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Agnes Cornell, Jørgen Møller,
Svend-Erik Skaaning, and
Staffan I. Lindberg

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Please address comments and/or queries for information to:

V-Dem Institute
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711
SE 40530 Gothenburg
Sweden
E-mail: contact@v-dem.net

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Civil Society, Party Institutionalization, and Democratic Breakdown in the Interwar Period*

Agnes Cornell
Assistant Professor, PhD
Aarhus University

Jørgen Møller
Professor, PhD
Aarhus University

Svend-Erik Skaaning
Professor, PhD
Aarhus University

Staffan I. Lindberg
Professor, of Political Science
Director, V-Dem Institute
University of Gothenburg

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Abstract

The relationship between the strength of civil society and democratic survival in the interwar period has been much debated. Prominent studies have questioned the existence of a positive association, arguing that the relationship is conditioned by the level of party institutionalization. This revisionist perspective has been vindicated by case studies of important European cases, in particular Germany and Italy. But due to a lack of cross-national data, neither the direct effect of civil society nor the alternative perspective has so far been subjected to a comprehensive statistical analysis. In this paper we enlist novel data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project that enable us to carry out such an assessment of all democratic spells in the interwar years. Our survival analysis demonstrates that a vibrant civil society generally contributed to democratic survival in this period and that this effect was not moderated by the level of party institutionalization.

Introduction

The importance of civil society for democratic stability has been emphasized since the publication of Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1988[1835/1840]; see also Dahl 1961; Lederer 1940; Lipset et al. 1956; Kornhauser 1959). In the early 1990s, the thesis was revitalized (e.g., Putnam et al. 1993; Shils 1991; Cohen & Rogers 1992), leading Pérez-Díaz (1993, 40), among others, to conclude that democratic consolidation could only be successful in the context of a vibrant civil society.¹ However, the notion about the propitious political effects of civil society has repeatedly been challenged (see Bermeo 2003, 8–15). One of the most influential objections contends that the effect of civil society on democratic survival is conditional on the level of political institutionalization (Huntington 1968; Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Armony 2004; Riley 2010). More particularly, it has been argued that civil society is likely to be negative for democratic stability at low levels of party institutionalization as input from a vigorous associational life is apt to overwhelm the political system when it is not channeled by strong parties.

This revisionist perspective has been supported by case-studies (Berman 1997; 1998; Riley 2010) and a more general pattern matching (Ertman 1998) within interwar Europe. But due to the lack of cross-national data, neither the proposition about the positive direct effect of civil society nor the revisionist qualification has been subjected to a comprehensive statistical analysis (cf. Berg-Schlosser & Mitchell 2002; Tusalem 2007; Zimmermann 1988).² In this paper we enlist novel data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2015a) that enable us to carry out such an assessment of all democratic spells in the interwar years.

We focus on the interwar period for two reasons. First, from the classical treatments of Lederer (1940), Kornhauser (1959), and Lipset et al. (1956, 88-89) via Huntington (1968) to a series of more recent contributions (Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Riley 2010), the interwar period has been central to the debate about the effects of civil society on democratic survival. Second, this period, delimited by the two world wars, presents relevant variation on the key variables based on a limited case universe of countries with democratic spells. Apart from Japan, all countries with democratic spells in these years were European, Latin American, or belonged to the set of former British settler colonies. The variation in democratic trajectories between these countries enables us to carry out systematic statistical tests of both the direct effect of civil society on democratic survival and of whether the relationship is

¹ The literature on civil society and democratic stability can be seen as a subset of a more general literature on the relationship between the advent of civil society and modern liberty (see Gellner 1994).

² To our knowledge, the only exception is a recent working paper by Bernhard et al. (2015), which, however, differs from our approach as it employs a thicker measure of democracy, a thicker measure of civil society strength (that is also based on indicators of freedom of association), and does not place special emphasis on the interwar period.

moderated by the degree of political institutionalization. Meanwhile, the limited case universe reduces the risk of causal heterogeneity and it means that we retain an ability to interpret these results with the actual country trajectories in mind.

The interwar period is therefore the context to revisit if we wish to bring new evidence to the debate described above. Indeed, the entire revisionist literature is so heavily based on developments in interwar Europe that we would have little confidence in the empirical purchase of its expectations if they were not borne out by a large-n assessment of this period.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the claim that civil society has an independent effect on democratic survival and the notion that this effect is moderated by the level of party institutionalization. Second, we subject these two propositions to survival (aka. event history) analysis of up to 41 countries for the period 1918–1939. The analysis shows that civil society strength decreases the likelihood of democratic breakdown. These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of potential confounders such as constitutional arrangements, socio-economic development, land inequality, and ethnic fractionalization. However, the analysis does not support the notion that party institutionalization conditions this relationship. The final section concludes.

Civil Society and Democratic Stability: Two Positions

With respect to the definition of civil society we generally follow Diamond (1994, 5), who conceptualizes it as “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, selfgenerating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.” However, we disagree with Diamond’s last aspect, that is, the emphasis on the legal order or a set of shared rules, as we do not think that the specific values or behavior of the organizations should be taken into account. This point is important to avoid introducing selection bias, which would be the case if we for example excluded anti-democratic organizations (see Armony 2004; Riley 2010, 10-11). The only voluntary groups we exclude from the definition of civil society are therefore political parties and outright criminal organizations such as mafia groups.

How does civil society, so conceived, bear upon democratic stability? The seminal treatment by Lipset et al. (1956) presents a forceful account of a direct, positive relationship between civil society and democratic stability. Lipset et al. argue that the key to the institutionalization of democracy is the existence of voluntary but structured subgroups that make up relatively independent centers of power while at the same time retaining a basic loyalty to the broader polity. Such voluntary associations serve a

number of functions that are vital for democracy. First, they provide and communicate new opinions to the citizenry. Second, they serve as an arena in which citizens become versed in politics and which stimulate their political participation at the national level. Third, they make up bases of political opposition to the powers-that-be. Lipset et al. (1956) summarize these functions in two categories: *external functions*, that is, secondary organizations opposing the power of the central body, and *internal functions*, that is, secondary associations increasing the political involvement of their members.

These arguments are broadly similar to those presented by Putnam et al. (1993, 89–90) in their influential work on democracy in Italy. Putnam et al. also highlight the internal and external effects of civil society – but with a slight twist. That twist has to do with the external functions, which enhance social collaboration by articulating and aggregating interests; a point which obviously differs in emphasis from the ability to guard the guardians. Nonetheless, both accounts present a one-sided story about the auspicious effects of civil society on democracy (see Bermeo 2003, 8–11).

These arguments are further supported by a number of classical works of social science. Both Lipset et al. and Putnam et al. invoke Alexis de Tocqueville's (1988[1835/1840]) work when arguing for this relationship. Tocqueville's definition of civil society differs somewhat from especially that of Putnam (see Welch 2006) but Tocqueville also emphasizes both the internal and external functions of what he took to be civil society organizations. Most important for Tocqueville is the way voluntary associations increase the political involvement of their members and make up barriers against centralization of power. These arguments are basically identical to the two set of functions that Lipset et al. refer to. Finally, especially Lipset et al. are also heavily indebted to the so-called "mass society" perspective. This perspective in a sense updates Tocqueville's notion that modern democracy produces a kind of "individualism", which makes citizens withdraw from political life and therefore stop presenting the necessary opposition to the centralizing aims of the powers-that-be. Following Tocqueville, the mass society perspective construes civil society organizations as the only way to avoid this atomism of modern mass society, and thereby to create a stable democracy (Lederer 1940; Kornhauser 1959).

What emerges from this literature is thus the general message that a vibrant civil society creates a virtuous circle that stabilizes democracy to the extent that undemocratic elites and undemocratic social movements are unlikely to prevail. In summary, the point is that civil society creates engaged and vigilant citizens, who get involved politically and mobilize against transgressions of power. It follows that a vibrant civil society has a number of important consequences that are conducive to democratic stability. First, if the government attempts to centralize power in a way that threatens democracy, citizens will mobilize in order to fend off these initiatives. Second, pro-democratic movements and

parties will likewise actively mobilize and protect democracy if mass-based radical political movements and parties present a challenge to the political system (Lederer 1940; Kornhauser 1959; see Riley 2010, 6-8). However, as both elites and masses would anticipate this, the most important empirical implications of strong civil societies are non-events; the absence of situations of political crisis of the kind that threaten to topple the system (Svensson 1986, 133). Furthermore, if a situation with the potential to produce crisis emerges, the political system will normally be able to defuse tensions in a peaceful and constitutional manner, even before citizens mobilize to fend off the challenges.

A telling illustration can be found in the interwar trajectory of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom had developed one of the earliest modern civil societies and throughout the interwar period large groups of citizens were schooled in cooperative values and political participation by partaking in this rich associational life. During the 1920s and 1930s, the United Kingdom experienced a series of potentially destabilizing situations, including a nasty spell of economic depression beginning in 1929 and lasting well into the 1930s. But the British political system was extremely stable in the face of these crises. When ruptures threatened in Britain – such as during the general strike of 1926 and the political crisis of 1931 – large-scale violence did not erupt and strong groups mobilized to peacefully deal with the situation. Likewise, no anti-system parties were able to use the crises to mobilize to any significant degree (Mitchell 2000). In fact, even during the intense stress of World War I, the British political system had proved remarkably stable. As Payne (1996, 73-74) has pointed out the destructiveness of World War I put the political systems of all belligerents under severe pressure. But “[w]hereas the stable western European democratic systems were able to respond with various forms of coalition ‘national union’ governments, the situation deteriorated further in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe”. The proponents of the civil society thesis would argue that, in the context of a vibrant civil society, it was well-nigh impossible to establish the kinds of *de facto* dictatorship that other belligerents experienced.

The counterfactual is a social order with an inherent propensity to create political conjunctures, whether triggered from outside events or developments inside the system. It follows that countries with weakly developed associational landscapes are likely to experience repeated bouts of political crisis, a general inability to deal with such crises in an efficient way within the rules of the democratic system, a significant mobilization of undemocratic political movements, and passivity on behalf of the citizens in the face of acts of government or non-government groups which transgress democratic rights.

Numerous empirical examples from the interwar period could be adduced to illustrate this. In interwar East-Central Europe, where civil societies were notoriously weak, we thus encounter vicious circles of political crisis, often met by undemocratic acts of government which were passively accepted by the citizens, all of which in a context where undemocratic political movements were able to gather

substantial support and threaten the democratic system from the inside (Mann 2004). In Latin America we also find political systems repeatedly being toppled by crisis and extremist demands, without it provoking reactions in the form of substantial mobilization in order to defend the democratic system (Bulmer-Thomas 1987; Drake 2009).

The first proposition that we test in this paper is thus that strong civil societies decrease the risk of democratic breakdown. However, the widespread praise of civil society in general and the notion that it is conducive to democratic stability in particular has repeatedly faced criticism (see Bermeo 2003, 8–15). Critics have emphasized that the vibrant civil societies of interwar Germany, Austria, and (Northern) Italy did not hinder democratic breakdowns. Indeed, they arguably fueled the flames that would devour democracy. Referring back to Huntington's (1968) seminal work on political order, scholars have used these cases to make the argument that civil society was not an unmitigated blessing for democracy in the interwar years (Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Armony 2004; Riley 2010).

It is not that these critics make the general claim that strong civil societies are *always* bad for democracy. Their message is that political institutionalization is needed to channel the input of an effervescent civil society (Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Riley 2010). Two different dynamics drive this general relationship. First, a mutually reinforcing relationship – or vicious circle – where the lack of political institutionalization breeds political gaps which civil society steps in to fill. In the face of unresponsive and/or weak parties, civil society creates alternative outlets for voicing demands, a process that furthers political instability because these demands are not channeled through the political system (Berman 1997, 411–416). Second, a strong texture of voluntary associations enables non-democratic parties to mobilize, with civil society emerging as the Trojan Horse that provides access to the citadel of power. The vibrant German civil society was, according to this perspective, what made it possible for the Nazi party to quickly mobilize a large part of German society and to spread its tentacles even into rural organizations (Berman 1997, 425). Likewise, it is argued that the short-lived Italian democracy was overwhelmed by a crisis brought about by a vibrant civil society that was not channeled by democratic parties and therefore left room for the mobilization of a fascist party that transcended politics (Riley 2010).

The revisionist perspective is inspired by Huntington's (1968) work on political order. Huntington (1968, 4) actually invokes Tocqueville (1988[1840], 517), who in *Democracy in America* pointed out that,

[a]mong the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of

associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.

Huntington (1968, 198) emphatically points to Weimer Germany as an instance where this formula was not fulfilled, with democratic breakdown as the predictable consequence. Huntington sees Weimar democracy as a “mass praetorian system”, characterized by weak political institutions facing a starkly mobilized society. The lack of autonomy of the political system means that it is unable to mediate and moderate group political action: “In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict” (Huntington 1968, 196). According to this argument, such a system is put in jeopardy by any increase in social mobilization, including via civil society.

If correct, the revisionist perspective implies that a vibrant civil society may trigger two different sets of mechanisms depending on the level of political institutionalization. On the one hand, it can produce the set of mechanisms that works to sustain democracy and to further democratic quality via the internal democratic schooling and external ability to balance the powers-that-be and enhance societal cooperation. On the other hand, it can produce the set of mechanisms which work to destabilize democracy by providing input that cannot be processed by the political system and by creating bridgeheads for undemocratic movements to mobilize. This conditional relationship is the second proposition we subject to a large-N empirical examination.³

To do so, it is first necessary to spell out what is meant by the relatively vague concept of political institutionalization. We have already hinted that parties play a pivotal role in the revisionist literature. Huntington (1968, 12–24) uses a number of criteria based on the structuralist functionalist conceptual apparatus of the 1950s and 1960s to unpack political institutionalization. But he also provides a simpler rendering, stressing that the core of the matter has to do with the existence of strong parties. Berman (1997, 402, 426) singles out “strong and responsive national government and political parties” – or, more generally, “strong and flexible institutions, particular political parties”. Ertman (1998, 495) points to a more contextual specification of the same variable, namely whether “parties and party competition stood at the center of political life before 1914”. Riley (2010) provides an even more specific sequencing argument, based on whether “hegemonic politics” antedate growth in civil society. By hegemonic politics, he means virtually the same as Huntington does with political

³ Notice that it differs from the claims made by several scholars about an independent effect of party institutionalization on democracy (see Randall & Svåsand 2002; Mainwaring 1998; Dix 1992).

institutionalization, i.e., the existence of strong autonomous parties (Riley 2010, 13–16). In the context of the interwar period, Riley’s argument therefore differs little from that of Ertman as the point is whether or not strong autonomous parties existed before the mass mobilization and associationalism unleashed by World War I.

Among the revisionist scholars, there is thus a general consensus that it is the institutionalization of parties that is the most relevant aspect of political institutionalization, albeit with disagreement about whether it is only the present degree of party institutionalization or also legacies of party institutionalization that matter. In what follows, we therefore understand political institutionalization as party institutionalization. In line with Bernhard et al. (2015, 6), we focus on the organizational routinization and understand institutionalized parties to be characterized by “strong, stable bases of support, robust party organizations, and party labels that are distinct and valuable to both voters and candidates.” We thus emphasize the parties’ organizational function (cf. Levitsky 1998, 88; Randall and Svåsand 2002, 12).⁴

Research Design and Data

Our analysis includes all interwar (1918–1939) country-years that qualify as democratic based on a minimalist definition of democracy (see below) and for which we have been able to collect data. We use two types of estimation techniques to test our two propositions. First, we employ survival analysis. For the survival analyses we use the cox proportional hazards model, which is a semi-parametric duration model. It is appropriate for our analyses because, contrary to parametric models such as the Weibull model, it leaves the form of duration dependency unspecified (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 49, 66–67). Thus, there is no assumption of a specific distribution of the baseline hazard rate. This is an advantage considering that in the social sciences “strong theoretical reasons to expect one distribution over another” are rare (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 48). The events or failures are democratic breakdowns among the democracies in the sample. Tied failures are handled using the Efron method (Cleves et al. 2010). Standard errors are adjusted for clusters (countries). Second, we run logistic

⁴ Following Randall and Svåsand (2002, 7), we argue that a distinction between party institutionalization and party system institutionalization is needed. When, for instance, Mainwaring & Scully (1995) identify four different dimensions of institutionalized party systems (i.e., regular patterns of inter-party competition, strong party roots in society, electoral and partisan legitimacy, and solid party organizations), they tend to conflate these concepts. This is all the more problematical because party system institutionalization and party institutionalization do not always converge. In other words, it is an empirical question whether and under what circumstances party institutionalization is conducive to party system institutionalization. Moreover, some features of party system institutionalization, for example inter-party competition, are also attributes of democracy. The examination of the impact of party system institutionalization on democracy therefore risks becoming tautological. We avoid this by only focusing on party institutionalization.

regression analyses. These analyses employ robust standard errors clustered on countries and cubic time polynomials (Carter and Signorino 2010). To be certain that the event occurs after the independent variables are measured, all the time-varying independent variables are lagged by one year in both types of models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 47-67, 110-2). Our results are robust to both types of estimation techniques and, overall, they produce very similar results.

Defining and Measuring Democracy

To demarcate the empirical scope of the investigation, we employ a minimalist definition of democracy that distinguishes cases with genuinely contested elections from autocracies (see Møller & Skaaning 2013; Przeworski et al. 2000; Schumpeter 1974[1942]). This definition is solely based on the existence of genuine multi-party competition for government power via recurrent elections, that is, it is shorn of considerations about the extent of the suffrage and the respect for civil (political) liberties (e.g., Dahl 1989). We base our operationalization on an updated version (LIED_v2) of the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015).⁵ More particularly, we employ the scores for the competitive elections variable, which is one of the indicators that constitute this index. A score of 1 corresponds to our minimalist conception of democracy as it signifies a situation of contested, multi-party elections for the legislature and (directly or indirectly) the executive, while 0 corresponds to a situation where one or more of these criteria are not fulfilled. We use this measure both for defining our sample, which only includes democracies, and to demarcate instances of democratic breakdown. Democratic breakdown is coded as 1 the year when there is a transition from democracy to autocracy (the first year of autocracy according to the indicator) and 0 otherwise. There are 27 democratic breakdowns in the period 1918–1939 according to this measure (henceforth Lexical). As a robustness test we run the models with Boix et al.'s (2013) binary indicator for democracy (henceforth BMR). The BMR is basically based on the same operational criteria as Lexical. The only substantial difference is that it adds a suffrage criterion (i.e., at least half of all adult males should have voting rights). Nonetheless, according to the BMR measure there are only 14 democratic breakdowns in the interwar period. (See Online Appendix 1 Table A1 for country-years, i.e., democratic spells, included in the samples.)

⁵ See <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/skaaning>. Besides providing a high level of concept-measure consistency, the coding of this indicator is based on a more careful consultation of relevant country-specific sources than the alternatives (see Møller & Skaaning 2015).

Main Independent Variables: Civil Society Strength and Party Institutionalization

One of the great constraints on cross-national research of political regimes in the interwar period has been a dearth of data. With the new data (version 5) from the V-Dem project we are able to measure civil society strength and party institutionalization in a fine-grained manner and with a comprehensive coverage of relevant country-years. The V-Dem data we employ are coded by country experts (generally academics with deep country-knowledge of one or more specific substantive areas). To minimize bias and to increase precision and cross-country equivalence, the data are generated based on the following procedure: Multiple, carefully selected country-experts (in most cases a minimum of five) code each country-year for every indicator. To increase the cross-country equivalence in measurement standards, many country experts carry out bridge coding (i.e., code more than one country for many years) and/or lateral coding (i.e., code additional countries but for one year only). The aggregation of all of these codings into point estimates for each indicator is based on Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling techniques that estimate latent scores based on the expert surveys. While the IRT model takes ordinal values as input, its output is an interval-level estimate of the given latent trait (e.g., strength of civil society) (see Coppedge et al. 2015a; Pemstein et al. 2015).

To measure the strength of the civil society, we use the V-Dem indicator for CSO participatory environment. This variable distinguishes between different levels of engagement, ranging from situations where there are hardly any independent associations with voluntary participation to situations where many diverse civil society organizations proliferate and where it is normal that people participate (for the exact wording of the question, see Online Appendix 2).

The civil society indicator does not concern the political orientation of these organizations and therefore registers many different types of civil society organizations. As noted above, it would bias our results if we only included pro-democratic organizations, as we are interested in the overall impact of civil society strength and not in the effects of specific types of organizations. In the V-Dem dataset, civil society organizations are defined as (see also Coppedge et al. 2015b, 398):

... interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions (Coppedge et al. 2015b, 229).

Figure 1 shows the trajectory of civil society strength for each one of the countries included in the sample. We can see that Germany receives a high score. This is what we would expect based both on some of the revisionist works and on other accounts of civil society strength in the interwar period. The high scores for Germany indicate, first, that coders have not only had pro-democratic civil society organizations in mind when scoring this indicator and, second, that coders have not assigned scores based on their knowledge of democratic developments (i.e., calculated backwards). Furthermore, the fact that the other relatively rich countries, such as the Northwest European countries, the Southern Cone countries in Latin America, and the former British settler colonies, tend to have higher scores than relatively less developed countries in Central America, the Andes, and the Balkans, indicates that our data indeed capture the relevant differences in civil society strength between countries (see Lipset 1959; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). More generally, the differences between the country scores presented in the overview are in line with what we would expect based on country-specific accounts, the distinctions made in comparative-historical studies (see, e.g., Ertman 1998; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), and dominant theories about the correlates of strong civil societies.

Figure 1. Civil society strength by country in the sample



Note: The figure shows the levels of civil society strength from the beginning of the first democratic spell in the country until the end of the last democratic spell during the period. Thus, in this figure the line is not interrupted when there is a breakdown within this period. Ecuador and El Salvador are included in the sample but these countries only have a democratic spell of one year, which is not visible in the figure. The figure is based on the sample from Table 1, Model 1.

While V-Dem only provides a single indicator on how vibrant civil society is, aspects of the level of party institutionalization are covered by a number of indicators, which are combined into the V-Dem party institutionalization index developed by Allen Hicken (see Online Appendix 2). The index scores consist of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis, including five different components: party organizations, party branches, party linkages, distinct party platforms, and legislative party cohesion. The party organizations indicator captures whether the parties in the political system have permanent organizations. Party branches capture whether the parties have permanent local branches. Party linkages indicate what type of linkages parties form with their constituents, ranging from clientelistic to programmatic. Distinct party platforms reflect whether parties have distinct platforms that are publicly circulated. Legislative party cohesion measures how important party discipline is in the legislature. As noted by Randall and Svåsand (2002) it is not clear how different components of party institutionalization relate to each other. In order to examine whether the associations are driven by certain components, we therefore also run the same models with each of the components separately.

Our main specification of party institutionalization measures levels in the interwar period, not levels in e.g. the period before World War I. This specification is chosen, first, because it captures the explanatory logic put forward by Huntington (1968) and Berman (1997), which solely focus on the contemporaneous interaction between civil society and party institutionalization, second, because the legacy of party institutionalization before World War I should also be reflected in the contemporary levels.

Figure 2. Party institutionalization by country in the sample



Note: The figure shows the levels of party institutionalization from the beginning of the first democratic spell in the country until the end of the last democratic spell during the period. Thus, in this figure the line is not interrupted when there is a breakdown within this period. Ecuador and El Salvador are included in the sample but only has a democratic spell of one year, which is not visible in the figure. All data on this variable is missing for Argentina for this period and therefore not included in this sample. The figure is based on Table A6, Model 1 in Online Appendix 1.

However, as a robustness test we also run iterations where a pre-World War I specification of the party institutionalization variable is used. This serves to assess the “legacies” or “sequential” arguments of Ertman (1998) and Riley (2010), which are based on whether a high level of party institutionalization predated a vibrant interwar civil society. Figure 2 shows the trajectory over time for party institutionalization for the countries included in the sample.

Control Variables

On the right-hand side of the model, we include a number of control variables that previous research has attributed importance in explaining democratic survival and breakdown. To control for the level of economic development, we include both economic growth and a logged version of GDP/capita. We primarily use data from the Maddison project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014) for these variables but we supplement this with data from various sources for countries and/or years that are missing in the

Maddison project.⁶ As a robustness test we also run the models with the untransformed original Maddison data (see Online Appendix 1 Table A22). Moreover, we include binary indicators for whether the country was a presidential democracy or not and whether the electoral system was proportional or not. For presidential system we primarily use Gerring and Thacker's (2008) classification of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems. We collapse the latter categories into a common category of non-parliamentarian. In case of missing data we use country specific sources to code them.⁷ For electoral system we primarily use data from Colomer (2004). Countries missing from this source are scored with data from Gerring and Thacker (2008) or with our own coding from country specific sources for a few countries.⁸ We include a measure of ethnic fractionalization from Bernhard et al. (2001).⁹ Further, as a robustness test we replace this coding of ethnic fractionalization with the Alesina et al. (2003) measure (see Online Appendix 1 Table A23). We also control for land inequality (cf. Moore 1966) using an interpolated version of Vanhanen's measure of family farms (Vanhanen 2003). Finally, since there may be trends and diffusion effects in when democracies break down we include a control that measures the mean level of democracy in the region each year according to the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy. We take the mean of democracy levels for all countries in each region for which this variable is available, which also include non-democracies excluded from our sample. For the models with the BMR measure, we construct a similar measure based on that indicator. (See Online Appendix 1 Table A2 for descriptive statistics of all variables.)

⁶ In order to increase to the scope of the study, we have supplemented these data with figures for Estonia after 1922 from Klesment (2010), for Bulgaria from Ivanov (2012), and for Bolivia from Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías (2015). For Estonia until 1922, Romania until 1925, Poland until 1928, Latvia, and Lithuania, we have used GDP/cap. estimates based on interpolation of figures from Bolt and van Zanden (2014), Aldcroft (2006), and Rosés and Wolf (2008). In the cases of Panama and the Dominican Republic, we have used GDP/cap. estimates based on data for Colombia and El Salvador, respectively, and comparisons of alternative modernization indicators (infant mortality rates and urbanization) from CLIO Infra (see <https://www.clio-infra.eu/>).

⁷ I.e., Romania, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Latvia, and Nicaragua. It should also be noted that on the basis of other sources (see, for example, Sartori 1997) we disagree with Gerring and Thacker (2008) and regard Finland as a semi-presidential rather than a parliamentary system.

⁸ I.e., Romania, Bulgaria, and Nicaragua are coded based on country specific sources. The specific sources used to code the formal political institutions are available upon request.

⁹ We have added figures of ethnic fractionalization for Romania and Yugoslavia from Eberhardt (2003). For those countries where figures on some years are missing in Bernhard et al. (2001) we replace missing data with the figure from the most recent year included in the Bernhard et al. (2001) data.

Empirical Analysis

In the first step of our analysis, we investigate whether a vibrant civil society decreased the likelihood of democratic breakdown in the interwar years. Table 1 reports the results from these analyses. Model 1 features a simple bivariate analysis, which indicates that civil society decreases the risk of democratic breakdown substantially and that this effect is statistically significant. The hazard ratio is 0.270, which indicates that the probability of democratic breakdown (Lexical) decreases with about 73% with every one-unit increase in civil society strength. The results are similar if we employ the BMR measure for democratic breakdown. In the bivariate analysis the probability of democratic breakdown decreases with about 83% with every one-unit increase in civil society strength (Table 1, model 5).

Models 2–4 and 6–8 add several control variables to the analyses. We see that the inclusion of these control variables does not change the result substantially, but that the hazard ratios vary between the models. Depending on the controls included, the risk of democratic breakdown decreases (Lexical) with between 51% and 70% with each one-unit increase in civil society strength. The results also hold with the BMR measure for democratic breakdown where the probability of democratic breakdown decreases with between 83% and 92% depending on the controls included. But it should be noted that the BMR models include less observations than the ones employing Lexical.¹⁰

The logit models likewise, both with Lexical and BMR, corroborate that civil society strength decreases the probability of democratic breakdown. The inclusion of controls does not change the results substantially (See Online Appendix 1 Table A3). Civil society strength thus consistently decreases the probability of democratic breakdown and the effect is significant in all models.¹¹

Table 1. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.270***	0.299***	0.494*	0.427*	0.169***	0.0802***	0.169**	0.0850*
	(0.0474)	(0.0553)	(0.159)	(0.144)	(0.0430)	(0.0407)	(0.110)	(0.0968)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.624	2.813	1.781		0.167	0.737	0.255
		(0.937)	(2.208)	(1.858)		(0.169)	(0.749)	(1.166)

¹⁰ The results do not change if we instead employ the original Maddison variables for GDP/capita and economic growth (see Online Appendix 1, Table A22, models 1–2) or if we replace the ethnic fractionalization measure with the Alesina et al. measure of ethnic fractionalization (See Online Appendix 1, Table A23 model 1 and 3).


¹¹ The logit results show that with the inclusion of controls the predicted probability of democratic breakdown (Lexical) is about 12% at the lowest level of civil society strength in the sample, about 1% at the mean level and about 0.5 at the highest level in the sample (based on Online Appendix 1 Table A3, model 4). With the BMR measure the logit results with the inclusion of controls show that the predicted probability of democratic breakdown is about 82% at the lowest level of civil society strength, only about 0.4% at the mean level and as low as 0.05 at the highest level of civil society strength in the sample (based on Online Appendix 1 Table A3, model 8). Predicted probabilities are calculated with margins in STATA.

Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.680	1.727	2.331				
		(0.164)	(0.518)	(1.426)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.0176***	0.0809*	0.0241
						(0.0215)	(0.0931)	(0.106)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0190***	0.00507*			0.100***	0.202
			(0.0168)	(0.0107)			(0.0564)	(0.297)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.011	1.005			0.940*	0.933
			(0.0293)	(0.0370)			(0.0264)	(0.0605)
Proportional _{t-1}				2.433				3.453
				(1.356)				(5.621)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.688				0.0429
				(1.015)				(0.250)
Family farms _{t-1}				1.007				1.000
				(0.0240)				(0.0705)
<i>Number of observations</i>	579	560	499	466	487	469	430	395
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	41	41	36	34	30	30	27	25
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	27	27	21	19	14	14	11	10
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.186	0.204	0.312	0.377	0.265	0.371	0.430	0.515
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-131.2	-127.5	-84.69	-68.85	-59.46	-50.54	-35.78	-27.64
AIC	264.4	261.0	179.4	153.7	120.9	107.1	81.55	71.28
BIC	268.7	274.0	200.4	186.8	125.1	119.5	101.9	103.1

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 3 shows the estimated survival function for democracies at different levels of civil society strength based on the Cox model. By dividing the sample in quartiles and taking the mean of civil society strength in each quartile we can clearly see how the rate of survival of democracies is considerable lower at lower scores of civil society strength than at higher scores in the sample. This is true for both measures of democratic breakdown.

Figure 3. Civil society and democratic breakdown, 1918–1939



Note: The figures show the estimated survival function at the mean values of civil society for each quartile in the sample. All other predictors are set at their mean. Analysis time is year. The figure to the left is based on Table 1, model 2 and the figure to the right is based on Table 1, Model 6.

Turning to the control variables we can see that it does not seem to matter for democratic breakdown whether the system is presidential or not, whether a country has a proportional system, its degree of ethnic fractionalization or land inequality as measured by the degree of family farms. These variables are not significant in any of these models (Table 1, models 2–4, 6–8). The degree of democracy in the region is not significant in most models, but where it is significant it shows the expected result, i.e., that a higher level of democracy in the region decreases the risk of democratic breakdown (Table 1, model 6–7). Similarly, GDP growth is only significant in one of the models and decreases the risk of democratic breakdown (Table 1, model 7). On the other hand, GDP/capita is significant in most models and decreases the probability of democratic breakdown (Table 1, models 3–4, 7).

In sum, these results corroborate the notion that – on average – civil society bolsters the chances of democratic survival and that the effect of civil society is substantial.¹² However, this finding does not rule out the potential presence of a conditional relationship. In the next step of our analysis we investigate whether the effects on democratic breakdown shown above are conditioned by party institutionalization.

We begin by assessing whether party institutionalization in itself decreases the risk of democratic breakdown. It does so in a bivariate model but as we include more controls in the model

¹² If we run the analyses on a sample only including Europe and the former British settler colonies, USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, the results are similar. Civil society strength is significantly related to democratic breakdown in seven out of the eight Cox models (See Online Appendix 1, Table A4). Similar models but with logit show the same results. Civil society strength is significantly related to democratic breakdown in six (at $p < 0.1$ seven) out of the eight Logit models (See Online Appendix 1, Table A5).

the effect of party institutionalization becomes insignificant (see Online Appendix 1, Table A6).¹³ Moreover, party institutionalization is only significant in a few (cox) models with control for civil society whereas civil society remains significant in all models (same models as in previous tables with the addition of a control for civil society) (see Online Appendix 1, Table A7). Party institutionalization is not significant in any of the logit models where we also control for civil society but civil society remains significant in all these models (see Online Appendix 1, Table A9).

Table 2 reports the results for the interaction between civil society and party institutionalization. The effect of civil society on democratic breakdown does not seem to be conditioned by party institutionalization.¹⁴ The interaction effect between civil society and party institutionalization is statistically insignificant in all models with the Lexical measure for democratic breakdown reported in Table 2 (Models 1–4). However, the models with the Boix et al. (2013) measure show a significant interaction term in some of the models but this effect becomes insignificant as we add more controls (Models 5–8). It should once again be noted that the BMR sample is considerable smaller than the one in the models using Lexical.

¹³ In Logit models with BMR, party institutionalization is significant also with the inclusion of further controls (See Online Appendix 1, Table A8).

¹⁴ The results do no change if we employ the original data Maddison data for GDP/capita and economic growth (see Online Appendix 1 Table A22, Models 3–4 and 7–8) or if the ethnic fractionalization measure is replaced by the Alesina et al. indicator of ethnic fractionalization (see Online Appendix 1 Table A23, Models 2 and 4).

Table 2. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.773 (0.687)	0.676 (0.595)	0.354 (0.366)	0.112* (0.122)	548.8** (1313.6)	47.12 (139.4)	5.553 (20.93)	64.65 (354.2)
Party institutionalization _{t-1}	0.0747 (0.118)	0.0595 (0.109)	2.979 (6.520)	12.79 (29.40)	5.500 (9.997)	0.142 (0.548)	0.0256 (0.244)	0.0305 (0.257)
Civil society _{t-1} *Party institutionalization _{t-1}	0.264 (0.320)	0.317 (0.374)	1.703 (2.296)	9.639 (13.52)	0.00000659** (0.0000263)	0.0000886* (0.000393)	0.00464 (0.0208)	0.0000117 (0.0000720)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.796 (0.621)	3.550 (3.479)	1.369 (1.635)		0.0742 (0.123)	0.156 (0.440)	0.108 (0.551)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.957 (0.282)	1.857 (0.595)	3.919** (1.931)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.177 (0.316)	0.0777 (0.313)	0.0313 (0.170)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.00752*** (0.00914)	0.000104*** (0.000229)			0.499 (1.149)	22.68 (64.33)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.015 (0.0330)	1.025 (0.0381)			0.935* (0.0259)	0.907 (0.0670)
Proportional _{t-1}				3.492* (1.906)				199.2*** (249.8)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.0837 (0.127)				0.00614 (0.0428)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.982 (0.0191)				1.081 (0.0695)
<i>Number of observations</i>	566	548	487	454	473	456	417	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	40	40	35	33	29	29	26	24
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	26	26	20	18	13	13	10	9
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.229	0.229	0.339	0.452	0.432	0.481	0.486	0.609
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-119.5	-118.8	-77.32	-57.27	-42.60	-38.69	-29.32	-20.04
AIC	245.1	247.5	168.6	134.5	91.21	87.38	72.64	60.08
BIC	258.1	269.0	198.0	175.7	103.7	108.0	100.9	99.54

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The results for the models with the Lexical measure are similar for the logit models (see Online Appendix 1, Table A10, Models 1–4). A first glance the models with the BMR data seems to indicate a significant interaction even after including relevant controls (see Online Appendix 1, Table A10, Models 5–8). However, to fully interpret the interaction effect we need to plot the marginal effects. Plotting the effects it becomes clear that it is only in the BMR-model with no controls included (model 5) that there is an effect. The models with controls included show no support for the interaction (See Online Appendix 1 Figure A1).

The main findings do not change substantially when we rerun the analysis with the separate components of the party institutionalization index. The interactions between each of the components of the index and civil society strength are insignificant for most components (Table 3). Logit models produce similar results (see Online Appendix 1, Table A11).

Table 3. Civil Society, Different Components of Party Institutionalization, and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.294* (0.158)	0.374* (0.157)	0.487 (0.216)	0.340 (0.212)	0.511 (0.240)	0.0810 (0.152)	0.0564 (0.142)	0.0426* (0.0583)	0.0940 (0.195)	0.00739** (0.0120)
Party organization _{t-1}	2.019 (1.191)					0.337 (0.332)				
Party branch _{t-1}		2.041 (0.809)					0.262 (0.329)			
Party linkage _{t-1}			0.790 (0.283)					1.634 (2.513)		
Party platform _{t-1}				1.268 (0.686)					0.730 (2.562)	
Party cohesion _{t-1}					0.869 (0.672)					0.0609 (0.125)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party organization _{t-1}	1.877* (0.478)					0.339 (0.678)				
Civil society _{t-1} * Party branch _{t-1}		1.230 (0.333)					0.227 (0.310)			
Civil society _{t-1} * Party linkage _{t-1}			0.965 (0.272)					0.560 (0.744)		
Civil society _{t-1} * Party platform _{t-1}				1.335 (0.657)					0.355 (0.390)	
Civil society _{t-1} * Party cohesion _{t-1}					0.886 (0.505)					6.349 (6.084)
Presidential system _{t-1}	1.396 (1.493)	1.597 (1.692)	0.967 (0.887)	1.184 (1.423)	0.815 (0.839)	0.0515 (0.256)	0.131 (0.624)	0.201 (1.622)	0.253 (1.095)	7.755 (19.86)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}	4.740*** (1.916)	3.604** (1.721)	3.698** (1.562)	3.465* (1.763)	3.970* (2.210)					
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.0130 (0.0535)	0.0128 (0.0682)	0.0492 (0.266)	0.0814 (0.345)	0.118 (0.194)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}	0.0000754*** (0.000167)	0.000172*** (0.000353)	0.00131** (0.00269)	0.000345** (0.000915)	0.000521** (0.00123)	6.380 (9.711)	62.38 (132.5)	0.673 (2.150)	3.235 (15.75)	8.622 (16.27)
Economic growth _{t-1}	1.032 (0.0375)	1.024 (0.0404)	1.011 (0.0415)	1.015 (0.0407)	1.020 (0.0364)	0.915** (0.0307)	0.871* (0.0597)	0.952 (0.106)	0.927 (0.0673)	0.853** (0.0515)

Proportional _{t-1}	2.710	3.772*	2.934	3.638	2.079	88.56**	1536.5**	30.48***	33.21*	123.3**
	(2.030)	(2.534)	(2.370)	(2.604)	(2.136)	(141.8)	(3432.4)	(23.03)	(55.30)	(216.8)
Fractionalization _{t-1}	0.114	0.118	0.464	0.205	0.183	0.0170	0.0123	0.00747	0.0342	19.46
	(0.183)	(0.187)	(0.894)	(0.365)	(0.371)	(0.0984)	(0.0693)	(0.0719)	(0.233)	(71.64)
Family farms _{t-1}	0.985	0.982	0.997	0.992	0.996	1.027	1.099	1.041	1.061	1.127
	(0.0187)	(0.0216)	(0.0178)	(0.0244)	(0.0236)	(0.0475)	(0.0741)	(0.0747)	(0.0858)	(0.0799)
<i>Number of observations</i>	454	454	454	454	451	382	382	382	382	382
<i>Number of countries</i>	33	33	33	33	33	24	24	24	24	24
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	18	18	18	18	17	9	9	9	9	9
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.456	0.447	0.433	0.435	0.430	0.603	0.631	0.578	0.586	0.617
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-56.81	-57.79	-59.25	-59.01	-56.03	-20.34	-18.90	-21.60	-21.20	-19.62
AIC	133.6	135.6	138.5	138.0	132.1	60.68	57.80	63.20	62.39	59.23
BIC	174.8	176.8	179.7	179.2	173.2	100.1	97.25	102.7	101.8	98.68

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

There is one exception to this pattern. For both the survival models and the logit models with the Lexical measure, the interaction with the component party organization seems to be significant (Table 3, Model 1 and Online Appendix 1, Table A11, model 1). We therefore proceed to plot the conditional marginal effects based on the logit model. The graph shows clearly that there is no significant interaction with party organization (see Online Appendix 1, Figure A2). Likewise, while the interaction with party cohesion seems to be significant in the logit model with BMR (see Online Appendix 1, Table A11, Model 10) when we plot the conditional marginal effects there is no such significant effect (see Online Appendix 1, Figure A3).

Neither the event history nor the logit results change substantially if we make the specification of party institutionalization more “historical” or “sequential”. Recall from the theoretical discussion that one current of the revisionist perspective has put forward the argument that it is not so much the contemporaneous levels of party institutionalization that influences the association between civil society and democratic survival as the legacy of prior party institutionalization (Ertman 1998) or whether such party institutionalization predated the growth in civil society (Riley 2010). However, iterations that capture this specification by measuring the pre-World War I level of party institutionalization do not show support for an interaction effect.¹

Finally, some would object that the revisionist thesis only concerns patterns of regime change in interwar Europe. Reducing the sample to European countries and the former British settler colonies (USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) does not change the result. Even with this reduced sample, there is no support for an interaction effect between civil society and party institutionalization on democratic breakdown (see Online Appendix 1 Tables A20–21).² In some models the interaction term seems to be significant but the plotted conditional marginal effects show clearly that the interaction is not significant in any of the models (see Online Appendix 1 Figure A4 and A5).

¹ We have run specifications where the party institutionalization variable is measured in 1905, 1910, 1913, and using an average for the period 1900-1913 (see Online Appendix Tables A12–A19). This appreciates Ertman (1998) legacies argument about the pre-World War I levels being essential and can also – in a more imperfect manner – be said to probe Riley’s (2010) sequential argument. The cox models with all controls and BMR with party institutionalization measured in the year 1910 and 1913 did not converge and are therefore not reported. STATA failed to produce robust standard errors for the logit model with all controls and BMR with party institutionalization measured in the year 1913 and therefore this model is not reported.

² STATA failed to produce robust standard errors for the Cox model with all controls and Lexical as dependent variable for the reduced sample. This model is therefore not reported.

Conclusions

An important debate, centred on the interwar period, concerns the effects of civil society on democratic breakdown. One line of scholarship argues that civil society directly stabilizes democracy; another that this relationship is conditional on the level of party institutionalization – and that high levels of associationalism is likely to undermine democracy in certain situations. So far, these competing claims have not been subjected to broader empirical assessments because prior scholarship has been hampered by a dearth of data.

Our analysis is thus the first to test these claims statistically based on a sample that includes all interwar spells of democracy (conceived in a minimalist, Schumpeterian sense), including non-European ones. To do so, we have enlisted new data from the V-Dem project that measures the strength of civil society and party institutionalization in all of these instances of interwar democracy. The analysis shows that, in this context, a vibrant civil society was generally positively associated with a lower probability of democratic breakdown, and that there is no evidence that the effect is moderated by the degree of party institutionalization. These results are robust both to using different methods (event history analysis and logistic regression, respectively), to introducing different sets of relevant control variables, and to using different specifications of the main outcome and explanatory variables.

The results indicate that scholars have been too quick to generalize from the German and Italian interwar experiences where the negative effects of civil society have been identified by in-depth qualitative studies. When only analyzing a few cases in-depth one might derive perfectly correct lessons about the causes of political developments in these countries, but out-of-sample generalizations might not be warranted, especially when the cases are not representative for the broader population (*in casu*, interwar democracies). Hence, the developments in Weimar Germany and Italy might simply be exceptions to a more general pattern. Qualitative scholars are normally aware of these limitations. But the debate about the interwar effects of civil society on democratic stability illustrate that the research community still has a tendency to generalize such case-specific insights insofar as they seem plausible. This is why it is so important to carry out more general empirical assessments.

To what extent can these findings travel to the present era? We can start by noting that the immediate aftermath of the breakdown of communism in 1989–91 produced a political opening similar to that of 1919–1921, i.e., a massive wave of democratization piggybacking on a democratic zeitgeist and an international order dominated by liberal democracies. Where the situation differs is that the multiple interwar crises (Overy 1994; Zimmermann 1988) have had no equivalent after 1989. In particular, the international order has remained conducive to democratization (see also Linz 1991). But

were this to change, we would expect the strength of civil society to once more appear as a significant safeguard of democracy. We are more hesitant as to whether a high level of political institutionalization would, even under the strain of crisis, be needed to channeling the input of vigorous civil societies in the contemporary era. At least, the interwar analysis does little to sustain this expectation.

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Online Appendix 1

Table A1. Country Years Included in the Sample

Country	Democratic spells in sample (Lexical)	Democratic breakdown (Lexical)	Democratic spells in sample (BMR)	Democratic breakdown (BMR)
Argentina	1918-1929	1930	1918-1930	1931
Australia	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Austria	1920-1932	1933	1920-1932	1933
Belgium	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Bolivia	1931-1933	1934		
Bulgaria	1919 & 1931-1933	1920 & 1934		
Canada	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Chile	1918-1923 & 1932-1939	1924	1918-1924 & 1934-1939	1925
Colombia			1937-1939	
Costa Rica	1919-1939			
Czechoslovakia	1920-1937		1919-1939	
Denmark	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Dominican Republic	1924-1926	1927		
Ecuador	1934	1935		
El Salvador	1930	1931		
Estonia	1919-1933	1934	1919-1933	1934
Finland	1919-1939		1918-1939	
France	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Germany	1919-1932	1933	1919-1932	1933
Greece	1926-1934	1935	1926-1935	1936
Honduras	1929-1933	1934		
Ireland	1921-1939		1922-1939	
Italy	1919-1921	1922	1919-1921	1922
Japan	1918-1931	1932		
Latvia	1920-1933	1934	1920-1933	1934
Lithuania	1920-1925	1926	1920-1925	1926
Netherlands	1918-1939		1918-1939	
New Zealand	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Nicaragua	1929-1935	1936		
Norway	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Panama	1932-1935	1936		
Peru	1918 & 1931-1932 & 1939	1919 & 1933		
Poland	1919-1925	1926	1919-1925	1926
Portugal			1918-1925	1926
Romania	1919 & 1928-1929	1920 & 1930		
South Africa	1918-1939			
Spain	1931-1935	1936	1931-1936	1937
Sweden	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Switzerland	1918-1939		1918-1939	

United Kingdom	1918-1939		1918-1939	
United States	1918-1939		1918-1939	
Uruguay	1918-1932 & 1938-1939	1933	1919-1933	1934
Yugoslavia	1920-1928	1929	1921-1928	1929

Note: The lists are based on the sample included in Table 1, Model 1 (Lexical) and Model 5 (BMR).

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations	Number of countries
Civil society _{t-1}	1.314724	1.139207	-2.297109	2.775694	579	41
Democracy (Lexical)	.9533679	.211032	0	1	579	41
Democratic breakdown (Lexical)	.0466321	.211032	0	1	579	41
Democracy (BMR)	.791019	.4069324	0	1	579	41
Democratic Breakdown (BMR)	.0138169	.1168315	0	1	579	41
Party institutionalization _{t-1}	.7497562	.2039506	.1036129	.9643804	566	40
Party organization _{t-1}	1.30353	.8576364	-1.410434	2.854919	566	40
Party branch _{t-1}	1.293266	1.064875	-2.09526	2.887708	566	40
Party linkage _{t-1}	1.299109	1.371534	-2.919729	3.196842	566	40
Party platform _{t-1}	1.571486	1.014817	-2.079118	2.840981	566	40
Party cohesion _{t-1}	.582339	1.013448	-1.976868	2.310991	563	40
Party institutionalization mean 1900–1913	.7003019	.2245608	.0634703	.9400966	484	34
Party institutionalization 1905	.6933001	.2396529	.0634703	.9400966	469	33
Party institutionalization 1910	.7249067	.2107754	.0634703	.9400966	484	34
Party institutionalization 1913	.7305724	.215859	.0634703	.9400966	484	34
Presidential system _{t-1}	.3357143	.4726618	0	1	560	41
Regional democracy (lexical) _{t-1}	4.006275	1.10303	0	5.190476	579	41
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}	.5788349	.3329281	0	.9	578	41
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}	8.019246	.5213858	6.677083	9.063672	568	41
Economic growth _{t-1}	1.387952	7.166434	-22.42546	26.63518	516	36
Proportional _{t-1}	.5892857	.4924033	0	1	560	41
Fractionalization _{t-1}	.2896203	.2503985	.0104582	.8945445	577	40
Family farms _{t-1}	38.73142	21.80558	1	84	506	37

Note: Based on the sample in Table 1, model 1.

Table A3. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown 1918–1939 (Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.491*** (0.0792)	0.522*** (0.0921)	0.628* (0.134)	0.489* (0.137)	0.337*** (0.0818)	0.150*** (0.0844)	0.217** (0.119)	0.130** (0.0888)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.364 (0.618)	1.652 (0.961)	1.631 (1.214)		0.107 (0.125)	0.265 (0.341)	0.272 (0.592)
Regional democracy (lexical) _{t-1}		0.827 (0.158)	1.161 (0.309)	1.636 (0.767)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.246 (0.320)	0.392 (0.550)	0.106 (0.266)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.105** (0.0912)	0.0477+ (0.0781)			0.824 (0.476)	1.641 (2.766)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.010 (0.0337)	1.009 (0.0401)			0.933 (0.0419)	0.911+ (0.0495)
Proportional _{t-1}				2.891 (1.871)				4.969 (6.780)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				7.094 (8.866)				0.0653 (0.197)
Family farms _{t-1}				1.013 (0.0183)				1.020 (0.0453)
t	1.294+ (0.181)	1.325+ (0.194)	1.261 (0.191)	1.512+ (0.351)	0.970 (0.478)	0.770 (0.396)	0.598 (0.314)	0.955 (0.747)
t ²	0.984+ (0.00912)	0.983+ (0.00956)	0.989 (0.00994)	0.978 (0.0156)	1.058 (0.0540)	1.106+ (0.0669)	1.118+ (0.0712)	1.061 (0.0877)
t ³	1.000 (0.000166)	1.000 (0.000174)	1.000 (0.000180)	1.000 (0.000271)	0.998 (0.00151)	0.996+ (0.00194)	0.996+ (0.00208)	0.998 (0.00242)
Constant	0.0469*** (0.0275)	0.0716** (0.0669)	413852.5* (2511981.3)	5215578.0 (56395391.2)	0.00768*** (0.00945)	0.0299** (0.0392)	0.220 (0.990)	0.000272 (0.00405)

<i>Number of observations</i>	579	560	499	466	487	469	430	395
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	41	41	36	34	30	30	27	25
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.160	0.170	0.219	0.286	0.317	0.389	0.396	0.460
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-91.69	-89.86	-68.01	-56.67	-43.39	-38.48	-30.94	-25.19
AIC	193.4	193.7	154.0	137.3	96.78	90.96	79.87	74.38
BIC	215.2	224.0	191.9	187.1	117.7	120.0	116.4	122.1

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown 1918–1939 (Only Settler Colonies and Europe)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.186*** (0.0476)	0.139*** (0.0596)	0.431* (0.152)	0.644 (0.342)	0.144*** (0.0383)	0.0864** (0.0702)	0.175* (0.155)	0.0233* (0.0426)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.183 (0.275)	2.364 (3.550)	1.176 (2.089)		0.124 (0.299)	0.219 (0.548)	0.0495 (0.318)
Regional democracy (lexical) _{t-1}		0.335** (0.131)	0.777 (0.459)	0.735 (0.388)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.0286 (0.0526)	0.445 (1.411)	0.339 (0.864)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0201** (0.0303)	0.00000324** (0.0000127)			0.0774*** (0.0600)	0.270 (0.471)
Economic growth _{t-1}			0.993 (0.0679)	0.992 (0.0521)			0.938 (0.0361)	0.865** (0.0473)
Proportional _{t-1}				17.49 (26.03)				45.43*** (26.63)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.00000745 (0.0000502)				0.00419 (0.0299)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.910*** (0.0225)				1.072* (0.0324)
<i>Number of observations</i>	933	429	387	356	849	428	389	357
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	31	27	24	23	29	26	23	22
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	18	14	10	9	13	11	8	7
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.236	0.357	0.413	0.713	0.282	0.373	0.433	0.626
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-90.56	-52.14	-33.76	-14.76	-60.24	-39.60	-25.91	-14.94
AIC	183.1	110.3	77.52	45.52	122.5	85.19	61.82	45.89
BIC	188.0	122.5	97.32	76.52	127.2	97.37	81.64	76.91

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown 1918–1939 (Only Settler Colonies and Europe, Logit models)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.354*** (0.104)	0.345*** (0.0936)	0.457** (0.124)	0.513 (0.238)	0.308*** (0.0886)	0.103* (0.119)	0.207 (0.179)	0.0212*** (0.00930)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.235 (0.271)	0.492 (0.561)	0.0569 (0.159)		0.0157 (0.0478)	0.0952 (0.259)	0.0463* (0.0708)
Regional democracy (lexical) _{t-1}		0.811 (0.216)	1.031 (0.539)	2.947 (1.889)				
Regional democracy (Boix) _{t-1}						1.469 (2.448)	1.337 (2.854)	13.24 (59.55)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.154 (0.255)	0.00000195 (0.0000151)			0.437 (0.412)	0.0507 (0.0869)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.022 (0.0968)	1.006 (0.0752)			0.901 (0.0708)	0.750* (0.0957)
Proportional _{t-1}				16.10 (26.52)				115.7** (180.1)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.0650 (0.244)				0.00207 (0.0105)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.928 (0.0731)				1.234*** (0.0722)
t	1.442* (0.252)	1.094 (0.506)	0.646 (0.517)	14.04 (37.75)	1.761 (0.633)	0.628 (0.340)	0.467 (0.248)	0.277 (0.436)
t ²	0.985* (0.00735)	1.036 (0.0598)	1.096 (0.110)	0.888 (0.176)	0.989 (0.0298)	1.167* (0.0868)	1.181** (0.0758)	1.251 (0.232)
t ³	1.000* (0.0000528)	0.998 (0.00183)	0.996 (0.00315)	1.001 (0.00451)	1.000 (0.000788)	0.994* (0.00253)	0.994** (0.00217)	0.992 (0.00577)
Constant	0.0189*** (0.0178)	0.0916* (0.111)	127055.0 (1422674.2)	1.13107e+37 (5.90943e+38)	0.00179*** (0.00249)	0.00860* (0.0198)	14.03 (81.75)	2071.8 (29310.4)

<i>Number of observations</i>	954	429	387	356	873	428	389	357
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	31	27	24	23	29	26	23	22
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.251	0.304	0.338	0.599	0.313	0.445	0.453	0.675
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-66.85	-42.94	-30.75	-16.83	-46.43	-28.39	-21.33	-11.20
AIC	143.7	99.89	79.51	57.67	102.9	70.77	60.67	46.40
BIC	168.0	128.3	115.1	104.2	126.7	99.19	96.34	92.94

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Party institutionalization _{t-1}	0.00653***	0.0170*	3.996	22.89	0.000518***	0.000145***	0.00384	0.00441
	(0.00975)	(0.0297)	(9.604)	(58.05)	(0.000747)	(0.000264)	(0.0144)	(0.0244)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.879	4.973	1.126		0.639	0.908	0.453
		(0.634)	(4.592)	(1.606)		(0.482)	(0.909)	(1.170)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.671	1.708	3.910*				
		(0.224)	(0.653)	(2.674)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.0469**	0.0800	0.143
						(0.0468)	(0.117)	(0.319)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.00352***	0.0000597***			0.0936*	0.102
			(0.00352)	(0.000109)			(0.108)	(0.204)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.010	1.019			0.908*	0.894*
			(0.0318)	(0.0317)			(0.0443)	(0.0439)
Proportional _{t-1}				2.502				3.601
				(1.851)				(5.981)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.0683				0.858
				(0.105)				(2.212)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.976				0.995
				(0.0244)				(0.0304)
<i>Number of observations</i>	566	548	487	454	473	456	417	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	40	40	35	33	29	29	26	24
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	26	26	20	18	13	13	10	9
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.123	0.131	0.308	0.403	0.167	0.234	0.341	0.376
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-135.8	-134.0	-80.90	-62.33	-62.52	-57.10	-37.54	-31.95
AIC	273.7	274.0	171.8	140.7	127.0	120.2	85.09	79.89
BIC	278.0	286.9	192.7	173.6	131.2	132.6	105.3	111.5

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A7. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown with Control for Civil Society, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Party institutionalization _{t-1}	0.0454*	0.0412	3.052	14.81	0.0589	0.000980*	0.000402	0.000808
	(0.0694)	(0.0766)	(6.845)	(36.50)	(0.125)	(0.00295)	(0.00305)	(0.00628)
Civil society _{t-1}	0.332***	0.325***	0.495*	0.492**	0.233***	0.0968***	0.129*	0.0308*
	(0.0772)	(0.0755)	(0.160)	(0.133)	(0.0849)	(0.0617)	(0.124)	(0.0436)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.719	3.510	1.652		0.0427*	0.0916	0.191
		(0.556)	(3.391)	(2.064)		(0.0620)	(0.221)	(0.698)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.898	1.857	3.738*				
		(0.260)	(0.588)	(2.069)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.0161**	0.0133	0.0128
						(0.0209)	(0.0416)	(0.0561)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.00872***	0.000282***			0.932	11.21
			(0.00958)	(0.000542)			(1.820)	(35.12)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.014	1.022			0.919***	0.887**
			(0.0337)	(0.0423)			(0.0134)	(0.0408)
Proportional _{t-1}				2.761				66.76***
				(1.650)				(82.82)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.153				0.133
				(0.222)				(0.578)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.990				1.059
				(0.0221)				(0.0430)
<i>Number of observations</i>	566	548	487	454	473	456	417	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	40	40	35	33	29	29	26	24
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	26	26	20	18	13	13	10	9
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.222	0.225	0.338	0.440	0.294	0.439	0.469	0.583
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-120.5	-119.5	-77.41	-58.49	-52.97	-41.83	-30.25	-21.34
AIC	245.0	246.9	166.8	135.0	109.9	91.67	72.50	60.68
BIC	253.7	264.1	192.0	172.0	118.3	108.2	96.70	96.19

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A8. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Party Institutionalization _{t-1}	0.0765 (0.106)	0.184 (0.255)	1.948 (3.961)	8.643 (19.51)	0.0399* (0.0583)	0.0212** (0.0296)	0.0207* (0.0405)	0.00111* (0.00361)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.173 (0.526)	2.006 (1.506)	1.165 (1.272)		0.589 (0.299)	0.660 (0.378)	0.417 (0.415)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.755 (0.126)	1.118 (0.314)	2.092 (0.940)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.575 (0.502)	0.722 (0.747)	0.135 (0.286)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0379** (0.0392)	0.00310*** (0.00416)			0.547 (0.685)	0.604 (0.852)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.006 (0.0348)	1.003 (0.0394)			0.912 (0.0553)	0.883 (0.0603)
Proportional _{t-1}				3.106 (2.506)				1.705 (1.989)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				1.967 (2.641)				0.613 (1.517)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.982 (0.0188)				1.031 (0.0356)
t	1.310 (0.215)	1.332 (0.212)	1.335 (0.207)	1.760* (0.496)	0.912 (0.543)	0.985 (0.600)	0.716 (0.483)	1.534 (1.206)
t ²	0.980 (0.0106)	0.979* (0.0106)	0.982 (0.0101)	0.964 (0.0194)	1.053 (0.0646)	1.044 (0.0637)	1.076 (0.0720)	0.998 (0.0791)
t ³	1.000 (0.000185)	1.000 (0.000188)	1.000 (0.000178)	1.001 (0.000341)	0.998 (0.00174)	0.998 (0.00169)	0.997 (0.00187)	0.999 (0.00222)
Constant	0.197* (0.143)	0.283 (0.261)	490166657.8** (3.19017e+09)	1.34338e+15*** (1.15326e+16)	0.101 (0.140)	0.213 (0.293)	37.79 (336.0)	27.20 (267.3)

<i>Number of observations</i>	566	548	487	454	473	456	417	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	40	40	35	33	29	29	26	24
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.131	0.139	0.220	0.303	0.247	0.261	0.325	0.384
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-91.67	-90.08	-65.11	-52.82	-44.81	-43.62	-31.84	-26.25
AIC	193.3	194.2	148.2	129.6	99.63	101.2	81.67	76.50
BIC	215.0	224.3	185.9	179.1	120.4	130.1	118.0	123.8

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown with Control for Civil Society (Logit), 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Party Institutionalization _{t-1}	0.201 (0.284)	0.272 (0.369)	2.699 (5.279)	31.67 (72.42)	2.328 (5.239)	0.567 (1.516)	0.0514 (0.217)	0.247 (1.092)
Civil Society _{t-1}	0.536*** (0.0954)	0.541*** (0.1000)	0.617* (0.143)	0.430* (0.149)	0.322** (0.121)	0.114** (0.0911)	0.168* (0.130)	0.0399** (0.0438)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.003 (0.461)	1.926 (1.449)	2.676 (3.475)		0.0419 (0.0678)	0.0707 (0.148)	0.111 (0.312)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.883 (0.165)	1.246 (0.355)	2.383 (1.200)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.326 (0.471)	0.304 (0.651)	0.195 (0.656)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0524** (0.0588)	0.00314*** (0.00428)			2.119 (2.819)	10.83 (38.97)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.012 (0.0359)	1.016 (0.0469)			0.929 (0.0454)	0.895 (0.0831)
Proportional _{t-1}				5.742** (3.826)				93.86 (230.1)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				6.739 (10.41)				0.104 (0.455)
Family farms _{t-1}				1.003 (0.0228)				1.058 (0.0550)
t	1.366* (0.209)	1.378* (0.214)	1.299 (0.195)	1.755* (0.499)	0.777 (0.419)	0.557 (0.340)	0.634 (0.625)	0.735 (1.118)

t ²	0.980*	0.980*	0.986	0.969	1.092	1.167*	1.147	1.148
	(0.00966)	(0.00999)	(0.0103)	(0.0199)	(0.0633)	(0.0838)	(0.107)	(0.186)
t ³	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001	0.996*	0.994*	0.995	0.995
	(0.000167)	(0.000176)	(0.000182)	(0.000339)	(0.00173)	(0.00225)	(0.00272)	(0.00487)
Constant	0.0988**	0.127	26880806.9*	4.72319e+13***	0.00626*	0.0477	0.000460	9.92e-13
	(0.0829)	(0.144)	(194745950.8)	(4.25226e+14)	(0.0132)	(0.0911)	(0.00411)	(2.85e-11)
<i>Number of observations</i>	566	548	487	454	473	456	417	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	40	40	35	33	29	29	26	24
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.181	0.184	0.244	0.364	0.347	0.438	0.448	0.558
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-86.43	-85.39	-63.07	-48.18	-38.86	-33.22	-26.03	-18.85
AIC	184.9	186.8	146.1	122.4	89.72	82.44	72.07	63.69
BIC	210.9	221.2	188.0	175.9	114.7	115.4	112.4	115.0

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A10. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil Society _{t-1}	1.069 (0.748)	1.018 (0.719)	0.629 (0.538)	0.158 (0.187)	20.32 (33.60)	25.25 (73.12)	37.83 (93.47)	2234.7* (8200.5)
Party Institutionalization _{t-1}	0.293 (0.404)	0.403 (0.513)	2.713 (4.989)	38.98 (95.52)	56.30 (144.5)	159.2 (771.5)	26.36 (164.5)	0.0000414 (0.000275)
Civil society _{t-1} *Party institutionalization _{t-1}	0.334 (0.337)	0.364 (0.368)	0.971 (1.112)	4.548 (6.770)	0.00147* (0.00409)	0.000186* (0.000794)	0.000109* (0.000439)	6.21e-09* (4.94e-08)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.108 (0.536)	1.928 (1.430)	2.592 (3.407)		0.0429 (0.0925)	0.0381 (0.114)	0.00465* (0.0113)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.928 (0.184)	1.247 (0.353)	2.482 (1.237)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						4.539 (9.479)	2.704 (7.198)	0.00855 (0.0270)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0527* (0.0637)	0.00133*** (0.00266)			2.342 (3.847)	33804.3 (212835.7)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.012 (0.0358)	1.020 (0.0452)			0.939 (0.0419)	0.850** (0.0507)
Proportional _{t-1}				6.801** (4.955)				1925.7* (6182.0)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				4.144 (6.931)				0.00751 (0.0395)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.998 (0.0220)				1.205* (0.106)

t	1.326 (0.204)	1.339 (0.211)	1.298 (0.193)	1.815* (0.493)	0.748 (0.426)	0.256* (0.170)	0.126+ (0.153)	0.129 (0.393)
t ²	0.982 (0.00977)	0.981 (0.0101)	0.986 (0.0103)	0.969 (0.0192)	1.103 (0.0715)	1.287** (0.116)	1.365* (0.204)	1.439 (0.559)
t ³	1.000 (0.000167)	1.000 (0.000177)	1.000 (0.000182)	1.001 (0.000328)	0.996 (0.00213)	0.991** (0.00302)	0.990* (0.00473)	0.988 (0.0121)
Constant	0.0957** (0.0785)	0.0972* (0.100)	25688764.1* (199993077.8)	1.77022e+16** (2.28586e+17)	0.00111* (0.00319)	0.00140 (0.00694)	0.000148 (0.00138)	7.87e-37 (3.87e-35)
<i>Number of observations</i>	566	548	487	454	473	456	417	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	40	40	35	33	29	29	26	24
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.186	0.188	0.244	0.370	0.407	0.491	0.506	0.657
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-85.89	-84.99	-63.07	-47.74	-35.31	-30.05	-23.32	-14.63
AIC	185.8	188.0	148.1	123.5	84.63	78.10	68.65	57.25
BIC	216.2	226.7	194.2	181.1	113.7	115.2	113.0	112.5

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A11. Civil Society, Different Components of Party Institutionalization, and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil Society _{t-1}	0.333*	0.369*	0.499	0.411	0.500*	0.103**	0.0678	0.00407**	0.000000162	0.00113***
	(0.147)	(0.185)	(0.188)	(0.262)	(0.161)	(0.0761)	(0.196)	(0.00838)	(0.00000167)	(0.00220)
Party organization _{t-1}	3.095					0.394				
	(1.963)					(0.505)				
Party branch _{t-1}		1.817					2.078			
		(0.710)					(4.951)			
Party linkage _{t-1}			0.895					88.08		
			(0.266)					(260.4)		
Party platform _{t-1}				1.468					0.0183	
				(0.875)					(0.0890)	
Party cohesion _{t-1}					0.673					0.0187
					(0.479)					(0.0382)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party organization _{t-1}	1.637*					0.312				
	(0.405)					(0.399)				
Civil society _{t-1} * Party branch _{t-1}		1.116					0.000844			
		(0.350)					(0.00365)			
Civil society _{t-1} * Party linkage _{t-1}			0.889					0.215		
			(0.187)					(0.202)		
Civil society _{t-1} * Party platform _{t-1}				0.912					5.49e-08	
				(0.302)					(0.000000532)	
Civil society _{t-1} * Party cohesion _{t-1}					0.856					9.096*
					(0.286)					(7.878)
Presidential system _{t-1}	2.986	2.035	1.368	2.097	0.961	0.0684	0.0000227*	0.0159**	2.42e-21	0.159
	(4.040)	(2.141)	(1.212)	(2.506)	(0.994)	(0.249)	(0.000109)	(0.0251)	(7.63e-20)	(0.539)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}	3.435*	2.395	2.601*	2.310	2.421*					
	(1.761)	(1.083)	(1.173)	(1.065)	(0.972)					
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.0421	0.0303	0.0122	3.46e-17	0.621
						(0.195)	(0.154)	(0.0327)	(8.58e-16)	(1.922)

Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}	0.000398***	0.00279**	0.0120***	0.0109**	0.0105***	29.69	359861.1	0.0591	8.96932e+24	3148.4
	(0.000865)	(0.00510)	(0.0159)	(0.0166)	(0.0141)	(99.55)	(2925375.1)	(0.281)	(3.58748e+26)	(14928.8)
Economic growth _{t-1}	1.025	1.017	1.009	1.009	1.011	0.882	0.872**	0.957	0.857*	0.842*
	(0.0432)	(0.0455)	(0.0453)	(0.0456)	(0.0455)	(0.0644)	(0.0381)	(0.0669)	(0.0618)	(0.0708)
Proportional _{t-1}	6.280*	6.142**	4.343*	4.844*	3.128	161.0*	58660.0*	191.9	2.63290e+14	2362.2*
	(4.499)	(4.222)	(2.922)	(3.519)	(2.604)	(394.3)	(288631.5)	(560.7)	(6.17301e+15)	(8772.1)
Fractionalization _{t-1}	10.78	5.339	11.21	7.829	10.63	0.0474	0.0000992	0.000000840*	5.52e-31	10.47
	(17.46)	(9.338)	(15.38)	(13.27)	(20.89)	(0.201)	(0.000468)	(0.00000504)	(2.42e-29)	(52.43)
Family farms _{t-1}	1.007	1.003	1.017	1.012	1.018	1.081*	1.209	1.085	2.000	1.178**
	(0.0260)	(0.0205)	(0.0158)	(0.0185)	(0.0187)	(0.0389)	(0.136)	(0.0577)	(0.854)	(0.0586)
t	1.959*	1.802*	1.688	1.687	1.717	0.395	0.0115	0.0761	0.00635	1.116
	(0.621)	(0.515)	(0.572)	(0.513)	(0.661)	(0.553)	(0.0588)	(0.206)	(0.0222)	(2.325)
t ²	0.966	0.968	0.972	0.971	0.971	1.216	2.133	1.466	4.847	1.252
	(0.0213)	(0.0204)	(0.0229)	(0.0205)	(0.0248)	(0.200)	(1.452)	(0.466)	(4.950)	(0.222)
t ³	1.001	1.001	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.993	0.974	0.987	0.942	0.990
	(0.000366)	(0.000352)	(0.000393)	(0.000347)	(0.000412)	(0.00498)	(0.0214)	(0.00962)	(0.0358)	(0.00498)
Constant	7.49602e+19**	6.23417e+14**	1.39018e+10**	3.50525e+10*	7.23523e+10**	3.34e-15	8.43e-48	1.78591e+09	9.93e-203	1.07e-39*
	(1.05543e+21)	(7.97275e+15)	(1.19792e+11)	(3.72460e+11)	(6.57552e+11)	(8.63e-14)	(5.63e-46)	(7.30905e+10)	(3.20e-200)	(4.67e-38)
<i>Number of observations</i>	454	454	454	454	451	382	382	382	382	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	33	33	33	33	33	24	24	24	24	24
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.388	0.360	0.351	0.352	0.338	0.578	0.711	0.606	0.764	0.615
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-46.37	-48.45	-49.16	-49.09	-47.96	-18.01	-12.32	-16.79	-10.08	-16.42
AIC	120.7	124.9	126.3	126.2	123.9	64.01	48.64	61.59	44.15	60.85
BIC	178.4	182.5	184.0	183.8	181.5	119.2	95.98	116.8	91.50	116.1

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A12. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (mean 1900–1913) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.613 (0.510)	0.706 (0.648)	0.558 (0.552)	0.463 (0.642)	25.71 (78.37)	0.0547 (0.384)	0.958 (11.37)	30777472.8 (317115821.7)
Party institutionalization mean 1900–1913	0.0992 (0.154)	0.399 (0.701)	8.132 (16.90)	41.42 (131.2)	0.420 (1.297)	0.000171 (0.000943)	0.000868 (0.00444)	8.38e-13** (7.57e-12)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization mean 1900–1913	0.285 (0.331)	0.237 (0.312)	0.687 (0.848)	1.358 (2.746)	0.000275 (0.00146)	1.033 (9.410)	0.0117 (0.205)	3.16e-22* (7.81e-21)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.954 (1.698)	5.213 (5.313)	1.957 (3.266)		0.0357 (0.0938)	0.112 (0.245)	0.0000108 (0.0000963)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.728 (0.242)	1.574 (0.516)	3.495 (2.336)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.00172 (0.00844)	0.00420 (0.0204)	9.15e-09* (7.73e-08)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.00588*** (0.00747)	0.000114*** (0.000269)			0.893 (0.773)	1.32913e+10* (1.23735e+11)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.027 (0.0358)	1.043 (0.0362)			0.908 (0.0590)	0.685*** (0.0669)
Proportional _{t-1}				1.873 (1.846)				2.04060e+10* (2.04413e+11)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.0767 (0.126)				8.61e-10 (1.45e-08)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.983 (0.0308)				1.217** (0.0781)
<i>Number of observations</i>	484	467	429	420	389	373	358	347
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	34	34	31	30	23	23	22	21
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	22	22	18	17	9	9	8	8

<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.244	0.253	0.390	0.464	0.470	0.599	0.651	0.817
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-97.52	-95.83	-63.34	-52.33	-27.11	-20.36	-15.76	-8.246
AIC	201.0	201.7	140.7	124.7	60.22	50.73	45.52	36.49
BIC	213.6	222.4	169.1	165.1	72.11	70.34	72.69	74.98

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A13. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1905) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.472 (0.374)	0.626 (0.530)	0.546 (0.501)	0.592 (0.752)	1.301 (2.018)	0.0214 (0.160)	0.446 (3.122)	0.0881 (0.226)
Party institutionalization 1905	0.138 (0.204)	0.625 (1.008)	11.96 (23.20)	86.10 (274.4)	0.202 (0.642)	0.000325 (0.00175)	0.00110 (0.00506)	0.000000113** (0.000000593)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization 1905	0.406 (0.447)	0.269 (0.333)	0.729 (0.817)	1.055 (1.976)	0.0249 (0.0706)	4.719 (45.41)	0.0378 (0.367)	0.00391 (0.0270)
Presidential system _{t-1}		2.410 (2.104)	5.462 (5.282)	1.970 (3.222)		0.0654 (0.140)	0.113 (0.227)	0.0710 (0.361)
Regional democracy _{t-1}		0.679 (0.231)	1.523 (0.510)	3.755* (2.503)		0.00216 (0.0104)	0.00360 (0.0143)	0.0000118 (0.0000919)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.00528*** (0.00666)	0.0000770*** (0.000176)			0.781 (0.608)	1506.1*** (3218.2)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.028 (0.0355)	1.048 (0.0365)			0.911* (0.0388)	0.856*** (0.0371)
Proportional _{t-1}				1.629 (1.581)				3818.4** (10062.7)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.0689 (0.111)				0.00802 (0.0799)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.978 (0.0305)				1.142*** (0.0341)
<i>Number of observations</i>	469	452	429	420	374	359	358	347

<i>Numbers of countries</i>	33	33	31	30	22	22	22	21
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	21	21	18	17	8	8	8	8
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.244	0.259	0.394	0.471	0.477	0.597	0.646	0.757
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-92.87	-90.45	-62.91	-51.64	-23.75	-18.17	-15.98	-10.95
AIC	191.7	190.9	139.8	123.3	53.51	46.33	45.96	41.89
BIC	204.2	211.5	168.3	163.7	65.28	65.75	73.12	80.38

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A14. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1910) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.796 (0.704)	0.695 (0.658)	0.742 (0.828)	0.493 (0.805)	1375.2 (7085.4)	0.462 (4.282)	230.1 (2748.9)
Party institutionalization 1910	0.0482 (0.0808)	0.0733 (0.179)	2.247 (6.427)	14.19 (52.24)	0.610 (1.941)	0.000306 (0.00212)	0.000869 (0.00346)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization 1910	0.196 (0.240)	0.238 (0.321)	0.376 (0.534)	0.963 (2.229)	0.000000670 (0.00000580)	0.0405 (0.513)	0.00000172 (0.0000320)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.071 (1.211)	4.136 (5.584)	2.253 (4.307)		0.0378 (0.0991)	0.0921 (0.157)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.816 (0.301)	1.696 (0.567)	3.072 (2.163)			
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.00576 (0.0325)	0.0128 (0.0483)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.00790*** (0.0105)	0.000241** (0.000624)			1.889 (2.208)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.024 (0.0352)	1.034 (0.0368)			0.887 (0.0702)
Proportional _{t-1}				2.243 (2.068)			
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.106 (0.200)			
Family farms _{t-1}				0.994 (0.0320)			

<i>Number of observations</i>	484	467	429	420	389	373	358
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	34	34	31	30	23	23	22
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	22	22	18	17	9	9	8
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.265	0.267	0.385	0.453	0.524	0.608	0.667
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-94.83	-94.02	-63.87	-53.42	-24.35	-19.90	-15.00
AIC	195.7	198.0	141.7	126.8	54.71	49.80	44.00
BIC	208.2	218.8	170.2	167.3	66.60	69.41	71.17

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A15. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1913) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.812 (0.714)	0.690 (0.649)	0.749 (0.842)	0.504 (0.822)	917.3 (3569.8)	2.634 (27.97)	348.1 (2500.7)
Party institutionalization 1913	0.0447 (0.0749)	0.0523 (0.134)	2.249 (6.591)	14.71 (55.00)	0.602 (1.802)	0.000925 (0.00764)	0.000518* (0.00197)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization 1913	0.190 (0.231)	0.238 (0.319)	0.369 (0.530)	0.929 (2.146)	0.00000155* (0.0000100)	0.00298 (0.0442)	0.00000112 (0.0000120)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.946 (1.123)	4.141 (5.684)	2.281 (4.405)		0.0362 (0.0957)	0.0646 (0.119)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.848 (0.323)	1.694 (0.569)	3.070 (2.173)			
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.0175 (0.114)	0.0198 (0.0637)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.00791*** (0.0107)	0.000239** (0.000620)			3.627 (3.997)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.024 (0.0353)	1.034 (0.0369)			0.895* (0.0505)
Proportional _{t-1}				2.239 (2.045)			
Fractionalization _{t-1}				0.107 (0.200)			
Family farms _{t-1}				0.994 (0.0320)			

<i>Number of observations</i>	484	467	429	420	389	373	358
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	34	34	31	30	23	23	22
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	22	22	18	17	9	9	8
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.269	0.271	0.385	0.453	0.541	0.620	0.682
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-94.27	-93.54	-63.87	-53.42	-23.47	-19.30	-14.34
AIC	194.5	197.1	141.7	126.8	52.95	48.60	42.69
BIC	207.1	217.8	170.2	167.3	64.84	68.21	69.85

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A16. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (mean 1900–1913) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.873	0.848	0.683	0.233	1.628	0.232	8.501	1.54189e+10
	(0.556)	(0.561)	(0.531)	(0.249)	(3.086)	(1.749)	(36.98)	(6.44295e+11)
Party institutionalization mean 1900–1913	0.346	0.640	7.101	64.70	1.599	0.523	0.0139	1.36e-80
	(0.474)	(0.889)	(19.90)	(220.2)	(5.055)	(4.587)	(0.0773)	(2.43e-78)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization mean 1900–1913	0.414	0.462	0.712	3.512	0.0690	0.319	0.000429	4.23e-70
	(0.409)	(0.490)	(0.792)	(5.315)	(0.236)	(3.212)	(0.00334)	(9.85e-68)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.289	2.945	2.928		0.0367	0.000882**	3.80e-81
		(0.760)	(3.413)	(4.508)		(0.0741)	(0.00229)	(1.02e-78)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.846	1.223	2.472				
		(0.175)	(0.379)	(1.392)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.277	0.236	6.05e-113
						(1.872)	(0.655)	(1.97e-110)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0317*	0.000974*			41.05***	3.11302e+25
			(0.0547)	(0.00287)			(45.73)	(2.34657e+27)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.025	1.040			0.918	0.596
			(0.0377)	(0.0442)			(0.0413)	(0.451)
Proportional _{t-1}				5.327*				3.34305e+55
				(4.514)				(5.99229e+57)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				6.452				4.43e-24

				(13.62)				(3.91e-22)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.997				77.39
				(0.0337)				(433.5)
t	1.214	1.241	1.242	1.917*	0.621	0.361	0.204	0.000000163
	(0.188)	(0.201)	(0.206)	(0.536)	(0.382)	(0.480)	(0.383)	(0.00000441)
t ²	0.985	0.984	0.989	0.965	1.110	1.215	1.402	121.6
	(0.0111)	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.0203)	(0.0833)	(0.166)	(0.349)	(900.9)
t ³	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001	0.996	0.993	0.987	0.831
	(0.000196)	(0.000208)	(0.000211)	(0.000341)	(0.00233)	(0.00418)	(0.00814)	(0.234)
Constant	0.114**	0.119	579754280.7	1.54630e+17*	0.0145	0.176	9.66e-13***	1.83e-177
	(0.0876)	(0.134)	(6.23692e+09)	(3.05931e+18)	(0.0320)	(0.882)	(7.99e-12)	(1.01e-174)
<i>Number of observations</i>	484	467	429	420	389	373	358	347
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	34	34	31	30	23	23	22	21
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.198	0.203	0.286	0.391	0.406	0.509	0.590	0.815
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-71.80	-70.72	-53.32	-43.33	-25.40	-20.84	-15.70	-7.046
AIC	157.6	159.4	128.6	114.7	64.81	59.67	53.41	30.09
BIC	186.9	196.8	173.3	171.2	92.55	94.96	96.09	60.89

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A17. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1905) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.665	0.652	0.612	0.297	0.592	0.760	2.150	14.95
	(0.367)	(0.375)	(0.410)	(0.270)	(0.750)	(2.654)	(4.527)	(390.9)
Party institutionalization 1905	0.431	0.841	9.308	158.9	1.720	0.708	0.0137	4.52e-33
	(0.556)	(1.086)	(24.69)	(496.0)	(4.902)	(3.950)	(0.0692)	(2.68e-31)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization mean 1905	0.610	0.671	0.881	2.879	0.310	0.0607	0.00378	1.41e-26
	(0.519)	(0.621)	(0.870)	(3.892)	(0.750)	(0.307)	(0.0149)	(1.35e-24)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.320	3.153	3.136		0.0160***	0.00107***	5.02e-35
		(0.813)	(3.492)	(4.625)		(0.0195)	(0.00222)	(5.02e-33)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.800	1.219	2.839				
		(0.178)	(0.375)	(1.686)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.349	0.163	2.08e-45
						(1.202)	(0.397)	(2.26e-43)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0267*	0.000497**			34.38***	1.27981e+17
			(0.0469)	(0.00134)			(34.09)	(3.89953e+18)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.027	1.043			0.921	0.741
			(0.0374)	(0.0436)			(0.0406)	(0.214)
Proportional _{t-1}				5.206*				2.77276e+24
				(4.262)				(1.76890e+26)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				7.743				5.68e-18

				(17.65)				(1.90e-16)
Family farms _{t-1}				0.992				4.787
				(0.0366)				(9.180)
t	1.185	1.212	1.245	2.072*	0.606	0.325	0.242	0.000233
	(0.197)	(0.213)	(0.208)	(0.668)	(0.435)	(0.379)	(0.350)	(0.00239)
t ²	0.986	0.985	0.989	0.960	1.109	1.249	1.375	10.59
	(0.0125)	(0.0134)	(0.0123)	(0.0223)	(0.0939)	(0.176)	(0.260)	(29.27)
t ³	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001	0.996	0.992	0.988	0.913
	(0.000223)	(0.000239)	(0.000209)	(0.000369)	(0.00257)	(0.00452)	(0.00619)	(0.0966)
Constant	0.113**	0.136	1.70228e+09	8.26324e+18*	0.0155*	0.209	2.70e-12***	1.12e-125
	(0.0842)	(0.157)	(1.87484e+10)	(1.51473e+20)	(0.0295)	(0.632)	(1.96e-11)	(2.53e-123)
<i>Number of observations</i>	469	452	429	420	374	359	358	347
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	33	33	31	30	22	22	22	21
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.209	0.217	0.289	0.405	0.410	0.516	0.583	0.782
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-67.83	-66.56	-53.08	-42.37	-22.81	-18.56	-15.96	-8.304
AIC	149.7	151.1	128.2	112.7	59.62	55.12	53.92	34.61
BIC	178.7	188.1	172.8	169.3	87.09	90.07	96.61	69.25

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A18. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1910) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	1.156	1.090	0.988	0.341	7.494	0.514	20.19
	(0.856)	(0.830)	(0.930)	(0.500)	(20.19)	(3.899)	(75.87)
Party institutionalization 1910	0.225	0.335	2.967	7.922	1.609	1.024	0.0228
	(0.349)	(0.528)	(8.281)	(28.00)	(5.491)	(10.03)	(0.113)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization mean 1910	0.266	0.304	0.382	1.470	0.00648	0.100	0.0000867
	(0.300)	(0.365)	(0.511)	(2.939)	(0.0303)	(1.024)	(0.000610)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.110	2.455	2.662		0.0394	0.000292*
		(0.667)	(2.896)	(4.508)		(0.0707)	(0.000960)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.886	1.275	1.999			
		(0.178)	(0.406)	(1.052)			
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.478	0.413
						(3.309)	(0.881)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0469*	0.00492*			65.18**
			(0.0675)	(0.0133)			(89.54)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.023	1.031			0.920*
			(0.0373)	(0.0439)			(0.0376)
Proportional _{t-1}				4.821			
				(4.069)			
Fractionalization _{t-1}				6.672			

				(14.82)			
Family farms _{t-1}				1.011			
				(0.0278)			
t	1.206	1.225	1.229	1.674	0.650	0.337	0.144
	(0.190)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.469)	(0.364)	(0.456)	(0.265)
t ²	0.987	0.986	0.988	0.972	1.100	1.223	1.489
	(0.0112)	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0211)	(0.0734)	(0.178)	(0.389)
t ³	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.997	0.993	0.985
	(0.000197)	(0.000210)	(0.000218)	(0.000357)	(0.00205)	(0.00454)	(0.00871)
Constant	0.144*	0.162	55000393.0*	6.59103e+12	0.0171	0.118	2.27e-14**
	(0.117)	(0.185)	(491734027.1)	(1.19762e+14)	(0.0393)	(0.706)	(2.31e-13)
<i>Number of observations</i>	484	467	429	420	389	373	358
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	34	34	31	30	23	23	22
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.208	0.210	0.282	0.369	0.420	0.511	0.605
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-70.92	-70.09	-53.61	-44.91	-24.81	-20.74	-15.15
AIC	155.8	158.2	129.2	117.8	63.62	59.48	52.30
BIC	185.1	195.5	173.9	174.4	91.37	94.77	94.98

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table A19. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1913) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	1.158 (0.819)	1.085 (0.785)	0.990 (0.923)	0.352 (0.513)	8.036 (22.21)	0.606 (4.273)	15.01 (49.84)
Party institutionalization 1913	0.214 (0.325)	0.291 (0.453)	2.869 (8.120)	7.932 (28.46)	1.517 (5.155)	1.212 (11.97)	0.0121 (0.0625)
Civil society _{t-1} * Party institutionalization mean 1913	0.265 (0.286)	0.304 (0.348)	0.380 (0.501)	1.391 (2.737)	0.00583 (0.0279)	0.0812 (0.762)	0.000128 (0.000810)
Presidential system _{t-1}		1.058 (0.643)	2.433 (2.903)	2.686 (4.601)		0.0397* (0.0652)	0.000134* (0.000463)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.899 (0.180)	1.276 (0.407)	1.999 (1.060)			
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						0.570 (3.950)	0.407 (0.828)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0475* (0.0689)	0.00494 (0.0135)			110.8** (166.6)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.023 (0.0373)	1.031 (0.0440)			0.924* (0.0346)
Proportional _{t-1}				4.795 (4.017)			

Fractionalization $t-1$				6.734			
				(15.01)			
Family farms $t-1$				1.012			
				(0.0278)			
t	1.208	1.226	1.228	1.672	0.662	0.332	0.140
	(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.468)	(0.363)	(0.456)	(0.256)
t ²	0.987	0.986	0.988	0.972	1.097	1.224	1.516
	(0.0112)	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0212)	(0.0714)	(0.184)	(0.396)
t ³	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.997	0.993	0.985
	(0.000197)	(0.000210)	(0.000218)	(0.000357)	(0.00200)	(0.00477)	(0.00874)
Constant	0.145*	0.168	51736668.1*	6.34850e+12	0.0175	0.103	4.20e-16**
	(0.110)	(0.188)	(466803597.6)	(1.16284e+14)	(0.0403)	(0.636)	(4.67e-15)
<i>Number of observations</i>	484	467	429	420	389	373	358
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	34	34	31	30	23	23	22
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.210	0.212	0.282	0.369	0.422	0.512	0.612
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-70.69	-69.91	-53.61	-44.92	-24.75	-20.68	-14.86
AIC	155.4	157.8	129.2	117.8	63.49	59.36	51.73
BIC	184.7	195.1	173.9	174.4	91.24	94.66	94.41

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A20. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Reduced sample Europe and Settler Colonies)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	8.851	12.24	0.828	3.942	66.36	5.953	6984752.8*
	(13.06)	(24.52)	(2.862)	(8.986)	(204.9)	(22.42)	(48054697.3)
Party institutionalization _{t-1}	314.9*	0.00225	0.00000144	80.07	0.0803	0.0334	1.13032e+11**
	(877.7)	(0.0120)	(0.0000139)	(344.0)	(0.564)	(0.363)	(1.09445e+12)
Civil society _{t-1} *Party institutionalization _{t-1}	0.00220**	0.00148*	0.373	0.00565	0.0000569*	0.00498	2.61e-14**
	(0.00499)	(0.00470)	(2.119)	(0.0199)	(0.000274)	(0.0230)	(2.52e-13)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.203	0.618		0.0458	0.121	0.0159
		(0.365)	(0.914)		(0.190)	(0.534)	(0.121)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		0.506	1.070				
		(0.378)	(0.930)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}					0.499	0.158	0.000000489**
					(1.387)	(0.531)	(0.00000250)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.0575			0.527	0.00703
			(0.116)			(1.210)	(0.0303)
Economic growth _{t-1}			0.980			0.939*	0.796**
			(0.0796)			(0.0244)	(0.0657)
Proportional _{t-1}							643.8***
							(583.3)
Fractionalization _{t-1}							2.70e-14*
							(3.72e-13)

Family farms _{t-1}							1.113
							(0.0612)
<i>Number of observations</i>	932	429	387	849	428	389	357
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	31	27	24	29	26	23	22
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	18	14	10	13	11	8	7
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.283	0.470	0.514	0.319	0.491	0.479	0.680
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-84.98	-42.99	-27.92	-57.17	-32.13	-23.84	-12.79
AIC	176.0	95.99	69.85	120.3	74.26	61.67	45.58
BIC	190.5	116.3	97.56	134.6	94.55	89.42	84.36

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A21. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Reduced sample Europe and Settler Colonies) (Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil Society _{t-1}	5.289	8.449+	6.144*	105578592.5**	3.077	56.21	24.32	24.87
	(6.911)	(9.209)	(5.411)	(755349143.3)	(4.404)	(161.7)	(73.03)	(58.33)
Party Institutionalization _{t-1}	56.77+	0.171	0.0613	0.00200	66.44	9.536	8.171	0.000103
	(132.6)	(0.546)	(0.140)	(0.0136)	(170.4)	(52.43)	(85.11)	(0.000946)
Civil society _{t-1} *Party institutionalization _{t-1}	0.0144*	0.00607*	0.0173**	2.00e-13**	0.0221	0.0000462	0.000333	0.0000216**
	(0.0275)	(0.0121)	(0.0258)	(2.24e-12)	(0.0479)	(0.000279)	(0.00156)	(0.0000767)
Presidential system _{t-1}		0.221	0.391	0.0151		0.00560	0.0415	0.0112**
		(0.342)	(0.510)	(0.0405)		(0.0312)	(0.213)	(0.0156)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}		1.100	1.381	1.323				
		(0.365)	(0.875)	(0.879)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}						63.85	3.896	9.628
						(223.9)	(6.337)	(68.04)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}			0.226	0.0000223			1.548	6.636
			(0.428)	(0.000126)			(3.308)	(16.62)
Economic growth _{t-1}			1.019	1.017			0.915	0.731
			(0.0976)	(0.111)			(0.0856)	(0.149)
Proportional _{t-1}				101.9				197.1***
				(289.4)				(252.1)
Fractionalization _{t-1}				6.91e-09*				0.00196
				(6.00e-08)				(0.0103)

Family farms _{t-1}				0.897				1.319***
				(0.0595)				(0.0742)
t	1.435*	0.731	0.541	10.02	1.894	0.291	0.182	0.372
	(0.248)	(0.433)	(0.477)	(14.50)	(1.098)	(0.226)	(0.323)	(0.952)
t ²	0.985*	1.087	1.121	0.998	0.987	1.286*	1.318	1.213
	(0.00726)	(0.0792)	(0.123)	(0.108)	(0.0433)	(0.165)	(0.242)	(0.333)
t ³	1.000*	0.997	0.996	0.997	1.000	0.991*	0.990	0.993
	(0.0000519)	(0.00235)	(0.00346)	(0.00323)	(0.00110)	(0.00444)	(0.00552)	(0.00790)
Constant	0.00185***	0.229	22097.9	8.38885e+33	0.000111*	0.00142*	0.00235	9.72e-12
	(0.00348)	(0.447)	(280436.6)	(3.60069e+35)	(0.000423)	(0.00411)	(0.0326)	(1.29e-10)
<i>Number of observations</i>	953	429	387	356	873	428	389	357
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	31	27	24	23	29	26	23	22
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.281	0.356	0.383	0.682	0.336	0.503	0.505	0.699
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-64.17	-39.70	-28.64	-13.35	-44.91	-25.43	-19.30	-10.36
AIC	142.3	97.40	79.28	54.71	103.8	68.86	60.59	48.71
BIC	176.4	134.0	122.8	109.0	137.2	105.4	104.2	103.0

Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A22. Tables 1 and 2 with Original Maddison, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.413*	0.362**	0.239	0.102	0.125**	0.0850*	0.265	64.65
	(0.145)	(0.133)	(0.280)	(0.135)	(0.0869)	(0.0968)	(1.027)	(354.2)
Party institutionalization _{t-1}			5.194	19.02			0.0361	0.0305
			(12.28)	(47.64)			(0.332)	(0.257)
Civil society _{t-1} *Party institutionalization _{t-1}			2.322	8.927			0.246	0.0000117
			(3.509)	(14.94)			(1.056)	(0.0000720)
Presidential system _{t-1}	3.030	1.921	4.115	1.587	0.770	0.255	0.200	0.108
	(2.517)	(1.927)	(4.491)	(1.868)	(0.952)	(1.166)	(0.552)	(0.551)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}	1.886*	2.289	2.166*	4.085**				
	(0.607)	(1.427)	(0.692)	(2.137)				
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}					0.0825	0.0241	0.0591	0.0313
					(0.122)	(0.106)	(0.253)	(0.170)
Log(GDP/capita) (Maddison) _{t-1}	0.0213***	0.0112*	0.00560***	0.000213***	0.131***	0.202	0.420	22.68
	(0.0204)	(0.0196)	(0.00764)	(0.000456)	(0.0711)	(0.297)	(0.918)	(64.33)
Economic growth (Maddison) _{t-1}	0.982	0.972	0.983	0.984	0.927**	0.933	0.921***	0.907
	(0.0280)	(0.0333)	(0.0350)	(0.0458)	(0.0258)	(0.0605)	(0.0227)	(0.0670)
Proportional _{t-1}		2.945		4.153*		3.453		199.2***
		(1.803)		(2.409)		(5.621)		(249.8)
Fractionalization _{t-1}		1.041		0.134		0.0429		0.00614

		(1.210)		(0.179)		(0.250)		(0.0428)
Family farms _{t-1}		1.008		0.984		1.000		1.081
		(0.0245)		(0.0200)		(0.0705)		(0.0695)
<i>Number of observations</i>	482	460	470	448	419	395	406	382
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	34	33	33	32	26	25	25	24
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	18	17	17	16	10	10	9	9
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.339	0.378	0.377	0.457	0.486	0.515	0.513	0.609
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-69.25	-61.16	-61.56	-50.10	-29.30	-27.64	-24.97	-20.04
AIC	148.5	138.3	137.1	120.2	68.59	71.28	63.93	60.08
BIC	169.4	171.4	166.2	161.2	88.78	103.1	91.98	99.54

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.


Table A23. Tables 1 and 2 with Alesina Ethnic Fractionalization, 1918–1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Lexical	Lexical	BMR	BMR
Civil society _{t-1}	0.469*	0.124	0.0908*	68619977.1
	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.0993)	(1.79896e+09)
Party institutionalization _{t-1}		3.932		5442.1
		(8.648)		(122571.5)
Civil society _{t-1} *Party institutionalization _{t-1}		8.770		3.12e-15
		(12.80)		(1.36e-13)
Presidential system _{t-1}	2.090	1.578	0.639	0.00710
	(2.097)	(1.969)	(2.221)	(0.0687)
Regional democracy (Lexical) _{t-1}	2.282	3.611*		
	(1.342)	(1.804)		
Regional democracy (BMR) _{t-1}			0.0720	0.231
			(0.178)	(0.966)
Log(GDP/capita) _{t-1}	0.00288**	0.0000931***	0.264	2.271
	(0.00631)	(0.000182)	(0.322)	(8.575)
Economic growth _{t-1}	1.011	1.026	0.925	0.915
	(0.0334)	(0.0328)	(0.0391)	(0.0537)
Proportional _{t-1}	1.871	2.886	3.892	146.6**
	(1.130)	(1.734)	(6.157)	(281.8)
Fractionalization (Alesina) _{t-1}	0.434	0.0653	0.265	3.85e-08
	(0.671)	(0.105)	(1.230)	(0.00000110)
Family farms _{t-1}	1.011	0.992	1.015	1.152
	(0.0232)	(0.0207)	(0.0442)	(0.121)
<i>Number of observations</i>	468	456	399	386
<i>Numbers of countries</i>	35	34	26	25
<i>Number of failures (democratic breakdown)</i>	20	19	10	9
<i>Pseudo R squared</i>	0.376	0.442	0.505	0.626
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-72.72	-61.63	-28.20	-19.15
AIC	161.4	143.3	72.40	58.29
BIC	194.6	184.5	104.3	97.85

Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.


Figures

Figure A1. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1)




Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (BMR) at different levels of Party Institutionalization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A2. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1)




Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (Lexical) at different levels of party organization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A3. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1)




Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (BMR) at different levels of party cohesion when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A4. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1) (Reduced Sample)



Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (Lexical) at different levels of party institutionalization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A5. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1) (Reduced Sample)



Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (BMR) at different levels of party institutionalization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.

Online Appendix 2.

Civil Society Strength: CSO Participatory Environment (V-Dem Codebook 5.5, p. 232)

12.6 CSO participatory environment (C) (v2csprtcpt, *_osp, *_ord)

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Responses:

0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.

1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.

2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.

3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Party Institutionalization: Party Institutionalization Index (V-Dem Codebook v.5.5, p. 60)

2.18 Party system institutionalization index (D) (v2xps_party)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

Clarifications: Party system institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system. This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, i.e., those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages (v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

The Components of Party Institutionalization (V-Dem Codebook v.5.5 pp. 120–123)

4.6 Party organizations (C) (v2psorgs, *_osp, *_ord) (pp. 120–121)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

Clarification: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

Responses:

0: No parties.

1: Fewer than half of the parties.

2: About half of the parties.

3: More than half of the parties.

4: All parties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net). 121

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

4.7 Party branches (C) (v2psprbrch, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 121)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

Responses:

0: None.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

4.8 Party linkages (C) (v2psprlnks, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 121)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

Clarification: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that the party offers in exchange

for political support and participation in party activities.

Responses:

0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.

1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.

2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.

3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.

4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

4.9 Distinct party platforms (C) (v2psplats, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 122)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

Clarification: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

Responses:

0: None, or nearly none.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All, or nearly all.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

4.11 Legislative party cohesion (C) (v2pscohesv, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 123)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

Responses:

0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.

1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.

2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.

3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.