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April 2018

Users Working Paper

SERIES 2018:14

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Jack Paine*

April 18, 2018

Abstract

What explains the emergence and evolution of political institutions under colonial rule? Existing research implies that European settlers engendered democracy by (1) establishing oligarchic representation and (2) later expanding the franchise. This paper rethinks the origins and evolution of colonial institutions by providing a new explanation for both sequencing steps focused on *impediments* to democratizing oligarchies. First, creating representative institutions required European settlers to have a representative tradition on which to draw. This paper introduces new data on colonial legislatures from the 17th through 20th centuries and shows that early promotion of elected legislatures was mostly limited to British colonies—a metropole with a representative tradition. Second, extending class-based theories of democracy predicts perverse institutional evolution—resisted enfranchisement and contestation backsliding—because sizable European settler minorities usually composed an extractive landed class. Evidence on franchise size and on legislature disbandment from Africa, the British Caribbean, and Iberian America supports these implications.

Keywords: Democracy, Colonialism, European settlers, Institutions

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What explains the emergence and evolution of political institutions under Western European colonial rule? An influential perspective argues that cross-colony differences in European settlement can explain institutional divergence. Where numerous, European settlers tended to transplant representative political institutions to protect property rights and to promote freedom within the European community, in contrast to colonies with small or no settler populations focused primarily on extraction (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson, 2014; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Hariri, 2012, 2015; Easterly and Levine, 2016).¹ Although early franchise rules restricted political participation to Europeans, early contestation institutions should create favorable conditions for eventually transitioning to full democracy in the Dahlian sense of high competition and high participation.² In fact, Dahl (1971) and others have argued that originally establishing electoral competition among a small and cohesive elite followed later by mass franchise expansion enhances prospects for full democracy. These arguments imply two main sequencing steps for colonial European settlers to promote democracy: (1) create oligarchic electoral competition among whites (high contestation, low participation) and (2) eventually expand the franchise to establish full democracy (high contestation, high participation).

By contrast, in most colonies with miniscule European populations, electoral competition became prevalent only on the eve of independence and coincided with mass franchise expansion. Dahl (1971, 37) expounds the difficulty of establishing competitive elections within a polity that contains “a large and heterogeneous collection of leaders representing social strata with widely varying goals, interests, and outlooks.” Empirically, many post-colonial states have indeed faced considerable difficulties establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. Examining broad non-European samples, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 1385) statistically document a positive correlation between colonial European settlement and early democratic competition. Hariri (2012, 2015) shows similarly supportive regression evidence when analyzing post-colonial aggregate democracy levels.

¹Recent review articles emphasize the foundational distinction between settler and extractive institutions in economic development and political science research (Owolabi 2014, 2; Nunn 2014, 349; De Juan and Pierskalla 2017, 160).

²Contestation is the extent to which political competition is governed by free and fair elections. Participation distinguishes the scope of who can participate in politics, which corresponds with franchise size in polities where officials are chosen by elections.

However, two historical facts about European colonialism raise crucial concerns about both steps in the theoretical sequence linking European settlers and full democracy. First, many colonizers did not have representative institutions. It is unclear why European migrants would promote democratic competition—even among themselves—if they had no democratic tradition on which to draw. Second, where sizable, overseas European settlements often engendered a minority class of large landowners. Landed classes should be expected to resist broad-based representation, and in response to threats from below could take actions that would undermine their own representative institutions.

Drawing from these historical facts, this paper rethinks the origins and evolution of colonial institutions. It provides a new explanation and empirical evidence for both sequencing steps that focuses on *impediments* to democratizing oligarchies, disaggregated into questions about origins and evolution.

First, did colonial European settlers actually create electoral institutions, as posited by existing theories? Britain’s strong history of representative institutions distinguished it from other major European colonial powers. However, strikingly—given the centrality of colonial institutions to the broader debate—no existing research has collected systematic data on colonial-era elected legislatures. This paper introduces colonial legislature data coded by the author for 119 Western European colonies between 1600 and 1945. It shows that British settler colonies—but not settler colonies outside the British empire—are associated with the presence of elected legislatures.³ The statistical results are similar when replacing British colonialism with metropolitan constraints on the executive. Until the mid-19th century, no empire besides Britain’s had experienced elected legislatures, but they were prevalent in British North America and the British Caribbean. Differences from the Spanish and Portuguese empires across the centuries are striking, although French settler colonies made some gains after the mid-19th century following democratic advances in the metropole. Overall, achieving the first step in the theoretical sequence connecting settlers and democracy—oligarchic democratic institutions—was largely limited to British colonies. These findings are consistent with arguments about economic development that positive settler effects are limited to British colonies (Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau, 2006; Fails and Krieckhaus, 2010)—although focus squarely on Britain’s repre-

³The main findings operationalize “settler colony” with a binary variable for whether colonial European population share ever exceeded 5%. As discussed below, this is a useful threshold for distinguishing colonies in which European settlers held considerable political influence from non-settler colonies, although robustness checks show similar results using a continuous European population variable.

sentative tradition rather than on other aspects of British colonialism—and contrast with arguments that de-emphasize or reject the importance of British colonialism.⁴

Second, how did democratization proceed after the initial oligarchic phase? What pressures were there to perpetuate or to reverse early representative gains? In four historically exceptional “neo-British” colonies,⁵ European settlers composed a population majority. However, in most colonies with comparatively large and politically influential European settlements, Europeans composed a *minority* class. Rather than replicating the egalitarian social structure found in the neo-Britains (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011), these European minorities composed a landlord class that dominated large swaths of the territory’s most fertile land, sometimes organized into plantations or haciendas. Privileged landed classes organized as political oligarchies usually oppose widespread democratic franchises that would dilute their political and economic power. Distinguishing democratic contestation from participation yields two hypotheses for how these incentives to perpetuate oligarchic rule could prevent future democratic gains or reverse existing ones. First, the purportedly “good” settler institutions could also be used to discriminate against and to extract from the population majority, given incentives to restrict the franchise. Second, repression to restrict participation could also undermine democratic *contestation* by sparking violent contests from below or by causing vulnerable settlers to create authoritarian structures to resist the threat from below—reversing liberalization gains embodied in earlier colonial legislatures.

Quantitative and qualitative analysis from the three major clusters of European settler minority colonies—Africa, British Caribbean, and Iberian America—demonstrates how a landed class resistant to full democracy caused perverse evolution of colonial institutions. Facing threats to their political monopoly after World War II, European settler-dominated administrations in Africa reacted by repressing the African or Arab majority. Statistical evidence shows that a smaller percentage of the population was legally enfranchised in African settler colonies than in non-settler colonies between 1955 and 1970, as most of the continent peacefully gained independence and majority rule. European settlers’ repressive actions to prevent majority rule

⁴Owolabi (2014) summarizes the broader shift in the colonialism-democracy literature toward studying specific colonial actors, such as European settlers. However, Olsson (2009) and Lee and Paine (2018) provide recent exceptions.

⁵Fails and Krieckhaus (2010) prefer this term over the more widely used “neo-Europes” because Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States were all primarily British colonies.

often caused liberation wars that brought guerrilla leaders to power and undermined political competition, although democratic institutions survived largely intact in South Africa. In the 19th century British Caribbean, settlers reacted to the end of slavery and a rising political threat from the former slave majority by trading their legislatures for direct Crown rule, thus reducing contestation to prevent franchise expansion. Elected legislatures again became widespread in the 20th century, but working- and middle-class actors—prominent in class-based democracy theories—rather than landed European settlers propelled these democratic gains. Finally, Iberian America also featured high land inequality and resisted enfranchisement into the 20th century. All these cases exhibit evidence of European settlers seeking to protect their extraction of economic rents, usually in the form of land domination.

Overall, the paper provides three main contributions. First, it presents a novel theory and empirical analysis to better understand a widely heralded favorable path to democracy. Using colonial cases, it demonstrates unrecognized difficulties with transitioning from oligarchy to full democracy by extending ideas from research on colonizer identity and on class-driven transitions. Second, the analysis also overturns conventional wisdom that links colonial European settlers and democracy. Besides the four neo-Britains and South Africa, former settler colonies have either tended not to be democratic since gaining independence, or have become democratic for reasons unrelated to colonial European settlers. Despite evidence that settlers transplanted early representative institutions in most British settler colonies, class-based theories of democracy find considerable support as actions to erode widespread political participation undermined potentially beneficial legacies in most European settler colonies. Therefore, early democratic advantages had largely dissipated by independence, which highlights the importance of the present focus on analyzing persistence mechanisms that connect colonial occurrences to post-colonial legacies. Third, it introduces new data for studying colonialism by codifying dates for colonial legislatures across a broad set of colonies. The conclusion elaborates upon how the general mechanisms posited here and these data can advance the broader literature.

1 Existing Research: European Settlers and Democratizing Oligarchies

Insights from two distinct and influential literatures imply that European settler colonies should promote full democracy by first developing representative institutions and later expanding the franchise. First, theories on the role of electoral competition in democratic sequencing. Second, theories on economic development and democracy that distinguish European settler institutions from extractive institutions.

1.1 Electoral Competition and Democratic Sequencing

Many have argued that full democracy is most likely to emerge and to survive in countries/colonies that have a history of high democratic contestation. Dahl (1971, 36) posits:

“Probably the commonest sequence among the older and more stable polyarchies has been some approximation of the first path, that is, competitive politics preceded expansion in participation. As a result, the rule, the practices, and the culture of competitive politics developed first among a small elite . . . Later, as additional social strata were admitted into politics they were more easily socialized into the norms and practices of competitive politics already developed among the elites.”

Creating competitive party competition among elites was often “harsh and bitter,” but mutual ties among elites enabled them to resolve differences. Furthermore, establishing competitive norms should diminish incentives to resist franchise expansion: “neither the newer strata nor the incumbents who were threatened with displacement felt that the costs of toleration were so high as to outweigh the costs of repression, particularly since repression would entail the destruction of a well-developed system of mutual security” (36).

Although Dahl primarily highlights the Western European countries that have followed this path, many have discussed and evaluated this sequencing argument in other contexts. Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 179) argue for contemporary African cases: “The process of liberalization would seem to be relatively easier in regimes where competition is tolerated; the main challenge is then the simpler one of expanding the franchise to allow political participation.” Summarizing Latin American countries, Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989, 4) conclude, “our evidence strongly supports Robert Dahl’s thesis that, historically, the most favorable path to polyarchy was one in which political competition preceded the expansion of participation.” Using data on competition and participation across a broad global sample during the 19th and 20th centuries, Miller (2015) shows that a history of high contestation correlates with full democratization, whereas a history of high participation does not. This also relates to evidence from the authoritarian transitions literature that regimes with semi-competitive elections are more likely to democratize than are closed authoritarian regimes (Lindberg, 2009).

1.2 Settler versus Extractive Institutions

Despite studying a wide range of cases, the democratic sequencing literature has mostly overlooked an applicable set of cases: colonies with sizable European settlements. Instead, these colonies have received considerable attention in research on how historical institutions have affected economic development and democracy. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) estimate the effect of economic and political institutions on modern economic development. A key element of their theory relates to the first step in the sequencing argument: colonies with sizable European settler populations were more likely to develop early competitive electoral institutions. They focus primarily on political representation and on political constraints against property expropriation in the colonial era, quoting historians who establish that settler colonies had representative institutions and that political life was modeled after the home country (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 1374). This occurred in part because European settlers often successfully lobbied the metropole for electoral representation and other civil liberties. By contrast, in other colonies, colonizers sought to extract natural resources and to tax at exploitatively high levels from subjects that did not enjoy representative institutions. Empirically, they proxy for early contestation institutions with Polity IV's aggregate democracy measure and constraints on the executive component in 1900 (Marshall and Gurr, 2014), and demonstrate a strong positive correlation with European settlement (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 1385). Regarding institutional evolution and persistence, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) emphasize the sunk costs of institution-building and the difficulty of switching institutions after independence, therefore focusing on how competitive institutions persist over time.

Hariri (2012, 2015) expands their framework to explain how European settlers enhanced prospects for democracy after independence. Large-scale European settlements broke down traditional forms of authority that mitigated against post-colonial democracy elsewhere. For example, in Spanish America, he argues that European settlers created "a system of comprehensive checks and balances" during the colonial era that "facilitated the spread of early representative institutions" (Hariri, 2012, 474). Consequently, "European settlement and influence were among the important factors that helped shape the international distribution of political regimes" (474). Empirically, Hariri (2012) regresses Polity IV aggregate democracy scores averaged between 1991 and 2007 on a proxy for European influence, European language fraction, and demonstrates a strong positive correlation (487).

Although Hariri (2012, 2015) extends the framework to explain aggregate democracy levels, the mechanisms to explain persistence and institutional evolution are somewhat underdeveloped because he does not explicitly discuss franchise expansion. In other work, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have examined impediments to franchise expansion, discussed below, albeit without focusing on European settlers. Therefore, it is useful to incorporate insights from Dahl and related authors to make explicit the two-step historical sequence that should connect European settlers to full democracy:

1. *Institutional origins*. Establish an oligarchic democracy ruled by whites.
2. *Institutional evolution*. Eventually expand the franchise to establish full democracy.

2 Theory: Limitations and Resistance Along the Oligarchic Path

Two historical facts about European colonialism motivate the alternative theoretical framework proposed here by raising crucial concerns about each step in this theoretical sequence. First, many colonizers did not have representative institutions. It is unclear why European migrants would promote democratic competition—even among themselves—if they had no democratic tradition on which to draw. Second, sizable overseas European settlements usually engendered a minority class of large landowners. Landed classes should be expected to resist broad-based representation, and in response to threats from below could take actions that would undermine their own representative institutions. We need a new theory that incorporates these two historical facts. Extending existing ideas from research on colonizer identity and on how social classes affect democratic transitions engenders a new explanation for both sequencing steps focused on *impediments* to democratizing oligarchies.


2.1 Creating Representative Institutions: Metropole Tradition

Regarding origins, an important historical consideration is that many major colonizers did not themselves contain representative institutions. Although Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Hariri (2012, 2015) have proposed the compelling idea that European settlers would seek to replicate political institutions from their country of origin, Europeans' institutional transplantation should only have bred representative political institutions if the settlers' home country in fact had a representative tradition. This factor sharply distinguished Britain from other major colonizers, suggesting that the first step in the theoretical sequence connecting settlers and democracy—oligarchic democracy—should be largely limited to

British colonies. This discussion draws from existing arguments about the importance of colonizer identity (Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau, 2006; Mahoney, 2010; Fails and Kriekhaus, 2010), but focuses squarely on the importance of Britain’s history of representative institutions rather than on other aspects of British colonialism.

Figure 1 depicts constraints on the executive for the four major Western European colonizers—Britain/England, France, Portugal, and Spain—over 50 year intervals between 1600 and 1950. The data draw from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Gurr, 2014) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). Following Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), each data point takes the average of 20-year windows before and after the stated year. Smoothing the data enables viewing snapshots of differences in metropolitan executive constraints across European empires over time without depicting sharp fluctuations in democratic constraints at various periods (for example, the struggle between the Crown and Parliament in England during most of the 17th century).

Figure 1: Metropolitan Executive Constraints in Half-Century Snapshots



The first notable trend in Figure 1 is that England/Britain became increasingly democratic during the first major periods of imperial expansion and contraction, which Abernethy (2000) dates respectively between 1415 to 1773 and 1775 to 1824.⁶ Narizny (2012) compares estates in medieval and early modern Europe and concludes: “Only in England did a medieval assembly evolve into a representative parliament with sovereign authority over the crown, and only in England was liberal protodemocracy a stable equilibrium” (359). Especially after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, England had established parliamentary constraints

⁶For graphical evidence of these waves, see Figure 2 and Olsson (2009, 538).

on the monarch that were unparalleled among the other major colonizers.⁷ By contrast, the Spanish monarch retained absolute powers until the Napoleonic Wars, which caused it to lose most of its American colonies (Elliott, 2007, 319). Hariri (2012, 474) correctly argues that neither metropole was fully democratic in the 18th century, but this did not imply that European settlers from Britain and Spain each drew from a similar representative tradition. Collectively, the British and Spanish American empires accounted for almost every colony with a sizable European population during this period.

Notably, the theory is largely agnostic regarding whether actions by the metropole or by settlers were more important for creating or resisting representative institutions. Empirically, both appear important. Spanish settlers did not have a representative tradition on which to draw, and Spain tightly controlled its colonial administration. Britain was more permissive of creating legislatures, although the actions of settlers were also pivotal. British settlers expected and actively created representative institutions, as discussed below in the empirical analysis, despite a Crown that occasionally resisted the degree of autonomy demanded by settlers. Gailmard (2017) provides a broader theoretical discussion of how Britain approached separation of powers in its American colonies.

Britain also differed from other European powers with settler colonies during the second major waves of expansion (1824 to 1912) and contraction (1940 to 1980). The major migration of Portuguese settlers to Angola and Mozambique starting in the 1930s began during the Salazar dictatorship (Duffy, 1962), which had the lowest executive constraints score. France represents a mixed case. It exhibited the highest Polity IV executive constraints score between 1877 and 1939, and again between 1947 and 1957. However, unlike Britain, France exhibited prolonged struggles between authoritarian and democratic forces throughout the 19th century, and again in the 20th century during World War II and with the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Even during democratic periods, Spruyt (2005) compares France's unstable politics to Britain's stability. Elected officials in France's Fourth Republic were susceptible to special interest pressures, such as European settlers and the military, due to unstable governments and weak party discipline (101). Furthermore, Britain and France also practiced different colonial governing philosophies. Although differences on the ground created by Britain's preference for indirect rule and France's preference for more centralized

⁷This point is well-established in the historical literature. See, for example, Finer's (1997, 1375-1427) survey history of empires and North and Weingast's (1989) seminal work on institutions in early modern England.

control have sometimes been exaggerated, variance in delegation practices did meaningfully affect prospects for institutional transplantation (Collier, 1982, 83-87). For example, France “tightly controlled” European settlement in French Algeria and “the Algerian enterprise received much greater governmental supervision and the population was subject to a greater degree of regulation, unthinkable in a contemporary British colony” (Christopher, 1984, 130). Overall, these considerations yield the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (Creating representative institutions: Metropole tradition). *Colonies with a sizable European settler population should be more likely than non-settler colonies to have representative colonial institutions under the scope condition that the metropole has a representative tradition (which, empirically, is closely associated with British colonialism).*

This argument relates to broader debates about the importance of colonizer identity, but emphasizes distinct points about why British colonialism should matter. Several studies on economic development have argued that the beneficial effects of European settlers are limited to British colonies (Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau, 2006; Mahoney, 2010; Fails and Krieckhaus, 2010). Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau (2006) and Mahoney (2010) expound the distinction between British liberal economic institutions and Spanish mercantilist institutions. However, the more theoretically relevant focus for studying democracy concerns differences in Britain’s and Spain’s representative traditions. Fails and Krieckhaus (2010) appeal to a broader range of factors that may have distinguished British settlers, but also argue that British settlement is essentially a binary variable that distinguishes the neo-Britains from the remainder of the empire (494-495). However, Britain colonized numerous territories in the Caribbean with small British populations that nonetheless drew from a similar representative tradition as contemporaneous North American settlers (Greene, 2010b), and H1 applies to these colonies as well.

Furthermore, examining the importance of colonizer identity is crucial because many have argued that any effects of British colonialism are driven by selection effects. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) explicitly argue against colonizer importance: “it appears that British colonies are found to perform substantially better in other studies in large part because Britain colonized places where [large-scale European] settlements were possible, and this made British colonies inherit better institutions” (1388).⁸ Similarly, Engerman and Sokoloff (2011, 44-46, 218) argue that variance in land endowments rather than in colonizer

⁸More recently, the authors provide evidence that their core economic development results are largely similar when using modified data and controlling for British colonialism (Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson, 2014).

identity accounts for differences in colonial institutions. Other major statements on European settlers and democracy propose unconditional theories about European settlers (Hariri, 2012, 2015) and have expounded the similarities of 18th-century British and Spanish colonialism (Hariri, 2012, 474). This reflects the broader shift in the colonialism-democracy literature away from emphasizing the importance of differences among European colonizers, as Owolabi (2014) summarizes.

2.2 Institutional Evolution: Landed Oligarchs and Resisted Transitions

A different historical consideration raises concerns about the institutional evolution step in the sequence linking European settlers to democracy: transitioning from oligarchic democracy to full democracy. Overseas European settlements often contained a minority class of large landowners. Even where Europeans transplanted representative institutions to promote democratic contestation, they created exclusive white political communities. Applying and extending class-based theories of democracy yields expectations for sizable European settler minorities to resist enfranchising non-Europeans and for these repressive actions to undermine earlier gains in competitive institutions. These hypotheses also highlight the importance of distinguishing the contestation and participation components of democracy (Dahl, 1971), including the novel theoretical consideration that an explanatory factor can exert countervailing effects on these two aspects of democratization.

Resisted franchise expansion. Class-based theories of democratization and democratic consolidation have a long history in political science. Moore (1966) famously proposed “no bourgeoisie, no democracy,” which recent research has also expounded (Ansell and Samuels, 2014). Others have focused on either the working class (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992) or the interplay between the working class and political elites (Collier, 1999). Regardless of the specific actor posited to promote democracy, class-based theories agree that landowning agricultural elites should repressively resist franchise expansion, especially in circumstances of high land inequality. Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) posit one plausible mechanism. Their theories consider an interaction between an elite minority and the masses. The masses may be able to achieve concessions from the political/economic elite because they pose a revolutionary threat by virtue of their large size. However, elites that control political power amid high economic inequality face incentives to repress rather than to expand the franchise to include the masses—who would redistribute considerable income from the elites to themselves. Landlords particularly fear majority rule

because land is a non-mobile asset that is easy to redistribute (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 287-320). This same logic also explains landlords' incentives to support coups against democracy when the opportunity arises. Ansell and Samuels (2014) extend the argument to specifically address extraction by arguing that regimes controlled by landed elites will tax non-elites at exploitative levels.⁹

The empirical analysis below provides evidence of highly unequal land distribution patterns between Europeans and non-Europeans in colonies with a sizable European minority, such as parts of Africa, the sugar-producing Caribbean, and Iberian America.¹⁰ Throughout much of the colonial era—and, in some cases, afterwards—European settlers wielded considerable political influence either by lobbying the metropole or by directly controlling the state, and therefore could achieve their preferred extractive economic policies such as controlling the best land and distorting the labor market.¹¹ By contrast, in the few colonies where Europeans formed a majority group, inequality tended to be low because everyone was relatively wealthy, although Europeans still had incentives to not share political power with non-whites. Angeles (2007) provides statistical evidence for this non-monotonic relationship between size of the European settler population and economic inequality, and Engerman and Sokoloff (2011) provide evidence from the Americas. Overall, these considerations yield the following hypothesis:

⁹Albertus (2015) instead argues that autocracies are more likely than democracies to implement land reform because there are more pivot points for landed elites to target in democracies that can undermine land reform. However, in colonial Africa and the colonial Caribbean, European settlers expected to lose all their political influence under majority rule. Therefore, these cases lie outside the scope conditions of Albertus's (2015) argument.

¹⁰See, for example, Skidmore and Smith (2005) for Iberian America, Good (1976) for Africa, and Green (1976) for Caribbean plantation colonies. European settlers also controlled assets besides land. However, many of these colonies were founded by displacing natives from their land or by settling forced migrants onto European-controlled plantations—therefore making land a crucial source of economic and political power for Europeans. Paine (2018) discusses how European land control in African settler colonies created broad interests against majority rule even among non-farming whites.

¹¹Settlers' political influence could change over time, however, such as between the 19th and 20th centuries in the British Caribbean after most colonies acquiesced to direct British rule.

Hypothesis 2a (Institutional evolution: Landed oligarchs resist franchise expansion). *In the presence of threats from below, colonies with a sizable European settler population should be less likely than non-settler colonies to enfranchise the majority under two scope conditions: (1) European settlers compose a minority and (2) European settlers are politically influential.*

Although strategies to defend elite privileges are central to class-based theories, existing colonialism research focused mainly on economic development mentions this mechanism only in passing. Fails and Kriekhaus (2010) argue that British colonies besides the neo-Britains did not exhibit meaningful variation in settler population size, and therefore medium-size British settler colonies should not differ from colonies largely devoid of European settlement. However, they also briefly mention that small Spanish settlements could have caused worse outcomes than colonies without settlement by creating an interest group that favors extraction (492), which resembles the argument here (also see Engerman and Sokoloff's (2011) argument about Spanish institutions). Mahoney (2010) and Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau (2006) distinguish British from Spanish colonies based on a liberal/mercantile distinction, but this difference is less important for explaining democracy conditional on the existence of an elite class. Mercantile policies might contribute to creating "entrenched actors who benefit from state privileges" (Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau, 2006, 1419), but many British colonies in the Caribbean and in southern Africa contained a similarly privileged European elite despite pursuing different overall economic policies than imperial Spain.

Contestation reversals. In addition to negatively affecting democratic participation, anti-majority rule strategies could also undermine colonial-era representative institutions—hence preventing colonial-era institutional transplantation from fostering long-term democracy after independence. There are two relevant channels through which contestation backsliding could have occurred. The first involved direct actions by Europeans. In some historical circumstances, European settlers could request the colonizer to rule directly, as Green (1976) and Greene (2010b) discuss for the British Caribbean in the 19th century. This strategy reflected fear that the non-European majority could potentially use extant representative institutions to advance its own political agenda. If settlers disbanded their institutions and allowed the colonizer to directly rule the colony, then they did not bequeath representative institutions to leaders of the post-colonial state. Outside the colonial context, this mechanism resembles Slater's (2010) argument that in the presence of serious threats from below, elites may replace democratic representation with authoritarian "protection pact" institutions better able to counteract the threat, as in Malaysia.

The second channel is indirect. Upon the end of European rule, European settlers' repression should be more likely to cultivate leaders whose comparative advantage is in coercion rather than in democratic competition. Specifically, repression to prevent the majority from gaining power should raise the likelihood of facing a violent challenge from below. Empirically, in post-World War II Africa, European population share positively correlates with liberation wars against Europeans (Paine, 2018). Even if whites continued to regulate their political participation through representative institutions during the violence, representative institutions should be less likely to persist after a transition to majority rule than if European settlers had peacefully acquiesced to franchise expansion. This channel is indirect, however, because Europeans' actions are posited to create conditions for *non-European* actors to take actions that undermine contestation. Relevant possibilities include creating coercively powerful ruling parties during the violent process of gaining power (Levitsky and Way, 2013) or bringing leaders to power cultivated outside the democratic system whose comparative advantage is in coercion rather than in persuasion and negotiation. Broadly, this mechanism reflects the focus of recent democratic backsliding research on actions taken by the *incumbent* executive to undermine democratic procedures (Bermeo, 2016). These considerations imply:

Hypothesis 2b (Institutional evolution: Landed oligarchs and contestation backsliding). *Actions to restrict majority rule should cause contestation backsliding through (a) direct institutional reversals engineered by European settler elites or (b) creating conditions favorable for non-European rulers to erode the competitiveness of electoral competition.*

This hypothesis is theoretically intriguing because, juxtaposed with H1, it shows how an explanatory factor can yield divergent implications for different components of democracy—i.e., the elite's franchise calculus can undermine earlier contestation gains. This is a largely novel consideration among existing colonialism research. Much research on European settlement focuses on the distinct outcome of economic development, and studies specifically on democracy tend not to disaggregate its components. Although Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Hariri (2012, 2015) discuss one positive effect of European settlement on democratic contestation, neither they nor their critics scrutinize the countervailing effects of class-based political considerations to restrict the franchise.

3 Assessing Metropolitan Representation and Institutional Origins

Did colonial European settlers actually create electoral institutions, as posited by existing theories? Creating electoral competition among Europeans—i.e., an oligarchic democracy with high contestation and low

participation—provides the first step in the theoretical sequence linking colonial settlers to post-colonial democracy. Hypothesis 1 from the present theory finds support from data newly compiled by the author on elected colonial legislatures from the 17th to 20th centuries. Statistically, British settler colonies—but not settler colonies outside the British empire—are associated with elected legislatures.

3.1 Data

This section briefly describes the data for Figure 2 and Table 1, and Appendix Section A.1 provides more detail. Table A.1 lists every territory in the sample, years of colonial rule and independence, years with a colonial legislature, score on the settlers variable, and colonizer. Table A.3 provides summary statistics. The sample consists of 119 former Western European colonies, starting in 1600. It includes numerous small islands in the Caribbean and Pacific, including several present-day dependencies. Due to data availability constraints, in most cases the units correspond to modern-day countries, and Appendix Section A.1.1 explains why this biases against the present findings. Each territory is only included in the sample in years under colonial rule.

This paper introduces new data coded by the author for the first year with a colony-wide elected legislature for every territory, using various secondary sources (Appendix Section A.1.5). There had to be evidence that citizens/subjects outside the government elected some of the legislators, which excludes legislatures in British Crown colonies. This definition also excludes elections at the very local level, such as town councils, or *cabildos*, in Spanish America (see below for more detail), and elections to an empire-wide assembly, which France had introduced in 1789. The Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem; Coppedge and Zimmerman., 2016) generates about half the data points, although I consulted numerous additional sources for pre-20th century legislatures and for many small territories. Except for British Caribbean cases, also discussed below, a territory is coded as 1 on the elected legislature variable in all years following the first year of the legislature. In most colonies prior to World War II, the population percentage that could vote for legislative elections (if they existed) was very small.

The main European settlers variable is an indicator for whether the territory contained a European population share of at least 5% at any point in the colony's history, using data from Easterly and Levine (2016), Owolabi (2015), and other sources (Appendix Section A.1.2). Several considerations motivate using this simple measure: the panel contains a very long period of time, some countries fluctuated considerably in


European population share over time, and data on colonial European populations is inherently uncertain farther back in time. Although 5% may appear to be a low threshold, the many cases discussed below show that even colonies with relatively small European minorities fit the scope conditions of the theory regarding the political power of European settlers. However, to show that the results do not depend on a particular population threshold, robustness checks analyze a logged continuous European population share variable that varies throughout the colony's history. Colonizer identity is based on the final Western European country that colonized the territory, and all years prior to the final colonizer gaining control are excluded from the sample (Appendix Section A.1.3). For example, Britain gained control of Mauritius during the Napoleonic Wars, and Mauritius is included in the sample as a British colony from 1814 until independence, but is excluded from the sample before 1814.

3.2 Main Patterns

Figure 2 shows the percentage of colonies with an elected colony-wide legislature between 1600 and 1959. Panel A codes a colony-year as 1 if the colony has ever had an elected colonial legislature, and 0 otherwise. The lines average over the different categories of colonies. Because the dependent variable is whether a territory has *ever* had a legislature, percentage dips occur either because new territories in a category became colonies and did not immediately gain elected representation, or because colonies with a legislature gained independence. The cutoff year for Panel A is 1959 (blue line). The percentages are exceedingly difficult to interpret after 1959 because the number of colonies dropped precipitously in the 1960s, generating rapid fluctuation in the sample for the figure. Panel B shows how the sample changes over time by presenting the number of colonies by category through 2000.

Figure 2 offers three main takeaways. First, until the mid-19th century, elected legislatures were exclusive to British settler colonies. All colonies founded by English settlers in North America and the Caribbean, and some colonies founded by British conquest, created elected legislatures shortly after colonization. In the 1850s, similar political developments occurred in Oceania and in Cape Colony/South Africa. Greene (2010a) discusses New World colonies and shows evidence that, for Englishmen, liberty was “not just a condition enforced by law, but the very essence of their national identity” (3-4). Settlers' colonial assemblies consciously sought to replicate the English House of Commons and to obtain corresponding political privileges (7). British North American colonies largely controlled their internal affairs, and their legislatures

Figure 2: Elected Colonial Legislatures Since the 17th Century



even outpaced the English House of Commons in terms of autonomy due to their “continuous and continuing British connection and the tremendous impact of the British constitution upon their own perception of the constitutional order” (Finer, 1997, 1403). Even in smaller Caribbean islands with less ability to resist British encroachment, legislatures exerted considerable autonomy, fully controlling finances and exercising extensive executive powers (Green, 1976, 68).

These British institutions contrasted sharply with the “despotisms” of 18th-century Spanish, Portuguese, and French American empires (Greene, 2010a, 10). Finer (1997, 1383) quotes Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, written in 1776: “In everything except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists to manage their own affairs in their own way is complete . . . The absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the contrary, take place in their colonies.” Spain, which possessed most of the remaining American colonies at the time, practiced authoritarian direct rule. The Spanish crown did not legally allow colonial officials to perform any executive or legislative functions. “Formal power was not shared by anyone outside the immediate Council and the king” (Hanson, 1974, 202), local officials functioned solely as judiciaries, and no colony-wide parliamentary bodies were established (Morse, 1964, 144). The one institution with some popular participation existed at the local level: *cabildos*, or town councils. However, shortly after towns were formed, the Spanish Crown typically diminished the power of *cabildos* and sold the office to raise

revenues (Finer, 1997, 1387). Haring (1947, 177-178) proclaims: “As a repository of people’s liberty, a training school for the democratic system to be set up after independence, the *cabildo* possessed no potency at all. It had little or no freedom in action or responsibility in government. Its weakness was not a recent development at the turn of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, the institution had been in a state of collapse for generations.” The first and only attempt to promote general elections occurred in 1809 in response to turmoil in Spain caused by the Napoleonic wars, but even these elections were to an empire-wide assembly in Spain rather than to local legislatures—and colonial representatives were never seated in the *Junta Central* (Posada-Carbó, 1996, 4, 42).

These differences also highlight the importance of colonizer identity relative to natural endowments, a debate that has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff 2011; Frankema 2009b, 44-84). At the turn of the 19th century, elected legislatures were prevalent across British territories regardless of whether the territory was suitable for small-scale farming (northern United States, Canada) or for sugar plantations (much of the Caribbean). Islands recently conquered from France “inhabited by alien people” provided the main exceptions to British settler colonies having representative institutions (Green, 1976, 76). These colonies “required firm executive authority and rendered the immediate application of legislative government and English legal institutions neither possible nor desirable” (76). Spain imposed similar authoritarian institutions across South America, Central America, and the Caribbean despite varying endowments, as did France among its Caribbean sugar colonies and Quebec prior to 1763 (Narizny, 2012, 360).

The second observation from Figure 2 is that many settler colonies, even outside the British empire, gained electoral representation starting in the mid-19th century. Shortly after the 1848 revolution in France and the establishment of the Second Republic, Guadeloupe and Martinique (and non-settler Reunion, followed several decades later by Senegal) each created legislatures.¹² Whites in Algeria also gained representation later in the 19th century. However, French Tunisia never gained a legislature, nor did authoritarian-ruled Portuguese settler colonies in Africa. Furthermore, Emerson (1962, 232) qualifies the relevance of legislatures in centrally ruled French colonies: “Despite the revolutionary tradition of liberty and equality, the French colonies offered little in the way of democratic institutions . . . At best the French created advisory

¹²This is consistent with Owolabi’s (2015) argument about colonizers granting legal rights equivalent to those in the metropole earlier in forced settlement colonies.

councils of a dubiously representative kind with some financial and administrative powers but little general legislative competence,” a pattern that persisted even after World War II and is consistent with France’s stronger propensity toward direct colonial rule (also see Delivagnette 1970, 263).

Third, by the 1930s, many non-settler colonies had established elected legislatures, such as India (1910), Nigeria (1923), and Mali (1925). However, only in the decades after World War II did other types of colonies catch up to British settler colonies, as France introduced legislative elections across its Sub-Saharan African colonies in the 1940s and 1950s, Britain gradually decolonized its entire empire, and even Portugal relented in an abortive attempt to gain African support of the colonial project in the early 1970s.

3.3 Statistical Evidence: British Settler Colonies and Early Elected Legislatures

Table 1 statistically assesses these patterns between 1600 and 1945, the beginning of the terminal colonial period, using a series of logit models with standard errors clustered by colony. The dependent variable equals 1 if the colony has an elected legislature in that year and 0 otherwise. The sample contains the same colonies as in Figure 2, and only includes years under colonial rule. Every column contains a fixed effect for post-1850 following arguments from Abernethy (2000), Olsson (2009), and others that the nature of colonial rule changed over time and during the mid-19th century there occurred a shift from mercantile- to imperial-based colonial rule.¹³

Column 1 uses the binary settlers indicator for whether the colony ever had a European population share of at least 5%, and interacts it with British colonialism. Column 2 adds four covariates: population density in 1500, a territory’s history of a state in 1500, an indicator for a forced settlement colony, and colonial Protestant missionary population. These address the counterarguments presented above that any effects of British colonialism are driven by selection effects because Britain colonized territories with better endowments for attracting settlers and for generating beneficial outcomes. Appendix Section A.1.4 discusses how these are four of the most prominent alternative explanations in the literature. Column 3 replaces the British colonial rule indicator with metropolitan constraints on the executive, and Column 4 adds the four covariates. The

¹³Panel B of Figure 2 shows limitations to comparisons within more fine-grained time periods, especially farther back in time: there were very few non-settler colonies, especially in the British empire, until the mid-19th century. The appendix presents several robustness checks, summarized below, to deal with these comparison problems as best as possible.

changes over time in metropolitan executive constraints facilitate modeling unit fixed effects and therefore accounting for time-invariant sources of heterogeneity across colonies, and Column 5 truncates the sample to settler colonies and estimates the coefficient for metropolitan executive constraints when including colony fixed effects.¹⁴ Column 6 replaces the European settlers indicator with the continuous measure of European population share, and Column 7 adds covariates.

Table 1 strongly supports H1. In all columns, the marginal effect estimate is positive and statistically significant among British colonies or colonies whose metropole has high executive constraints, but not among non-British colonies or low metropolitan executive constraint colonies. In Column 1, the predicted probability of a legislature for British settler colonies is 71%, compared to 13% for British non-settler colonies, 11% for non-British settler colonies, and 9% for non-British non-settler colonies. The appendix shows qualitatively identical results when altering the original models in various ways. Appendix Table A.4 replaces the post-1850 fixed effect with century fixed effects, and Appendix Table A.5 analyzes a cross-section of countries in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the colony created an elected legislature within 20 years of colonization and 0 otherwise.

3.4 Nineteenth-Century Iberian America

Although Iberian American countries do not exhibit evidence of institutional transplantation during colonial rule, anti-monarchical ideas that inspired their wars of liberation could plausibly have triggered early democratic gains after independence (Hariri, 2012, 474). Related, many of these post-colonial countries modeled their constitutions on that of the United States. Although this argument is somewhat different than claims of *colonial-era* institutional transplantation, it suggests an alternative pathway through which European settlers could have spurred democratic competition. However, Appendix Section A.3.1 shows that most Iberian American countries experienced a long time lapse between independence and the onset of competitive elections. This reinforces the evidence that colonial institutional transplantation was mostly limited to British settlers.

¹⁴There is no supplementary column for this specification because all four covariates are time-invariant.

Table 1: Settler Colonies and Early Elected Legislatures, 1600–1945

| | DV: Elected legislature | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Settler colony | -0.131 (0.609) | -0.166 (0.622) | -0.0530 (0.802) | 0.143 (0.983) | | | |
| British colony | 0.237 (0.389) | 0.236 (0.366) | | | | 4.484*** (0.658) | 4.409*** (0.731) |
| Settler*British colony | 2.862*** (0.642) | 2.430*** (0.689) | | | | | |
| Exec. constraints in metropole | | | 0.348*** (0.113) | 0.339*** (0.129) | 0.660*** (0.145) | | |
| Settler*Exec. constraints in metropole | | | 0.308** (0.124) | 0.218 (0.143) | | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | | | | 0.141 (0.113) | 0.144 (0.122) |
| ln(Eu. pop. %)*British colony | | | | | | 0.683*** (0.145) | 0.701*** (0.147) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.0231 (0.0238) | | 0.0197 (0.0228) | | | 0.0848*** (0.0288) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 0.109 (0.785) | | -0.161 (0.742) | | | 0.677 (0.770) |
| Forced settlement colony | | 0.494 (0.437) | | 0.394 (0.468) | | | 0.605 (0.428) |
| Protestant miss./10,000 pop. in 1923 | | 0.156* (0.0796) | | 0.225*** (0.0761) | | | 0.0639 (0.0897) |
| Colony-years | 14,471 | 14,471 | 14,471 | 14,471 | 5,070 | 14,471 | 14,471 |
| Post-1850 FE? | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Sample | FULL | FULL | FULL | FULL | Settler col. | FULL | FULL |
| Colony FE? | NO | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO |
| | Marginal effect estimates | | | | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | 0.569*** (0.0833) | 0.476*** (0.0954) | | | | | |
| Settler colony High metro. exec. const. | | | 0.473*** (0.0708) | 0.374*** (0.0839) | | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | | | | 0.187*** (0.0259) | 0.184*** (0.0313) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -0.0120 (0.0549) | -0.0163 (0.0600) | | | | | |
| Settler colony Low metro. exec. const. | | | 0.00858 (0.0225) | 0.0137 (0.0306) | | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | | | | 0.0127 (0.0108) | 0.0133 (0.0115) |

Notes: Table 1 summarizes a series of logit regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and colony-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. Every specification contains century fixed effects. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variables under various values of conditioning variables. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

4 Assessing Institutional Evolution in Africa

How did democratization proceed after the initial oligarchic phase? What pressures were there to perpetuate or to reverse early representative gains? Settler minority colonies broadly—those with and without legislative representation for whites—support Hypothesis 2a by providing evidence that a politically influential landed class resisted enfranchising a rising non-white majority.¹⁵ In most colonies that had previously created legislative representation, these repressive actions coincided with contestation backsliding (Hypothesis 2b).

Unlike the previous section, the evidence for institutional evolution individually analyzes Africa, the British Caribbean, and (briefly) Iberian America. The reason is that the emergence of strong demands for mass political participation differed by region. Africa was pacified until World War II. Much earlier, the end of slavery and other economic changes created a rising threat from below in the mid-19th century in the British Caribbean. Iberian America differed still because most countries gained independence in the early 19th century. Therefore, region-by-region analysis appropriately captures a key scope condition: the posited institutional evolution mechanisms are most relevant when there is a tangible threat from below. Additionally, among these regions, only post-World War II Africa offers sufficient variation in settler populations to permit statistical comparisons.¹⁶

In Africa, faced with threats to their political monopoly after World War II, European settler-dominated administrations reacted by repressing the African or Arab majority. Statistical evidence shows that a smaller percentage of the population was legally enfranchised in African settler colonies between 1955 and 1970,

¹⁵The logic of H2a extends beyond only colonies with legislative representation because landed oligarchs should tend to resist franchise expansions regardless of the extant quality of competitive institutions. However, given the present emphasis on transitions from oligarchic representation to full democracy, the analysis focuses mainly on colonies that have already established electoral competition. Additionally, the exact time period to which H2a applies is contingent on European settlers having considerable political power. In many cases this political power waned at the end of colonial rule, whereas in others it persisted after independence. However, consistent with the present theme, the analysis focuses mainly on the colonial period.

¹⁶Although it is possible to include British Caribbean colonies and other small islands in the 20th-century analysis, by then European settlers in these colonies tended to have low political power—another key theoretical scope condition.

as most of the continent peacefully gained independence. European settlers' repressive actions to prevent majority rule often caused liberation wars that brought guerrilla leaders to power and undermined political competition, although democratic institutions survived largely intact in South Africa.

4.1 Data

The sample for Figure 3 and Table 2 consists of 43 mainland African countries, including North Africa and Madagascar, that gained African majority rule after 1945 following Western European colonial rule.¹⁷ It presents patterns for every year between 1900 and 2000, i.e., both before and after independence. Examining pre- and post-independence periods is useful because the timing of independence was endogenous to European settler pressure, as settlers' political clout often enabled delaying reforms (Paine, 2018). The dependent variable is the percentage of the population with the legal right to vote in national elections, measured by V-Dem. Therefore, this variable relates to legal franchise restrictions based on race, but even territories with high values of this variable are not necessarily democratic because they may lack free and fair elections. Table A.3 provides summary statistics.

4.2 Main Pattern for Resisted Enfranchisement

In the decades preceding 1945, Europeans had pacified their African territories and established colonial rule. However, important changes during and after World War II created a "wind of change" that yielded peaceful transitions to majority rule and independence in most of non-settler Africa¹⁸—but Africa's settler colonies exhibited a divergent path from the rest of the continent. Figure 3 demonstrates three distinct periods of suffrage expansion during the 20th century across Africa. First, prior to World War II, all territories exhibited a low population percentage with the legal franchise. In fact, this percentage tended to be higher in the settler colonies because they experienced legislative elections earlier, with the franchise restricted to whites. South Africa, Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Algeria each had legislatures for Europeans at the turn of the 20th century. Second, settler and non-settler territories each experienced increases in legalized suffrage in the decades following World War II, but this process occurred more slowly in settler colonies. The blue lines highlight the 1955-to-1970 period and show more clearly that non-settler colonies expanded the franchise

¹⁷Equatorial Guinea is missing data on the dependent variable. South Africa is included because European colonialism persisted until 1994 from the perspective of the African majority.

¹⁸Young (1994, 182-217) details changes during the decolonization period.

more rapidly than settler colonies as decolonization proceeded in Britain’s and France’s non-settler colonies. In fact, South Africa’s Cape province had inherited non-racial franchise rules at independence in 1910, but the national legislature revoked non-whites’ remaining suffrage rights in 1956. Finally, after this period, settler territories eventually caught up as liberation wars in Portuguese Africa, British southern Africa, and (earlier) in French North Africa ended with Africans or Arabs gaining majority rule. This does not imply that these countries became democratic, only that legal restrictions of the franchise based on race and other qualifications had been overturned.

Figure 3: Legalized Suffrage in 20th-Century Africa (Pre- and Post-Independence)



4.3 Statistical Evidence for Resisted Enfranchisement

Table 2 statistically assesses differences in legalized enfranchisement between 1955 and 1970 using OLS models with year fixed effects and standard errors clustered by colony. It demonstrates support for H2a using the same sample of African countries as in Figure 3. As in Table 1, Column 1 models the settler colony dummy, British colonialism, and their interaction. Column 2 adds covariates. Columns 3 and 4 run otherwise identical models that replace the settler colony dummy with logged European population share. Across the columns, the table shows that settlers are strongly negatively associated with franchise size among both British and non-British colonies. In Column 1, the expected difference in percent en-

franchised is 44%, with 70% legal enfranchisement in non-settler colonies versus 26% in settler colonies. Appendix Table A.6 shows that the results are similar when not controlling for British colonialism and its interaction. These specifications produce coefficient estimates based on a larger number of units, and are theoretically relevant because H2a applies even in polities that do not have an elected legislature.¹⁹ The results are also qualitatively identical under two additional alterations. Appendix Table A.7 shows similar results when replacing the legalized enfranchised population percentage variable with a binary variable for majority rule, i.e., whether or not at least 50% of the adult population has the legal franchise. Appendix Table A.8 analyzes a cross-section of African territories. Paine (2018) provides additional tests that complement these findings. He demonstrates similar results when instrumenting for European settlement using land suitability for large-scale European agriculture, and also shows that percentage of land alienated for Europeans negatively correlates with franchise size.

4.4 Evidence for Resisted Enfranchisement Mechanisms

Considerable evidence supports the key redistributive mechanism for H2a posited by class-based theories: the settler landed elite repressed the majority to perpetuate their ability to extract from the best land on the continent. Research by area specialists and historians of Africa supports that land inequality between Europeans and Africans was starkly higher in settler than non-settler colonies. “In many African colonies without settlers, the colonial authorities did not attempt to disrupt local tenure practices. Indirect rule was interpreted to call for, in some places, vesting local authorities with control over land” (Herbst, 2000, 190). By contrast, almost every colony that experienced disruption to existing land tenure practices “saw exceptionally large amounts of land alienated during white rule for the benefit of white settlers” (189). Table 3 summarizes starkly unequal land distribution patterns in four major settler colonies, compared to 0% European land

¹⁹The results in Columns 3 and 4 show that the marginal effect findings are not predicated on using the 5% population threshold for settler colonies. However, analyzing results without the Britain interaction mitigates some small-sample issues that arise when using the binary settlers variable: the only British settler territories (by the 5% threshold) in this sample are South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the non-British settler colonies are Algeria, Angola, Namibia, and Tunisia. Alternatively, given the posited theoretical mechanisms, it would be reasonable to classify Namibia as a British colony because it was governed by South Africa, in which British settlers composed a major part of the European population.

Table 2: Legalized Enfranchisement in Africa, 1955–1970

| | DV: Legally enfranchised pop % | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Settler colony | -37.51* (19.79) | -34.14* (17.01) | | |
| British colony | -14.98** (7.162) | -8.362 (7.646) | -20.79 (26.97) | 0.399 (23.20) |
| Settler*British colony | -12.60 (21.00) | -1.640 (15.48) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | -11.00*** (3.973) | -11.13** (4.435) |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British colony | | | -0.968 (4.493) | 2.108 (3.947) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.422 (0.432) | | 0.314 (0.380) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 22.35 (19.49) | | 24.95 (19.02) |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | | -6.641* (3.917) | | -2.627 (5.649) |
| Territory-years | 682 | 682 | 682 | 682 |
| R-squared | 0.404 | 0.449 | 0.434 | 0.459 |
| Year FE? | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | Marginal effect estimates | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | -50.11*** (7.204) | -36.45*** (8.460) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | -11.97*** (2.151) | -7.944** (3.526) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -38.22* (20.25) | -35.61* (18.11) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | -9.657** (4.216) | -10.02** (4.774) |

Notes: Table 2 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The sample contains 43 countries in Africa between 1955 and 1970. The dependent variable is legally enfranchised population percent measured annually, and the sample is all continental African countries plus Madagascar. The forced settlement covariate is not used because it equals 0 for every country in this sample. Every specification contains year fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

alienation in most colonies (see Hailey 1957, 687).

Until 1945, European settlers faced no major challenges to their political hegemony. However, changes after World War II facilitated African mobilization, creating a threat from below unless the political elite responded with concessions (Young, 1994, 182-217). The key economic difference between settler and non-settler colonies—considerable European alienation of land—created broad interests against decolonization in settler colonies. For farmers, relatively low technological barriers to entry on many Europeans' farms would make it easy to replace Europeans with Africans (Kahler, 1981, 391). European land control also created positive spillovers for non-agricultural whites via broader extractive mechanisms. The major settler colonies were founded upon preferential European access to land, and displacing Africans from their land

Table 3: European Settler Land Domination in Africa

| Territory | Eu. settler % of population | Eu. settler % alienated land | Eu. settler % cultivable land |
|-------------------|--|---|--|
| South Africa | 20% | 87% | 61% |
| Algeria | 11% | 34% | 27% |
| Southern Rhodesia | 6% | 50% | 58% |
| Kenya | 1% | 7% | 25% |

Source: Land data from Lutzelschwab (2013), Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Figures for Algeria exclude the Sahara.

created a cheap, mobile labor supply (Palmer, 1977, 246; Mosley, 1983, 13-6). Consequently, politically influential settlers responded with repression rather than with concessions to the African majority. South African and Southern Rhodesian whites elected extremist parties after World War II to combat rising African demands, and French settlers in Algeria rigged the 1948 legislative elections to prevent Arab representation. Overall, all six African colonies coded as settler colonies in Figure 2 experienced a major liberation war to gain independence—or, in the case of South Africa, to end European political dominance and gain majority rule—amid repression intended to prevent enfranchising Africans.

4.5 Contestation Backsliding

Among the six African settler colonies, Table 4 shows that only South Africa exhibits clear evidence of colonial institutional transplantation promoting full democracy after European colonial rule ended. By contrast, three cases mostly fit the pattern predicted by H2b, and the other two are irrelevant for assessing H2b because they did not have colonial legislatures.²⁰ European settlers in Algeria, Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and South-West Africa/Namibia had each created elected legislatures two decades or more before World War II ended, but also experienced lengthy decolonization wars as European settlers attempted to cling to power and failed to establish high competition after independence.

This evaluation implicitly follows the logic of a process tracing “hoop test” (Collier, 2011): having (1) a legislature in 1900 and (2) at least one year with high contestation (or full democracy) in the first decade of independence are treated as individually necessary conditions for colonial-era settlers to have contributed to creating full democracy. The cutoff year of 1900 captures the waning political influence of European

²⁰Tunisia did not have a legislature until after independence. Portugal granted legislative representation to its colonies in 1973 in an abortive attempt to settle its decolonization wars that began in the early 1960s, although guerrilla groups in Angola and its other colonies did not participate.

Table 4: Colonial Democratic Legacies in African Settler Colonies

| Country | Independence year or first year non-Eu. rule | Legislature in 1900?* | Democratic years (high contestation years) in first decade |
|--------------|--|-----------------------|--|
| South Africa | 1994* | YES | 10 (10) |
| Tunisia | 1956 | NO | 0 (0) |
| Algeria | 1962 | YES | 0 (0) |
| Zimbabwe | 1980* | YES | 0 (0) |
| Angola | 1975 | NO | 0 (0) |
| Namibia | 1990 | YES** | 0 (0) |

Notes: Last column is the count of democratic years in first decade of independence using Boix, Miller and Rosato’s (2013) binary measure for full democracy, for which high contestation and high participation are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. This column also presents, in parentheses, the count of years with high contestation in the first decade, using data from Miller (2015).

* South Africa gained independence in 1910 but did not gain African majority rule until 1994. Rhodesia declared independence in 1965 without gaining international recognition.

** For territories such as Namibia that were colonized by the power from which they gained independence after 1900, this column indicates whether a legislature was established within the first 20 years of colonization.

settlers over time: whereas legislatures created before 1900 were usually generated by settler pressure, later legislatures were usually created in response to demands by non-whites or by colonizer initiative.²¹

Zimbabwe exemplifies how repression to resist franchise expansion could negatively impact prospects for high democratic competition after independence. Robert Mugabe became president at independence after a prolonged war with the Rhodesian government. However, within a decade of achieving independence, the ruling party ZANU had used the coercive organization it had built during the decolonization war to repress political opposition and to become a de facto one-party state, fitting Levitsky and Way’s (2010, 240) concept of a competitive authoritarian regime. Another plausible effect of the war on undermining post-colonial democracy was to select a ruler that was not cultivated through the electoral system—which had deep roots in colonial Rhodesia—and had a comparative advantage in coercion rather than in democratic negotiation. By contrast, the white government in South Africa’s stronger bargaining position—stemming from a larger European population and a stronger military—induced the African National Congress to incorporate non-violent strategies, which elevated Nelson Mandela to eventually become the post-colonial executive.

Namibia is ambiguous because some consider it a democratic success story (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 120). However, the revolutionary party SWAPO has been in power since independence in 1990 with limited checks on executive power, and Namibia appears to be better categorized as competitive authoritarian than as democratic (Melber, 2017).²² Finally, FLN revolutionary leaders in Algeria did not hold even semi-

²¹The notes accompanying Table 4 explain the coding exception for territories colonized after 1900.

²²Polity IV codes moderate constraints on the executive for Namibia. Miller (2015) codes Namibia as

competitive executive elections after independence, with every presidential election prior to 1995 involving only one candidate who received over 90% of the vote (Nohlen, Thibaut and Krennerich, 1999, 60).

5 Assessing Institutional Evolution in the British Caribbean

Evidence from the British Caribbean also supports Hypotheses 2a and 2b. In the 19th century, settlers reacted to the end of slavery and a rising political threat from the former slave majority by trading their legislatures for direct Crown rule, thus preventing franchise expansion. Elected legislatures again became widespread in the region in the 20th century, but working- and middle-class actors—prominent in class-based democracy theories—rather than landed European settlers propelled democratic gains.

5.1 Main Pattern for Resisted Enfranchisement


Figure 4 summarizes the pattern of legislative reversals using the same elected legislature data as in Figure 2, although Figure 4 differs in three ways. First, it only contains British Caribbean colonies.²³ Second, it lists the number rather than percentage of colonies with an elected legislature. Third, the legislature variable equals 1 if the colony has an elected legislature in a particular year and 0 otherwise (same as the dependent variable in Table 1), as opposed to whether or not the colony has *ever* had an elected legislature (as in Figure 2). Figure 4 shows the prevalence of legislative institutions in the British Caribbean prior to the 1860s, and then the wave of legislature dissolutions that began in Jamaica in 1865. By 1880, only the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, and Dominica still had elected legislatures (and Dominica disbanded its legislature in 1898). Appendix Table A.2 provides colony-by-colony information on legislature reversals.

5.2 Evidence for Resisted Enfranchisement Mechanisms

Historical evidence closely matches the expectations of class-based theories. Most British Caribbean colonies produced sugar and, by the 19th century, featured a small landed settler elite ruling over a vastly larger slave population. Among nine British sugar colonies with disaggregated population data around 1830, slaves ranged from six times the size of the white population in Barbados to more than 30 times in Grenada (Green, having medium levels of contestation, corresponding with his category of electoral authoritarianism.

²³Guyana is excluded because it does not meet the 5% European population threshold used for the binary settlers variable.

Figure 4: British Caribbean Colonies with an Elected Legislature



1976, 13). Sugar was either the principal or the only product in most British Caribbean colonies, and plantations provided the core social and economic units (35)—indicating extreme land inequality.²⁴

In the 19th century, British settlers faced two types of challenges to maintaining their political power, which they exercised through elected legislatures in most colonies. First, the latent threat of revolution from below by the slave majority became more acute in the 19th century. In addition to the successful Haitian revolution, “[s]lave rebellions significantly increased after 1815 on all the British islands. Slaves rebelled both in the major sugar colonies and on the smaller islands” (Rogoziński, 2000, 161-163, 185). A second challenge arose after decades of successful lobbying by white Caribbean planters to retain slavery finally failed in 1833 (Greene, 2010*b*, 74-75), when Britain outlawed slavery throughout its empire. Although this policy created the possibility of former slaves gaining political representation, European settlers reacted by increasing property right restrictions on voting while creating exceptions for whites that could vote under the old rules (Rogoziński, 2000, 194). Table 5 summarizes available voter data in several colonies and shows that less than 2% of the population could vote in the 1850s even though slavery had ended more than a decade before. Overall, British settlers “had no intention of sharing their liberty with former slaves or of making island liberty less exclusive” (Greene, 2010*a*, 15).

²⁴The limited quantitative data available support this contention. Frankema (2009*a*) provides land Gini data for a broad global sample, although most data points are from the 20th century. The average land Gini for three British Caribbean countries with data is 38% higher than the average among all countries excluding settler colonies (75.5 versus 54.5).

Table 5: Population Share of Eligible Voters: Select British Caribbean Colonies in Mid-19th Century

| Colony | Year | Voters | Population | Eligible voter population % |
|---------------|-------|--------|------------|-----------------------------|
| Barbados | 1857 | 1,350 | 135,939 | 0.99% |
| Grenada | 1854 | 191 | 28,732 | 0.66% |
| Jamaica | 1863 | 1,457 | 441,300 | 0.33% |
| Saint Vincent | 1850s | 273 | 22,239 | 1.23% |
| Tobago | 1850s | 135 | 9,026 | 1.50% |

Sources: Rogoziński (2000, 194) provides data on number of voters. Barbados population measured in 1851 and Jamaica in 1861 from Rogoziński (2000, 188), Grenada in 1829 and Saint Vincent in 1825 from Rogoziński (2000, 120), and Tobago in 1775 from Wells (1975, 253).

Apprehensive of mass enfranchisement by either peaceful or revolutionary means, settlers ultimately disbanded their legislatures in most colonies and acquiesced to direct British Crown rule. After slavery ended, plantation agriculture in the Caribbean became less profitable, which in turn decreased government revenues. Over time, an increasing share of white planters believed that an authoritarian government with a strong executive would increase private investment in the islands (Green, 1976, 361) and prevent non-whites from gaining political power. In 1852, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies warned that absent reforms, “they must anticipate being overwhelmed in the Assembly by representatives of the coloured and black population” (363). The triggering event for moving to direct British rule occurred after a major revolt led by former slaves at Morant Bay in Jamaica in 1865. Although the government successfully repressed the rebellion, “the gravity of the crisis was vastly greater than anything experienced in Jamaica since emancipation” (390). This revolt was interpreted by whites in starkly racial terms. Jamaica’s governor “declared that only a strong-minded government could preserve the island from further violence” (395) in his speech that preceded a vote to disband the legislature. Facing largely similar circumstances, most of the remaining British Caribbean followed this pattern in the 1860s and 1870s. In contrast to their British neighbors in North America, or later in South Africa and Rhodesia, the very small size of the white plantocracy made them vulnerable (Greene, 2010*b*, 70), yielding metropolitan rule as the desired solution to their fear from below.²⁵

²⁵The possibility of creating British Crown rule was also historically contingent. For example, settler populations in Tanganyika/Tanzania, Northern Rhodesia/Zambia, and Kenya were influential but not large enough to follow the South African or Rhodesian path of ruling independently of Britain. After World War II, Britain had developed a firm commitment to promoting electoral representation inclusive of non-Europeans.

5.3 Contestation Backsliding

Across most of the British Caribbean, European settlers’ decisions in the 1860s and 1870s to voluntarily disband their legislatures (see Figure 4) support H2b by showing that strategies to resist enfranchisement undermined electoral contestation. However, Table 6 shows that most of these countries have been stable democracies initially after and since independence. This subsequent evidence does not disconfirm H2b because the push for electoral institutions before independence came from non-Europeans rather than from landed European settlers. The following analysis uses the same hoop test used to evaluate the cases in Table 4 and substantiates the premise that post-1900 legislatures usually did not result from European settler pressure. Appendix Section A.4 discusses the Bahamas, Barbados, and Jamaica—the three countries that do not fail the hoop test—in more depth.

Table 6: Colonial Democratic Legacies in the British Caribbean

| Country | Independence year | Legislature in 1900? | Democratic years in first decade |
|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Jamaica | 1962 | YES | 10 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1962 | NO | 10 |
| Barbados | 1966 | YES | 10 |
| Bahamas | 1973 | YES | 10 |
| Grenada | 1974 | NO | 5 |
| Dominica | 1978 | NO | 10 |
| St. Lucia | 1979 | NO | 10 |
| St. Vincent and G. | 1979 | NO | 10 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 1981 | NO | 0 |
| Belize | 1981 | NO | 10 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 1983 | NO | 10 |

Sources: Last column is the count of democratic years in first decade of independence using Boix, Miller and Rosato’s (2013) binary democracy measure. Most of these countries are not coded in Miller’s (2015) dataset, which provides disaggregated data on contestation levels. Bermuda is excluded from the table because it is a colony as of 2018.

The crucial political events and changes began in the 1930s. Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, St. Kitts, and St. Vincent each experienced strikes and riots in reaction to economic austerity caused by the Great Depression (Rogoziński, 2000, 313-314). With the white plantocracy having previously relinquished political control to Britain in the 19th century, Britain reacted to widespread strikes and riots in the 1930s with concessions in the 1940s that went “much further than the local upper classes would have dreamed of” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 240).²⁶ In addition to organizing workers, trade union lead-

²⁶This observation also relates to Hypothesis 1 by highlighting pro-democratic effects of a democratic metropole, although Britain did not attempt to promote popular participation in its colonies prior to the 20th century.

ers also established labor parties across the region (Rogoziński, 2000, 315-319) that advocated for political representation and participated in the first elections under universal suffrage in the 1940s (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 236-238). Jamaica was the first colony to gain universal suffrage in 1944, followed by the rest within the next decade.

In addition to Britain rather than settlers making the policy choices in response to demands for democratic representation among the non-European majority, important structural changes had also occurred to alter the balance of power between white plantation owners and the masses. Economic changes weakened the plantocracy by increasing foreign land ownership (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 238-239). Furthermore, in the aftermath of slavery, Britain granted metropolitan legal rights to freed slaves in the Caribbean. Corresponding educational gains during the Crown rule period may have helped to facilitate societal organization (Owolabi, 2015). Overall, the re-establishment of elected legislatures and mass franchise expansion in the British Caribbean in the 20th century tended to occur in spite of rather than because of European settlers, and “the driving force behind democratization and decolonization was an alliance of the working-class and the middle classes” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 244).

6 Assessing Institutional Evolution in Iberian America

The absence of representative institutions in colonial Iberian America implies that examining franchise size during colonial rule is not relevant. However, post-colonial evidence is still relevant for assessing H2a. Colonial-era Iberian settlers created countries with among the highest levels of land inequality in the world. Therefore, evidence of early franchise expansion in the region would provide disconfirming evidence for H2a. Instead, Appendix Section A.3.2 shows that all Iberian American countries featured very limited franchises throughout the 19th century. Large franchises did not become prevalent in the region until the 1950s, more than a century after independence for almost all these countries. Furthermore, qualitative evidence shows that landed interests consistently acted to thwart franchise expansion. Regarding contestation reversals, Section A.3.2 also discusses how landed inequality contributed to democratic instability in the 20th century.

7 Conclusion

Combining the evidence used to assess Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b from the present theoretical framework demonstrates the prevalence of democratic resistance by colonial European settlers—anticipated by class-based theories of democracy—and the few number of countries with clear evidence of beneficial European settler democratic legacies. In the four neo-Britains, which have received little attention here because of the broad consensus about pro-democratic legacies in existing research, settlers resisted expanding the franchise to non-Europeans (most glaringly, in the U.S. South). However, their actions exerted less deleterious consequences for competitive political institutions because European descendants composed a majority. South Africa since 1994, despite experiencing lengthy repressive white rule over the majority, has also managed to consolidate democratic institutions originally created by Europeans (Table 4). Appendix Section A.4 discusses several other possible examples, although also raises important questions about the pro-democratic role of European settlers in those cases. Therefore, besides the neo-Britains and possibly a few other countries, former settler colonies have tended either not to be democratic since gaining independence, or have become democratic for reasons unrelated to colonial European settlers. Despite evidence of settlers transplanting representative institutions in most British settler colonies—highlighting the relevance of incorporating colonizer identity into the theoretical framework—implications generated by extending class-based theories of democracy find considerable support as actions to erode widespread political participation usually undermined potentially beneficial European settler legacies.

These findings carry important implications for research on colonial legacies. Existing research equates settler colonialism either with promoting rule-based institutions at the exclusion of extraction (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002) or with direct rule (Hariri, 2012, 2015). However, the present analysis rethinks both of these perspectives, especially as they relate to democracy promotion. Outside the neo-Britains, European settlers tended to organize the colonial economy specifically to extract from natives (Africa, Iberian America) or from non-European migrants (Caribbean and other plantation islands). These actions created negative economic and political consequences even in colonies, such as many in the British Caribbean, that created early representative institutions—thus combining aspects of settler institutional and extractive colonialism. Hariri (2012, 2015) instead focuses on how European settlers disrupted traditional political institutions that—had they remained in place—may have undermined prospects for democracy

after independence. However, the modes of direct rule established by settlers created an alternative system of non-democratic rule. In British Caribbean colonies, a critical change occurred when direct rule by the British Crown supplanted settler rule. Britain had stronger incentives than the settlers to promote education among non-Europeans (Owolabi, 2015), and fewer incentives to repress demands for democracy. This is consistent with Lange's (2004) findings relating direct British rule to post-colonial democracy. Broadly, in contrast to the recent shift in the colonialism-democracy literature toward studying specific colonial actors and de-emphasizing the importance of colonizer identity, as Owolabi (2014) reviews, the present findings demonstrate that these two are not mutually exclusive and should be studied jointly.

This paper also introduces panel data on colonial legislatures that examines *variation* in colonial institutions, contrary to common approaches that treat colonial institutions as static and examine correlations between a snapshot of colonial institutions and subsequent outcomes. Further examination of the new legislatures data, as well as colonial franchises, should complement the current focus on theoretically developing persistence mechanisms to better understand colonial institutions.

Finally, the theoretical and empirical analysis highlights important considerations about democratic sequencing for the broader democracy literature. Contrary to the emphasis of many arguments (Dahl, 1971; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Miller, 2015), establishing full democracy faces considerable impediments even when contestation institutions have already been created—especially in the colonial context. The same reasons that a polity gains early limited representation may also undermine prospects for subsequent democratization—as with British settlers that drew from a representative tradition but also had large landownings that caused them to repress the masses. Furthermore, although existing theories anticipate resistance to democratization in the presence of redistributive threats (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), much less theoretical work analyzes how those repressive actions can cause backsliding in electoral competition—highlighting the relevance of disaggregating democratic contestation and participation while also considering their interaction. This is an important direction for future research, especially given the shortcomings of Dahl's (1971, 36) argument that elites in polities with high contestation should not use repression because they believe the masses will be restrained by having to compete within the representative framework. Broadly, the considerations raised here about (1) the origins and evolution of colonial institutions and (2) the challenges of transitioning from oligarchy to full democracy should help to further our understanding of how colonialism affected democracy and other outcomes.

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A Online Appendix

A.1 Additional Data Information

A.1.1 Sample for Table 1

Owolabi's (2015) dataset contains observations from many modern-day countries colonized by Western Europe as of 1945, and several territories that have remained as colonial dependencies. The sample for Table 1 contains most of his units plus every former Western European colony that gained independence prior to 1945, as well as Bhutan, Eritrea, and Namibia. The only territories in Owolabi's (2015) data excluded from the present dataset are seven small present-day dependencies (i.e., never gained independence) that lack data on European population in both Owolabi's (2015) and Easterly and Levine's (2016) datasets. The resulting sample contains 110 present-day countries and 9 dependencies. Due to data availability constraints, in most cases the units correspond to modern-day countries, e.g., the United States and Antigua and Barbuda are each included as one unit in the dataset despite each containing distinct colonies. For such cases, I use data from the colony with the largest population. The one exception is that mainland Spanish America is included as four distinct colonies because the 16 modern-day countries did not correspond to colonial territorial units. Importantly, these coding decisions bias against the results in Table 1. Specifically, many British colonies that established early legislatures, such as the United States and Canada, originally consisted of various colonies. Similarly, none of the Spanish American colonies had legislatures. In both cases, by reducing observations that support H1 (i.e., "positive-positive" cases and "negative-negative" cases), this sampling procedure biases against the main finding.

A.1.2 European Settlers

The main European settlers variable in Tables 1 and 2 is an indicator for whether a territory had a European population share of at least 5% at any point while under colonial occupation. The data draw primarily from Easterly and Levine's (2016) dataset, who compiled information on colonial European populations from a variety of primary and secondary sources, and also from Owolabi (2015) for some forced settlement colonies for which Easterly and Levine are missing data. The author added data points using several additional secondary sources. Rogoziński (2000, 78, 165, 212) provides colonial-era data for Martinique and Guadeloupe. Easterly and Levine (2016) do not have data on Portuguese islands Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe prior to the mid-20th century. Putterman and Weil's (2010) descendency data shows that 41% of Cape Verde's residents lived in Portugal in 1500. This high figure is the basis for coding Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe as settler colonies for Table 1 (Putterman and Weil 2010 do not have data for Sao Tome and Principe). Lawrence (2010) provides data for French colonies between 1946 and 1950.

The continuous European population share variable in Table 1 is computed as follows. Easterly and Levine (2016) provide data points on European population share at various points in time in a colony's history. For every colony that does not have data in Easterly and Levine or lacks a data point in the 20th century while still colonized, I add a data point from Owolabi (2015). I also added earlier data for Guadeloupe and Martinique using the sources described above. These data points served as the anchors for imputing a value for other years, which constitute an average between the last data point and the next data point weighted by the temporal distance from each point. For example, if a colony has data on European population share in 1850 and 1860 and for no years in between, then the imputed data point for 1857 equals 70% of the value for 1860 plus 30% of the value for 1850. All colonies are set to 0% European population share in their colonization year. Although this variable is useful for cross-colony comparisons and tracks broad shifts over time in a colony's European population share, this variable is not suitable to use when controlling

for unit fixed effects. Because most annual points are imputed, year-to-year movements are not precisely estimated.

The continuous European population share variable in Table 2 differs because the analysis concerns a concentrated time period. Unlike with the continuous measure for Table 1, it is possible to use a small set of sources that cover every territory in the Africa decolonization sample. This measure is time-invariant and is based on one or multiple data points for each territory between 1945 and 1960, drawing from three sources that estimate Western European settlers as a percentage of the population. Lawrence (2010) provides a data point for each French colony between 1946 and 1950, Mosley (1983) for southern British colonies and several others in 1960, and United Nations (1965) for various colonies for up to three years ranging from 1946 to 1961. The latter two sources were identified using the replication data for Easterly and Levine (2016). This yields at least one data point for all but four colonies in the sample. I consulted additional secondary sources for these four that justified coding no settlers for any of them because the sources did not mention a European settler population. This coding rule follows Easterly and Levine (2016), who argue: “colonial histories (which are virtually all written by European historians) are extremely unlikely to fail to mention significant European settlements.” For colonies in which multiple sources provided a European settlers estimate, I average the estimates.

A.1.3 Colonizer Identity and Metropolitan Constraints on the Executive

For territories colonized by multiple European powers at different times, only the final colonizer is coded (the only partial exceptions are Somalia and Libya, which are coded as Italian colonies despite gaining independence as UN Mandates administered by Britain after Italy lost World War II). Consequently, the colonial onset year corresponds with colonization by that power, as opposed to the first year of colonization by any Western European power. For example, Tanzania is coded as colonized in 1919 by Britain, ignoring the earlier period of German colonization. Onset year is coded using Olsson (2009) and Encyclopaedia Britannica (which is also Olsson’s (2009) source). For countries that combined multiple colonies with different colonizers, I use the colonizer for the larger territory. For example, Somalia is coded as an Italian colony despite combining Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland.

Columns 3 through 5 of Table 1 control for constraints on the executive in the metropole. For years after 1800, this is measured using Polity IV’s annual constraints on the executive variable (for transition years, the data point from the last year without missing data is imputed). For earlier centuries, this is calculated using Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), which is measured in 50-year intervals (for intervening periods, the data point is the average of the most recent data points).

A.1.4 Covariates

Many have studied conditions that affected prospects for European settlement, or alternative colonial influences that affected democracy. The regression results control for four important factors from this literature. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) argue that territories with higher population density made it more difficult for large numbers of Europeans to settle, and Hariri (2012, 2015) argues that territories with a longer history of statehood were better able to resist European encroachment. The regressions use their variables, logged population density in 1500 and state antiquity in 1500, respectively. I use the same data sources as the authors, although I modified the data for the more comprehensive sample in Table 1. Population density comes from McEvedy and Jones (1978), who provide population estimates and area in square kilometers that cover every territory in the present sample in 1500 except Maldives, which is computed by averaging Seychelles and Sri Lanka. I consulted Encyclopædia Britannica (2017) for several territories with

limited information in McEvedy and Jones (1978). The state antiquity index comes from the updated version of Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman's (2002), who code a territory's combined years with government above local level between 0 CE and 1500 (unit of analysis is modern countries). I coded this variable for numerous small islands and a handful of other territories missing data using their same data source (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017) and using their averaging procedure with a 5% discount factor for each 50-year interval.

Regarding alternative colonial explanations, Owolabi (2015) codes an indicator variable for colonies in which "descendants of non-indigenous African slaves and/or Asian indentured laborers make up at least 60 percent of the postcolonial population." This also relates to Engerman and Sokoloff's (2011) argument that land endowments favorable for plantation-type agriculture generated large slave populations and high inequality. I coded this variable for every pre-1945 independence country—not included in Owolabi's (2015) dataset—which additionally yielded Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti as forced settlement colonies. Woodberry (2012) provides data on the number Protestant missionaries per 10,000 people in each territory in 1923. Although this variable has broad coverage, it is missing for the neo-Britains and for the 9 modern-day dependencies in the sample. Using Owolabi's (2015) source data on Protestant population share in 1900 (Barrett, 1982)—which has data for every territory in the present sample—I imputed a value for Woodberry's (2012) measure for every territory with missing data based on predictions generated by regressing Protestant missionaries in 1923 on Protestant population share in 1900. Overall, none of the covariates are missing data for any territory.

A.1.5 Elected Colonial Legislatures

Table A.1 lists the first year with an elected colonial legislature for every territory in the Table 1 sample. For territories in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem; Coppedge and Zimmerman., 2016) dataset that had 0 percent of the population legally enfranchised early in the 20th century, the first year with a positive population percent enfranchised is coded as the first year with an elected legislature (their codebook states: "Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%"). Consulting secondary sources showed that increases in enfranchised population percent did indeed arise because an elected legislature had been created. For territories either not included in the V-Dem dataset or that V-Dem codes as having a positive percent of the population enfranchised in 1900 (therefore indicating the legislature was created before 1900), I consulted additional secondary sources listed in Table A.1.

For most territories in the Table 1 dataset, the legislature variable is coded as 1 for every year after the first. The only exceptions are British Caribbean colonies, for which there is considerable documented evidence of legislative reversals. Table A.2 lists the data used to generate Figure 4. Three reasons motivate not coding legislative reversals outside the British Caribbean. First, there is scant evidence of legislative reversals. V-Dem does not provide any examples in the 20th century in which legally enfranchised population percent decreased from a positive level to 0 during the colonial era. Secondary sources consulted to code the election onset variable in earlier centuries did not indicate any reversals, either, save for the British Caribbean. The one additional example found during the coding process is that Kuwait created an elected legislature in 1938 that was disbanded the next year and then periodically reappeared in the future. But overall, not coding reversals outside the British Caribbean seems to induce minimal measurement error. Second is practical: whereas coding elected legislative onset is straightforward for most colonies, more fine-grained evidence on the timing of elections during the colonial era (especially before the 20th century) is not well-documented, in particular in smaller colonies. Third, this coding decision biases against the findings from Table 1. The only colonies for which reversals are coded (i.e., changing what would be 1's for other colonies to 0's for many years in British Caribbean colonies) are British settler colonies.

Table A.1: Elected Colonial Legislatures and Other Data for Table 1

| Country | Colonizer ^a | >5% Eu. pop.? | Year colonized ^a | First year w/ legislature ^a | Year indep. | Source |
|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------|--|
| Cape Verde | Portugal | YES | 1462 | 1972 | 1975 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Dominican Republic | Spain | YES | 1492 | - | 1821 | ^b |
| Mozambique | Portugal | NO | 1505 | 1973 | 1975 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Cuba | Spain | YES | 1511 | - | 1898 | ^b |
| Mexico/New Spain | Spain | YES | 1521 | - | 1824 | ^b |
| Sao Tome and Principe | Portugal | YES | 1522 | 1972 | 1975 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Colombia/New Granada | Spain | YES | 1525 | - | 1819 | ^b |
| Peru | Spain | YES | 1531 | - | 1821 | ^b |
| Brazil | Spain | YES | 1533 | - | 1822 | ^b |
| Argentina/Rio de la Plata | Spain | YES | 1536 | - | 1816 | ^b |
| Angola | Portugal | YES | 1576 | 1973 | 1975 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| United States | Britain | YES | 1607 | 1619 | 1783 | Finer (1997, 1400) |
| Bermuda | Britain | YES | 1612 | 1620 | - | ^c |
| Indonesia | Netherlands | NO | 1619 | 1919 | 1949 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | Britain | YES | 1623 | 1642 | 1983 | ^c |
| Barbados | Britain | YES | 1627 | 1639 | 1966 | ^c |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Britain | YES | 1632 | 1644 | 1981 | ^c |
| Netherlands Antilles | Netherlands | YES | 1634 | 1936 | - | Oostindie and Klinkers (2012, 61) |
| Guadeloupe | France | YES | 1635 | 1854 | - | Idowu (1968, 265) |
| Martinique | France | YES | 1635 | 1854 | - | Idowu (1968, 265) |
| Senegal | France | NO | 1638 | 1879 | 1960 | Idowu (1968, 268) |
| French Guiana | France | YES | 1643 | 1878 | - | Idowu (1968, 268) |
| Bahamas | Britain | YES | 1648 | 1729 | 1973 | ^c |
| Reunion | France | NO | 1650 | 1854 | - | Idowu (1968, 265) |
| Jamaica | Britain | YES | 1660 | 1664 | 1962 | ^c |
| Haiti | France | YES | 1665 | - | 1804 | ^d |
| Suriname | Netherlands | NO | 1667 | 1866 | 1975 | Nationale Assemblée (n.d.) |
| Canada | Britain | YES | 1713 | 1758 | 1867 | Girard (2010, 169) |
| India | Britain | NO | 1750 | 1910 | 1947 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Dominica | Britain | YES | 1759 | 1768 | 1978 | ^c |
| St. Vincent and G. | Britain | YES | 1762 | 1768 | 1979 | ^c |
| Grenada | Britain | YES | 1763 | 1768 | 1974 | ^c |
| Equatorial Guinea | Spain | NO | 1778 | 1968 | 1968 | Nohlen, Thibaut and Krennerich (1999, 351-366) |
| Malaysia | Britain | NO | 1786 | 1955 | 1957 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Australia | Britain | YES | 1788 | 1852 | 1901 | Waterhouse (2010, 231) |
| Guyana | Britain | NO | 1796 | 1892 | 1966 | ^c |
| Belize | Britain | YES | 1798 | 1854 | 1981 | ^c |
| Sri Lanka | Britain | NO | 1802 | 1911 | 1948 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | Britain | YES | 1802 | 1925 | 1962 | ^c |
| South Africa | Britain | YES | 1806 | 1853 | 1994 | Greene (2010a, 21) |
| Sierra Leone | Britain | NO | 1808 | 1925 | 1961 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Mauritius | Britain | YES | 1814 | 1886 | 1968 | Selvon (2012, 401-432) |
| Seychelles | Britain | YES | 1814 | 1948 | 1976 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| St. Lucia | Britain | YES | 1814 | 1925 | 1979 | ^c |
| Gambia | Britain | NO | 1816 | 1947 | 1965 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Singapore | Britain | NO | 1819 | 1948 | 1963 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 239-259) |
| Algeria | France | YES | 1830 | 1883 | 1962 | Aldrich (1996, 215) |
| Cote d'Ivoire | France | NO | 1830 | 1925 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| New Zealand | Britain | YES | 1840 | 1854 | 1907 | Greene (2010a, 20) |
| Gabon | France | NO | 1841 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| French Polynesia | France | NO | 1842 | 1946 | - | Aldrich (1996, 212, 215) |
| Hong Kong | Britain | NO | 1842 | 1985 | 1997 | Hong Kong Government (1984) |
| Comoros | France | NO | 1843 | 1947 | 1975 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Nigeria | Britain | NO | 1851 | 1923 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Vietnam | France | NO | 1859 | 1922 | 1945 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Bahrain | Britain | NO | 1861 | 1972 | 1971 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 49-56) |
| Djibouti | France | NO | 1862 | 1946 | 1977 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Benin | France | NO | 1863 | 1925 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Cambodia | France | NO | 1863 | 1947 | 1964 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Lesotho | Britain | NO | 1868 | 1960 | 1966 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Fiji | Britain | NO | 1874 | 1905 | 1970 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Ghana | Britain | NO | 1874 | 1926 | 1947 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Guinea-Bissau | Portugal | NO | 1879 | 1973 | 1974 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Congo | France | NO | 1880 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |

Elected Colonial Legislatures, continued

| Country | Colonizer ^a | >5% Eu. pop.? | Year colonized ^a | First year w/ legislature ^a | Year indep. | Source |
|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------|--|
| Guinea | France | NO | 1881 | 1925 | 1958 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Tunisia | France | YES | 1881 | 1956 | 1956 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Egypt | Britain | NO | 1882 | 1924 | 1922 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Botswana | Britain | NO | 1885 | 1920 | 1966 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| DR Congo | Belgium | NO | 1885 | 1960 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Solomon Islands | Britain | NO | 1885 | 1964 | 1978 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Myanmar | Britain | NO | 1886 | 1922 | 1948 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Macau | Portugal | NO | 1887 | 1976 | 1999 | Shiu-Hing (1989, 843) |
| Maldives | Britain | NO | 1887 | 1933 | 1965 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Brunei | Britain | NO | 1888 | - | 1984 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 47-51) |
| Somalia | Italy | NO | 1888 | 1956 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Eritrea | Italy | NO | 1890 | 1956 | 1950 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Uganda | Britain | NO | 1890 | 1958 | 1962 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Zambia | Britain | NO | 1890 | 1926 | 1964 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Zimbabwe | Britain | YES | 1890 | 1899 | 1980 | Willson, Passmore and Mitchell (1963, 1, 13) |
| Malawi | Britain | NO | 1891 | 1955 | 1964 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Kiribati | Britain | NO | 1892 | 1967 | 1979 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 673-685) |
| Tuvalu | Britain | NO | 1892 | 1967 | 1978 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 823-832) |
| United Arab Emirates | Britain | NO | 1892 | - | 1971 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 289-292) |
| Laos | France | NO | 1893 | 1946 | 1949 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Mali | France | NO | 1893 | 1925 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Burkina Faso | France | NO | 1895 | 1948 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Kenya | Britain | NO | 1895 | 1920 | 1963 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Madagascar | France | NO | 1895 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Chad | France | NO | 1898 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Guam | United States | NO | 1898 | 1970 | - | EB Guam ^e |
| Philippines | United States | NO | 1898 | 1907 | 1946 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Sudan | Britain | NO | 1898 | 1949 | 1956 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Central African Republic | France | NO | 1899 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Tonga | Britain | NO | 1900 | 1875 | 1970 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 809-822) |
| Mauritania | France | NO | 1903 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Swaziland | Britain | NO | 1903 | 1921 | 1968 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Papua New Guinea | Australia | NO | 1906 | 1951 | 1975 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Vanuatu | French | NO | 1906 | 1975 | 1980 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Bhutan | Britain | NO | 1910 | - | 1947 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Libya | Italy | NO | 1912 | 1956 | 1951 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Morocco | France | NO | 1912 | 1963 | 1956 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| East Timor | Portugal | NO | 1914 | 1973 | 1975 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Kuwait | Britain | NO | 1914 | 1938 | 1961 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 155-167) |
| Samoa | New Zealand | NO | 1914 | 1873 | 1962 | Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001a, 779-794) |
| Qatar | Britain | NO | 1916 | - | 1971 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| U.S. Virgin Islands | United States | YES | 1917 | 1970 | - | EB U.S. Virgin Islands ^e |
| Lebanon | France | NO | 1918 | 1923 | 1946 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Burundi | Belgium | NO | 1919 | 1953 | 1962 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Cameroon | France | NO | 1919 | 1946 | 1960 | Collier (1982, 37) |
| Namibia | South Africa | YES | 1919 | 1926 | 1990 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Rwanda | Belgium | NO | 1919 | 1955 | 1962 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Tanzania | Britain | NO | 1919 | 1958 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Togo | France | NO | 1919 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Iraq | Britain | NO | 1920 | 1922 | 1932 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Jordan | Britain | NO | 1920 | 1924 | 1946 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Nauru | Australia | NO | 1920 | 1951 | 1968 | Viviani (1970, 105) |
| Niger | France | NO | 1922 | 1946 | 1960 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Syria | France | NO | 1922 | 1918 | 1946 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |
| Israel | Britain | YES | 1923 | 1920 | 1948 | Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) |

^aColonizer and year colonized express identity of the colonizer from which the colony gained independence and year of colonization by that European power (as opposed to necessarily its first year being ruled by any European power). Legislature column is first year with elected legislature under colonial rule. - denotes that no elected legislature was created under colonial rule.

^bCoding no elected colonial legislatures in Spanish and Portuguese America is based on discussions from numerous secondary sources: Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), Finer (1997, 1383-1394), Hanson (1974), North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000), Posada-Carbó (1996), Przeworski (2009), Rogoziński (2000), and Stanley and Stein (1981). The text provides additional details on

town council elections and on the Spanish empire-wide assembly elections of 1809.

^cMany British Caribbean colonies were either colonized by European settlers, or gained through conquest but gained legislative representation shortly afterwards (Green, 1976, 65). These years are coded from Greene (2010b, 52, 70) and Kammen (1969, 11-12). Several others were ruled as Crown colonies for much of the 19th century and gained legislative representation afterwards. Belize is coded from EB Belize (see note e below). Guyana is coded from MacDonald (1992, 11-12). St. Lucia is coded from Nohlen (2005, 581). Trinidad and Tobago is coded from Coppedge and Zimmerman. (2016) (also see Nohlen (2005, 628)). Although Tobago had created a legislature before 1925, following the coding rule stated above, Trinidad’s data is used because Trinidad is the larger of the two islands.

^dNo legislature coded for Haiti based on discussions in Rogoziński (2000, 164-168) and Idowu (1968), which do not mention a legislature in Haiti but do in other contemporaneous French colonies.

^eAll sources noted as “EB” are the Encyclopædia Britannica (2017) page for that country.

Table A.2: Panel Data on Elected Legislatures in British Caribbean Colonies

| Country | Legislative years | Additional sources |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| Antigua and Barbuda | 1640-1867, 1951- | Dippel and Carvalho (2015), Nohlen (2005, 61-72) |
| Bahamas | 1729- | |
| Barbados | 1639- | |
| Belize | 1854-1871, 1936- | EB Belize |
| Bermuda | 1620- | |
| Dominica | 1760-1898, 1924- | Nohlen (2005, 223-4) |
| Grenada | 1760-1876, 1951- | Dippel and Carvalho (2015), Nohlen (2005, 301-315) |
| Guyana* | 1892- | |
| Jamaica | 1660-1865, 1884- | EB Jamaica |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 1640-1877, 1937- | Central Electoral Office (n.d.) |
| St. Lucia | 1925- | |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 1760-1866, 1951- | Dippel and Carvalho (2015), Nohlen (2005, 595-606) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1925- | |

Notes: The last column lists any additional sources for the country not stated in Table A.1. All sources noted as “EB” are the Encyclopædia Britannica (2017) page for that country.

* Guyana is the only British Caribbean colony that does not meet the 5% European population share threshold, and therefore is not included in Figure 4.

A.2 Additional Tables

Table A.3: Summary Statistics

| <i>Table 1 sample</i> | | | |
|---|--------|-----------|-------|
| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | N |
| Elected colonial legislature | 0.27 | 0.444 | 14471 |
| Settler colony | 0.561 | 0.496 | 14471 |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | -4.264 | 2.393 | 14471 |
| British colony | 0.443 | 0.497 | 14471 |
| Exec. constraints in metropole | 4.895 | 2.536 | 14471 |
| New World FE | 0.511 | 0.5 | 14471 |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | 2.366 | 3.955 | 14471 |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | 0.135 | 0.245 | 14471 |
| Forced settlement colony | 0.446 | 0.497 | 14471 |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | 1.475 | 1.97 | 14471 |
| <i>Table 2 sample</i> | | | |
| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | N |
| Legally enfranchised pop. % | 66.645 | 42.416 | 682 |
| Settler colony | 0.141 | 0.348 | 682 |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | 0.018 | 0.039 | 682 |
| British colony | 0.352 | 0.478 | 682 |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | 3.251 | 5.125 | 682 |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | 0.182 | 0.259 | 682 |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | 0.637 | 0.950 | 682 |

Table A.4: Table 1 with Century FE

| | DV: Elected legislature | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Settler colony | -0.00464 (0.641) | -0.0800 (0.648) | -0.820 (0.947) | -0.666 (1.021) | | | |
| British colony | | 0.262 (0.403) | | | | 4.593*** (0.689) | 4.547*** (0.737) |
| Settler*British colony | 2.967*** (0.654) | 2.545*** (0.704) | | | | | |
| Exec. constraints in metropole | | | 0.446*** (0.155) | 0.397*** (0.148) | 0.892*** (0.162) | | |
| Settler colony*Exec. constraints in metropole | | | 0.445*** (0.146) | 0.360** (0.155) | | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | | | | 0.162 (0.114) | 0.159 (0.126) |
| ln(Eu. pop. %)*British colony | | | | | | 0.708*** (0.151) | 0.731*** (0.150) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.0192 (0.0243) | | 0.0140 (0.0228) | | | 0.0843*** (0.0307) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 0.197 (0.780) | | -0.0971 (0.726) | | | 0.866 (0.797) |
| Forced settlement colony | | 0.569 (0.442) | | 0.437 (0.457) | | | 0.815* (0.433) |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | | 0.147* (0.0796) | | 0.180** (0.0731) | | | 0.0609 (0.0868) |
| Colony-years | 14,471 | 14,471 | 14,471 | 14,471 | 5,070 | 14,471 | 14,471 |
| Century FE? | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Sample | FULL | FULL | FULL | FULL | Settler col. | FULL | FULL |
| Colony FE? | NO | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO |
| | Marginal effect estimates | | | | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | 0.604*** (0.0773) | 0.510*** (0.0967) | | | | | |
| Settler colony High metro. exec. const. | | | 0.517*** (0.0689) | 0.426*** (0.0895) | | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | | | | 0.193*** (0.0250) | 0.187*** (0.0312) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -0.000393 (0.0542) | -0.00728 (0.0585) | | | | | |
| Settler colony Low metro. exec. const. | | | -0.00618 (0.0150) | -0.00687 (0.0213) | | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | | | | 0.0136 (0.0104) | 0.0134 (0.0109) |

Notes: Table 1 summarizes a series of logit regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and colony-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. Every specification contains century fixed effects. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variables under various values of conditioning variables. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.5: Table 1 with Cross-Section

| | DV: Elected legislature w/in 20 years of colonization | | | |
|---|---|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Settler colony | -0.588 (1.158) | -0.195 (1.243) | | |
| British colony | 0.255 (0.750) | 0.219 (0.776) | 1.963 (1.572) | 2.289 (1.768) |
| Settler*British colony | 2.923** (1.350) | 2.832** (1.410) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | 0.214 (0.241) | 0.206 (0.272) |
| ln(Eu. pop. %)*British colony | | | 0.177 (0.289) | 0.244 (0.327) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.0237 (0.0391) | | 0.0421 (0.0460) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 0.976 (1.013) | | 1.178 (0.934) |
| Forced settlement colony | | -0.410 (0.808) | | -0.168 (0.732) |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | | 0.190 (0.158) | | 0.169 (0.139) |
| Colonies | 119 | 119 | 119 | 119 |
| Sample | FULL | FULL | FULL | FULL |
| | Marginal effect estimates | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | 0.457*** (0.121) | 0.501*** (0.155) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) British rule | | | 0.0608*** (0.0174) | 0.0646*** (0.0209) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -0.0383 (0.0674) | -0.0130 (0.0794) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) Non-British rule | | | 0.0164 (0.0193) | 0.0149 (0.0207) |

Notes: Table A.5 replaces the Table 1 specifications with a cross-section of 119 colonies. The dependent variable equals 1 if the colony had an elected legislature within 20 years of colonization. The bottom part of the table presents the marginal effect estimates and corresponding standard error estimates for the European settlers variables under various values of other conditioning variables. Columns 3 and 4 are the analogs of Columns 6 and 7, respectively, in Table 1, and the European population share variable equals its maximum value for the colony within 20 years of colonization. There is no analog to Column 5 in Table 1 because that specification compares colonies over time. There is no analog to Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 because the cross-sectional models do not converge with the metropolitan executive constraints variable. There are also no time controls in any specification because the models do not converge. However, unreported linear models with the post-1850 fixed effect yield similar results. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.6: Table 2 without British Colonial Control

| | DV: Legally enfranchised pop % | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Settler colony | -41.38*** (14.48) | -32.48** (12.37) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | -11.46*** (2.680) | -9.355** (3.684) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.482 (0.407) | | 0.394 (0.358) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 23.75 (18.67) | | 24.99 (17.93) |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | | -8.361* (4.239) | | -4.918 (6.061) |
| Territory-years | 682 | 682 | 682 | 682 |
| R-squared | 0.366 | 0.441 | 0.402 | 0.446 |

Notes: Table A.6 is identical to Table 2 except it does not control for British colonialism nor the interaction term. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Table 2 with Majority Rule DV

| | DV: Legally enfranchised pop % | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Settler colony | -0.428** (0.208) | -0.432*** (0.149) | | |
| British colony | -0.143* (0.0842) | -0.0620 (0.0758) | -0.361 (0.263) | -0.110 (0.228) |
| Settler*British colony | -0.216 (0.218) | -0.0560 (0.129) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | -0.127*** (0.0390) | -0.147*** (0.0401) |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British colony | | | -0.0387 (0.0447) | -0.000586 (0.0379) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.00889 (0.00637) | | 0.00741 (0.00523) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 0.430* (0.215) | | 0.470** (0.190) |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | | -0.0533 (0.0363) | | 0.0180 (0.0561) |
| Territory-years | 682 | 682 | 682 | 682 |
| R-squared | 0.401 | 0.478 | 0.452 | 0.506 |
| Marginal effect estimates | | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | -0.644*** (0.0640) | -0.488*** (0.0488) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | -0.127*** (0.0390) | -0.147*** (0.0401) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -0.428** (0.208) | -0.432*** (0.149) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | -0.127*** (0.0390) | -0.147*** (0.0401) |

Notes: Table A.7 is identical to Table 2 except the dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether or not a majority of adults can legally vote in elections. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Table 2 with Cross-Section

| | DV: Avg. pop. % legally enfranchised, 1955-70 | | | |
|---|---|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Settler colony | -38.22* (20.25) | -35.16* (18.09) | | |
| British colony | -15.69** (7.334) | -9.229 (8.130) | -20.64 (27.63) | 0.154 (25.02) |
| Settler*British colony | -11.89 (21.50) | -0.906 (16.47) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | -11.15*** (4.077) | -11.38** (4.779) |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British colony | | | -0.821 (4.610) | 2.214 (4.265) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.388 (0.459) | | 0.278 (0.403) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 22.65 (20.97) | | 25.24 (20.54) |
| Protestant missionaries/10,000 pop. in 1923 | | -6.484 (4.167) | | -2.402 (6.076) |
| Territories | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 |
| R-squared | 0.319 | 0.409 | 0.379 | 0.430 |
| Marginal effect estimates | | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | -50.11*** (7.204) | -36.06*** (8.123) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | -11.97*** (2.151) | -9.171** (3.567) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -38.22* (20.25) | -35.16* (18.09) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | -11.15*** (4.077) | -11.38** (4.779) |

Notes: Table A.8 replaces the territory-years from Table 2 with a cross-section of the same 43 African countries. The dependent variable is average adult population percentage legally enfranchised between 1955 and 1970. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


A.3 Additional Discussion of Iberian America

A.3.1 Nineteenth-Century Competition

Although Iberian American countries do not exhibit evidence of institutional transplantation during colonial rule, anti-monarchical ideas that inspired their wars of liberation could plausibly have triggered early democratic gains after independence (Hariri, 2012, 474). Related, many of these post-colonial countries modeled their constitutions on that of the United States. Although this argument is somewhat different than claims of *colonial*-era institutional transplantation, it suggests an alternative pathway through which European settlers could have spurred democratic competition. However, this section shows that most Iberian American countries experienced a long time lapse between independence and the onset of competitive elections, albeit with some intra-regional variance. This reinforces the evidence that colonial institutional transplantation was mostly limited to British settlers (H1).

Main pattern. Figure A.1 demonstrates the long time delay between independence and the emergence of competitive institutions. The solid black line presents the percentage of the 19 Iberian American countries in Miller’s (2015) dataset with the highest level on his trichotomous contestation variable (which is calculated by combining six existing indices), which corresponds to either “competitive oligarchies” (if the country has high competition but low participation) or “democracies.”²⁷ The figure demonstrates the rarity of highly competitive institutions in Iberian America (black line) throughout the 19th century, reaching roughly half the region only in the mid-20th century and then—after a period of democratic reversals—only becoming preponderant since the late 20th century. Although most of the world was undemocratic in the 19th century, the dashed black line in Panel A shows that Iberian America failed to experience the same gains in contestation as in Western Europe. Iberian America has experienced more competition than the rest of the non-European world (gray line), although this gap did not become permanent and pronounced until the Third Wave of democratization when most of Iberian America finally consolidated competitive institutions—well more than a century after independence for most of these countries (note that the “rest of world” countries change over time when countries gain independence, and therefore the composition of this sample changes dramatically after 1945).

Figure A.1: Political Competition in Iberian America and Elsewhere, 1830–2004



²⁷Miller’s (2015) data is only available for independent countries, whereas the legislatures variable presented above was only coded for colonies.

Only when lowering the contestation threshold to the medium level on Miller’s (2015) trichotomous contestation variable, as shown in Panel B, is it possible to find evidence potentially consistent with institutional transplantation closer to independence in Iberian America. The majority of countries in the region experienced at least medium levels of political competition between 1850 and 1900, and therefore correspond to what Miller (2015) labels as either “electoral oligarchy” (medium contestation and low participation) or “electoral authoritarian” (medium contestation and high participation). For reference, Miller’s (2015, 506) motivating examples of electoral oligarchy are the United Kingdom from 1815-34, Mexico from 1917-54, and Egypt from 1922-52. The motivating examples of electoral authoritarianism are Russia since 1989, Mexico from 1955-1999, and Egypt since 1976 (the dataset ends in 2004). Using a different dataset, Przeworski (2009, 14) shows a similar pattern as in Panel B of Figure A.1: Latin America compares favorably to Western Europe throughout the 19th century in terms of the frequency of elections (regardless of their democratic caliber), a topic that has received attention in qualitative research as well (Posada-Carbó, 1996).

It is possible that early limited elections in some Iberian American countries resulted from colonial European settler institutional transplantation, and in turn made subsequent democracy more likely. Related to this idea, Miller (2015) provides evidence from a broader global sample that early electoral competition correlates with later democratization. This possibility, however, is not well-supported for European settlers in Iberian America. Table A.9 demonstrates two pieces of contradictory evidence. First, there is a negative rather than positive correlation between European population share at independence and the percentage of the country’s first 10 years of independence in which it scored at least the medium level on Miller’s (2015) contestation variable, denoted as the extent of “early competition.” Second, among all years after the first decade of independence, there is a negative rather than positive correlation between the amount of early competition and aggregate *polity2* score from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Gurr, 2014). The lack of support for institutional transplantation here is not a function of low statistical power, either, because the sign of the coefficient estimates go in the wrong direction. Przeworski (2009) provides an explanation consistent with these findings: Iberian America’s experimentation with elections at low levels of income undermined prospects for future democratization. Competition at low income levels created unstable regimes, which in turn destabilized future regimes.

Table A.9: Settlers, Early Competition, and Democracy in Iberian America

| DV: | Early competition | <i>polity2</i> |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Years | ≤10 yrs. indep. | >10 yrs. indep. |
| | (1) | (2) |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | -0.123 (0.122) | |
| Early competition | | -0.748 (1.354) |
| Country-years | 19 | 3,189 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 |
| R-squared | 0.050 | 0.004 |

Notes: Table A.9 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Evidence of mechanisms. Historically oriented analyses emphasize the post-independence challenges that Iberian American countries faced to creating competitive institutions following the absence of such inheritance from Iberian colonial rule. North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000) argue that the breakdown of the colonial authoritarian order—which occurred after Latin American countries gained independence in the early 19th century through anti-colonial wars—left elites scrambling to create a new institutional equilibrium. “Citizens in the new societies were unlikely to be able to police adherence to limits on political power. Instead, these conditions fostered the development of an authoritarian system. The absence of widespread support for constitutional principles made adherence to them unlikely” (39). Instead, elites attempted to

reconstruct “the authoritarian-autocratic model of 16th century Spain and Latin America” (41) in response to widespread political disorder. Anti-monarchical sentiments tended to result in disorder rather than in competitive governance because the Crown was central to political order under Iberian rule (31). Removing this coordination device explains post-independence political “chaos” (Morse, 1964, 157-8), and explains why the “most enduring [political] problem was that of reconstructing legitimate authority in the absence of the king” (Safford, 1987, 56). The written letter of the formal constitutions was unimportant because there was no representative tradition that induced compliance with them (North, Summerhill and Weingast, 2000, 40-41), and reasons related to H2a provided elites with incentives to counter republican and liberal principles that “conflicted with the system of maintaining corporate privileges; for example, landed elites’ right to labor, the independence and power of the church and the military” (38).

Regional variation. Although Figure A.1 provides aggregate support for H1 among Iberian American countries, there was some regional variation in the timing of electoral reforms to promote competition. However, even in cases that experienced earlier gains—Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Uruguay—each experienced at least one collapse in competitive institutions during the 20th century. Neither these four nor the rest of Iberian America became consistently democratic until after 1980.

Chile is typically considered a case of early electoral reform. Unlike most of the region, it managed to avoid persistent warfare in the 19th century (North, Summerhill and Weingast, 2000, 30). “Competitive elections were held in Chile as early as the 1830s, although democratic limitations included a suffrage restricted by property and literacy requirements, the absence of the secret vote, and the subordination of the legislature to the executive” (Collier, 1999, 59), an argument that finds support in considerable research (Valenzuela 1996; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 176). Albeit in the context of franchise expansion rather than democratic competition, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) discuss Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay as exceptional in the region for their large European population shares. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 234-5) discuss the differences between Costa Rica and the rest of Central America: “The crucial factors setting it apart were the relative weakness of the oligarchy and relative strength of the rural middle class which had their roots in colonial times,” when Costa Rica was “poor and sparsely populated.” “After 1889 responsible government and contestation became institutionalized, but property, income, and literacy qualifications kept the suffrage still highly restricted.” Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 160-1) also code Argentina and Uruguay as the first South American countries to become fully democratic (in 1912 and 1919, respectively), although neither of these cases provide evidence of institutional transplantation near independence. Democratization occurred after nearly a century of periodic warfare following independence.

A.3.2 Assessing Institutional Evolution in Iberian America

The absence of representative institutions in colonial Iberian America implies that examining franchise size during colonial rule is not relevant. However, post-colonial evidence is still relevant for assessing H2a. Colonial-era Iberian settlers created countries with among the highest levels of land inequality in the world. Therefore, evidence of early franchise expansion in the region would provide disconfirming evidence for H2a. Instead, this section shows that all Iberian American countries featured very limited franchises throughout the 19th century. Large franchises did not become prevalent in the region until the 1950s, more than a century after independence for almost all these countries. Furthermore, qualitative evidence shows that landed interests consistently acted to thwart franchise expansion, and Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) provide additional supportive evidence by examining within-region variance. Regarding contestation reversals, this section also discusses how landed inequality contributed to democratic instability in the 20th century.

Main pattern for resisted enfranchisement. Figure A.2 plots political participation over time. The black line plots the percentage of Iberian American countries with high participation on Miller’s (2015) dichotomous participation variable, calculated by combining six existing participation indices.²⁸ High participation became prevalent in the region only after 1950, and the end of the section discusses regional variation. One caveat is that franchise size was low across the world throughout the 19th century. The dashed black line shows this pattern for Western Europe, and the gray line for all other countries in the world (note that the “rest of world” countries change over time when countries gain independence, and therefore the composition of this sample changes dramatically after 1945). A large gap emerged between Iberian America and Western Europe for most of the 20th century. Data from Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) in the 19th and early 20th centuries summarized in Table A.10 reveals a similar pattern: Iberian America featured a small percentage of its population that participated in elections both in absolute terms and relative to the United States and Canada. Iberian America instead more closely resembles the rest of the post-colonial world in the 20th century despite its seeming advantages from experiencing a much longer period of post-colonial governance (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008; Olsson, 2009). Overall, consistent with H2a, these patterns show that Iberian America experienced over a century in which the dominant regional trend was limited political participation.

Figure A.2: Political Participation in Iberian America and Elsewhere, 1830–2004




Table A.10: Percent of Population Voting in Elections in the Americas

| Countries/Years | 1840-1880 | 1881-1920 | 1921-1940 |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| U.S./Canada | 13.0% | 20.5% | 39.5% |
| Iberian America | 0.6% | 5.7% | 10.2% |
| ARG/CRI/URU | - | 8.8% | 16.3% |
| Rest of Ib.Am. | 0.6% | 4.2% | 7.2% |

Sources: Figures in the cells are the average percentage of the population voting in elections, based on averaging Engerman and Sokoloff’s (2005) select data for various countries and years within the different categories. Following Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are distinguished from the rest of the region.


Evidence for resisted enfranchisement mechanisms. Iberian American settler colonies fit the theoretical scope conditions that anticipate resisted enfranchisement. There is widespread consensus that the distribution of land in Iberian American is highly unequal and that this inequality dates back to the colonial era. Skidmore and Smith (2005, 22) describe the rise of a colonial landed elite: “Typified by vast territorial holdings and debt peonage, the haciendas [great landed estates] often became virtually autonomous rural communities governed by the owners of their foremen. Land titles were hereditary, and most were held by

²⁸Roughly half of the observations in Miller’s dataset have the low value of this variable (505).

creoles. By the mid-eighteenth century, the [Spanish] crown was confronting a proud New World nobility.” Frankema (2009*b*, 35) describes how dividing up land created differences even among European settlers: “In the early colonisation phase in the 16th century the prospects of fortune attracted a rapidly increasing stream of new immigrants. The early conquest-settlers divided the best tracts of land. In due time the chances of social mobility started to decline and increasingly depended on birth and entrepreneurship.”

Various datasets on land inequality substantiate the extreme degree of land inequality in Iberian America. Frankema (2009*a*) calculates a Gini coefficient on the distribution of land for 111 countries and dependencies during the 20th century. Higher numbers indicate greater inequality. The median land Gini coefficient among the 19 Iberian American countries is 38% higher than that for other countries (77.5 versus 56.2), and the difference in means is statistically significant. Using Vanhanen’s (1997) data on the percentage of total farms that were family farms—as opposed to larger landholdings, such as haciendas or plantations—in 1868 shows evidence that this divergence had indeed already occurred during the 19th century, although the number of territories in the dataset is somewhat limited. Lower numbers indicate greater inequality. In the 17 Iberian American countries, the median percent family farms was 79% lower than in the 22 other European and non-colonized countries with data (5% versus 23.5%), and the difference in means is statistically significant. Figure A.3 shows the distribution of these variables using kernel density plots.

Figure A.3: Inequality in Iberian America



Notes: Figure A.3 presents kernel density plots of Frankema’s (2009*a*) land Gini index (Panel A) and of Vanhanen’s (1997) percent family farms variable (Panel B), with Iberian America distinguished from the rest of the world. In Panel A, higher values indicate greater inequality. In Panel B, lower values indicate greater inequality.

Qualitative research on democratization in Iberian America argues that unequal landowning patterns engendered anti-democratic legacies. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 155) claim in Spanish America, “the nature of large landowners and other elite sectors was crucial for the intensity of resistance against democratization.” Similarly, Collier (1999) evaluates the role that different classes played in transitions to democracy in Europe and South America in the late 19th and 20th centuries. She devotes little attention to landed elites because they never positively contributed to transitions. Instead, “the hegemony and dominance of the politically privileged traditional elite and/or corporate groups” predisposed them to oppose franchise expansion (34). As another example, Skidmore and Smith (2005, 50) discuss how landed elites in several Iberian American countries acquiesced to limited franchise reforms starting in the late 19th century only in reaction to working-class growth. This provided incentives for elites to collude with the middle class to prevent full franchise expansion.

Regional variation. As with competition, there is some regional variation. Engerman and Sokoloff (2005)

hypothesize that countries with lower levels of income inequality and land inequality, and higher levels of population homogeneity, should be less resistant to expanding the franchise—based on similar logic as H2a posited here. Their main contrast is between the United States and Canada versus Iberian America, but they also discuss some within-region variation for Iberian America. “Those countries that are thought to have long had more economically and ethnically homogenous populations, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, were the first to implement suffrage institutions associated with greater access to and use of the franchise” (917).²⁹ Table A.10 shows this pattern. However, they also offer a caveat: “Although this pattern is consistent with the hypothesis, the limited information available means that this is but a weak test” (917), as they do not have country-level data for any of these three countries in the 19th century on the percentage of the population that voted in elections (910-1). Overall, despite caveats, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) highlight some variation within Iberian America that is consistent with H2a.

Contestation backsliding. Restricting attention to colonial-era institutions, H2b is irrelevant for Iberian America because there were no inherited electoral institutions to overturn. However, as noted, some Iberian American countries had established competitive political institutions by the first few decades of the 20th century, and the remainder of the century generated a prolonged contest between the working class and political elites over democracy (Collier and Collier, 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Collier, 1999). Whether examining high or medium levels of contestation, Figure A.1 shows that the region experienced two major waves of contestation backsliding during the 20th century, which correspond with Huntington’s (1993) first and second reverse waves of democracy.

Although it is infeasible here to offer a comprehensive analysis of problems of democratization and democratic consolidation in 20th century Iberian America, it is useful to highlight that conditions dating back to colonial-era European settlers contributed to regime instability. For example, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 155) offer the broad argument for the region that “the nature of large landowners and other elite sectors was crucial for the intensity of resistance against democratization.” Similarly, Collier and Collier (1991) argue that organized labor was crucial for breaking landed power to push countries in the region toward democracy, with reversals stemming from the desire to curb labor power. As discussed above, the extreme extent of land inequality in the region dates back to colonial European settlements. Across a broad sample, Ansell and Samuels (2014) provide statistical evidence that higher land inequality covaries with a lower likelihood of democratic transitions.

Argentina provides an informative example. Its very large European population and relative wealth would seem to imply an easy case for existing pro-settler theories to explain. However, instead of inheriting stable proto-democratic institutions, “Argentina’s political history is marked by a recurrent pattern of institutional instability” (Levitsky and Murillo, 2005a, 22). Even nearly a century after independence when Argentina experienced its first democratic regime, this merely preceded a pattern of military coups reversing democratic gains, six between 1930 and 1976. This has provoked scholars such as Levitsky and Murillo (2005b) to attempt to explain “the country’s persistent failure to build enduring political and economic institutions and its continued propensity toward crisis” (1) and O’Donnell (1994) to understand why, as late as the early 1990s, Argentina lacked the type of institutions that should produce enduring democracy.

Furthermore, the most plausible explanations by area specialists for democratic consolidation across much of the region starting in the 1980s—more than 150 years after independence for many of these countries—focus on popular mobilization by the working class (Collier 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 2016, 110-116) or on the United States’ foreign policy shift toward promoting democracy in the region (Mainwaring and

²⁹ Although Argentina is exceptional in the region for its high percentage of Europeans, it still has extremely high inequality. It ranks 11 out of Frankema’s (2009a) 111 territories for highest land Gini, and 11 out of Vanhanen’s (1997) 40 countries for lowest percentage family farms in 1868, at only 5%.

Perez-Liñan 2014, 230-1; Levitsky and Way 2010), as opposed to emphasizing the democratic virtues of colonial European settlers.

A.4 Additional Information for Summary of Implications

The analyses of Tables 4 and 6 are premised on the following hoop test: having (1) a legislature in 1900 and (2) at least one year with high contestation (or full democracy) in the first decade of independence are individually necessary conditions for colonial-era settlers to have contributed to creating full democracy. For Table 4, only South Africa passes the hoop test, as the text discusses. Three countries from Table 6 pass the hoop test, although these cases do not provide strong evidence that European settlers made important contributions to post-colonial democracy. In the Bahamas and Barbados, settlers created legislatures that lasted uninterrupted until independence, and they have been democratic since independence (Table 6). However, comparing these territories to others in the region does not support the counterfactual claim that had European settlers not created and sustained early legislatures, then they would not have experienced democracy after independence. As shown in the discussion surrounding Table 6, most colonies in the region regained legislative representation at least several decades before independence—in spite of resistance from European settlers—and most have also been democratic since independence. Therefore, despite the longer uninterrupted history of colonial legislatures in Bahamas and Barbados, they are not distinct from other countries in their region in which European settlers did not create the legislature inherited at independence. The same argument applies to Jamaica, which regained legislative representation in 1884 following its legislature disbandment in 1865. In this case, the 1900 cutoff year does not capture the extent to which European settlers' political influence had decreased by the pre-1900 year in which the Jamaican legislature was re-created.

Besides Africa (Table 4) and the British Caribbean (Table 6), most countries in which colonial European settlers ever exceeded the 5% population share threshold discussed in Section A.1.2 are in Iberian America. As discussed in the text and earlier in the appendix, no Iberian American countries created legislatures nor experienced high contestation in their first decade of independence in the 19th century. Table A.11 provides information on colonial-era legislatures and post-colonial democracy for the remaining territories that exceeded 5% European population share and had gained independence by 2018, most of which featured large slave populations at some point in their history. Two countries from Table A.11 do not fail the hoop test: Israel and Mauritius. However, a closer look at both cases raises questions about the importance of European settlers for promoting post-colonial democracy.

British Palestine was a League of Nations Mandate territory briefly ruled by Britain in the interwar period experienced a large influx of Jewish immigrants from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world, with a particularly large inflow occurring in the final years of colonial rule after World War II prior to its contested independence. Not only were the majority of these settlers not British (Staetsky, Sheps and Boyd, 2013)—as opposed to the overwhelming majority of Europeans originating from the *metropolitan* country in other settler colonies—it is exceedingly difficult to assess the percentage that derived from any Western European country, which is why Easterly and Levine (2016) do not include any data points for Israel (personal correspondence).³⁰ Lange (2009, 26) does not code Israel as a British colony because of its “unique and informal type of foreign domination.”

The argument against European settlers contributing to post-colonial democracy in Mauritius is similar to that for Jamaica: a legislature was created only after settlers' political and economic influence had waned significantly, although this event occurred before 1900. Britain permanently gained control of Mauritius

³⁰Note that throughout the paper, “European” refers exclusively to “Western European” because no research has suggested Eastern European colonizers such as Russia promoted democracy.

during the Napoleonic wars and governed it directly as a Crown Colony just like St. Lucia and Trinidad—two exceptions to the broader pattern in the Caribbean of British settlers creating elected legislatures shortly after colonization. Britain did not permit legislative elections in Mauritius until 1886, more than 50 years after the end of slavery had fundamentally altered its economy and undermined European settler dominance. This delay occurred in part because Britain did not want to “place the power in the hands of an oligarchy of the upper classes” that would exclude non-whites from power (Will, 1966, 700), and therefore Britain granted electoral representation only in response to the declining influence of European settlers.

Table A.11: Colonial Democratic Legacies in Other Settler Colonies

| Country | Independence year/ first year non-Eu. rule | Legislature in 1900?* | Democratic years (high contestation years) in first decade |
|-----------------------|---|-----------------------|--|
| Haiti | 1804 | NO | 0 |
| Israel | 1948 | YES* | 10 (10) |
| Mauritius | 1968 | YES | 10 (10) |
| Cape Verde | 1975 | NO | 0 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 1975 | NO | 0 |
| Seychelles | 1976 | NO | 0 |

Notes: The sample in Table A.11 consists of every colony coded as a settler colony in Table A.1 that is not in continental Africa, the British Caribbean, or Iberian America and had gained independence by 2018. Last column is the count of democratic years in the first decade of independence using Boix, Miller and Rosato’s (2013) binary democracy measure. This column also presents, in parentheses, the count of years with high contestation in the first decade, using data from Miller (2015) where available. Every country in Table A.11 is coded by Owolabi (2015) as a forced settlement colony except for Israel.

* For territories such as Israel that were colonized after 1900, this column indicates whether a legislature was established within the first 20 years of colonization.

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