:

- 0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
- 1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
- 2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
- 3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.

4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrgen, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.

2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.

3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.

4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom of domestic movement for women (C) (v2cldmovew, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:

0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).

1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom from forced labor for women (C) (v2clslovef, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

Responses:

- 0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
- 1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
- 2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.
- 3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
- 4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Access to justice for women (C) (v2clacjstw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely limited – access to justice.

Responses:

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.

- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Appendix II. Overview of the structure of the indices.

Structure of Aggregation – Indices and Indicators

| Democracy Indices Names | Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Indices Names | Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Indices Names | Names Indicators | v2_tag Indices and Indicators |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|-------------------------------|
| Electoral Democracy Index | | | | v2x_polyarchy |
| | Freedom of expression index | | | v2x_freexp |
| | | | Government censorship effort - Media | v2mecenefm |
| | | | Harassment of journalists | v2meharjrn |
| | | | Media self-censorship | v2meslfcen |
| | | | Freedom of discussion for men | v2cldiscm |
| | | | Freedom of discussion for women | v2cldiscw |
| | | | Freedom of academic and cultural expression | v2clacfree |
| | Alternative source information index | | | v2xme_altinf |
| | | | Media bias | v2mebias |
| | | | Print/broadcast media critical | v2mecrit |
| | | | Print/broadcast media perspectives | v2merange |
| | Electoral Component Index | | | v2x_EDcomp_thick |
| | | Freedom of association index (thick) | | v2x_frassoc_thick |
| | | | Party Ban | v2psparban |
| | | | Barriers to parties | v2psbars |
| | | | Opposition parties autonomy | v2psoppaut |
| | | | Elections multiparty | v2elmulpar |
| | | | CSO entry and exit | v2cseeorgs |
| | | | CSO repression | v2csreprss |
| | | Share of population with suffrage | | v2x_suffr |
| | | | Percent of population with suffrage | v2elsuffrage |
| | | Clean elections | | v2xel_frefair |

| | | index | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|--|---|---------------|
| | | | EMB autonomy | v2elembaut |
| | | | EMB capacity | v2elembcap |
| | | | Election voter registry | v2elrgstry |
| | | | Election vote buying | v2elvotbuy |
| | | | Election other voting irregularities | v2elirreg |
| | | | Election government intimidation | v2elintim |
| | | | Election other electoral violence | v2elpeace |
| | | | Election free and fair | v2elfrfair |
| | | Elected executive index (de jure) | | v2x_accex |
| | | | Lower chamber elected | v2lgello |
| | | | Upper chamber elected | v2lgelecup |
| | | | Legislature dominant chamber | v2lgdomchm |
| | | | HOS selection by legislature in practice | v2exaphos |
| | | | HOS appointment in practice | v2expathhs |
| | | | HOG selection by legislature in practice | v2exaphogp |
| | | | HOG appointment in practice | v2expathhg |
| | | | HOS appoints cabinet in practice | v2exdfcbhs |
| | | | HOG appoints cabinet in practice | v2exdjcbhg |
| | | | HOS dismisses ministers in practice | v2exdfdmhs |
| | | | HOG dismisses ministers in practice | v2exdfdshg |
| | | | HOS appoints cabinet in practice | v2exdfcbhs |
| | | | | |
| Liberal Democracy Index | | | | v2x_libdem |
| | Electoral Democracy Index | | | v2x_polyarchy |
| | Liberal Component Index | | | v2x_liberal |
| | | Equality before the law and individual liberty index | | v2xcl_rol |
| | | | Rigorous and impartial public administration | v2clrspct |
| | | | Transparent laws with predictable enforcement | v2cltrnslw |
| | | | Access to justice for men | v2clacjstm |

| | | | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|---|---------------|
| | | | Access to justice for women | v2clacjstw |
| | | | Property rights for men | v2clprptym |
| | | | Property rights for women | v2clprptyw |
| | | | Freedom from torture | v2cltort |
| | | | Freedom from political killings | v2clkill |
| | | | Freedom from forced labor for men | v2clslavem |
| | | | Freedom from forced labor for women | v2clslavef |
| | | | Freedom of religion | v2clrelig |
| | | | Freedom of foreign movement | v2clfmov |
| | | | Freedom of domestic movement for men | v2cldmovm |
| | | | Freedom of domestic movement for women | v2cldmovw |
| | | Judicial constraints on the executive index | | v2x_jucon |
| | | | Executive respects constitution | v2exrescon |
| | | | Compliance with judiciary | v2jucomp |
| | | | Compliance with high court | v2juhccomp |
| | | | High court independence | v2juhcind |
| | | | Lowercourtindependence | v2juncind |
| | | Legislative constraints on the executive index | | v2xlg_legcon |
| | | | Legislature questions officials in practice | v2lgqstexp |
| | | | Executive oversight | v2lgotovst |
| | | | Legislature investigates in practice | v2lginvstp |
| | | | Legislature opposition parties | v2lgoppart |
| Deliberative Democracy Index | | | | v2x_delibdem |
| | Electoral Democracy Index | | | v2x_polyarchy |
| | Deliberative Component Index | | | v2xdl_delib |
| | | | Reasoned justification | v2dlreason |
| | | | Common good | v2dlcommon |
| | | | Respect counterarguments | v2dlcountr |
| | | | Range of consultation | v2dlconslt |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---------------|
| | | | Engaged society | v2dlengage |
| Egalitarian democracy Index | | | | v2x_egaldem |
| | Electoral Democracy Index | | | v2x_polyarchy |
| | Egalitarian Component Index | | | v2x_egal |
| | | | Power distributed by socioeconomic position | v2pepwrse |
| | | | Power distributed by social group | v2pepwrso |
| | | | Social group equality in respect for civil liberties | v2clsocgrp |
| | | | Educational equality | v2peedueq |
| | | | Health equality | v2pehealth |
| | | | Power distributed by gender | v2pepwrge |
| | | | Encompassing-ness | v2dlencmps |
| | | | Means-tested vs. universalistic | v2dlunivl |
| Participatory Democracy Index | | | | v2x_partipdem |
| | Electoral Democracy Index | | | v2x_polyarchy |
| | Participatory Component Index | | | v2x_partip |
| | | Civil society participation index | | v2x_cspart |
| | | | Candidate selection--National/local | v2pscnslnl |
| | | | CSO consultation | v2cscnsult |
| | | | CSO participatory environment | v2csprtpt |
| | | | CSO womens participation | v2csgender |
| | | Direct Popular Vote Index | | v2xdd_dd |
| | | | Initiatives permitted | v2ddlegci |
| | | | Initiatives signatures % | v2ddsigcip |
| | | | Initiatives signature-gathering time limit | v2ddgrtlci |
| | | | Initiatives signature-gathering period | v2ddgrgpci |
| | | | Initiatives level | v2ddlevci |
| | | | Initiatives participation threshold | v2ddbndci |
| | | | Initiatives approval threshold | v2ddthreci |
| | | | Initiatives administrative threshold | v2dddistsci |

| | | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|---------------------------|--|---------------|
| | | | Initiatives super majority | v2ddspmjci |
| | | | Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year | v2ddciniyr |
| | | Local government index | | v2xel_locelec |
| | | | Local government elected | v2ellocelc |
| | | | Local offices relative power | v2ellocpwr |
| | | | Local government exists | v2ellocgov |
| | | Regional government index | | v2xel_regelec |
| | | | Regional government elected | v2elsrgel |
| | | | Regional offices relative power | v2elrgpwr |
| | | | Regional government exists | v2elreggov |
| | | | | |
| | Core Civil Society Index | | | v2xcs_ccsi |
| | | | CSO entry and exit | v2cseeorgs |
| | | | CSO repression | v2csreprss |
| | | | CSO participatory environment | v2csprtcpt |
| | | | | |
| | Party Institutionalization index | | | v2xps_party |
| | | | Party organizations | v2psorgs |
| | | | Party Branches | v2psprbrch |
| | | | Party linkages | v2psprlnks |
| | | | Distinct party platforms | v2psplats |
| | | | Legislative party cohesion | v2pscohesv |
| | | | | |
| | Female rights index | | | v2x_gender |
| | | | CSO womens participation | v2csgender |
| | | | Percent (%) Female Journalists | v2mefemjrn |
| | | | Freedom of domestic movement for women | v2cldmovew |
| | | | Freedom of discussion for women | v2cldiscw |
| | | | Freedom from forced labor for women | v2clslavef |
| | | | Property rights for women | v2clprptyw |
| | | | Access to justice for women | v2clacjstw |

| | | | | |
|--|------------------------|--|-----------------------------|----------------|
| | | | Power distributed by gender | v2pepwrgen |
| | | | | |
| | Electoral Regime Index | | | v2x_elecreg |
| | | Legislative or constituent assembly election | | v2xel_elecparl |
| | | | v2eltype | v2eltype_0 |
| | | | v2eltype | v2eltype_1 |
| | | | v2eltype | v2eltype_4 |
| | | | v2eltype | v2eltype_5 |
| | | Legislature closed down or aborted | | v2xlg_leginter |
| | | | Legislature bicameral | v2lgbicam |
| | | Presidential election | | v2xel_elecpres |
| | | | v2eltype | v2eltype_6 |
| | | | v2eltype | v2eltype_7 |
| | | Chief executive no longer elected | | v2x_hosinter |
| | | | HOS = HOG? | v2exhoshog |
| | | | HOG appointment in practice | v2expathhg |
| | | | HOS appointment in practice | v2expathhs |